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Introduction 
 
He who knows only one country only knows none. 
(Sartori 1994:16) 
 
The articles in this special issue collection were presented at the ‘Small Islands, 
Big Issues’ conference that was held at University College Dublin in September 
2011. The conference is the first multi-disciplinary academic symposium devoted 
to comparative studies relating to Taiwan and Ireland, and to their respective area 
studies. The project resulted from a developing interest in recent years in finding 
ways to make theoretically useful comparisons between Taiwan and Ireland, and 
the discourses that have come to characterize the study of each place. 
   It may be thought that the comparison is suggested by situation: both Taiwan 
and Ireland are small islands adjacent to powerful neighbours with whom they 
have had complex histories. In both locations we can see histories, politics, and 
cultures marked by contested subjectivities and identities, as well as struggles over 
democracy and human rights. A focus on the human situation in both places 
invites the application of discursive categories such as colonialism and post-
colonialism; globalization and localization; and nationalism and hybridity. It also 
allows explorations of the goals, problems, and limits of sovereignty and 
independence in the context of sub-ethnic and religious divisions, as well as of the 
complex relations with a nearby metropolitan ‘Other’ and of diaspora experiences 
in the era of post-national globalization. At the same time both contexts challenge 
the straightforward appropriation of such categories and demand their 
sophisticated reworking. However, Ireland and Taiwan are neither internally 
homogeneous, nor are they similar to each other. Indeed, they are strikingly 
distinctive in their political, institutional, and intellectual histories. The romance of 
comparison sits in tension with the difficulty of finding a secure and satisfactory 
place from which to make it. 
   The attempt is further complicated and enriched by important differences in the 
approaches and development of Irish Studies and of Taiwan Studies, both of which 
find themselves arriving at a point of self-examination where positivist assumptions 
dissolve and are replaced by questions concerning the epistemological and 
discursive bases of the academic enterprises that have come to be named ‘Irish 
Studies’ and ‘Taiwan Studies’. 
   For both Irish Studies and Taiwan Studies there are specific and limited 
questions that are asked, argued over, and answered, on the basis of particular 
discursive categories. Reflecting its diaspora origins in North American academic 
circles, Irish Studies privileges history, politics, language and literature, both 
‘classical’ and modern. In contrast, Taiwan Studies operates to interrogate and 
create the possibility of Taiwan itself in a manner that reflects its later development 
and the contested history of Taiwan. Irish Studies encompasses the political, as 
Taiwan Studies does to some degree. However, Taiwan Studies exists as a self-
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consciously political programme as well as an academic one. This existential 
questioning has become mainstream in Irish scholarship only in comparatively 
recent times as the possibility of Ireland itself has become a question. History and 
literature find themselves having to share unaccustomed space with other 
perspectives in the stories that the Irish tell about themselves. 
   Taiwan Studies, on the contrary, was organized from the outset at the 
intersection of a range of modern social sciences such as political science, cultural 
studies and anthropology. Therefore, though Taiwan Studies may claim to be 
‘multidisciplinary,’ its epistemological structure is based on those of its primary 
disciplines (Harrison 2006:18). 
 
   The current volume comprises articles that aspire to make explicit comparisons 
using frameworks and modes of discourse characteristic of Irish Studies, of Taiwan 
Studies, and of ‘positivist’ social science. In itself this makes the present collection 
of interest as an ethnographic experiment where Ireland is inscribed in terms of 
Taiwan Studies, and Taiwan in a manner more typical of scholarship concerning 
Ireland. Scholars whose focus of interest is Taiwan or Ireland (or even more purely 
theoretical in orientation) are thus enabled not just to ‘see ourselves as others see 
us’, but also to expose their own discourse to scrutiny as comparisons are 
explored and Ireland is discussed as if it were Taiwan, and vice versa. It may be 
argued that the associations thereby constructed are sometimes fragile. But what 
is revealed in the attempt, perhaps, is itself instructive. 
   Fang-Long Shih takes up the challenge of comparing the development of 
nationalist discourses on both islands. Her treatment contributes to the scholarship 
concerning the natures and historical developments of the nationalisms in each 
island, including the Republic of China nationalism of KMT orthodoxy and 
Irish/Ulster unionism, as well as to that of contemporary Irish and Taiwanese 
nationalisms. Shih’s focus on the elements and processes involved in constructing 
and sustaining the ethnic, cultural and civic impulses in the various nationalisms of 
the two contexts makes what could otherwise be seen as a hopelessly distant and 
asynchronous comparison satisfying and fruitful. Although her attention is on 
Taiwan in the present article, her discussion of the role and dangers of ‘strategic 
essentialism’ provides a tool that may usefully reflect the Irish experience. 
   Stéphane Corcuff contextualizes Shih’s discussion of discourses of nation as 
naturalized subject by adding a geopolitical perspective. He adapts an 
anthropological concept, liminality, to parse the relationships between China and 
Taiwan, arguing that Taiwan is both conservatory and laboratory vis-à-vis the 
Chinese imagination. Corcuff’s elaboration of liminality helps to explain also how a 
place can be simultaneously marginal and symbolically essential, a conservatory 
and a laboratory. Corcuff rejects a number of theoretical models, including a 
centre–periphery paradigm, arguing instead for an appreciation that a new model 
is needed to understand Taiwan, and in the process to understand what Taiwan as 
a place and an unavoidable subject, as a threshold of China, causes China to 
reveal about herself, her perception of history, identity and relations with the world. 
One is left wondering in what manner Corcuff‘s liminality, although developed to 
explain Taiwan, could be applied to relationships between the two jurisdictions of 
Ireland and perhaps even to Irish–British relations. 
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   Among the stories that Irish nationalists have told about themselves is that 
Ireland was ‘the first colony to be free’ and ‘an inspiration for other nations in the 
British Empire’. Taiwanese people, if they have a clear concept of Ireland, often 
share this view of Irish history in which a small island wrested itself from the grip of 
its neighbour, at that time the world’s foremost imperial power. The paper on Lin 
Hsien-Tang by Fu-San Huang, Sam Huang and Conor Mulvagh is an interesting 
exercise in comparative historiography, and argues for the similarities and 
probable influence of John Redmond’s example and that of the Home Rule 
movement in Ireland on the political methods and aspirations of the leading native 
agitator for political change in the Japanese colony of Taiwan. As the authors note, 
the intrusion of global war caused the efforts of both men to be superseded. 
Although both figures ended their careers in frustration and disappointment, this 
careful and closely argued comparison casts light on the methods, contexts and 
philosophies of both figures. 
   Ming-Yeh Rawnsley expands the range of our comparisons to the visual and 
cinematic, with an examination of two films of different mood under the common 
category of resistance. Like other papers in this issue Rawnsley again shows how 
comparison can be enhanced and refined by great variations in representation and 
style, where differing contexts lead to varying notions of resistance, including overt 
challenge and more veiled defiance. The intricacy and variety of resistance as a 
concept and as an act is well-illuminated. 
   Resistance and its representation through the theatres of Taiwan and Ireland is 
the theme of Wei-Hung Kao’s contribution. Kao references Bhabha to argue that 
theatres can tell us much about a national self-understanding, although not always 
or even usually on purpose but rather through a kind of self-reflexivity different 
from the explicit and deliberate pedagogy of dominant narratives. From this 
‘contradictory and ambivalent space’ those marginalized in each society speak. 
We are offered examples from the canons and movements of both nations to 
illustrate and develop this theme. 
   Both Ireland and Taiwan have been societies of emigration and immigration. Two 
papers examine these phenomena. Pei-Te Lien and Jeanette Yih Harvie deal 
comparatively with the situation of Irish and Taiwanese who have migrated to the 
United States through the prism of political incorporation into the receiving country. 
As well as expounding a number of parallels and differences in the migrant groups, 
and in the chronology of their movement to the United States, Lien and Harvie 
review the commonly employed theories used to explain patterns of political 
incorporation, leading to the conclusion that the discursive construction of racial 
difference is the unavoidable determinant of political incorporation even to the 
present day. 
   Questions of immigrant reception, incorporation and the projects of both cultural 
and economic nation-building are treated by Bryan Fanning. In his many-layered 
discussion, association is made not just between the relative openness to 
immigration of the different populations but also how this has influenced, and been 
influenced by, developmental goals. Fanning concludes with a positive evaluation 
of the potential for further comparative work, as well as the lessons that Ireland 
might learn from Taiwan. 
   Khinn-Huann Li, with Liam Mac Mathúna, presents a Taiwanese view of the Irish 
language movement in a study that those with an interest in Ireland will find 
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stimulating and informative, as it confirms that the situation of Irish is not as unique 
as is sometimes suggested and because it provides an evaluation from the 
viewpoint of quite a different context. Scholars of Taiwan, especially those with a 
concern or connection to the Taiwanese language movement, will appreciate the 
assessment of the Taiwanese movement in the light of the Irish experience. 
   The two commentary articles in this issue of the journal, those of Kerry Brown 
and Qiao Mu, give a view form London and Beijing respectively. Brown draws our 
attention to the ‘other Ireland’ and examines the external aspects to the Northern 
Ireland peace process in an attempt to set out the conditions that might underpin 
progress towards a more permanent peace across the Taiwan Strait. 
   It has been said that a ‘Chinese shadow’ lies over Taiwan, in that internationally 
Taiwan’s space is constrained by Chinese government pressure. The same 
shadow lies over Ireland’s knowledge of and engagement with Taiwan, Ireland 
having a so-called ‘One China Policy’ that is one of the most deferential of all her 
EU partners. Political decisions inside Taiwan are also constrained by the threat 
from China. In public media in the Western world little explanation is offered of 
Taiwan’s position or of the varying aspirations of its population beyond the 
‘renegade province’ trope. Qiao Mu’s paper demonstrates that the Chinese view of 
Taiwan is evolving and that views on the ‘Taiwan question’ are increasingly varied, 
despite the near unanimity of official pronouncements. His paper describes the 
evolution of Chinese thinking and the responses to Taiwanese aspirations 
available to Beijing.  
   In these papers, we have an eclectic approach to the study of Taiwan structured 
around the notion of its change, and of some of the disciplines through which 
Ireland is usually studied in Irish Studies programmes overseas. The unmistakably 
Taiwanese-flavoured theoretical discussion is combined with comparative work 
involving Irish themes. 
 
   This collection of articles, together with the accompanying book reviews, which 
continue the Hiberno-Taiwanese comparative theme, represent a beginning. Each 
of the contributors has stepped out of their academic comfort zone to engage in 
this new venture. What is written is not the last word on any of the topics under 
consideration. Nor does it exhaust the possibilities. It is a contribution to Taiwan 
Studies, in particular, and also we hope to Irish Studies. In a broader sense, it 
serves to develop thinking about comparative area studies.  
   There is a kind of aesthetic to this collection of papers. It is clear that it is not only 
as Small Islands with Big Issues, but as locations characterized by Stéphane 
Corcuff’s ‘liminality’ and as nodes in the global flows of culture where East has 
come to West and West to East, both Ireland and Taiwan have much to contribute 
to scholarship of wider application. We have begun unashamedly in a somewhat 
ideographic vein. As we build familiarity, and the romance of scholarly engagement 
deepens, we aspire to develop our common enterprise further. Asking Irish 
questions of Taiwan (or questions informed by Irish assumptions) and vice versa 
holds the potential for greater understanding of both small islands. 
 
 
 
 
TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  5 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Harrison, M. (2006) Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of 
Taiwanese Identity, New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Sartori, G. (1994) ‘Compare Why and How. Comparing, Miscomparing and the 
Comparative Method’, in M. Dogan and A. Kazancigil (eds) Comparing Nations: 
Concepts, Strategies, Substance, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 14–34. 
 
Address for Correspondence 
 
Rev John McNeil Scott, Lumen United Reformed Church, 88 Tavistock Place, 
London, UK, WC1H 9RS. 
 Taiwan in Comparative Perspective, Vol. 4, December 2012, pp. 6–33 
ISSN 1752-7732 
© Taiwan Research Programme, London School of Economics 
 
 
 
Taiwan’s Subjectivity and National Narrations: Towards a 
Comparative Perspective with Ireland 
 
 
Fang-Long Shih 
LSE Asia Research Centre 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper looks at how Taiwan has been imagined or narrated as a national 
subject from the perspective of different nationalisms, using Ireland in the context 
of the colonized Other as a comparator. As with Irish nationalist projects, the 
Chinese nationalism of the KMT and the Taiwanese nationalism of the DPP were 
and are complex phenomena, with ethnic, cultural, and civic dimensions. However, 
in the cases of the KMT and of the DPP the civic dimension was either suspended 
or remained under-developed. This paper takes a critical view, focusing on ethnic 
and cultural nationalism to explore how the KMT and the DPP narrated their 
respective national imaginaries. The first framework examined shows how Taiwan 
was narrated as part of China through a particular form of Chineseness, which was 
imposed on Taiwan by the KMT. The second framework analyses how Taiwan was 
re-narrated through Taiwanization discourses as a national subject in its own right; 
in particular, through a post-modern primordialist turn by which the DPP used 
Taiwanization to stress ethnicity politics. Critical interpretations here make use of a 
comparative perspective, re-examining notions of national subjectivity in 
juxtaposition with Ireland, whose own national imaginaries have, like those of 
Taiwan, also emphasized ethnicity and culture. The paper concludes by 
suggesting a third framework, emphasizing the need to pay attention to the 
cosmopolitan processes of mobilization and globalization. These can help us to re-
consider Taiwan and Ireland as network societies that can be narrated in the light 
of relationships and connections through which they have been constituted as 
places. 
 
Introduction 
 
Nations, like narratives,… [are ideas] whose cultural compulsion lies in the 
impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force. This is not to deny the attempt by 
nationalist discourses persistently to produce the idea of the nation as a continuous 
narrative of national progress, the narcissism of self-generation, the primeval present 
of the Volk. 
(Bhabha 1990: 1) 
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This paper examines how Taiwan has been imagined, or narrated as a national 
subject from the perspective of different nationalisms. Further, I would like to 
explore comparatively to what extent there are parallels and divergences in the 
way that national subjectivity discourses emerged in Taiwan and Ireland in the 
context of colonialism. Ireland and Taiwan are both small islands whose histories 
reflect complex relationships with powerful adjacent neighbours. These histories, 
as well as the islands’ politics and cultures, are marked by contested subjectivities 
and identities, and also by struggles over democracy, language and human rights. 
These are not, though, experiences that Taiwan shares with China. However, 
while Taiwanese nationalism did not properly develop until the 1970s, Irish 
nationalism can be traced back to the eighteenth century. There is, therefore, a 
considerable historical contrast between these two case studies, and as such I do 
not intend to make a direct comparison of Taiwan with Ireland. Rather, I will 
juxtapose elements and processes in the construction of ethnic, cultural, and civic 
nationalisms in these two contexts. 
   My discussion of how Taiwan’s national subjectivity has been narrated focuses 
on two frameworks: Framework One is the national narrative of the Republic of 
China (ROC), which was brought with the Kuomintang (the KMT, or Chinese 
Nationalist Party) when it retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1947, while 
Framework Two is an ongoing narrating of Taiwanese nationhood which has been 
promoted by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is the major 
opposition party and which was in Presidential office from 2000 to 2008. However, 
to place these two frameworks in context, the first part of my discussion briefly 
introduces the period before any form of nationalism shaped Taiwan. Prior to the 
arrival of the KMT there was no real sense, among the peoples of Taiwan, that 
they were a national subject; therefore, I locate the period of Qing and Japanese 
rule in Taiwan as being ‘before the dawn of nationalism’. I also draw some 
contrasts with Ireland. 
   The second part looks at how Taiwan was framed as part of China, which 
remained at the centre of the KMT’s imaginary of Chinese-ness as the rightful 
inheritance of the Mainlander minority now living in exile in Taiwan. It begins by 
examining the construction of Republican Chinese nationalism on the mainland in 
the decades prior to 1947. The exiled KMT regime forcibly imposed on Taiwan the 
political structure of the ROC, as well as a Chinese nationalist culture, and was 
indeed a kind of ‘colonialism’. Taiwan was Sinicized and became a representation 
of true Chineseness as against its mutant strain on the mainland under 
communism. I then contrast this with Ireland, where descendants of the colonists 
have maintained a British identity that remains strong in Northern Ireland. I end this 
section with examples demonstrating that KMT Chineseness indeed shaped the 
study of Taiwan in the martial law period. 
   The third part explores how Taiwan was re-framed from the perspective of 
bentuhua (本土化, nativization, or Taiwanization) as a form of resistance to KMT 
Sinicization. Bentuhua, or Taiwanization discourses, emerged as a literary and 
cultural movement in the 1980s. They were later integrated into the process of 
democratic reform in the 1990s, and played a significant role in crafting Taiwanese 
subjectivities and nationalism. Taiwan was therefore re-narrated through the 
vehicles of de-Sinicization and Taiwanization, evidence for which can be found in 
the curriculum of Renshi Taiwan (認識台灣, Knowing Taiwan). I then investigate 
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the post-modern primordialist turn by which the DPP used Taiwanization to stress 
politics of ethnicity and identity by appealing to the major Hoklo ethnic group as a 
strategy in the struggle for power. I then compare this with Irish nationalism in the 
years before and after most of Ireland achieved independence from Britain. I end 
this section with examples demonstrating that Taiwanization discourses have in 
fact influenced the study of Taiwan since the late 1980s. 
   In the conclusion, I further consider subjectivity beyond imperialism, colonialism 
and nationalism, and I emphasize the need to pay attention to processes of 
industrial and digital modernization, mobilization, and globalization. I conclude that 
we must consider ourselves on the edge of new forms of belonging that bear no 
relation to anything that has been defined as Chineseness or Taiwaneseness. We 
shall need new concepts and practices with which to re-consider Taiwan (and 
Ireland) as network societies to be studied and re-narrated in the light of forms and 
visions of connected-ness and related-ness that today can hardly be predicted.  
 
Before the Dawn of Nationalism: Taiwan and Ireland 
 
Taiwan is situated on the immediate geographical periphery of China and Japan, 
as well as at edge of the USA’s current sphere of influence. It has thus been seen 
as a frontier in relation to each of these three super-powers, with a special 
geopolitical significance that is greater than its size (36,000 sq. km.) would indicate 
(for Taiwan and geopolitics see Stéphane Corcuff in this special issue). Up until 
the early seventeenth century, Taiwan was inhabited almost exclusively by 
Austronesian-speaking peoples, consisting of more than twenty ethno-linguistic 
groups (Shepherd 1993: 31). Similarly, Ireland, before the first invasion by 
England, consisted almost exclusively of Celtic peoples divided into various 
kingdoms, although under the ceremonial authority of a High King. 
   The situation in Taiwan began to change from the seventeenth century. Dutch 
and Spanish colonizers arrived in the 1620s, and in 1661 the island was invaded 
by Cheng-Gong Zheng (known in the west as Koxinga), a Chinese merchant and 
pirate who was opposed to the Qing Dynasty that had displaced the Ming Dynasty 
in China. The Dutch were eventually expelled, and under Koxinga’s successors the 
island remained independent from Qing Dynasty authority until 1683. From the 
middle of the century, large numbers of Chinese immigrants began to settle on the 
island, but these, like the native inhabitants, were diverse: the majority came 
originally from the localities of Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, or Hakka, and they brought 
the Hakka language and the Quanzhou and Zhangzhou dialects of Hoklo, as well 
as cultural variations in cuisine, dress, kinship, and religious practices. This variety 
has been described as ‘subethnic’ (Lamley 1981: 282). The Chinese immigrants 
later became the majority population in Taiwan, while in Ireland, by contrast, the 
indigenous Celtic population remained in the majority, even after the English 
invasion of Ireland in the same period as the Chinese settlement of Taiwan. 
However, Ireland and Taiwan continued to be seen as remote and uncivilized 
lands respectively in the eyes of the British Empire and the Manchurian Qing 
Empire. 
   The English invasion of Ireland in the mid-seventeenth century was undertaken 
with the aim of establishing control over a Catholic population widely viewed in 
England with suspicion and of being in need of civilizing. One important difference 
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from Taiwan, however, is that the contrast between England and Ireland was 
bound up with religious differences, following the Reformation of the sixteenth 
century. Roman Catholics continued to recognize the Pope as the earthly head of 
the universal church founded by Jesus Christ, while Protestants believed that the 
Pope’s teaching was in conflict with God’s teaching as given in the Bible. 
Protestantism was attractive to the King of England, because it meant the Pope no 
longer had authority over him, and that the Christian church in England could be 
brought under the control of the state in the form of the Church of England (or 
Anglican Church). This greatly consolidated a sense of English identity, particularly 
after a short return to Catholicism during which Protestants were persecuted. Most 
people in Ireland remained Roman Catholic. 
   While Chinese immigration to Taiwan in the seventeenth century was not 
directed by the central government, England’s invasion of Ireland during the same 
period established Ireland as the first colony of an emerging British Empire. 
However, the effort to enforce the Reformation thoroughly in Ireland would have 
been too costly. Instead, it was decided to install a minority of Protestants from 
England and Scotland as the ruling class. The English colonial government 
introduced penal laws which sought to discipline the native population by 
preventing Roman Catholics from taking an active role in public life and restricting 
their religious practices (Bartlett 2010: 141). In 1700, Protestants owned 80 per 
cent of the land but represented only a quarter of the population (Brown 1991: 13); 
these landowners developed into a privileged Anglo-Irish class, and the period 
from 1691 to 1801 is known as the ‘Protestant Ascendancy’, reflecting their 
dominant position. In 1801, an Act of Union incorporated Ireland into the British 
state. 
   At the end of the nineteenth century, Japan was seeking to join the colonial 
powers, as a way to avoid becoming itself a colony of the West and at the same 
time to advance into becoming a modern nation-state. Lacking colonial experience, 
though, Japan framed its colonial model mainly with reference to European ideas 
and practices, and it mapped out a security region in which it further developed its 
interest in overseas trade. In 1895, following China’s defeat in the First Sino-
Japanese War, Taiwan was ceded by the Qing Dynasty to Japan, in accordance 
with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. However, neither the Qing Dynasty administration 
over the island from 1683 to 1895, nor Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945, 
succeeded in imposing their nationalisms on the peoples of Taiwan. Nor did 
Taiwanese people develop nationalism into a substantial movement during the 
Qing and Japanese periods.  
   Taiwan under Qing rule could be seen as a colony-cum-province, or as an 
aspect of what Vivienne Shue calls the pre-modern ‘honeycomb polity’ of the Qing 
Empire (Shue 1988: 89). The Qing itself was not a nation in the modern sense, 
and it only ruled Taiwan to a very limited extent. Over more than two hundred 
years of Qing administration, many Chinese immigrants made their homes in 
Taiwan and became nativized, including members of the Confucian gentry created 
by the keju (科舉) examination system, and this class became mediators between 
the Qing Empire and Taiwan’s localities. Japan, however, developed what Partha 
Chatterjee calls ‘anti-colonial nationalism’ (Chatterjee 1993 in R.-R. Wu 2004: 17), 
through which Japan sought to modernize itself via processes of nation-building. 
Following three years of military rule over Taiwan, Japan shifted its Taiwan policy 
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to a civic government, beginning a process of assimilation through differential 
incorporation (R.-R. Wu 2003). This meant that Japan expanded its territories and 
also incorporated the colonized – albeit hierarchically, not equally – into its modern 
nation-state formation. Although this policy did trigger resistance, this never 
developed into an island-wide nationalist movement, despite the fact that 
nationalist-type ideas did emerge, particularly in literary circles in the 1920s. 
Nevertheless, people in Taiwan were willing to accommodate themselves, to 
various degrees, to the new colonial situation and modern way of life. However, 
although the Japanese promoted dōka (assimilation), this was primarily a way to 
distinguish Japan from Western colonialism; the rhetoric of dōka was empty and 
did not lead to economic advancement or political representation (Ching 2001: 
104–106). 
   However, Japanese colonialist projects engendered a new kind of research and 
knowledge about the peoples, societies, and cultures under colonial rule. Chinese 
residents in Taiwan were classed together administratively as hontōjin (islanders), 
while indigenous Austronesian groups were classed as ban (savages), in contrast 
to the Japanese naichijin (homelanders). Indeed, Japanese colonialism was based 
on an allegedly biological discourse of race (Weiner 1994: 27), which thereby 
distinguished ‘the Self’ from ‘the Other’ by differentiating the colonizer ‘Self’ from 
the colonized ‘Other’. It was this representation of Otherness that made people in 
Taiwan conceive of themselves as a distinctive ethnic and cultural group for the 
first time. This new research and knowledge further created a new self-reflection 
and self-awareness among Taiwan’s colonized people. Taiwan ‘came to be 
defined as an independent cultural entity with distinctive characteristics’ (Kikuchi 
2007: 4) by its Japanese colonizers. 
   It is worth noting here that although the British colonization of Ireland goes back 
much further than the modern colonial theory of race, the Irish experience has a 
parallel with Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule. Stereotypical and indeed racist 
attitudes to Ireland and to the Irish remained normative in England even after the 
island was incorporated into the British state, and people in Ireland therefore 
learned that they were regarded as not-English and as not-England. As Declan 
Kiberd explains: 
 
If Ireland had never existed, the English would have invented it; and since it never 
existed in English eyes as anything more than a patchwork-quilt of warring fiefdoms, 
their leaders occupied the neighbouring island and called it Ireland. With the mission 
to impose a central administration went the attempt to define a unitary Irish character. 
(Kiberd 1995: 9) 
 
Kiberd’s analysis is derived from a central theme of Edward Said’s Orientalism, 
which is the process of ‘Othering’ in imperialism. Said explored how western 
scholarship and imperial administration interpreted the Middle East, observing that 
‘the Orient was almost a European invention’ (Said 1978: 1). Orientalism, he 
explained, was 
 
A way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient‘s special place in 
European Western experience. The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is also 
the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its 
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civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most 
recurring images of the Other. 
(Said 1978: 1) 
 
Framework One: Chineseness in Taiwan in Dialogue with Britishness in 
Ireland 
 
In Ireland, British colonial rule created self-consciousness in the population of 
being ‘Other’ and of being subordinate. British rule prompted resentment and 
resistance, leading to Irish independence in 1922. However, the situation has 
continued to be complicated; Ireland experienced partition, with the north of the 
island remaining a part of Britain. Here, in Northern Ireland, a slim majority 
maintains a British identity. In the case of Ireland, we see a nation become a state 
through resistance and independence. However, in the case of Taiwan, although 
Japanese rule similarly created self-consciousness in the population of being 
‘Other’, this, as noted in the previous section, did not lead to a sense of nationhood. 
In contrast to the sense of nationhood that preceded statehood in Ireland, a sense 
of nationhood in Taiwan was imposed with the arrival of the KMT’s ROC state. 
   With Japan’s defeat at the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War (from the end 
of 1941, part of the Second World War), the Allies gave Taiwan to the Republic of 
China. This was in accordance with an agreement made between Roosevelt, 
Churchill, and the ROC leader Chiang Kai-Shek at the Cairo Conference of 1943. 
The Treaty of San Francisco, which Japan signed in September 1951, included the 
sentence that ‘Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the 
Pescadores’, but did not specify Taiwan’s status. Chiang’s KMT, meanwhile, had 
retreated to the island between 1947 and 1949 after losing the civil war with the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on mainland China. While the CCP took control 
of China and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the KMT re-
located the ROC to Taiwan, planning to re-take mainland China at a later date. 
Although exiled to Taiwan, the KMT sought continuity with the Republican legacy 
on mainland China, and although de facto it had no authority beyond Taiwan it 
continued to assert its position as ‘the sole legitimate government of all China’ 
(Rigger 2011: 136). 
   Analysis of KMT’s ROC nationalism in Taiwan needs to be traced back to the 
preceding period of KMT rule in China. As noted by Benedict Anderson, ‘When 
Chinese nationalism did finally arise, it was rather late in world-historical time’ (B. 
Anderson 1983: 36). In fact, the Qing Dowager Empress did try, at the very end, to 
use Chinese identity as a form of resistance against the European and Japanese 
imperial powers, but the attempt was made too late and the dynasty was soon 
overthrown and replaced by the Republic of China following the so-called 
‘Nationalist’ Revolution of 1911. KMT Republican nationalism was indeed itself a 
fairly modern invention, derived from a new notion of the ‘Chinese people’ (中華民
族) which was first formulated during the last decade of the Qing dynasty by Qi-
Chao Liang. In his article ‘Overview of Peoples of China in History’ (1905), Liang 
indicated that when a person encountered a foreigner, he/she immediately 
distinguished him/herself as ‘a person of China’ (中國人). This ‘person of China’ 
was to be considered to be a member of the ‘Chinese people’. He further 
explained that the ‘Chinese people’ were a product of history: all ethnic groups in 
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the territory of China had been assimilated into Chinese culture over thousands of 
years, and had thus been integrated into the ‘Chinese people’. 
   The ROC’s ideological foundation was formulated by Dr Sun Yat-Sen, as 
expressed in his ‘Three Principles of the People’: these were nationalism; civic 
rights or democracy; and civic welfare. For Dr Sun, China, after being freed from 
imperialist domination, needed to develop a ‘China-nationalism’ to unite all of 
China’s different ethnicities. Adapting Liang’s notion, in 1912 he further proposed a 
multi-ethnic ‘Republic of the Five Peoples’ (‘五族共和說’), composed of five major 
ethnic groups: Han, Manchus, Mongols, Uyghurs, and Tibetans. However, these 
groups were all integrated into one national subject, constituting the ‘Chinese 
people’. In the territory of China, membership as ‘Chinese’ was thus determined by 
assimilation into Chinese culture (Duara 1995: 143). From 1924, this assimilation 
also included Mandarin, established as the state language. 
   This new notion of Chineseness thus referred both to a homogeneous cultural 
category and to a homogeneous quasi-ethnic category. Further, a particular 
connection was made between this newer notion of Chineseness and an older 
notion of Zhong-guo (中國, Middle Kingdom). In this way, Zhong-guo now referred 
not only to the territory of the provinces of China (which at that time numbered 36) 
but was also tied to the idea of ‘Chineseness’, as a holistic conception of both a 
Chinese national subject and a Chinese national culture. In short, the boundary of 
the ROC as a territory/nation was synonymous with that of an imagined cultural 
Chinese homogeneity and of an invented quasi-ethnic Chinese homogeneity. The 
KMT’s Chinese nationalism took a form which was seen in Europe and theorized in 
the eighteenth century by Johann Gottfried von Herder, although it was not 
acknowledged as such. Herder’s primordialist view of nationalism saw an essential 
link between a land and its Volk. Herder’s Volk, as elaborated by Kenneth 
Minogue, ‘is not simply the people of a country, but a metaphysical entity defined 
relationally as that which produces a particular language, art, culture, set of great 
men, religion and collection of customs’ (Minogue 1969: 57). However, the term 
‘Chinese’ is vague and ambiguous: while it may denote all five ethnic groups, in 
most instances it was used to represent only aspects of the core ethnic Han group, 
as expressed through Han language, art, culture, and customs. 
   The KMT’s national imagination was developed during the period when it had 
control of mainland China. However, while Chinese nationalism was being 
imposed on China, Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule. This version of 
Chinese nationalism was rejected by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which 
took control of the mainland, but it was brought to Taiwan by the KMT and 
imposed in a way that elided the island’s history. The year before the KMT arrived 
on the island, officials who were sent to survey Taiwan claimed that Taiwanese 
people had been ‘enslaved’ ( 奴 化 , nuhua) as the outcome of fifty years of 
colonization by Japan (C. Chen 2002 in F.-C. Wang 2005: 59). Accordingly, a 
distinction was made between benshengren ( 本 省 人 , ‘provincial natives’, or 
‘Taiwanese’) and waishengren (外省人, ‘provincial outsiders’, or ‘mainlanders’). 
Benshengren meant those peoples who had arrived previously and were seen as 
the residents of Taiwan province, mainly Hoklo, Hakka, and indigenous 
Austronesian inhabitants; in contrast, waishengren referred to those Chinese who 
came to Taiwan with the KMT after 1947 from various provinces other than Taiwan, 
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but who were united in a common interest as a ruling class (for more on the issue 
of class, see Kao in this special issue). 
   The KMT erased the past of Taiwan and turned the island into a frozen 
imaginary of the pre-Communist Republican mainland, both politically and 
culturally. In the political domain, as with the British establishment of the privileged 
Anglo-Irish class in eighteenth-century Ireland, the KMT implemented a similar 
strategy to install the waishengren as the ruling class of Taiwan, protected by law. 
The KMT maintained the political structure of the Republic in China; as such, 
legislators who nominally represented mainland districts were able to remain in the 
legislative assembly in Taiwan indefinitely, on the grounds that they could not be 
removed from office without elections on the mainland. These waishengren make 
up approximately 15 per cent of the population, but were overrepresented in 
military and civil positions (Corcuff 2002: 170). 
   In light of the 1946 claim of ‘enslavement’, it was decided that the benshengren 
should not be treated as equals with waishengren until they had been de-
Japanized and re-Sinicized (C. Chen 2002 in F.-C. Wang 2005: 59). The de-
Japanization campaign banned the formerly official Japanese language from use 
in school and media. It also downplayed the Japanese era as a disgraceful page in 
Taiwan’s history. The ‘re-Sinicization’ policy was further seen as re-awakening 
Taiwan’s supposed historical connection with Greater China, and also re-
connecting the island of Taiwan with the supposed territory of early twentieth-
century China. ‘Re-Sinicization’ also imposed the Beijing dialect of Mandarin as the 
official language for education, media, and government. Other Chinese languages, 
such as Hakka and Hoklo, which had existed long before Mandarin and which 
were widely used as day-to-day languages in Taiwan, were reduced by this 
Sinicization policy to the marginal status of patois. Pupils were fined if they spoke 
their mother tongue at school. As Allen Chun elaborates, 
 
The [KMT] government in effect played an active role (as author) in writing culture (by 
constructing discourses on tradition, ethnicity, ethical philosophy and moral 
psychology). It also inculcated these reconstructed notions of tradition (as culture) 
through the ‘normative’ machinery of the school, media, family and military in order to 
construct disciplinary lifestyles and ritual patterns of behaviour compatible with the 
underlying ethos of the State. Chinese culture ultimately became an object of 
discourse not only in a political sense but also through the construction of 
knowledge… market commercialization, and domestication of life routines. 
(Chun 1994: 54) 
 
Taiwan was somehow to be re-written into a long invented narrative of 5,000 years 
of unbroken Chinese history, beginning with the supposed common ancestor, the 
Yellow Emperor ( 黃 帝 , Huang Di), followed by about twenty dynasties and 
culminating in the establishment of the Republic in 1911. There was also an 
imagined geography of the 1911 ROC’s territory that included even Outer 
Mongolia. It is noted that ‘historical atlases published in Taiwan after 1949… often 
take for granted the logic of “imperial domain” and “lost territories”’ (Callahan 2009: 
156n). This invented narrative ignored the historical reality of repeated invasions 
by non-Chinese (so-called barbarians), the rise and fall of imperial dynasties, and 
constant interaction with non-Chinese cultures. It also suggested a continuous 
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connection of Taiwan with China, even though Taiwan had not been of interest to 
the imperial mainland until the late seventeenth century, and had further been 
ceded by the Qing Dynasty to Japan in 1895. While the narratives of the PRC and 
the KMT territories both include Taiwan as part of a much larger whole, the KMT’s 
imagined geography differed from that of the PRC by continuing to include Outer 
Mongolia, which the PRC had recognized as independent in 1949. 
   In further contrast to the CCP, while Mao and the PRC encouraged the Cultural 
Revolution between 1966 and 1976, Chiang Kai-Shek and the ROC urged a 
restoration of ‘tradition’ from 1966 onwards, under the name of the Chinese 
Cultural Renaissance Movement (中華文化復興運動, Zhonghua wenhua fuxing 
yundong). For example, traditional writing forms were preserved and used in ROC 
Taiwan, in contrast to the simplification of Chinese characters on the CCP 
mainland. This was one means by which the KMT represented itself and the ROC 
as the last bastion of ‘authentic’ Chinese culture, in this way justifying its right to 
possess various high-cultural imperial treasures which had belonged to the Palace 
Museum in Beijing but which had been removed to Taipei. The National Palace 
Museum in Taipei was presented as the ‘Temple’ of Chinese civilization, the 
symbol of the KMT’s preservation of that legacy (Vickers 2009).  
   In short, the exiled KMT in Taiwan attempted to demonstrate to the world that it 
was the legitimate heir and protector of traditional Chinese culture, and therefore of 
the Chinese nation. The KMT imposed only one form of Chineseness, consisting of 
political and cultural domination by a Chinese state (i.e., the ROC), a ruling class 
(i.e., waishengren with few token benshengren), and a high official language and 
culture (i.e., the Mandarin language and culture), at the cost of the suppression of 
other Chinese cultures and languages (i.e. Hoklo, Hakka etc.).  
   In the cases both of KMT Sinicization and British colonialism, one outcome was 
the same, in that Mandarin and English became the dominant languages in Taiwan 
and Ireland. However, there is a difference here between British colonialism in 
Ireland and the KMT’s Sinicization of Taiwan. Although, as noted above, the British 
imposed penal laws to suppress Roman Catholicism, particularly from 1691, these 
were gradually abandoned during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This 
was more in line with the general practice of British colonialism, which did not seek 
to impose Britishness on colonized populations, but rather to rule through a local 
elite. In the case of Ireland, this meant an Anglicized elite class that included 
settlers from outside, including Scotland. However for the Protestants of Ireland, 
Irish home rule made them not just a minority on the island, but the minority 
population of a Catholic country. The political compromise in 1921 was partition, 
with Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom. Here, Protestants 
were in the majority, although there was also a significant Catholic, and Irish 
nationalist, community. 
   Here we see another difference with Taiwan: a form of Chineseness was 
imposed on the benshengren majority across Taiwan, while the privileged status of 
Britishness was preserved by the Protestant minority in Ireland (the majority in 
Northern Ireland) only through partition. However, Britishness in Northern Ireland 
came to take on a distinct ‘unionist’ form; for example, unionist Britishness was 
expressed through symbols such as the display of the British flag, and through 
rituals such as parades organized by unionist ‘Orange Lodges’ (McAuley and 
Tongue 2010: 110). The men in these parades wore suits and bowler hats, which 
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looked smart but increasingly very old-fashioned. The marchers wear orange 
sashes, in memory of King William III, who became the monarch of England in 
1688, replacing his wife Mary’s father King James II. Although William’s victory 
over James in Ireland was an important cultural memory in Northern Ireland, it is 
hardly remembered by most people living in Britain. Moreover, unionist Britishness 
projected by the officially-sanctioned culture of Northern Ireland did not even 
reflect the reality of Protestant diversity in Ireland, as Gillian McIntosh observes: 
‘Unionists' image of the state was exclusive, and one which alienated many, in 
particular, but not exclusively, Catholics’ (McIntosh 1999: 223). Britishness in 
Northern Ireland for much of the twentieth century gave the impression of being 
frozen in time and of being exclusivist. According to McIntosh, 
 
[Unionists’] proclaimed 'Britishness', when it did arise, was often a reflection of 
political necessity which co-existed with a sense of being 'Ulster' and, to a lesser 
extent, 'Irish'. Unionist culture was thus at times repetitive and contradictory; it 
claimed distinctiveness and individuality within the United Kingdom, while at the 
same time it rejected the state's own unique culture (particularly catholic) which it 
saw as a cover for an Irish national culture; and while it claimed unity with Britain, its 
culture simultaneously projected elements of anti-Englishness. 
(McIntosh 1999: 222) 
 
Britishness in Northern Ireland was only one form of Britishness, and it was 
different from that of most of the rest of Britain. Similarly, KMT Sinicization was 
based on just one form of Chineseness, quite different to the CCP version of 
Chineseness which is imposed on China today.  
   These processes of Sinicization also shaped the study of Taiwan during the 
1960s to 1980s. As Stephen Murray and Keelung Hong (1994) have pointed out, 
anthropological studies of Taiwan at this time were conducted as if China and 
Chinese culture were the natural research contexts for Taiwan. According to 
Stevan Harrell, 
 
This was the Golden Age, when Taiwan stood for China, not only politically but 
anthropologically, when foreign anthropologists, mostly Americans, dealt with their 
exclusion from the Chinese mainland [because of the Cultural Revolution] by moving 
to the next-best place, the island province, the unsinkable aircraft carrier, the place 
where Chinese culture had not only continued to flourish, but had not been subjected 
to the depredations of Communists trying to create a new world out of its ashes. 
(Harrell 1999: 211–212) 
 
Anthropologists at that time studied Taiwan within a holistic and structural-
functionalist framework of Chineseness, although they acknowledged the 
importance of contextualizing their data in Taiwan historically and socially, and 
were also concerned with Taiwan’s local differences and cultural variations. 
However, the basic assumption as regards the existence of an essential Chinese 
culture and of a subjectivity of Chineseness tied to Taiwan was largely 
unquestioned. For instance, the anthropologist Arthur Wolf could assert that the 
Taiwanese conception of the spirit world was modelled on a conception of imperial 
China: ‘Gods are the supernatural counterparts of the imperial bureaucracy… 
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Ghosts are the supernatural equivalents of despised, dangerous strangers… 
Ancestors are the senior members of one’s own line of descent’ (Wolf 1974: 7–8). 
Similarly, Steven Sangren could also assert that: ‘Despite the demise of its earthly 
counterpart [physically speaking, the death of the last imperial dynasty, in 1911], 
eighty years ago, the imperial bureaucracy persists in the religion of present-day 
Taiwan’ (Sangren 1983: 5). 
   Wolf’s and Sangren’s assertions of the persistence of a continuing imperial and 
bureaucratic China in Taiwanese religion was regarded sceptically by Stevan 
Harrell (1999), who pointed out that the imperial bureaucracy had disappeared 
from Taiwan in 1895, when the island was ceded to Japan. Furthermore, as 
Feuchtwang, Shih and Tremlett have pointed out,  
 
In retrospect it is clear that the problem was not that they contextualised their field 
work data, but that they did not develop a theory of context. Thus, China as a whole 
country or society, a whole culture or ethnic unit of identity was uncritically assumed 
to be a ‘natural’ or given context [for the study of Taiwan] rather than a political 
choice and/or contingent construction. 
(Feuchtwang, Shih, and Tremlett 2006: 43) 
 
But, as the KMT’s subjectivity of Chineseness began to fade, new political and 
scholarly trends emerged to challenge it. 
 
Framework Two: Taiwanese Nationalism in Dialogue with Irish Nationalism 
 
Briefly surveying Taiwan’s past at the time of the 2004 election, Perry Anderson 
observed that ‘out of this sequence of historical experiences has come a distinctive 
kind of national sentiment’ (P. Anderson 2004: 2). As mentioned above, the 1946 
claim of ‘enslavement’ created a distinction between benshengren and 
waishengren, and benshengren encountered hostility and exploitation from the 
KMT in ways that led to Japan becoming an object of nostalgia while a Taiwanese 
subjectivity was developing. Conflict began as soon as the KMT arrived in 1947. In 
months of fighting which began on 28 February 1947, perhaps up to 30,000 
benshengren were killed in what is now known as the ‘2-28 Incident’ (see 
Rawnsley in this special issue), while others went into exile, primarily to Japan or 
to the USA. Most of the victims were urban intellectuals and well-off rural landlords 
who had prospered during the Japanese colonial period (Simon 2005: 132). 
   In the aftermath of the 2-28 Incident, martial law was imposed in 1949 as a 
‘Temporary Provision’, despite the democratic principles written into the 
Constitution of the ROC (Nathan 1985: xi). It was claimed by the KMT that as the 
rights given in the Constitution had been formulated to apply to all the people of 
mainland China, these rights were now temporarily suspended due to the national 
emergency that had been precipitated by communist control of the mainland. The 
KMT rulers were strongly anti-communist, and the hunt for communists on Taiwan 
quickly developed into the period known as the ‘White Terror’ in which those 
suspected of communism were executed or imprisoned. Even villagers with no 
knowledge of communism were accused of being communists and sentenced as a 
warning not to resist the KMT (one example was the Luku White Terror Incident, 
see F.-L. Shih 2011).  
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   The nature of KMT rule forcibly imposed on Taiwan the political structure of the 
ROC, as well as a Chinese nationalist culture, and was indeed a kind of 
‘colonialism’ which was no less ‘foreign’ than Japanese rule. As such, from the 
perspective of the ruled Taiwanese the KMT’s Sinicization was a prolonged ‘re-
colonialism’ following on from Japanization (Edmondson 2002; Su 1986). KMT rule 
provoked resistance in the name of ‘de-colonization’ and alternative discourses 
that took the form of bentuhua, or Taiwanization. Taiwanization as a political and 
cultural movement played a significant role in crafting Taiwanese nationalism.  
   There are similarities here with the formation of Irish nationalism. In 1846 and 
1847 there was a huge famine in Ireland caused by potato blight, a disease which 
destroyed the potato crop. During these years of hunger and disease, the British 
government still held to its strongly free market economic policies, exporting large 
quantities of grain from the starving island for greater profit, and refusing to 
intervene to feed the starving. Perhaps around a million people died, and half a 
million were forced to emigrate to survive, primarily to the USA. Irish bitterness at 
England’s attitude is recorded in the popular Irish peasants’ saying that ‘God sent 
the potato-blight, but the English caused the Famine’ (see Kiberd 1995: 21). 
   Ireland since 1801 had been part of the new United Kingdom, along with 
England, Scotland, and Wales. This meant that Ireland was represented at the 
Parliament in Westminster. However, one consequence of the famine was a rise in 
anti-English feeling. In the decades that followed the disaster there were increased 
calls for ‘Home Rule’, meaning for laws to be decided in Ireland rather than in 
Westminster. There was also increasing support for this in Britain, and some 
reforms were made. For example, in 1871 the official church, the Church of Ireland 
(a province of the Anglican Church) was disconnected from the state in Ireland, in 
recognition that most Irish people were Catholics and not Anglicans. However, Eric 
Hobsbawm notes that while most nationalist movements in Europe at this time 
simply wanted some local autonomy, the preference in Ireland was for a sovereign 
state. Nationalist organizations (members of which were known generally as 
‘Fenians’) ‘demanded an Irish Republic which could not but be independent from 
Britain’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 37). 
   Ireland declared independence in 1919, and following a guerrilla war the Irish 
Free State was established in 1922 following partition the year before. Ireland was 
from that time divided, with Northern Ireland remaining a part of the UK. However, 
the Irish Free State remained within the British Empire as a ‘dominion’, like 
Australia or Canada, until 1949, when it became a Republic. In contrast, 
Taiwanization and Taiwanese nationalism did not really take shape until the 1970s, 
and it is still an ongoing process. As a cultural movement, Taiwanization needs to 
be understood as a prolonged but discontinuous formation beginning in the 1920s 
and reviving in the 1980s. On the other hand, as a political movement, 
Taiwanization emerged sharply after the ‘Formosa Incident’ in 1979 and further 
developed to become integral to democratic reforms in the 1990s. However, the 
development of political opposition needs to be seen in relation to wider changes 
in international and domestic politics in the two prior decades. 
   The ROC constitution guarantees civic liberties and participation; the KMT, 
though, had suspended democracy, justifying its authoritarianism by claiming that 
it was preparing for the recovery of mainland China. The regime claimed that once 
it had retaken the mainland and the Chinese nation was reunited, it would allow for 
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nationwide elections to be held. However, the international context radically shifted 
and, consequently, the KMT’s legitimacy in representing all China both outside and 
within the island came into doubt.  
   With the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, ideological opposition to communism in 
the west lost ground to pragmatic political calculation. The US, along with many 
Western countries, used relations with China strategically against the Soviet Union 
(Goh 2009: 171–182, 215–218). As such, the CCP’s PRC began to replace the 
KMT’s ROC as the internationally recognized government of China. In 1971, the 
ROC lost its seat in the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United 
Nations, and this was followed by the loss of diplomatic recognition by the UK in 
1972 and by the USA in 1979. The ROC has since become even more politically 
isolated, with the PRC undergoing a process of neo-liberal economic transition 
from the 1980s and increasing its interaction with the rest of the world from the 
1990s (Naughton 1995).  
   By the early 1970s, it was clear in Taiwan that there was very little hope of 
recovering the mainland, despite years of war preparation. Increasing numbers of 
benshengren and some waishengren were becoming dissatisfied with the island’s 
political situation and were no longer willing to tolerate the KMT’s continually 
unmet promise of democracy. A token free press magazine sponsored by the KMT 
called Free China Fortnightly, run by a waishengren named Chen Lei, came to 
prominence: it began by publishing attacks on the CCP, but it shifted from its initial 
emphasis onto critiques of KMT authoritarian rule. Benshengren political activists 
expressed support for this change; mainlanders and Taiwanese worked together, 
campaigning for local elections and calling for the formation of an opposition party 
as a way to advance their demands for democracy. Both internal and external 
challenges increased the pressure on the KMT to justify its claim to legitimacy by 
reforming the political and electoral system. 
   Although opposition political parties were banned, activists could position 
themselves as members of the Dangwai (黨外 , Outside the KMT Party). The 
Dangwai leaders founded Formosa magazine in 1979 to serve as a platform for 
voices of political opposition island-wide, and the magazine organized a march in 
Kaohsiung on 10 December in commemoration of International Human Rights 
Day. Eight leaders of the protest were arrested, and after trial given prison 
sentences of between 12 years and life (Denny 2003: 168–169). However, they 
were also recognized by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience 
(Amnesty International 1980), while the KMT came under pressure from the US 
government, partly because of lobbying by exiled Taiwanese Americans (for the 
issue of Taiwanese Americans, see Lien in this special issue). The ‘Formosa 
Incident’ worked to radicalize opposition to the KMT regime and to give momentum 
to calls for democratic reform and Taiwanization. The first major opposition party, 
the DPP, was formed in 1986 and formally legalized in 1989, while martial law was 
finally lifted in 1987. 
   In Ireland, the perspective of colonial Britain engendered among the Irish a self-
awareness of being not-English. In turn, Irish people were motivated to reflect on 
the idea of a distinct culture and language as forming the basis of their collective 
experience and identity; this laid a foundation for the Irish national imaginary, 
which can be seen as having primordialist elements but also, as we shall see, 
other cultural resources to draw on for the construction of a national identity – 
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resources routed in a long history of relationships with outsiders. From the end of 
the nineteenth century, there was an increased emphasis on Irish culture in 
Ireland, including a movement to promote the native Gaelic language and a new 
emphasis on the island’s Celtic history. The Catholic Church also maintained a 
very strong focus for national identity: in 1879 some locals in the village of Knock 
claimed that they had seen a vision of Jesus’ mother, the Virgin Mary, alongside 
two saints. This was taken to show that God supported the Irish for following the 
true religion, and the Virgin Mary, as ‘Our Lady of Knock’, was given the name 
‘Queen of Ireland’ (Kearney 2007: 44). Knock is today Ireland’s national Marian 
shrine. 
   As with Irish nationalist emphasis on ethnic and cultural particularity, Taiwan 
underwent a similar process, with the Irish model to some extent in mind among 
Taiwanese nationalists who have turned to Ireland to make sense of their own 
experiences. The bentuhua literary movement took its inspiration from an earlier 
manifestation of politicized localism, dating from the 1920s. Japan at that time had 
replaced military rule over Taiwan with a modern civic governance structure, and 
resistance primarily took the form of a reformist and non-violent anti-colonialism. 
While Ireland in that decade was achieving independence, Taiwanese activists at 
that time were seeking Home Rule, similar to the strand of Reformist nationalism in 
Ireland. They stressed ‘Taiwan for the Taiwanese’, and their aim was a reform of 
the colonial system rather than full national autonomy (see F.-S. Huang and S. 
Huang with Mulvagh in this special issue).  
   The perspective of the Japanese colonizers provided the first opportunity for 
people in Taiwan to see themselves as a group defined by a distinctive ethnicity 
and culture. More and more Taiwanese writers were eager to reflect on, and 
further to create, their own literature in their own languages. One prominent 
reformist, Wo-Chün Chang, regarded the Taiwanese language as ‘a patois, an 
inferior language without a writing system’. He therefore wanted ‘to change our 
patois into a decent language that can be written down’ (translated in Hsiau 2000: 
38) (see Li with Mac Mathúna in this special issue). Another cultural reformist, 
Shih-Hui Huang, promoted xiangtu literature (native literature: literally ‘鄉, xiang’ 
meaning ‘rural’ and ‘土 , tu’ meaning ‘soil’), arguing that ‘xiangtu literature 
represents speaking and each place has its own language’ (translated in Hsiau 
2000: 41). Xiangtu writing, by using native language, would be better able to reflect 
and represent local culture and people.  
   After two decades of escapist modernism in Taiwan (Hsiau 2000: 73), literary 
culture made a turn back to the xiangtu genre in the 1970s. This ‘Return to 
Xiangtu’ was an expression of complex responses to political and economic 
frustrations, such as the dispute over jurisdiction of the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands 
(once again in the early 2010s the focus of a diplomatic dispute between China 
and Japan), diplomatic failures, and also Taiwan’s decline into an economic and 
cultural colony of the West, and in particular of the USA. The xiangtu writers urged 
the creation of a literature which ‘bases itself on the soil of Taiwan’s real society’; 
‘any kind of person, thing, and phenomenon existing in this society is what such a 
literature is intended to reflect and describe’ (Tuo Wang translated in Hsiau 2000: 
71). In benshengren xiangtu literature, we read about the ‘use of the Taiwanese 
dialect [i.e., Hoklo], depiction of the plight of country folks or small-town dwellers in 
economic difficulty, and resistance of the imperialist presence in Taiwan’ (Chang 
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1993: 149). Consequently, xiangtu writers were accused by the KMT of provoking 
‘localism’ or ‘provincialism’, and therefore ‘separatism’ (Hsiau 2000: 70–71). It was 
not until the early 1980s that xiangtu literature took a further step toward ‘a 
literature for nation-building’, via the notion of bentuhua. 
   Bentuhua discourses were well connected with the political debates about 
Taiwanese subjectivity and identity. In fact, the DDP was born out of civic struggle 
for political participation and voting rights. More than 80 percent of the residents of 
Taiwan were benshengren, but until that time they had not been allowed to 
participate in the elections of public officials and there were only with a few token 
Taiwanese politicians. After Chiang Ching-Kuo died in 1988, Lee Teng-Hui, who 
was a KMT reformer, succeeded to his position as the first benshengren president 
of the ROC. The bentuhua movement gained further momentum under Lee’s 
presidency (1988–2000), and he sought to develop a concept of ‘new Taiwanese’: 
According to Lee,  
 
Between us, there should be no argument about ethnic division. We are all Chinese. 
Only identify with Taiwan, give your heart to preserving and developing Taiwan, no 
matter what ethnic group, no matter whether you came to Taiwan early or late, then 
all are Taiwanese. 
(translated in Hughes 2011: 59, from Zhongguo shibao 31 December 1994) 
 
Lee Teng-Hui acknowledged the plurality of ethnic background while maintaining a 
Chinese identity. Rather than emphasize Taiwan’s status as a nation-state, Lee’s 
vision focused on Taiwan’s position within the ‘global village’, recognized for its 
commitment to human rights and democracy and for its economic achievements 
(Hughes 2011: 58). 
   Lee’s approach and the DPP campaign both helped to increase the growth of the 
bentuhua movement, which was integral to democratic reform in the 1990s. The 
DPP, as the first native opposition party, regarded the KMT regime as alien and 
sought to displace its Chinese version of nationalism. It issued a manifesto in 1991 
rejecting Chinese mainlander superiority, advocating Taiwan as an independent 
sovereign state, and articulating a new politics of Taiwanese identity and 
nationalism (Ogasawara 1998). The DPP portrayed Taiwan as a nation made up of 
successive waves of immigrants consisting of ‘Four Great Ethnic Groups’ (Rudolph 
2008: 51–52): the Yuanzhumin ( 原 住 民 , ‘original provincials’, or ‘indigenous 
peoples’), Hoklo, Hakka, and Mainlanders (for more about the issue of immigration, 
see Fanning in this special issue). Furthermore, the DPP contrasted 
democratization against the KMT; independence against China; and Taiwanization 
against Sinicization. 
   Debates prompted by the bentuhua movement further led to a political transition 
to democracy in the form of electoral reform. Indeed, as Shelley Rigger observes, 
the only process that could allocate political power legitimately both for the ruling 
KMT and emerging opposition parties was ‘voting for democracy’. According to 
Rigger, 
 
The ruling party believed it could use elections to enhance its legitimacy in an 
unstable era. At the same time, it expected to control the pace and direction of reform, 
because it was confident of its electoral ability. The opposition saw elections as an 
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opportunity to gain influence and to reach a larger audience. Although dissidents 
recognized the limitations of the electoral system, the majority of them were 
convinced that working to change the system from within was the most fruitful course 
open to them. 
(Rigger 1999: 33) 
 
The 1990s saw a peaceful transition to democratic elections: as explained above, 
prior to 1991 delegates purporting to represent mainland districts did not have to 
contest their seats because there was no way that elections could be held on the 
mainland, and so they maintained their positions unchallenged. The only national 
elections that occurred were ‘supplemental’ elections for new seats relating to 
Taiwan and nearby islands. However, in the 1990s the first non-supplemental 
elections were held, respectively for the National Assembly and the Legislative 
Yuan. Nearly all of the newly-elected delegates represented Taiwan (Copper 1994: 
23). In 1994, direct elections were brought in for the provincial governorship of 
Taiwan, and for the mayorship of Taipei and Kaohsiung; the first direct presidential 
election took place in 1996.  
   As well as changes in political structure, Taiwan also underwent a process of 
cultural transformation in national ideology and narration. In the previous section, 
we saw that the KMT consolidated its Chinese nationalism by creating a public 
amnesia about Taiwan’s past; there was little place for Taiwan in the KMT’s 
nationalist history and geography, other than in its current position as a retreat for 
preserving the ROC nation and Chinese culture. In fact, primary and secondary 
school textbooks on average devoted less than 3 per cent of their content to 
Taiwan (F.-C. Wang 2005: 62–63, citing Y.-T. Long 1987: 44); high school history 
textbooks had 5 per cent of their content on Taiwan, while geography textbooks 
less than 4 per cent (F.-C. Wang 2005: 62–63, citing calculations by Xiao-Feng 
Liu). However, following democratization, there was a new demand for knowing 
about Taiwan, and so a new way of narrating Taiwan was needed. A major change 
was announced in 1989 without serious controversy, in the form of a plan to 
publish new textbooks in a series called Renshi Taiwan (Knowing Taiwan) (Jacobs 
2012: 220). According to this proposed reform, students would learn about Taiwan 
in their first year, followed by China in their second year, and the world in the third 
year. Moreover, the new textbooks would treat all ethnic groups proportionately, 
and accommodate the ethnic diversity in Taiwan.  
   ‘Voting for democracy’ reached its fulfilment with the first direct presidential 
election, in 1996. During this time, the PRC held missile tests in an attempt to 
intimidate Taiwan’s electorate. These persistent cross-strait tensions offer perhaps 
a useful counterpoint to the approach taken by Britain towards achieving a peace 
agreement for Northern Ireland (see Brown in this special issue). Britain accepted 
the partition of Ireland in the 1920s, and by the late twentieth century it was taking 
a more moderate and pragmatic attitude to the conflict in Northern Ireland. In 1985 
the governments of Ireland and the UK signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The 
document said that Britain would consent to a united Ireland if a majority of the 
population of Northern Ireland agreed to it, and it established an 
‘Intergovernmental Conference’ by which ministers and officials would meet. 
Britain accepted that Ireland ‘will put forward views and proposals on matters 
relating to Northern Ireland’. Further: 
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The Conference shall concern itself with measures to recognise and accommodate 
the rights and identities of the two traditions in Northern Ireland, to protect human 
rights and to prevent discrimination. Matters to be considered in this area include 
measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral 
arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social 
discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form 
in Northern Ireland. 
(Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985) 
 
The process continued with a ‘Declaration on Peace’ in 1993, and the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998. The agreement contained details for a democratically elected 
power-sharing assembly in Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, 
and a British-Irish Council ‘to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial 
development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands’ 
(Belfast Agreement 1998). 
   In contrast, the PRC is still unable to recognize Taiwanese people’s rights and 
subjectivities (see Qiao in this special issue). The PRC’s attitude has affected the 
formation of Taiwanese nationalism, which has consequently taken stronger anti-
Chinese forms. For instance, the PRC’s missile provocations have prompted 
incredible anger from Taiwanese citizens: Lee Teng-Hui, to whom the PRC 
objected as an electoral candidate, was voted into presidential office, ironically 
because of this anger. There was also a furious rejection of the PRC’s claim to 
sovereignty over Taiwan, and resistance against both the ROC’s Chinese 
nationalism as well as the PRC’s Chinese nationalism. In 1996, a group of 
Taiwanese students burnt textbooks that expressed the KMT’s Chinese 
nationalism in front of Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, and they rejected Chinese 
identity with slogans such as ‘We Want to be Taiwanese, not Chinese!’, ‘Study 
Taiwanese History, not Chinese History’, and ‘Study Taiwanese Geography, not 
Chinese Geography’ (Hsiau 2000: 1). This anti-Chinese form of nationalism has 
been characterized by Horng-Luen Wang (2004) using Nietzsche’s term 
ressentiment. Wang argues that although Taiwan has many of the elements of a 
state, including anthem, flag, army, and diplomacy, there is a sense of grievance 
against the PRC for not allowing Taiwan to be treated fairly in international society 
or to receive universal recognition as a sovereign state. 
   In 1997, there was a turn as the new Knowing Taiwan textbooks came under 
attack from an elite group of waishengren under the leadership of a legislator 
named Ching-Hua Lee. The dispute was fundamental to narrations of Taiwan’s 
relations with China: the new textbooks interpreted Taiwan’s history from a 
Taiwan-centred perspective, stating that the Spanish, the Dutch, the Ming Dynasty 
loyalist Koxinga and his clan, the Qing, the Japanese, and the KMT were all 
foreign rulers or colonizers over Taiwan. In contrast, the group around Lee 
attempted to restore the formerly hegemonic Sino-centric paradigm, arguing that 
Taiwan has since ancient times been a part of China, and that Koxinga and his 
clan, followed by the Qing dynasty and the KMT, were certainly not foreign (F.-C. 
Wang 2005: 73–76). Knowing Taiwan was criticized as promoting Taiwan’s 
independence, attempting to erode Taiwan’s links with the Chinese Mainland, and 
as using education to remove a Chinese consciousness from the people of Taiwan 
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(Hughes 2011: 63, discussing H.-P. Wang et al. 1997). Indeed, the position of the 
waishengren is described by Stéphane Corcuff as being in a state of ‘liminality’; 
that is, a situation ‘during which an individual is in transition between a state of life 
that (s)he has not yet fully left, and a new stage into which (s)he has not fully 
entered’ (Corcuff 2011: 116). 
   Unfortunately, the Taiwanization movement since then has increasingly 
developed in a way that departs from Lee Teng-Hui’s vision of a shared identity, 
emphasizing instead ethnic particularity. Although the Taiwan-centred political 
transformation of the 1990s established the principle of equality between 
waishengren and benshengren, members of the waishengren who had previously 
enjoyed political privilege felt threatened by their new minority status. At the same 
time, benshengren in turn continued to feel resentful of waishengren and, on top of 
this, to feel threatened by the attitude of the PRC. Meanwhile, long-suppressed 
nativist energies, created through reflection on being regarded as the Others (i.e. 
as not-China and not-Chinese), began to explode in the form of Taiwanese 
ethnicity and nationalism. Rwei-Ren Wu, who is dedicated to projects relating to 
Taiwan’s nation-formation, argues that: 
 
Taiwan was broken off China before the latter began its transformation from empire 
into nation, and from this point on the historical trajectory of the two bifurcated 
sharply; while the nationalism in China rose after the moribund empire’s 1895 defeat 
to imagine a Chinese nation without Taiwan, the nationalism in Taiwan emerged as a 
reaction to Japan’s colonial nation-building to imagine a Taiwan that belonged only to 
the Taiwanese. In short, the bifurcated histories of China and Taiwan since 1895 
created two separate political fields that induced in both places movements of 
nationalism paralleled to – yet separate and different from – each other. 
(R.-R. Wu 2004: 17) 
 
While to some extent embracing multiculturalism and appropriating Taiwan’s 
indigenous heritage, the DPP’s overarching representation of itself was as 
embodying the marginalized Taiwanese majority. Indeed, many DPP activists were 
descendants of the victims of the 2-28 Incident and KMT authoritarianism. 
Taiwanization has further been used by the DPP as a political strategy to appeal to 
Taiwanese supporters and voters during election campaigns. However, the term 
‘Taiwanese’ is vague and ambiguous: while it may denote all residents of Taiwan, 
in areas where there was a struggle for power, the DPP tended to stress the 
politics of ethnicity and identity, and ‘Taiwanese’ thus merely stood for the majority 
Hoklo people. As such, Taiwanization also became associated with the majority 
Hoklo identity and ethnicity.  
   Here, it is worth noting a comparison with Ireland: the new Irish state 
emphasized the historical identity of the Celtic-Catholic majority of the population; 
as Declan Kiberd observes: 
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Those words Sinn Feîn (ourselves alone) 1 … became synonymous with the 
movement for national independence. That movement imagined the Irish people as 
an historical community, whose self-image was constructed long before the era of 
modern nationalism and the nation-state. There are many texts in the Irish language 
to bear this thesis out. 
(Kiberd 1995: 1) 
 
However, alongside this emphasis on ethnic and cultural Celtic and Catholic 
identity, Kiberd also notes: 
 
the extraordinary capacity of Irish society to assimilate new elements through all its 
major phases. Far from providing a basis for doctrines of racial purity, they seem to 
take pleasure in the fact that identity is seldom straightforward and given, more often 
a matter of negotiation and exchange. 
(Kiberd 1995: 1) 
 
If Irish nationalism contained strands of ethnic and cultural particularity and senses 
of hybridity, Taiwanese ethnic and cultural nationalism must be framed as an 
example of a discourse of strategic essentialism. In the beginning of his article 
‘Imagining Taiwan’, Cheng-Feng Shih pointed out that: 
 
On the way to democratic consolidation, Taiwan, as a multiethnic settlers’ society, 
has faced the challenge of how to forge its national identity. If we understand nation 
as an ‘imagined community’, to borrow the term from Benedict Anderson…, the task 
of nation-building is to reach consensus on the question of ‘who[se] community’ and 
‘how to imagine’. 
(C.-F. Shih 2003:14-1) 
 
Indeed, the formation of Taiwanese nationalism was a process of self-conscious 
adoption of various nationalist strategies that had been identified by western 
scholars. The DPP and pro-DPP scholars appeared to take on a self-conscious 
primordialist perspective to develop a Taiwanese nationalism which reflected the 
old linguistic nationalism of nineteenth-century Europe, in which each supposedly 
‘true’ nation ‘was marked off by its own peculiar language and literary culture, 
which together expressed that people’s historical genius’ (see B. Anderson 2001: 
40). As such, was the DPP attempting to prove itself to be a ‘true’ nation, by 
developing a totalizing and essentialist narrative of an ‘imagined’ community based 
on shared Taiwanese language, Taiwanese history, Taiwanese ethnicity, and 
Taiwanese culture? 
   The DPP’s Chen Shui-Bian was in power as the first elected non-KMT president 
between 2000 and 2008. During this period, new cultural and tourist and recreation 
policies were developed and implemented: in contrast to the KMT representation 
of Taiwan as the last bastion of authentic Chinese culture, the DPP attempted to 
demonstrate to the international community that Taiwan was a sovereign state with 
                                                 
1
 Sinn Feîn is the name of a political party, founded in 1905 and associated with militant 
nationalist republicanism against British rule in Ireland and in later decades in Northern 
Ireland. It is today the third-largest political party on the island of Ireland. 
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its own distinct culture. Culture was constructed through ‘invented traditions’, a 
phenomenon explored by Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds 1983). There was thus a 
conscious ‘invention’ of tradition and authenticity, in which Taiwanese heritage and 
religious practices and rituals were selected, re-generated, and promoted as tourist 
festivals and destinations defined by cultural particularity as well as potential 
vehicles for Taiwanese national culture and identity. These were further 
designated as ‘flagship’ tourist events and also commercialized as consumable 
goods in the global capitalist flow (see F.-L. Shih 2006: 276–279).  
   As such, as noted above, in the play of ethnicity politics, the DPP in many 
instances has reduced the meanings of ‘Taiwanese’ to standing only for the 
majority ethnicity of Taiwan; that is, the Hoklo people. Indeed, this is a critical 
element in the DPP’s strategy, which is to showcase an invented culture (i.e., the 
Hoklo culture, with few token Hakka, Formosa Austronesian and waishengren 
cultures) and an imagined community (i.e., the Hoklo communities, with few token 
Hakka, Formosa Austronesian and waishengren communities) that is local, 
essential and natural, which contrasts with what can be found in China, and which 
is enduring in a globalizing world. A-Chin Hsiau, who has paid extensive attention 
to Taiwanese cultural nationalism, points out that: 
 
Based on the recognition that for specific political and practical purposes in identity 
politics, marginalized social groups cannot act without stabilized identities, strategic 
essentialism expresses a positive attitude toward and/or refers to the very act of 
essentializing the identities of such groups as a means to these ends. Strategic 
essentialism, however, can rarely remain just ‘strategic’. In practice, any essentialist 
claim of identity strategically constructed for its practical effects typically turns out to 
be a form of de facto essentialism, which in turn causes essentialist reactions. 
(Hsiau 2005: 127) 
 
Yet, from within the limits of the DPP’s essentializations and ethnicizations emerge 
the problems of the ‘Others’ and of the politics of a multi-cultural society. If the 
anthropology of Taiwan is a kind of barometer of the narration of Taiwan’s 
subjectivity, it is worth taking note of how post-1980s anthropology of Taiwan has 
been influenced by bentuhua discourses to contextualize Taiwan in its own right 
and within its various processes. Taiwan by the late 1980s was no longer a 
simulacrum of a greater China but is instead its own place. But the anthropology of 
Taiwan has not, as it were, been ‘colonized’ by bentuhua discourses but has rather 
worked with and against them in the writing of a Taiwan profoundly implicated in 
local, regional and global connectivities. This shift has certainly generated a new 
trend of Taiwan-focused and comparative ethnographies; one good example is 
Robert Weller’s Alternate Civilities (1999) which contrasts fieldwork data from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and China, and takes proper consideration of the specific 
history and socio-cultural experience of each location. For instance, Weller 
demonstrates that the worship of ghosts thrived in Taiwan in the 1980s as a 
response to the new developments of a global capitalist economy in a way that 
‘tends towards utilitarian granting of individual desires, dissolving the local 
community interests of temple-based religion’ (1999: 88) and thus imperial patterns 
of order and belonging. He also notes that the emergence of ‘Buddhism in the 
Human Realm’ (人間佛教, renjian fojiao) and the increasing role of women in the 
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movement, (such as seen in the Tzu Chi Association), are ‘defining new kinds of 
communities no longer based on local geography’ (1999: 88). Weller’s Taiwan is 
described by Paul-Francois Tremlett in his ‘Introduction’ to Re-Writing Culture in 
Taiwan (2009) as: 
 
a Taiwan that cannot be assimilated to the cultural and historical experiences of any 
elsewhere and which simultaneously throws down the gauntlet for new, comparative 
studies – religious beliefs and practices emerge as vehicles for different kinds of 
social action and identification, whereby what emerges is not the playing out of a 
Sinic code or deep structure of Chineseness, but rather the active and contested 
making of culture, place, and identity by agents with varying access to sources of 
economic, political, and symbolic capital and power. 
(Tremlett 2009: 11) 
 
I myself conducted research on the issues around maiden death and its related 
death practices, regarding religious practices in Taiwan as being always embodied 
or embedded in economic, political, and social processes in the globalizing world. 
My research took place in Taipei City and Taipei County during the mid-1990s and 
the mid-2000s, when urbanization, democratization, and increasing female mobility 
were causing the breakdown of traditions. It was shown that Chinese ancestral 
orthopraxy never manages to constitute itself as a fully complete structure, and its 
incompleteness provides spaces in which other practices and systems of relations 
can emerge in Taiwanese society (F.-L. Shih 2007). These findings have 
significant consequences for how Taiwan was re-narrated. If religious practices 
merely legitimate an imperial Chineseness, then they are broadly a passive 
reflection of a given Chineseness. If the relationship is drawn differently – if 
religious practices in Taiwan constitute a partially autonomous sphere – then they 
might also be understood as vehicles for different kinds of social action and 
identification, and could further be seen as the condition for social re-invention that 
may create the possibilities for changes in Taiwan (also see F.-L. Shih 2009).  
   This shift and trend in the anthropological study and analysis of Taiwan has 
broken new ground: in Tremlett’s words, ‘nothing here is essentialized. Culture, 
identity, society, religion – these “things” are not objects passively awaiting 
anthropological description, but are the contested sites of human social action’ 
(Tremlett 2009: 11). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Until recently, Taiwan was not a free subject as regards thought or action, and the 
narrating of Taiwan’s subjectivity cannot be properly understood without an 
appreciation of the forces that have been imposed on the island. In Framework 
One, Taiwan was narrated as part of China and as embodying a particular form of 
Chineseness; therefore, to understand the narration of Taiwan as a metonym of 
China, we need to analyse the configurations of KMT power and domination. We 
can see that the KMT’s Chinese nationalism as developed in the early twentieth 
century reflects a primordialist perspective, in which the nation-state is regarded as 
an expression of the essence of a people, in their language, history, culture, and 
territory. However, the people and culture represented in KMT nationalism for the 
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most part reflected only typical aspects of Han ethnicity. This nationalism was 
forcibly imposed on Taiwan during the martial law period, and Taiwan was 
Sinicized and represented as the last bastion of authentic Chinese culture. This, 
though, was a KMT invention which did not correspond with the full picture of the 
reality of Taiwan’s history, people, languages or culture. Furthermore, KMT 
Chineseness dominated the representation of Taiwan in anthropological studies of 
Taiwan in that period. Taiwan was studied as merely a window through which a 
greater continuing imperial China, characterized by the idea of Chineseness, could 
be brought into view. I argue that the way the KMT narrated Taiwan as an 
embodiment of Chineseness was only one version of Chineseness, reflecting only 
one Chinese culture: that of a Mandarin ruling class.  
   In Framework Two, Taiwan since the transition to democracy was re-narrated as 
a national subject in its own right, or in some DDP instances as standing for a 
Hoklo subjectivity, and to understand this new narration we need to analyse the 
configurations of bentuhua discourses and the DPP’s power struggle and political 
strategies. We see that the DPP developed education, tourism and recreation 
policies to create the Taiwanese as a re-imagined community; while DPP state 
discourse was primordialist, its approach to culture was promoted through invented 
traditions. I argue that the DPP engaged in a sort of playful or post-modern 
primordialism, self-consciously inventing a form of Taiwanese nationalism which 
stood in most instances only for the majority Hoklo subjectivity. However, although 
the DPP’s strategic approach to crafting nationalism and national subjectivity was 
probably necessary for self-assertion in the context of a democratic struggle, and 
although there is recognition in Taiwanese nationalism of its inventedness and 
historicity, how can we judge the difference between strategic essentialism and un-
reflexive chauvinism? We witness that Taiwan’s democracy grew in close 
relationship to nationalism, but, as Craig Calhoun notes: ‘nationalism was also (at 
least often) an attempt to reconcile liberty and ethical universalism with felt 
community’. He also asks: ‘how can we reconcile the important potential of multiple 
and hybrid cultural and social identities with political participation and rights?’ 
(Calhoun 2008: 444) 
   We understand people as implicated in social actions which to some extent they 
are not entirely free to choose. Ironically, despite the DPP’s resistance to the KMT, 
the DDP’s strategies of nationalism were not much different in form from those 
pursued by the KMT, as the KMT was the only example of a nationalist political 
party from which, as it were, the DPP learned its craft. I argue that although DPP 
nationalism was a form of post-modern primordialism, it still bears striking 
similarities to its KMT ‘Chinese’ counter-part: both nationalisms are strategically 
essentialized, assuming an underlying unity out of which a common national 
culture and subjectivity are formed, and this underlying unity is, respectively, an 
essential ‘Chineseness’ or an essential ‘Taiwaneseness’. Here, we witness that the 
KMT’s essentialism triggered the DPP’s essentialist resistance. While the DPP’s 
reactionary version of ‘Taiwaneseness’ may have been constructed strategically 
for its practical uses, it also turns out to be a form of de facto essentialism, in turn 
bringing about other essentialist reactions such as indigenous ‘First Nation’ 
nationalism (Simon 2009). 
However, we also see that bentuhua discourses have inspired the crafting of 
Taiwanese subjectivity and nationalism, and have also influenced the post-1980s 
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anthropology of Taiwan. There has since then been a significant move away from 
the frameworks that typified the 1960s and 1980s – namely, a structure of 
essential Chineseness – towards the contextualization of Taiwan within its various 
processes of industrialization, urbanization, democratization, localization and 
globalization etc. The anthropology of Taiwan today represents plural voices and 
new claims on multiple histories and narrations in a globalizing web of connections 
that reach across space and time and suggest a Taiwan in both tension and 
transition. 
This critical review of KMT and DPP nationalisms has further made use of 
comparisons with Ireland. I consider Taiwan and Ireland as both situated as the 
Other in processes of colonization. As such, I attempt to demonstrate that it is 
through the concept of Otherness that Taiwan and Ireland came to be places of 
distinct histories, marked by difficult formations of subjectivities. This Otherness is 
also what connects Taiwan and Ireland, through the experience of struggle for self-
assertion over hegemonic domination. In both cases, we understand that the 
inhabitants of an island adjacent to a larger country have had not only to resist 
political domination and subordinate status, but also to negotiate identities that 
have been imposed upon them or used to maintain barriers. In the post-colonial 
era, Ireland and Taiwan have both sought to recover their pre-colonial pasts, as 
seen in the official recognition of indigenous cultures and languages. However, the 
present also contains colonial legacies, and I argue that there is the risk that a new 
‘official’ identity will be at the expense of the rights of a minority who retain an 
identity that was formerly hegemonic. In the case of Ireland, that fear led to 
partition, which in turn led to a continuing conflict over identity in the north of the 
island. However, through consideration of the on-going struggle for peace in the 
north of Ireland, a struggle based in an attempt to shift nationalist politics away 
from identity and onto civility and the processes of democratic government, it 
becomes possible to imagine an alternative future for Taiwan (and Ireland). 
   Here, before ending this paper, I would like to raise several questions while 
arguing for an understanding of national subjectivity that embraces broader 
perspectives than the narrow frameworks of ethnic and cultural nationalism: Has 
globalization led to renewed nationalism and the strengthening of boundaries in 
Taiwan and Ireland? Is ethnicity an essential quality or merely one choice of 
identification? At what point is essentialism for Taiwan, as a strategy, no longer 
needed? While strategically it may have been useful as a vehicle for democratic 
struggle, is a new strategy needed in the second decade of the 21st century, after 
Taiwan’s transition to democracy? In particular, how should we consider the 
narration of a subject beyond the subjectivities of imperialism, colonialism and 
nationalism, and instead in the contexts of transnational cosmopolitanism, digital 
modernization, and globalization? 
   In the main discussion of this paper, I show that imperialism, colonialism and 
nationalism have all imposed specific limits on how people in Taiwan belong 
together through the identification of a subject with specific intentions and 
imaginaries and so on. However, a fuller picture needs to consider the 
development of extended international networks formed by decades of diaspora 
and immigration, as well as by capitalism and gender politics, which mark the 
decline of the ethnic nationalist subject and the emergence of new forms and 
visions of belonging (also see Meaney 2011). Moreover, transnational 
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cosmopolitan processes expand through the new digital media, alongside older 
networks of kin and ethnicity, migration and diaspora, according to logics which 
seem a million miles from the intentions and imaginaries of any previous subject. 
Here, it is important to note that in order to be transnational, it is not necessary to 
be first a nation; although Taiwan is not recognized as a nation, it is a de facto 
nation-state. Taiwan is situated in a state of what Corcuff calls ‘liminality’, namely, 
‘being neither a state nor a non-state’, and he suggests we should ‘explore how 
liminality can be adapted from an analysis of a transitional period into a focus on 
spatial inter-connectivity within a timeframe’ (Corcuff in this special issue: 53), in 
order to study the sociology of Taiwan’s nationalism and international relations. 
However, whether analysis emphasizes a transitional period or a transnational 
condition, both represent a different way of thinking about international relations of 
power in tension, and a new way of connecting with other nations or other places 
in transition. Thus, we must consider ourselves on the edge of new forms and 
visions of belonging that bear no relation to old models of ethnic and cultural 
nationalisms. This requires new concepts and practices – in short, a new language, 
if we are to be able to make sense of them.  
   Post-modern critiques by the likes of Edward Soja (1989) suggest that places 
should no longer be understood to be natural facts or passive objects. Rather, 
places are constituted or fabricated in and through specific types of human action, 
social relationships and connections. It is through particular articulations of 
connectedness and relatedness that places come into being. Indeed, in both 
Taiwan and Ireland, Chineseness and Britishness, or Taiwaneseness and 
Irishness, were and are imagined and invented, with technologies such as printing 
and the media creating a national bond of solidarity. The narration of the national 
subject, then, is not the expression of particular ethnic and cultural characteristics, 
but the social cement of a new kind of greater universalism in the clash of 
technologies for connectivity. Consequently, I conclude with the thought that we 
may usefully think of Taiwan and Ireland in a new framework as network societies 
that can be studied in the light of connectedness and relatedness through which 
they have been constituted as places in an inter-connected world. In my view, 
Taiwan’s subjectivity and Irish subjectivity could be enriched by comparing what 
aspects of ‘Otherness’ are shared, but also by exploring ‘the perspective on what 
humanity shares’ (Calhoun 2008: 429); namely, the complex webs, links, 
relationships and connections through which Taiwan and Ireland have both 
become increasingly (dis) integrated parts of our globalizing world. 
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Abstract 
 
This article tries to adapt the anthropological concept of ‘liminality’ to three fields of 
research: China–Taiwan relations; the ontology of Taiwan Studies; and the 
conceptual development of geopolitics. Liminality, as translated into these fields, 
refers here to a spatial/temporal position of 'geopolitical threshold', rather than to 
an in-between, transitional period of time. The concept is used here as a substitute 
for, or nuanced alternative to, ‘marginality’, with reference to the growing debate 
over the significance of Taiwan as a geopolitical entity in the face of a China 
experiencing global renaissance. Beyond this, the paper is also an attempt to 
reflect upon the historical significance of the emergence of Taiwan since the early 
seventeenth century, first as a geopolitical object of appropriation or control, and 
later on as a geopolitical subject of its own, to help reassess Taiwan’s global 
significance. Finally, this is a contribution to the better understanding of the 
geopolitics of asymmetrical interdependence between a major state and a minor, 
neighbouring one, within the wider frame of a geopolitics of values. 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the spring of 2011, a debate has agitated American scholars, observers, and 
policy-makers about the extent to which Taiwan matters with regard to the national 
interest of the United States of America. A new perception of Taiwan as an 
increasingly marginal geopolitical entity in the face of China emerging as a global 
superpower raises the question of how relevant it is today either to defend or to 
study Taiwan. At the same time, and since the 2000s at least, there has been an 
introspective movement among Taiwan specialists about how to define their field 
with regard to Chinese studies. 1  The convergence of these two issues has 
produced interesting debates in recent symposia and their preparatory meetings, 
such as the First World Congress of Taiwan Studies (held in Taipei in April 2012) 
                                                 
1
 For how Taiwan has been misinterpreted as a local example of Chinese culture see Hong 
and Murray (2005); for what can be said about the ontological relations between Chinese 
studies and the study of Taiwan, see Corcuff (2010a, 2010b); for how to connect the study 
of Taiwan, with its specificities, to wider Chinese studies see Lupke (2012). 
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and recent regional congresses of Taiwan Studies held by the North American, 
European, and Japanese Associations of Taiwan Studies.2 
 
Taiwan’s Geopolitical Importance 
 
Taiwan’s integration into the world’s written history started late, in the sixteenth 
century. However, being situated close to both the Japanese and the Chinese 
empires, and from the early seventeenth century being a European colonial 
outpost in East Asia, Formosa rapidly emerged as an important geopolitical 
element of the earlier process of globalization that started with Europe’s colonial 
expansion. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, Taiwan has had a 
significantly more important geopolitical role than the size of its territory or 
population would appear to entail. Is this a ‘Taiwan Paradox’? And is Taiwan 
unique in this matter, as there are quite a few other places around the world where 
a small territory has yielded strategic importance, due to reasons such as the 
positive value attributed to its geographical given, or processes of human 
settlement, international trade, territorial and national building movements, wars, 
etc. Examples are numerous, from Gibraltar to Bali or Singapore, from Panama to 
Okinawa, from the Spratleys and Paracel Islands to the Falkland Islands or 
Pinnacle Islets.3 Many, obviously, are islands, peninsulas, archipelagos, or straits, 
and reasons for their special significance may include: being situated on the 
immediate periphery of one or more important power(s); being on the crossroads 
of important trade routes; being able to deny or facilitate access to inland or deep-
sea regions; possessing, or being reputed to possess, key natural resources; or 
being on a frontline between two areas of influence. 
   However, Taiwan’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis China certainly presents an 
especially high degree of complexity, notably due to the island’s cultural links with 
China, and to China’s irredentist posture on the Taiwan issue. It is not a mere 
geographical question of commanding a strait or of access to inland regions.4 For 
geopoliticists, could the study of Formosa’s relation to China help further develop 
new paradigms applicable to other geopolitical case studies in which a smaller 
entity has to deal with a larger one, without necessarily being either subject to it or 
fully free from its influence? Is Taiwan simply a modernized version of 
‘Finlandization’, a case among many others of delicate relations with an important 
neighbour, or is it a specific case, which nevertheless can be compared to others 
in order to develop geopolitical theory? 
 
Political Agendas and Historical Discourses 
 
Although many studies have reflected on Taiwan’s relationship with China (from 
historical, economical, societal, and military points of view, among others), these 
                                                 
2
 Respectively NATSA (http://www.na-tsa.org/new/), EATS (http://eats-taiwan.eu/), and 
JATS (http://jats.gr.jp/). 
3
 Better known as Senkaku by the Japanese or Diaoyutai by the Chinese. On this point, 
please also see the caption for Figure 2. 
4
 In this respect, relations with China appear to be an important dimension of Taiwan 
Studies, together with more local and domestic issues. 
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have, regrettably, often consisted of directly- or indirectly-politicized discourses as 
soon as they have touched upon issues of Taiwan’s history, identity, and 
belonging. Figure 1 below shows this plurality and evolution of the most vocal 
discourses over time. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Competing Discourses of Legitimization Regarding the Taiwan 
Issue by Political Actors of the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait Since 1941 
 
Such politicized discourses have generally been formulated with the purpose of 
justifying a particular situation or desired outcome: 
 
• For China’s Nationalist Party [KMT] and the Republic of China [ROC]: 
while still based on the Mainland at that time, the KMT’s aim from 1941 to 
1945 was to recover the island ceded to Japan in 1895 by its predecessor 
regime, the Manchu empire; 
• For the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] after the foundation of the 
People’s Republic of China [PRC] on the mainland in 1949 and since then: 
the CCP’s aim is to annex the island where its archenemy, the KMT, had 
retreated after losing the civil war, and where the ROC had managed to 
survive; 
• For the KMT after its retreat to Taiwan: the KMT’s aim now was (and still is) 
to justify its hold on its last shelter, which had been integrated into China 
only recently before the KMT’s exile to the island, and with difficulty (the 
1947 massacre of the Taiwanese elite by Chinese troops); 
• For the movement for Taiwan’s autonomy within China (1945–1946, after 
Taiwan’s integration in ROC), and the Taiwan independence movement 
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(since the 1947 events): the aim is to justify Taiwan’s independence vis-à-
vis the now-insularized Republic of China, change its name, and sever 
relations (including constitutional links) with the continental past of the 
Republic ‘of China’. 
 
   Each constructed discourse was aimed at describing the nature of Taiwan–China 
relations in a way that justified inclusion, appropriation, or independence, 
subjection, proximity or distantiation. The politicized rewriting of Taiwan’s history 
by Chinese authorities started in fact with the 1937–1945 Sino-Japanese war, and 
not before. More specifically, the changed started with Chiang Kai-Shek’s first 
mention of Taiwan, around 1941, as a topic of modern Chinese nationalism, in the 
context of mobilization against Japan. 
 
A Recent Element in Chinese Nation-Building Discourse 
 
Before 1941, Taiwan was of little interest for China and the Chinese. ‘In the 1930s, 
before the war against Japan, none of us in China would really care about Taiwan’, 
recalled an old, first-generation ‘Mainlander’ (外省人) resident of Taiwan in a 
discussion with the author in 1997. As this interviewee suggested, with the war 
against Japan, perceptions started to change.  
   After the ‘Mukden incident’ of 18 September 1931, by which Japan started its 
invasion of Manchuria, mobilization against Japan was launched. Maps of the 
Republic of China started specifically to emphasize the loss of Taiwan to Japan in 
1895, in accordance with the treaty of Shimonoseki, by the Manchu empire after its 
defeat by Japan in the 1894–1895 war. For instance, a learned society in 
Shanghai, by the name of Rixin Yudi Xueshe (日新輿地學社), published in 1932 a 
‘New Map of China’s Situation’ (‘新中華形勢大地圖’) (see Figure 2 overleaf), listing 
recent foreign aggressions which had led to portions of Chinese territory being ‘cut 
off’ [‘割’] from the motherland. An emphasis was clearly put on Manchuria, called 
(for political reasons) the ‘Three [North] Eastern Provinces’ (‘東三省’). The map 
also listed all previous losses, including feudatory but independent states, such as 
Burma, while, interestingly, nothing was said about Hong Kong. Taiwan, however, 
was now listed as having been ‘cut off and given to Japan’ (‘割於日’] in the twenty-
first year of Guangxu, or 1895. 
   Taiwan had thus become a new element in China’s discourse on national 
humiliation. However, if ‘irredentism’ is the refusal to accept current boundaries 
and the wish to see a territory that has been lost to a foreign country, or which has 
declared independence, incorporated back into the motherland, 5  the young 
Chinese Republic in 1932 did not yet express irredentism over a small island lost 
decades before by another regime, the Qing dynasty. 
   In 1936, just a few months before Chiang Kai-Shek was forced by the ‘Young 
Marshall’ Chang Hsüeh-Liang, during the Xi’an Incident, into a KMT-CCP alliance 
against the Japanese, Taiwan was still not yet an issue in mobilizing China against 
Japan: it was simply an argument in a discursive construction of the Japanese 
enemy, in reaction to Tokyo’s imperialism in China. That year, in a government 
map published by the Bureau of Roads of the Economic Council of China (全國經
                                                 
5
 See also note 10 below. 
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濟委員會公路處) featuring the railroads built by the young Republic, the island of 
Taiwan was simply hidden behind the caption (see Figure 3 opposite6). It was five 
years after the Mukden incident of 1931 over Shanghai in January and February 
1932; a clear sign that mentioning Taiwan as having been ‘cut off’ from China was 
not (yet) equivalent to ‘claiming it back’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Details from the ‘New Map of China’s Situation’  
(‘蘇甲榮編裝，新中華形勢大地圖，上海’), 1932 (Private collection). 
(Left: ‘Do not forget national humiliation [毋望國恥]: swift occupation [夲佔] of 
the three [north]eastern provinces of our country [after the incident of] 18 
September 1931; the [first] war of Shanghai of 28 January 1932’. Right: 
‘Taiwan. Cut off in the twenty-first year of Guangxu [1895] and given to 
Japan’ [In red: ‘光緒二十一年割於日’]) 
Pictures by Stéphane Corcuff, 2007 
 
                                                 
6
 One may notice that the then-named Pinnacle Islets do not appear on this map, even 
though the scale would have permitted it. These islands have been hotly disputed territory 
between China, Taiwan, and Japan since the 1960s, and are now known as either the 
Diaoyutai or the Senkakus. 
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Figure 3: Detail from the 1936 government map of China’s roads and 
railroads (Private collection) 
Picture by Stéphane Corcuff, 2007 
 
   Around 1941, Chiang Kai-Shek started to incorporate Taiwan into a discourse 
vilifying Japan and aimed at mobilizing China against the Japanese, or rallying the 
people behind himself. Since then, Taiwan has remained constantly on the 
Chinese agenda as a symbol of national division, except during the years 1945–
1949, when it was effectively integrated into the Republic. From ‘cut off and given 
to Japan’, Taiwan would become ‘stolen by the Japanese’, as indicated in the joint 
declaration made by the press attachés of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston 
Churchill and Chiang Kai-Shek, the three allied leaders who had met in Cairo in 
December 1943. This was part of the so-called ‘Cairo Declaration’; from a neutral 
mention of a historical fact, the discourse had changed into a political claim: China 
had become irrendentist.  
   However, it is still only with the retreat of the central government of the Republic 
of China to Taipei on 7 December 1949 that Taiwan specifically became a stake – 
both in China’s domestic geopolitics (between the now two Chinese governments) 
and in Chinese historiography. Not even the Sino-Japanese war of 1937–1945 had 
achieved this. With the events of 1949, Taiwan became a place of exile for the 
defeated regime of the Republic of China, and a place to be conquered for the 
newly founded People’s Republic of China, which was unhappy to see the ROC 
still surviving on the other side of the strait. Both regimes had to legitimize their 
official goals: on one side, ‘Taking back the Mainland’ was the stance of the ROC, 
now reduced to the recently recovered island; on the other, ‘Liberating the Island’ 
was the goal of the PRC on the Mainland. Both regimes, though, also tried to 
legitimize another agenda: for the ROC on Taiwan, emphasizing that Taiwan 
belonged to China was a justification for the policy of suppressing the Taiwan 
independence movement, which threatened to eradicate the remains of the 
Republic of China. It also helped to avoid facing the truth: the regime was in a sort 
of exile, as the so-called 1945 ‘retrocession’ had not technically happened in 
international law, in the absence of a formal treaty between the ROC and Japan at 
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that time. For the PRC, meanwhile, the goal was to eradicate the Republic of 
China, which had not fully disappeared, to bring Chiang Kai-Shek back to the 
Mainland and to put a formal end to the civil war. This would consecrate the 
People’s Republic’s full and undeniable status as successor to the Republic. 
Figure 4 below shows how claims by Chinese government(s) regarding 
sovereignty over Taiwan have evolved. 
   The exile of the KMT on Taiwan represents the opposite end of the spectrum in 
historiography of Taiwan’s years of change, starting from 1941. Both the ROC, 
reduced to Taiwan, and the PRC, longing to put a formal end to its predecessor 
regime, had to explain that Taiwan was fully a part of China, had always been so, 
had been wrongfully stolen by the Japanese in 1895, and had been formally 
restored to China in 1945.7 Such a discourse was formulated with China’s division 
into two competing governments, and not earlier. In September 1945, after the 
Japanese capitulation, although General Douglas MacArthur had agreed to the 
occupation of Taiwan by Chiang Kai-Shek’s troops, the island was still not 
mentioned as a part of Chinese territory in official documents (which the ROC 
would discursively turn into a formal ‘retrocession’ act), such as the official China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Evolving Discourses Regarding the Issue of Sovereignty over 
Taiwan by Mainland Governments since 1895 
 
Handbook 1937–1945, published by the Chungking (Chongqing) government of 
Chiang Kai-Shek. This remained the case in the updated edition of 1946, posterior 
by many months to the actual occupation of Formosa by ROC forces, which had 
begun on 25 October 1945. Although the opening chapter, entitled ‘General 
Information’, devotes its last two pages to a few paragraphs about Formosa, 
                                                 
7
 The legal reality of that 1945 ‘restoration’, called ‘glorious’ in Chinese (‘光復’), being a 
much more complex issue that the two governments claimed. 
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insisting on the ‘patriotic resistance’ of ‘Formosan Revolutionists’ against the 
Japanese and in favour Chinese recovery of the Island, the passages about 
Taiwan in the edition published in 1947, more than a year and a half after Taiwan’s 
return into Chinese hands, still had not been updated from the description of Taiwan 
as a Japanese colony in the first, 1945, edition (see particularly pp. 33–34). Similarly, 
Taiwan is significantly absent from a list of provinces of the official Chinese territory 
(p. 1–3, see Figure 5 below). 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 1937–1945: A 
Comprehensive Survey of Major Developments in China in Eight Years of 
War (New York: Macmillan, 1947) 
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   It was, apparently, only when Chiang started to consider Formosa as a probable 
retreat, around 1948, that Taiwan’s strategic importance started to be seriously 
considered. 8 
 
Focus of This Paper 
 
As Duara (1995), Détienne (2003, 2010), and several others have reminded us, 
‘national narratives’ have tended to cluster history into rigid and politicized 
historiographical frames. Following decades of such politicization in the 
historiography of China–Taiwan relations, there is, today, a need to re-examine the 
nature of Taiwan’s complex relation to China, and to understand it from a pure, yet 
integrated and multi-dimensional, geopolitical perspective that does not aim at 
justifying a particular political or nation-building program. This understanding is a 
precondition for the development of Taiwan studies as a genuinely academic field 
both inside and outside the borders of Taiwan, including both in China and in the 
rest of the world.  
   This paper does not explore relations between aboriginal peoples and 
Taiwanese of Chinese (and often Chinese-aboriginal) ancestry, where the notion 
of ‘marginality’ can be mobilized in addressing the status of aboriginal people in 
Taiwan, at least before the early 1990s and the presidential administrations of Lee 
Teng-Hui (1988–2000) and Chen Shui-Bian (2000–2008).9 Neither does it grapple 
substantially with Taiwan’s relation to Japan, where some dimensions of what will 
be described here as ‘liminality’ can also be applied. When qualifying Taiwan as 
‘liminal’, this paper is not either an attempt to describe or analyse Taiwan’s 
ethnicity, pluralistic culture, national identifications, or position in the world (such as 
being a gateway to another region, a nodus of contacts in a globalized world, a 
territory unable to choose between different national identities or a state left in a 
limbo of poor diplomatic recognition and ambiguity about its status in international 
law). Though the concept may be extended in these directions if our use of 
liminality here is proven to be valid or useful, characterizing Taiwan as ‘liminal’ in 
this paper focuses on just one of Taiwan’s important geopolitical relations with the 
outside world: the relation that the island has to, or with, China. Perhaps a 
paradigmatic element will be identified, which, mutatis mutandis, may guide 
geopoliticists in analysing relations in other, partially similar yet always specific 
situations in the world. Such situations may be found where there is, or has been, 
a strong geopolitical entity interacting with a smaller one that has, in spite of its 
smaller size, a word to say in an asymmetrical political and discursive exchange. 
This is often the case in the geopolitics of values; here, as often, an imbalanced 
one, in which actors mobilize what they see as worth fighting for – the difference 
                                                 
8
 More specifically, Chiang Kai-Shek started to prepare for a retreat as early as 1948. 
Several signs indicate this, such as the transfer to Taiwan of the treasures of the National 
Palace Museum (initially to Taichung), and of some political prisoners, and of the faculty 
members of the Peking University (to Taipei) that year. 
9
 In mentioning aboriginal issues, I follow here Scott Simon’s (University of Ottawa) 
recommendation not to capitalize the words ‘aboriginal’ or ‘aborigine’, as they are not ethnic 
terms per se, and would deny each group’s specificities as a nation equipped with its own 
language, cultural habits and myths. 
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between values and norms – in order (a minima) to protect their values at home, 
and (a maxima), when considered necessary, to impose them to others, outside 
their boundaries. 
   Following this introduction to a geopolitics of values in international society, as 
well as to the asymmetrical nature of cross-straits relations and the precautions to 
be taken when addressing questions of Taiwan’s status, historiography, and 
belonging, the paper will continue with a brief review of different theories that can 
be mobilized to characterize Taiwan’s relation to China, along with a short 
explanation of why they appear to be of little help. Building on this, the paper 
attempts to identify some of the most salient traits of Taiwan’s relation to China, 
although it should be borne in mind that, depending on one’s angle of approach, 
several other key traits could probably also be isolated, which are not mentioned 
here. The paper then proposes to translate, adapt, and further develop the 
anthropological notion of ‘liminality’ into the field of geopolitics. Such a translation 
has been attempted previously, but without the concept being substantially 
adapted to the specific needs of geopolitics, or at least without it being used in a 
way that really addresses situations that are both temporal and spatial (‘spatio-
temporelles'), rather than based only on a change in time, as supposed by the 
original anthropological approach of Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner. The 
paper will then characterize Taiwan’s ‘discursive and geopolitical liminality vis-à-vis 
China’, by mobilizing several examples pertaining to different disciplines. The 
paper concludes that translating liminality in geopolitics is not about describing a 
transitional phase, but rather about describing a space of connexion developed 
over a long period of time. 
 
The Difficulty of Characterizing Taiwan’s Relations to China with Existing 
Theories 
 
Understanding the nature of Taiwan’s relation to China certainly has to be made 
with reference to what Fernand Braudel called ‘longue durée’ (which can be 
rendered in English as ‘history in the long haul’). Reducing the focus to the current 
state of cross-strait relations, or merely going back to the post-World War II period, 
would limit the capacities of an analyst to detect the complexities of a relationship 
constructed over a much longer timeframe. Unfortunately, proponents of politicized 
discourses justifying unification or independence often lack a sense of precise 
historical facts. For an analyst, whose purpose is to deconstruct existing 
historiographies, Taiwan’s relation to China is a complex object that is ‘neither this 
nor that’, and that yet still needs to be identified and characterized. 
 
The Ancient Knowledge of Taiwan 
 
Clearly-documented relations between China and Taiwan started to develop in the 
late sixteenth century, when the declining Ming dynasty had fallen prey to Sino-
Japanese piratical activity on its southeastern coasts and to Manchu pressure on 
its northern frontier. Earlier knowledge of Taiwan by China is possible, but it is 
neither formally attested to by historical documents, nor supported by the overall 
geopolitical logic of pre-Ming dynasties’ weak interest in exploration and 
exploitation of overseas territories (the Song dynasty [960–1279] had developed a 
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powerful commercial navy, but we have no record of a discovery of Taiwan during 
this period). In the post-2008 political debate over textbooks in Taiwan, 
characterized by a methodical attempt at the resinicization of Taiwan (Corcuff, 
2011, Chapter 2), an old idea has been advanced again: that the reference to the 
‘discovery’ of a mythical territory – Yizhou (夷洲) – during an expedition in 230 CE, 
which is found in Chen Shou’s Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms (三國志) (吳書, 
Book of Wu), written in the late third century CE, is the first mention of Taiwan in a 
Chinese text. But this cannot be scientifically established, considering the paucity 
and vagueness of information given, and could be equally the Ryukyus, the 
Penghus, or even north Philippines. And in any case, knowledge of a place does 
not mean possession, and discovery is not equivalent to actual appropriation: 
Wherever the explorers went, they did not settle there and never attempted to 
return. Instead, the debate exemplified the determination of the pro-unification 
camp of today (on both sides of the Taiwan straits) to justify Taiwan’s belonging to 
China ‘since ancient ages’ (‘從古時代’, as the Chinese say), even though academic 
work in Chinese and foreign languages has long attested the limited, if not non-
existent, knowledge of Taiwan by China before the Ming Dynasty (Cartier 1983; 
Zheng 1995; T.-J. Chen 2005). 
 
The Pivotal Seventeenth Century 
 
With wide-ranging geopolitical changes at play in the region throughout the 
seventeenth century (the arrival of Western colonial powers, the decline of the 
Ming Dynasty, the beginning of the invasion of China by the Manchus, and the last 
decades of Japan’s maritime activities followed by the Shogunate’s ‘Closed 
Country’ policy for Japan), China’s perceptions of Taiwan started to evolve from a 
historic attitude characterized by poor knowledge and cultural prejudice, suspicion, 
and even fear, into a more acute perception of Taiwan as bearing a geopolitical 
significance. The process was long, spanning all of the seventeenth century, but it 
was especially the case after Taiwan was seized from Dutch colonial hands in 
1661 by the Chinese Zheng clan, a pro-Ming Chinese family of businessmen at 
sea (or, to some, ‘pirates’). However, this sudden interest in Taiwan by the Manchu 
court post-1661 was prompted by the Zhengs’ aggression against the newly 
conquered Chinese territory of the Manchu empire, and did not include an interest 
in Taiwan per se. Nor, until the early months of 1684, did this interest mean any 
desire to incorporate the recently Sinicized regions of Taiwan as parts of the 
Qing/Manchu Empire. The aim was primarily to put to an end to the Zheng family’s 
attempts to restore the Ming Dynasty in China, and to the Zhengs’ constant denial 
that the Manchu people had now the heavenly mandate to rule over the Chinese 
people. For that, the Manchus had to destroy the Zhengs’ island bastion (Wong 
1983; Corcuff 2011). 
   During the pivotal decades of 1624–1684 – between the arrival of the Dutch on 
Formosa and the incorporation of the newly Han-populated plains of the island into 
the Manchu Empire – not only the court in Peking, but also a multitude of other 
actors developed their own perceptions of Taiwan and of continent–island 
relations; perceptions that were varied and complex from the very beginning. With 
the great development of Taiwan historiography in recent decades, in no instance 
can it be suggested that Taiwan was simply ‘this’ or ‘that’ for the Chinese, or for 
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the Manchus, or for itself, without the risk of simplifying what is now known of the 
past. 
 
Geopolitics and Axiological Neutrality 
 
Geopolitics studies how geographical territories are turned into places invested by 
human memories and projects in contexts of interaction and competition over land 
and power when bare geography is augmented by memories, projects, and values. 
Geopolitics, as a study of this augmented reality, is supposed to listen to a plurality 
of competing discourses and projects that make territories multi-dimensional – 
from the geographic to the historical, and from the ideological to the emotional – 
without making distinctions between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, at least in the 
personal values of the analyst. It is by its nature an invitation to take into 
consideration the multiple ways that situations are perceived by a great variety of 
stakeholders, rather than an attempt to determine an essential geopolitical ‘truth’. 
   Can such a geopolitical approach be of help to better understand the plurality of 
actors in the history of cross-strait relations and their respective perceptions? 
 
There is not ‘One’ Single Chinese Way to Look at Taiwan 
 
In the decades and centuries that followed the progressive integration of initially 
limited portions of Taiwan’s southwestern plain as an overseas extension of the 
Qing Empire, Manchu and Chinese actors developed a set of perceptions, in which 
different and sometimes self-contradictory dimensions were intertwined: fear and 
prejudice, estrangement, appropriation, rejection, policies of subjectivization and 
dependency, jealousy, hate, and a feeling of cultural proximity. Each can be 
historically dated; they form a nexus of interrelated passions (clearly an object of 
interest to geopolitical studies), and a system of perceptions that have shaped 
policies as well as individuals’ decisions over the course of cross-strait history. 
   Taiwan’s relation to China cannot be reduced to one of subjectivization only, of 
merely a succession of waves of colonial or colonial-like domination by powers 
originating from the mainland.10 As a brief introduction to the idea of Taiwan as a 
liminal territory, it could be noted that, from the onset, Taiwan was in many 
respects treated differently from other Chinese provinces by the ruling 
Qing/Manchu dynasty (Corcuff 2006). The relationship was not, or not only and not 
always, that of a sheer and self-confident domination by the centre over a docile 
periphery. Among the theoretical tools that can be mobilized to better understand 
the nature of such a relationship, which ones could be of help? Could hegemony, 
imperialism, centre–periphery relations, be useful keys? 
                                                 
10
 These are the Zheng (1661–1683), the Manchus (1684–1895), and, following the 
Japanese period, the Republic of China. This third period can be divided into (1) 1945 to 
1949, in which year the KMT government crossed the strait to relocate itself at the margin of 
its official national territory; and (2) the period up to the years of 1992/1996, before the 
Taiwanese were finally allowed to elect representatives (for parliament in 1992 and the 
presidency in 1996) solely elected by the inhabitants of Taiwan and its associated islands of 
Lanyü, Lütao, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. 
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   As discussed below, various notions, concepts, and paradigms are available to 
help us characterize aspects of this relationship. However, these can never be fully 
applicable; hence the need for a further concept that may, initially at least, be 
applied specifically to Taiwan’s relation to China. It would then remain to be seen 
whether this could be adapted into a paradigm applicable to other case studies, to 
help Taiwan studies, from an epistemological point of view, to consist not only of 
concepts imported from abroad and applied to Taiwan (particularly from the 
European and American academies), but also of elaborations derived from Taiwan 
studies and exported abroad into relevant disciplinary fields of study. 
 
Centre–Periphery 
 
It is tempting to characterize Taiwan’s relation to China as one of periphery and 
centre, after the large Manchu empire progressively established a Qing 
administration on part of the small island in 1684. This perspective may also be 
commonly applied in the future, if growing economic integration between Taiwan 
and the People’s Republic of China (or whatever regime may succeed it), leads to 
the reorganization of cooperation between the two on the world economic stage, 
and, perhaps, of a political restructuring of the China–Taiwan ensemble. 
   The complexity of the centre–periphery paradigm was illustrated long ago, when 
Chen Chi-Nan elaborated his notion of the ‘indigenization’ (土著化) of Chinese 
culture in Taiwan in 1975. This was subsequently critiqued by Lee Kuo-Chi, who 
opposed it with the idea of Taiwan’s ‘integration into the centre’ of the Chinese 
Empire (內地化) (C.-N. Chen 1991). Political passions in this debate usually hide 
the fact that the two ideas address different dimensions of the Taiwan–China 
relation over the longue durée; one cultural, the other geopolitical. In some 
respects the two views are not incompatible. Integration into the Manchu Empire is 
a fact, but it was made possible through the localization and hybridization of 
Chinese culture in Taiwan, in a society where non-Chinese influences have been 
numerous and are more ancient than Chinese influences. Further, more than an 
integration of Taiwan within a neighbouring empire, we can consider the events of 
1684 and the subsequent extensions of Qing rule on parts of the island as an 
overseas expansion – in French, we could here coin the word ‘outremerisation’ 
(and, in Chinese, ‘海外化’) – of the empire. Is there room for an approach that 
could reconcile the two points of view, and which could allow us to understand 
Taiwan in its complex specificity, apart from any political agenda? 
  The centre–periphery paradigm, however, seems to lack historical validity, for 
several reasons. Less than a century after Taiwan’s integration into the Manchu 
empire, China’s southern provinces had already become dependent on Taiwanese 
grain, to the point that when typhoons or social unrest in Taiwan destabilized 
transportation, there were food shortages on the mainland (Corcuff 2006). In terms 
of economic development, Taiwan in 1945, when the latter integrated the island 
into its territory following fifty years of Japanese rule, was considered to be much 
more advanced than China. In 1949, the periphery (Taiwan) of the Chinese 
metropole was chosen for the relocation – in Taipei – of the central government of 
the Republic of China, and the Chinese mainland political centre (as perceived in 
the Republican Chinese and Chiang Kai-Shek’s eyes, at least) was thus displaced 
onto its own, recently re-included insular periphery, while claiming to be a centre 
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only temporarily displaced, with legitimacy to rule over all of China. As for the 
present situation, China and Taiwan are, in purely geopolitical terms, two 
sovereign states, each of which considers itself to be a centre per se, at times 
contesting the other’s legitimacy to speak for itself. This is even the case in the 
complex discourse of the Ma administration since 2008, which tries somehow to 
combine antagonistic objectives: the defence of Taiwan’s interests; progress 
towards unification; engaging China; and clinging to an outdated definition of the 
ROC’s national boundaries that encompasses the mainland. That definition had 
been virtually abandoned for nearly two decades already, by the previous KMT 
administration of Lee Teng-Hui (1988–2000), not to mention by the pro-
independence administration of Chen Shui-Bian (2000–2008). 11  In addition, 
although most observers see the balance of forces between the two states, in both 
military and economic terms, as shifting towards China, China cannot yet regard 
Taiwan as a ‘small problem’. Instead, it still has to patiently negotiate with Taiwan’s 
authorities, whether these authorities be cooperative or reluctant. 
   To conclude, viewing Taiwan as ‘peripheral’ is by definition a continent-centred 
point of view, which appears legitimate only because of China’s past and present 
influence over Taiwan. However, it forgets the amount of historical material that 
can establish Taiwan’s insertion into world (economic) networks since the early 
seventeenth century. In great part, this is a bias induced by our habit of looking 
at, assessing, and interpreting Taiwan from the viewpoint of the Continent, of 
China, of Chinese archives, and of an Empire. An insular-centred point of view 
would reject this, ‘disimperializing’ and ‘decontinentalizing’ our perceptions of 
Taiwan. A good example was given by the Chen Shui-Bian administration when 
it published a series of maps showing different Taiwans: Taiwan facing the sea, 
or with a south orientation, or placed at the centre of a world projection. The series 
(see Figure 6 overleaf) was entitled Whirling Ocean, Beautiful Island (婆娑之洋，
美麗之島), reflecting a rhetoric typical of the pro-independence movement, which 
considers Taiwan to be a ‘beautiful ocean nation’. 
   This illustrates the limited validity of the classic centre–periphery frame of 
analysis. Perhaps the China-leaning policies of President Ma’s administration 
(2008– ) are indeed giving more validity to this perspective (Chow ed. 2012); 
however, for reasons linked to Taiwan’s democratic structure, a now China-leaning 
government of Taiwan can go only so far in accommodating Beijing, at least 
officially. In an unofficial dialogue at South Taiwan’s Chang Jung Christian 
University in November 2011 between scholars across the Taiwan Strait, the 
Chinese scholar and Taiwan specialist Liu Guoshen (刘国深), head of the Taiwan 
Research Institute at Xiamen University, noted for instance that ‘now that China 
and Taiwan are developing relations, we cannot continue to oppose centre and 
periphery’. 
 
                                                 
11
 Arguably, the KMT’s stance on the issue is very complex, especially since the return of 
the KMT to the presidency of the Republic in 2008: while it is still trying to maintain that 
Taiwan is a centre of its own (but not as an independent country per se), in order to defend 
its interests, the KMT has however returned to a former rhetoric of insisting heavily on the 
idea that the official and constitutional territory of the Republic of China, now reduced to 
Taiwan, is the whole of China. 
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Figure 6: De-Imperializing the Perception of Taiwan: Introductory Documents 
with Reduced-Format Maps of the Series Whirling Ocean, Beautiful Island (婆
娑之洋，美麗之島), published by the Ministry of Culture (文化部, then called 文
建會); Centre de Documentation Taiwanaise de Lyon / Institut d’Asie 
Orientale. 
Picture by Stéphane Corcuff, 2012. The sixth map shows Taiwan explicitly as 
a centre per se. 
 
Dependency and Empire 
 
Taiwan being governed by the Republic of China, although recognized as a 
sovereign entity by a few states only, invalidates the possibility of using the classic 
paradigm of empire to analyse relations between the island and the People’s 
Republic of China. How about dependency theory? The current administration’s 
strategy of progressively opening Taiwan to Chinese investment may increase this 
interdependence, but it may also, by providing Taiwan’s economy with an 
increased source of speculation, undermine efforts to diversify sources of profit 
and increase China’s influence over Taiwan’s economy (Chow, ed. 2012.). 
Dependency may increase if Taiwan’s administration focuses primarily on one 
market, whether or not this is done with a view to future unification with China. 
However, dependency theory cannot be completely helpful, as Taiwan does not 
play the role of provider of raw materials for China’s industrial machine. Although 
Taiwan is increasingly dependent economically on Chinese manpower, the island 
continues to provide capital and high technology to China, and uses China’s cheap 
labour to export to the world. There is also Taiwan’s contemporary cultural 
influence on China: in addition to exporting capital and technology, Taiwan exports 
(at least to the youth, and to Chinese urban areas) its way of life, including its pop 
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music, food habits and delicacies, and some screen productions (films and 
entertainment). In terms of cross-strait economic relations, asymmetric economic 
interdependence seems a more accurate way to characterize the situation. 
 
Hegemony and the Geopolitics of Values 
 
In the early 1990s, a group of scholars around the UK-based Hong Kong academic 
Steve Tsang started to raise the issue of a ‘shadow of China’ over Taiwan (Tsang 
ed. 1993). Twenty years later, the issue had become central to political and 
academic debates in Taiwan (see Figure 7 below). Could hegemony therefore be a 
more interesting approach? After all, as China appears to be in the process of 
becoming a regional hegemon, one can suggest that Taiwan might well be its 
primary target, due to the PRC’s longstanding irredentist posture on the issue of 
sovereignty over the island. 12  As the theory of hegemony, properly speaking, 
postulates neither inclusion nor the full power of coercion, it could be an attractive 
concept with which to describe Taiwan–China relations. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: A Graphic Representation of the ‘Shadow of China’ in Interaction 
with the Taiwan Identity Debate 
(Stéphane Corcuff/Joao Correia, ENS de Lyon 2011) 
 
                                                 
12
 ‘Irredentism’ is surprisingly often misunderstood as ‘secessionism’. Irredentism does not 
designate the policies of a country wishing to obtain independence from another, but the 
policies and discourse of a country emphasizing its ‘right’ to rule, often justified by history, 
over a territory now independent or ruled by another country, which used to be part of its 
national territory. It denotes a rejection of the state as defined by existing boundaries.  
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   In addition, the notion of hegemony, as most notably defined by Gramsci, refers 
to shared values: the hegemon cannot exert influence on states simply by pure 
force, but instead imposes consent on willing states because they consider the 
hegemon to be able to represent them and defend their interests. Several 
sovereign states can hence coexist in a system in which one hegemonic state has 
an enduring influence over others, without necessarily imposing specific demands. 
Although ‘ba’ (‘霸’ – hegemon/y) refers today in Chinese to despotic rule, and to a 
government of force rather than law, in ancient times, it had a more sophisticated 
meaning. In Confucius’ Analects (論語), it refers to the legitimate authority that a 
central state has over feudatories; and as we know, legitimacy is a constructed 
perception of how a relation between a ruler and a ruled ‘must be’, based on the 
principle of shared values and explicitly consented submission to this authority. 
   As Robert Keohane (1984) has observed, a hegemonic state, as opposed to an 
imperial state, cannot impose its norms without a degree of consent from the other 
states. Here we find the fundamental difference between norms and values: norms 
are imposed, and they are respected because they have become rules, not 
necessarily because people believe in them; values, however, refer to shared 
beliefs; they are, at least originally, shared and accepted because members of a 
community – or at least the founding members of such a community – give or gave 
a fundamental value to such values. The international system is, to some extent, 
moved by and organized around a geopolitics of values (of States, NGOs, the 
UN…) that determines, along with other dimensions, much of the relations 
between its actors. In summary, if China exerts a strong influence on Taiwan; if 
Taiwan shares some values with China (Taiwan’s government oftentimes 
considers itself and Taiwan as ‘Chinese’); and if China has to negotiate with 
Taiwan, then hegemony as a concept seems to describe quite well some important 
aspects of this relation. 
   However, hegemony is originally and by definition formulated to analyse the 
power of one dominant or hegemonic state among an inter-state system, and it 
cannot be applied without adaptation to a two-state system. Simply adapting the 
concept and giving it a new dimension could certainly overcome this problem 
easily. However, another problem would have to be addressed: the particularities 
of Taiwan’s relations with China encompass more than these few elements, of a 
type of hegemony consisting of an imbalanced interdependence and shared 
values. The liminality of Taiwan is also based on a form of discursive power that 
Taiwan retains on Chinese affairs: as a free region close to China and heavily 
influenced by its culture, Taiwan has something to say about China and to China, 
which in turns makes it something more than a geopolitical entity to be merely 
‘liberated’, controlled, or ‘pacified’. The small island retains this ability in spite of 
China’s immensity, prestige, wealth, and power, perhaps because Taiwan 
protected some of China’s treasures: knowledge, a memory, archives and cultural 
treasures, as well some of the world’s best expertise on Chinese affairs. And 
considering the propensity of Chinese to view their culture as central, immensely 
rich, and superior, the fact that Taiwan may keep a memory of things that China 
has forgotten, an understanding of subtle elements of Chinese knowledge that 
China has lost, is likely to be a complicating factor in an otherwise simple model. 
There is something more than a partially consented to, partially rejected hegemony 
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of China over Taiwan. Obviously, we need to add some more complexity to the 
model. 
 
Comparison and Variation: Is Taiwan a ‘Case Study’? 
 
Taiwan’s relationship to China comprises elements of cultural proximity and 
difference, and factors bringing the two sides together as well as driving them 
apart. Within Taiwan, there are also processes of preservation, indigenization, and 
rejection of elements of Chinese culture. Does this make Taiwan specific in the 
world of geopolitics? 
   Samuel Huntington tended to establish a rather strict division of the world into 
clearly distinguishable cultures, as embodied by his ‘map of civilizations’ at the 
opening of The Clash of Civilizations (1996) – a surprisingly simplified description 
in a book otherwise more balanced than it may appear. As an alternative to his 
view, can we view the world as composed of a continuum of human cultures, a 
continuum of differences neither in a homogenizing, linear movement nor 
separated into several perfectly distinct cultures? In such a scheme, what would 
make an entity specific would be less the various elements of human culture that it 
‘contains’ than the specific combination of such elements of culture, combinations 
that would be specific to each given culture. 
   Geographic insularity probably does not suffice to make Taiwan a unique entity – 
which is not equivalent to saying that it does not play a role in shaping cultural, 
social, and political identities – and hence comparisons can and should be 
conducted with other parts of the world. However, are not the various ‘elements’ 
(geography, history of mentalities, geopolitical status etc.) that turn Taiwan into a 
distinct human society, into a particular geopolitical entity, and into a noteworthy 
spatial-temporal segment of the world’s geography and history, combined in a way 
that is specific to Taiwan, and proper to that particular human society? Reflecting 
on Taiwan as a contemporary field of study, framed within the background of a 
compared historical geopolitics of Taiwan (from the seventeenth to twenty-first 
centuries), the purpose of this question would be to consider to what extent Taiwan 
has a ‘historical significance’ that makes it a legitimate field of study per se, 
whether the study be limited to Taiwan’s various levels of locality or enlarged to 
consider Taiwan’s interactions with its regional and global environments. This 
possibly ‘unique combination’ of nevertheless shared features (in different 
combinations, by other entities) can be studied geopolitically. This is not meant 
narrowly, as studying a balance of forces (which is the field of strategic studies), 
economic interaction (or geo-economy), or Taiwan’s place in public and private 
global society (sociology of international relations). Geopolitics is broadly 
conceived of here as including sociological, political, economic, historical, legal, 
and military approaches, providing a holistic framework for understanding a 
relation of power in tension. In our case, it addresses Taiwan’s relations with China 
over a longer timeframe. 
   Our understanding of these multiple factors leads us to consider that the specific 
combination of geopolitical features that characterizes Taiwan’s relation to China 
as a case study is composed at least of the following basic diacritical dimensions, 
to which numerous others could certainly be added, depending on perspective: 
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• A major state, internationally recognized, exerting diplomatic, political, 
economic, and societal influence on a minor state that is poorly-recognized 
diplomatically; 
• A minor state, in which society is divided between different political 
identifications and programs: these include formal independence; 
recognition of its present status by the neighbouring hegemon; or 
compromising and avoiding conflict;13 
• The culture of the hegemon being the principal but not unique source (nor, 
historically, the first) of the cultural matrix of the minor territory; 
• A complex inter-dependency (economic links, but also global strategic 
situation), which means that the dominant or hegemonic state cannot use 
force to re-conquer the minor state; 
• The unfolding of a series of strategies (including economic relations, 
influence on media, diplomatic pressure, or engagement) to constrain the 
policies of the minor and sovereign state, in order to obtain favourable 
changes within a wider status quo to ensure hegemony, and perhaps 
ultimately to alter fundamentally the status quo in order to overcome the 
minor state’s sovereignty; 
• A proportion of the society and polity of the minor state being sensitive to 
some of the discourses of the major state, for reasons of cultural proximity 
(common ancestry, diasporic identity, etc.), which prevents the minor state 
from adopting a unified and firm response to the pressure exerted by the 
major state.14 
 
Liminality and Geopolitics 
 
We have seen that the specificity (as distinct from the idea of a ‘uniqueness’), of 
Taiwan’s relation to China cannot be explained fully by the few paradigms 
mentioned above; hence the necessity of a new concept with which to understand 
the complex frame of relations in their spatial and temporal dimensions. 
   Liminality is a concept well known to anthropologists, originating in the French 
scholar Arnold van Gennep’s 1909 opus, Les rites de passage. The book 
addresses the transitional periods between two states of life, such as (among 
many others) between childhood and adulthood, which are often accompanied by 
‘rites of passage’ established by group cultures to mark the passage symbolically 
and materially. Later popularized and extended by the American anthropologist 
Victor Turner at the very end of the 1960s, the concept of liminality addresses a 
                                                 
13
 In Taiwan’s case, it is understood that a formal peace treaty is too delicate to proceed 
with due to the hegemon’s irredentist view of the adverse state’s territory, as a peace treaty 
would give equal acknowledgment to the latter’s sovereignty. 
14
 As suggested by the author in a recent book, the mixed feelings experienced by most 
Taiwanese of recent mainland origin (the so-called ‘Mainlanders’) in terms of national 
identification towards both Taiwan and China, express Taiwan’s position as a liminal place 
vis-à-vis the country from which they have come, at least for first generation migrants. In 
other words, the anthropological liminality (中介時期／地帶／狀況) of Waishengren in 
Taiwan is directly linked to Taiwan’s geopolitical liminality (閾境性) vis-à-vis China (Corcuff 
2011: 116–188). 
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phenomenon inscribed in a timeframe, although its Latin origin, ‘limen’, or 
‘threshold’, refers to a physical place. Liminality is an in-between period during 
which an individual is in transition between a state of life that (s)he has not yet fully 
left, and a new stage into which (s)he has not fully entered. Rites of passage are 
often public, as they have to be attended (at least at some point) by members of 
the community who witness, share, control, or support. As shown by Turner, the 
new status acquired after the transitional period confers an increased dignity or 
respectability, or in any case another status in life that may be conferred either 
permanently or for the duration of a period that precedes the next status. 
   A number of scholars have attempted to introduce the notion of liminality into the 
sociology of nationalism and into the study of international relations. However, their 
use of liminality most often still aims at describing an in-between, transitional 
position unfolding in most cases within a timeframe; in other words, and to put it 
simply, a period of change. Is it possible, and useful, to further import, adapt, 
reconstruct, and develop the idea of liminality by reconnecting the notion with its 
spatial dimension, as suggested by the Latin origin of the word? The aim is to 
construct a time- and space-based tool to analyse the relations of a smaller 
geopolitical object situated at the margin of a larger geopolitical one, and 
interacting with it in a scheme more complex than that of a dominant centre to a 
dominated margin. This integrated concept of liminality should not exclude 
timescapes: history in the long haul is the canvas on which geopolitical 
complexities progressively develop, and the means by which human-appropriated 
territories are turned, over extended periods of time, into social spaces of 
memories that bear political projects. This leads to the field of geopolitics as soon 
as any frontier is crossed by any actor, factor, or idea touching upon the balance of 
power between different centres of production of values. 
   The concept of liminality is not yet widely used in geopolitics and international 
relations, although it is a popular analytic tool in sociology, cultural studies, and 
post-colonial theory. However, a recent move to apply liminality to international 
studies (sociology of international relations/geopolitics) has started to explore how 
liminality can be adapted from an analysis of a transitional period into a focus on 
spatial inter-connectivity within a timeframe. Wang Hung-Luen (2001), who studies 
Taiwan, used the word in the early 2000s with the meaning of psychological 
inbetweenness, or, more accurately, of being ‘neither-this-nor-that’: he argues that 
Taiwan is presently in a state of liminality, being neither a state nor a non-state; at 
least inform the perspective of an approach focusing on the sociology of 
nationalism. This is based on an understanding, which is frequent, of ‘liminality’ as 
expressing vagueness, a limbo period, a time of ‘undeterminedness’, even though 
the original theorists of the notion, van Gennep and Turner, have on the contrary 
insisted on the codification (with rites of passage) of that non-status, which is ispo 
facto a sort of status, in a transitional trajectory from a clearly defined state to a 
clearly defined other state. Wang departs from this and uses liminality in a more 
‘common’ understanding of the word. He also makes an implicit reference to space 
rather than to time, by changing the traditional ‘中介’ (介 jiè, being between) into 
‘中界’ (界, jiè, territory, boundary) as his Chinese translation of the anthropological 
‘liminality’ (Wang 2001: 286–287), as a subtle reference to Taiwan’s situation at 
the margin of a huge country that denies it the quality of a sovereign state. 
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   Another example is Higgott and Nossal (2008), who have written about how 
Australian society has been repositioning itself as a part of Asia’s renaissance 
through an increasing perception of belonging to Asia, in contrast to Australia’s 
traditional self-perception as an overseas Anglo-Saxon society closely linked to 
Britain. This is a first attempt to theorize a ‘geopoliticized’ liminality, although it still 
applies the concept to describe changing geographical perceptions over a period 
of time. For Higgott and Nossal, Australia is in a liminal phase of reorientation; they 
do not consider, for instance, Australia as being in a liminal state of connectedness 
between, or next to, both the East and the West. This approach, nevertheless, 
clearly applies to a situation that concerns contemporary geopolitics. It is also the 
case with Maria-Ruxandra Stoicescu’s (2008) work on Romania’s self-construction 
as a liminal place, first during the process of post-communist modernization, and 
then within the frame of its integration into the European Union, integrates both 
time and space, although over a shorter timeframe than is proposed in our analysis 
of the Taiwan case study. 
   As a fourth example, Lerna Yanik (2009, 2011) has shown how Turkey has 
attempted to construct, for itself and for the rest of world, an image of itself as an 
exceptional country (Turkey’s ‘exceptionalism’), imbued with an ‘inbetweenness’ 
that can be interpreted, in the author’s eyes, in terms of liminality. Yanik notes that 
Turkey’s discourse as a country where two continents converge – Europe and 
Asia, the West and the Orient – is based on geographical and historical 
approaches. This approach seems close to ours, as it mobilizes both the time and 
space references. There is, however, a difference: the timeframe used to 
characterize Taiwan’s liminality vis-à-vis China is not that of a contemporary 
change (the emergence of Turkey as a middle-sized international actor, as an 
emerging economy, and as a self-envisioned mediator), but a long-term 
construction of a complex relation between the two sides of the strait. Compared to 
those papers, and especially Wang’s interest in Taiwan’s national identity question, 
the focus of the present paper is both narrower (Taiwan’s relation to China) and 
wider (geopolitical relations in a 400-year perspective). 15  It considers that all 
elements of the relation between the two sides of the Taiwan strait contribute to a 
specific form of relationship. My work in Chinese language on this topic calls for a 
new Chinese translation of the word liminality’, when applied to geopolitics and 
referring both to time and space: while it is translated as ‘中介時期’ or ‘地帶’ in the 
field of anthropology – representing an in-between period – I propose in geopolitics 
the use of ‘閾境性’ (yùjìng xìng) – or a threshold character – with ‘閾’ meaning 
precisely limen, the threshold (Corcuff 2011). 
 
Geopolitical Liminality: A Typology 
 
There are, indeed, several types of geopolitical situation that can be called liminal. 
It appears that the sudden vagueness of the concept, once it has been extracted, 
by geopoliticists, from its original field as studied by Arnold van Gennep and Victor 
                                                 
15
 This article translates into English and further elaborates the content of Chapter Four (‘臺
灣閾境性’, ‘The Liminality of Taiwan’) of 高格孚 (Corcuff) 中華鄰國，臺灣閾境, (Neighbour of 
China: The Liminality of Taiwan), Taipei, 2011, as well as of a French-language paper on 
the ontology of Taiwan studies vis-à-vis sinology published in Etudes chinoises in 2010. 
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Turner, means that it encompasses already at least five different types of 
geopolitical realities: 
 
• the transition between two states in a specific temporal sequence of the 
history of a region or a nation – this is the case of Australia as analysed by 
Higgot and Nossal (2008); 
• the ‘inbetweenness’, or the fact of being between two world civilizations and 
trying to be a bridge, which is how Turkey is viewed by Yanik (2009, 2011); 
• being in a limbo of unclear self-definition and self-identity can be also 
characterized as ‘liminal’, as Wang (2001) has applied the term to Taiwan in 
the contemporary era; 
• being at the margin of a larger entity and trying to adapt to it, as Stoicescu 
(2008) analyses Romania’s position vis-à-vis the European Community; 
• being a historically constructed place of contact that has something to say to 
a hegemonic neighbour, as shown in the case of Taiwan. 
 
These approaches are either temporal or spatial, or a combination of both but not 
systematically explored as such, and in the first four cases history ‘in the long haul’ 
could have been a useful additional element, but was not mobilized. The case-
study of Taiwan’s 400-year relation with the Manchu empire, the Chinese Republic, 
and finally the People’s Republic of China, is a stimulus to further elaborate the 
concept of geopolitical liminality and to propose a refined conceptual tool: liminality 
as the geopolitical and discursive dynamic produced by a historically constructed 
reality of being a zone of contact in a context of asymmetrical interdependence, a 
threshold situated at the border of a large entity that has influenced deeply the 
smaller one without having ever been able to swallow it.  
   There are a few other, perhaps slightly simpler (but not necessarily so), cases of 
small geopolitical entities in a relationship with a larger body in the world, in which 
what the smaller entity ‘has to say’ is a reversal of what would otherwise seem to 
be the natural order in which the bigger entity dictates its wishes upon the smaller. 
As well as multi-cultural, insular Taiwan vis-à-vis continental China, examples 
include Hindu Bali vis-à-vis Muslim Java, or Ryukyus vis-à-vis Japan, resenting 
Japanization efforts and the generalization of the name ‘Okinawa’. All three cases 
share some basic similarities in spite of multiple contextual differences, and the 
smaller entity has been included in the larger’s territory or empire at a late date 
(the early Manchu Empire and the Chinese Republic; the late Dutch Indies Empire 
and the young Indonesian Republic; the nineteenth century Japanese Empire and 
1970s Japan). 
   By postulating that this asymmetrical relation does not result in the stronger party 
imposing its will without concession or negotiation, liminality, as distinct from 
marginality, restores the ‘power of words’ retained by the smaller entity: liminality is 
not only geopolitical, it is also discursive. Because an unstable smaller entity was 
obviously a danger to their empire, the Manchus, as noted above, adapted their 
rule when controlling Taiwan; and for complex reasons, the PRC, however strong it 
may become, today has to engage in negotiations with Taiwan. Meanwhile, Japan 
faces regular opposition movements both in relation to the increased Japanization 
of the Ryukyus/Liuqius and to the use of the archipelago for American military 
bases. Bali, further, has protected as much as it could of its cultural specificity and 
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autonomy, both as a part of the Dutch Empire (with the help of Dutch 
administrators) and after World War II, when it took an active part in opposition to 
the new republic and negotiated very stiff conditions for its eventual inclusion into 
it. By rediscovering today these alternative voices from the past, belonging to the 
then margins-to-be, we can better remember, long after re/integration has been 
acted or re-enacted (1945 for Taiwan, 1949 for Bali, 1972 for Okinawa), that the 
subaltern discourse has legitimacy, based on an original point of view on itself as a 
centre for itself. Furthermore, and as subaltern studies have emphasized, it is often 
at the margins that interesting and original phenomena can be observed, 
producing points of view that revisit hegemonic, centred perspectives from the so-
called, but not self-called, ‘periphery’. 
 
Taiwan’s Liminality vis-à-vis China 
 
Taiwan’s liminality vis-à-vis China is intimately linked to the 400 years of history 
that connect the island and the mainland, including the period since 1949. Since 
the seventeenth century, cultural inflows from the mainland have not always been 
a merely natural, demographic, or societal phenomenon, but have also had, at 
times, a political and programmatic intention: from early on, successive Chinese or 
continental regimes have in several instances used culture to shape the identity of 
Taiwan’s society. For instance, Chen Yonghua (陳永華) (1634–1680), under the 
anti-Manchu insular rule of Zheng Jing ( 鄭 經 ) (1662–1681), actively created 
Chinese-style institutions, and built Taiwan’s first Confucian temple as a message 
that government was to be virtuous and as a symbol of the Dongning kingdom’s 
Confucian values. Another example is the decision of the Manchus, who 
traditionally considered the former Zheng rulers of Taiwan during the 1661–1683 
period as their enemy, finally to accept, in 1874 (under the petition of the Qing 
imperial commissioner in Taiwan, Shen Baozhen, 沈葆楨), the officialization of the 
cult of the Chinese hero Zheng Chenggong, which had been observed unofficially 
in Taiwan long after the Qing takeover in 1684. Another good example is the policy 
of active re-Sinization of Taiwan under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the 
KMT, not to mention, at this current moment, the policy of restoring elements of 
traditional Chinese culture in Taiwan since 2008 (in textbooks, in national cultural 
programs, in TV shows, etc.).16 All are examples of the use of Chinese culture on 
Taiwan in support of a political project.  
   As a consequence of its China-connected history, Taiwan has become both a 
conservatory and a laboratory of Chinese culture(s). Both dimensions are known – 
Taiwan as a sanctuary, often idealized by the way, of Chinese culture, and Taiwan 
as a ‘laboratory of identities’. It is less common to realize and acknowledge that 
those two dimensions are intertwined, and in fact can hardly exist without each 
other: the laboratory grows out of the conservatory, while the conservatory, if never 
a replication of the copied object, always supposes an evolution. The first 
characteristic of Taiwan’s liminality vis-à-vis China is the conservatory and the 
laboratory in a dialectical relation. 
                                                 
16
 Cf 高格孚 (Corcuff) 中華鄰國。臺灣閾境性, Chapter 2, ‘回朝退潮’ (‘Return to Power, Low 
Tide’), especially the passages about the resinicization of political symbols and textbooks. 
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   The Taiwan Strait, originally only a geographical entity, from the seventeenth 
century onwards progressively became a geopolitical entity as Taiwan was 
colonized and the island was inserted into regional and global geopolitics. This 
new geopolitical identity of the Taiwan Strait became very singular. On the one 
hand, the Taiwan Strait is sufficiently narrow for Taiwan to have been the recipient 
of successive waves of Chinese culture and to have been heavily influenced by 
China over four centuries. As a result, Taiwan became a conservatory for many 
aspects of China’s culture and memory. However, on the other hand, this same 
geographical-turned geopolitical entity is also wide enough to have provoked, by a 
rupture of geographical continuity (Taiwan’s geographical insularity), an 
indigenization of that culture, or the process of its insularization: insularity is not 
only a geographical notion, but also a social construction. Added to this is the role 
played by aboriginal cultures and other non-Chinese influences over Taiwan’s 
history and culture: Chinese culture was from the onset indigenized, hybridized, 
and pluralized in its Formosan context… and first of all because it did not start to 
develop out of a terra nullius, in a virgin island free of Mankind. 
   Further, the emergence of an open identity debate in Taiwan in the post-
authoritarian era has enabled Taiwan’s society to discuss a wide set of options in 
terms of identification, enabling Taiwan to become a ‘laboratory of identities’, 
ranging from modern ways to be Chinese, national identification as Taiwanese, or 
global citizenship. This laboratory is perhaps not as new as it appears. An 
illustrative example is the invention of the modern Chinese word for ‘president’: 
while the word used at the end of the Qing dynasty was a phonetic translation (‘伯
雷/理璽天德’) that was adopted by Taiwan’s gentry in the initial reflection on the 
founding of the short-lived Taiwan Republic in 1895, it was also during this period 
that the word ’總統’ was invented. The Republic soon failed, but the project was a 
modern one: by establishing a sovereign ‘republic’ with a ‘president’, the self-
proclaimed ‘sovereignty’ of the island was supposed to appeal to European powers 
to defend Taiwan against Japan after the Manchu court had ceded the island in the 
Shimonoseki Treaty (Morris 2002). 
   It should also be noted that the Taiwan laboratory developed in great part due to 
the conservatory of cultures, which provided the cultural material to work with, to 
reflect upon intellectually, or to build up in contrast against. Further, the 
‘conservatory’ has itself probably never replicated the mainland’s cultures in their 
diversity and original shape, except perhaps at the sacrosanct National Palace 
Museum (at least until Du Cheng-Sheng’s mandate, after the transfer of power of 
2000, which tried to ‘aboriginize’, ‘Taiwanize’, and ‘Asianize’ its collections and 
exhibitions). In fact, in its efforts to build a new China on Taiwan, the KMT could 
not avoid creating something different and independent from the historical, 
mainland-based ROC. Dominic Yang shows in a 2012 paper that the KMT, after 
relocating to Taiwan, forbade military men from entering tongxianghui (同鄉會), 
locality-based associations which brought together people from the same native 
locations in China. This was to avoid reproducing on the island a problem that was 
one cause, in the KMT’s eyes, of the regime’s defeat on the mainland: 
provincialism. One can also suggest that Chiang Kai-Shek’s so-called ‘Chinese 
Cultural Renaissance Movement’ had little to do with China’s vast, pluralistic, and 
ancient cultures taken as a whole, and rendered only an essentialized version of 
culture though a political movement. 
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   The conservatory cannot but become a form of laboratory, just as the laboratory 
nurtures itself from the conservatory. One example of the delicate and interesting 
relations between the two is the creation of new Chinese characters in Taiwan, a 
complex issue in the Sinitic world. As Kaohsiung City and Kaohsiung County were 
preparing to merge in 2010, the city mayor and the county commissioner, both 
DPP figures, wanted to run in the December 2009 election. When the two teams 
were negotiating, during the previous November, negotiators from the camp of 
Kaoshiung city mayor Chen Chü ( 陳 菊 ) proposed creating a new character 
merging the characters 縣 (xiàn), ‘the district’, and the character 市 (shì), ‘the city’. 
A new character was officially proposed to Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior with 
the pronunciation of ‘dū’ (thus reminiscent of ‘都市’, dū shì， the capital). The 
Ministry, however, refused to acknowledge the new character, for it was, 
arguably, a zàozì (造字) or ‘invented character’. The laboratory had produced 
one effect, the conservatory another. In the meantime, local associations, as well as 
the municipal government itself, undeterred, started to use the new character, and 
even created a logo incorporating it (see Figure 8 below): a green chrysanthemum, 
reminiscent, obviously, of Japan’s colonization of Taiwan, associated with the green 
colour of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The new logo of the Kaohsiung Government under Mayor Chen 
Chü 
Picture by Stéphane Corcuff, 2012 
 
   There is, in conclusion, a dialectical relation between preservation and creation, 
protection and modernization. The laboratory and the conservatory dimensions of 
this liminality are clearly linked in interaction. 
 
A Taiwan Detour 
 
   A second dimension of this liminality is its discursive power. By this is meant that 
Taiwan’s liminality in history produces a discourse, on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait, which would not be produced without this tension between proximity and 
distance, or without push-and-pull factors, inclusiveness and independence, or 
inter-dependence. Such discourse, on Taiwan’s side, is a discourse on China that 
is both informed and keeps a critical distance from its object. 
   Taiwan having been close to China (historically, geographically, culturally) for 
extended periods of time, numerous segments of Taiwan’s society are familiar, 
and particularly concerned, with Chinese issues such as evolving identities, 
nationalism and national development, human rights, cultural issues, etc. Hence, 
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Taiwan’s politicians, businesspeople, artists, scholars, intellectuals, and NGOs can 
produce informed and valid discourses on China. In other words, the discursive 
liminality of Taiwan is possible because the Taiwan Straits is narrow enough for 
Chinese culture to have deeply influenced Taiwan over centuries and because it is 
also wide enough to have given Taiwan the possibility of assessing such a cultural 
heritage (though of course not always without ideological biases) from a distance, 
as well as maintaining a critical perspective on its discourse on China. In that 
process, being a free and democratic country has been a valuable asset for 
Taiwan, in the sense that, after the lifting of the martial law in 1987, the debate on 
identities and national building has been relatively open. As a centre, and thinking 
highly of itself, China is not always in the best position to assess critically all 
questions concerning itself, though a large transformation of China’s public debate 
freedoms has been underway for a decade. This is one of the interests of studying 
Taiwan: not only for the island’s own social reality, but for what it has to say about 
China, which is, in fact, a part of that reality. The Taiwan detour is the possibility for 
China-watchers to learn about contemporary China itself by looking at ways 
Taiwan perceives China. But how many acknowledge this, or are even at all 
conscious of it, so imbued as they are with a Chinese and mainland perception of 
Taiwan as marginal? We speak here not only of Chinese themselves, but of 
course also of still so many China-watchers. 
   There is yet another dimension of Taiwan’s discursive liminality, that justifies the 
Taiwan detour in another way: namely, what China and the Chinese reveal of 
themselves, in their multiple positions on Taiwanese questions, and in how they 
view China as a nation, territory, identity, and history. What China tends to see as 
marginal (at its margin, secondary) is nevertheless symbolically essential to that 
same country: post-1941 war politics, and then post-1949 cross-strait politics, have 
erected Taiwan as a symbol of national humiliation, incomplete victory, and the 
denial of its legitimacy to rule, and these are all elements certain to be found in a 
Chinese political psyche prone to building upon the romanticization of a traumatic 
past involving partially self-inflicted pains (of which Taiwan is the perfect example). 
In addition, due to geopolitical realities, Taiwan remained largely closed to Chinese 
action until recently, and it still remains, against Chinese will, an independent and 
sovereign entity. Elements of proximity, national frustration, and geopolitical 
deadlock combine to make Taiwan a delicate question for China, and it is no 
wonder PRC politics in recent decades have alternated a series of approaches to 
Taiwan, from conciliatory to bellicose, which reveal as much about how China 
views itself as how it actually views Taiwan. A simple example is how China, in its 
international public diplomacy, refers to Taiwan as belonging to China ‘since 
ancient ages’ (從古時代), yet prefers not to specify what actual ‘ancient history’ is 
meant beyond this vague expression, for fear of being too easily contradicted by 
even the least capable of historians. If we count Chinese history as consisting of 
over roughly 35 centuries (dating back from the invention of Chinese characters), 
Taiwan was integrated at century 32, which would not be considered ‘ancient 
history’, for a country so proud of being the oldest civilization still alive, were it not 
for Taiwan’s historical belonging to China being such a sensitive issue today. More 
generally, China’s utilization of trauma to legitimize irredentism reveals how China, 
in different periods, has viewed its own national identity, its links to history, 
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territory, and colonial aggression, and ultimately, perhaps, its mode of insertion 
into international society. 
   Taiwan’s liminality is of course not only discursive: it also has a geopolitical 
dimension, in the classical sense of the term as relations of power with regard to 
territory. As said, China has to negotiate with Taiwan, even when a government 
more inclined towards unification leads the island. Taiwan, in other words, remains 
globally out of reach for China, even though the situation has been changing 
quickly since 2008. China postulates the inclusion of Taiwan into its territory as 
desirable, legitimate, and ultimately unavoidable, and is turning itself into one of 
the world’s most powerful countries. However, China cannot impose itself upon 
Taiwan by sheer force; in order to achieve its goals, China has to compromise, 
make proposals, wait, and negotiate, seduce and manipulate (including by taking 
control progressively of Taiwan’s print and electronic media). The reasons for this 
are many, and the military factor appears to be important – but for how long? 
However, it is probable that other factors are also particularly significant, such as 
the necessity of avoiding the political cost that a brutal intervention in Taiwan may 
have for China, both in terms of its international image and of its image in 
Taiwanese minds. In other words, Taiwan, as the weaker of the two, and by far the 
most vulnerable, still remains immune from having an imperial form of power 
imposed upon it; hegemony, as discussed above, would have been a better tool to 
explain the shadow of China, had the concept been able to encompass more 
dimensions than those mentioned. 
   Just as with the dialectical relation between the conservatory and the laboratory, 
the geopolitical and discursive dimensions of Taiwan’s liminality are also 
intertwined, and as they influence each other they are sometimes difficult to 
differentiate fully. It is significant, for instance, that Taiwan, which has an economy 
now considerably dependent on China, still has the power to attract, but also to 
limit, regulate, and control, millions of Chinese tourists who wish to travel to 
Taiwan. Chen Chien-Yuan shows that in Chinese tourism handbooks newly 
developed for tourists leaving for Taiwan, the island is constructed as a repository 
of Chinese culture – the idealized conservatory. And while the tourists are on the 
island, insular travel and government agencies help them to see what corresponds 
only to what he calls Taiwan’s ‘constructed familiarity’: they depart from China to 
have a sense of a ‘real China’, whether or not illusionary, and what they see in the 
concrete in Taiwan is limited to essentialized motifs of Chinese culture and of 
modern Chinese history (C.-Y. Chen 2012). This is obviously done at the expense 
of a fair description of Taiwan’s pluralistic cultures, and such tourists never get an 
insight into what makes Taiwan pluralistic.17 In addition to tourists, some Chinese 
(anti-communist) intellectuals eager to visit Taiwan also fall into the trap of ‘Taiwan 
as the repository of true Chinese culture’ – which appears radically to contradict 
their perception of Taiwan as an otherwise minor territory compared to the great 
Chinese motherland. For instance, Xu Zhiyuan (許知遠), in his latest book Stranger 
to his Motherland (祖國的陌生人) recalls his first trip in Taiwan in late 2008, and his 
                                                 
17
 Simple observation shows that in addition, they tend to group together before entering the 
places visited and smoke while waiting for other tourists to exit. However, one taxi driver in 
Tamsui told me in 2011 that at night, some 陸客 (Mainland tourists) discreetly leave their 
hotels to freely tour the night markets and get another picture of Taiwan. 
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fascination in seeing the symbols of the Republic and of the true China, in contrast 
to the modern China that has erased, through communism and capitalism, the 
traditional one – but hasn’t Taiwan also modernized? He finally ‘confesses’ that, 
though a self-described anti-communist democrat, he is unable to understand the 
legitimacy of the reasons why Taiwanese independence militants were rejecting 
the visit to Taiwan (at the same time of his own visit) of China’s chief negotiator, 
and, beyond this, rejecting unification with China: as we know, being an anti-
communist Chinese does not necessarily mean being able to deconstruct a 
communist-constructed Chinese chauvinism. 
   Yet, according to every available statistic, Taiwanese people’s identification with 
Taiwan has never been stronger than it is today, and this is the moment when 
cross-strait relations are at their warmest. By almost entirely ignoring the local 
realities of a Taiwan that clearly thinks of itself not as a province of China, Chinese 
tourists and intellectuals bring back to China a confirmation of an idea of Taiwan 
that is more and more distant from the real Taiwan. It is a form of metaphor for a 
globalization that facilitates transportation and connects peoples, but does not 
necessarily allow individuals to understand others in a deeper way. This 
discrepancy is caused by the ‘unreachability’ of Taiwan, in that it remains outside 
of China’s governance, as well as by the ability of some in Taiwan to mobilize 
Chinese culture, whether authentic or not, to satisfy the consumerist desires of 
people with whom they don’t even share identification schemes. If, among Chinese 
tourists’ destinations, the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial, the Sun Moon Lake (which 
was, by the way enlarged to its current size by the Japanese colonial authorities), 
or the Martyr’s Shrine in Taipei are perhaps not embodiments of Taiwan’s role as 
the conservatory of Chinese culture, the National Palace Museum undeniably is 
so, and illustrates that Taiwan’s discursive and geopolitical liminality is far from 
marginal. Instead, Taiwan is both a depository of Chinese heritage and able to 
negotiate that heritage. 
   In sum, what is proposed here as the liminality of Taiwan is a combination of four 
major characteristics of Taiwan’s relation to China: 
 
• Chinese culture is the main cultural matrix of Taiwan’s culture, but not the 
only one and not the earliest one; Taiwanese increasingly think of Taiwan 
as having a pluralistic and partially oceanic culture, even though they 
regularly vote for the KMT – these are distinct questions, one of national 
identification, one of political pondering; there is a debate on these issues 
and on how to view Taiwan’s cultural identity (identity politics in Taiwan); 
• Taiwanese society plays the role both of conservatory and laboratory of 
that major cultural matrix, preserving and modernizing elements of the 
Chinese culture in a movement that is typical of the normal life of any living 
culture (cultural anthropology of Taiwan); 
• China would like to extend its rule to Taiwan and establish a political 
continuity to bridge a geographical discontinuity, but remains to this day 
obliged to negotiate with Taiwan to advance its agenda (geopolitical 
liminality of Taiwan; study of the geopolitics of the Taiwan strait); 
• Taiwan is a topic through which China reveals a lot of itself, because 
Taiwan as a political, cultural and geopolitical issue is a complicated and 
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sensitive one (discursive liminality of Taiwan; study of Taiwan; study of 
China, especially its nation-building discourses). 
 
Conclusion 
 
With regard to its relation to China, Taiwan is in a liminal situation that has slowly 
developed over four centuries. The term ‘liminal’ is proposed as an alternative to 
the term ‘marginal’. It suggests acknowledging the complexity of a relation that can 
be called a ‘marginal position’ only if it is reduced it to its negative elements and by 
viewing it from one particular point of view, the one of the centre. 
   Taiwan’s liminality is derived from a complex heritage that obviously has not yet 
escaped from its politicized fate. The suggestion of using ‘liminal’ is also a call to 
abandon seeing Taiwan’s identity as either merely ‘Chinese’, downsizing 
Taiwanese culture to a local one, or as ‘Taiwanese’, in a way that would consider 
Chinese culture in Taiwan as simply colonial, belonging to the past, and 
oppressive. Furthermore, it is a call to see that, in its discursive power in relation to 
China and Chinese affairs, Taiwan is still relevant. Ultimately, it is a way to better 
understand the complexity of China’s feelings toward Taiwan, where self-
proclaimed love and hidden hate, feelings of proximity and jealously, appropriation, 
interdependency, fascination and contempt all mix. 
   The island, as a threshold of China, is in sum an excellent topos for 
understanding China itself. In ancient Greek, τόπος means both ‘place’ and 
‘subject’, which fits the description of Taiwan’s liminality as both geopolitical and 
discursive. This topos says a lot about China itself, because China reveals itself 
through this delicate topic on matters such as its perception of history, the nation, 
identity, and relations with the world. 
   The liminal position of Taiwan is also a consequence of the 
‘conservatory/laboratory’ combination that the island has because of its 
multicultural society in which Chinese culture is an important matrix: as Taiwan 
protected Chinese culture, it also constantly revisited it, inventing new forms of 
Chineseness, a civic, if not national, Taiwanese identity, and ways to be global in 
the absence of diplomatic recognition. 
   In conclusion, liminality as a concept reframes an understanding of Taiwan that 
is, in each political program, usually simplified to fit an ideology revolving around a 
certain idea of the nation. I have tried to develop it to better accommodate the 
plurality of dimensions in Taiwan’s relation to China, which includes cultural, 
political, psychological, memorial, economic, and military aspects. Some of these 
dimensions bring Taiwan and China close to each other, while others keep them 
distant. It is damaging to the understanding of Taiwan to deny either of these 
contrary and concomitant movements. This context of push-and-pull forces is also 
a situation of distance and proximity, or conservatory and laboratory. Summarized 
to its narrowest definition, geopolitical liminality here defines an asymmetric 
interdependence where the small entity has something to say in the couple formed 
with the bigger entity, thanks to the historical and cultural thickness of their 
geopolitical relation over time. A geopolitical understanding of liminality, in this 
sense, may be exportable to other fields in the discipline; perhaps not without the 
risk of losing some of its substance, but hopefully as a way to rebalance the 
analysis of the strengths of the weak, as well as of the weaknesses of the strong. 
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Abstract 
 
Lin Hsien-Tang played the most significant role in leading resistance to colonialism 
in Taiwan during the Japanese period, 1895–1945. In 1907 Lin took the advice of a 
Chinese leader-in-exile named Liang Chi-Tsau to follow the Irish way of resisting 
English rule, and in 1911 he invited Liang to visit Taiwan. It can be assumed that 
Lin was thus influenced by Liang to start his political career from 1914 as a 
reformer rather than a revolutionary, though it is not known how exactly they 
conceptualized Irish Home Rule. Lin’s rise and development as a politician has 
parallels with John Redmond, who during the same period was leading the Irish 
Home Rule movement. This paper uses valuable and largely-unresearched 
materials, such as Lin Hsien-Tang’s Diary, contemporary Taiwanese and 
Japanese newspapers, and Japanese official records, to analyse the 
achievements and problems of Lin’s political career in depth. Lin is then compared 
with Redmond, drawing on scholarly and contemporary sources. In his role as 
leader of the Irish nationalist MPs at Westminster, John Redmond worked towards 
enhancing political rights and the social position of nationalists in Ireland while 
maintaining a peaceful political co-existence with his opponents, just as Lin wanted 
to achieve equality between the Taiwanese and the Japanese. Both succeeded in 
keeping the flame of national consciousness alight in their people, although 
sabotaged and attacked by radicals of their own side and ultimately frustrated in 
their aims. 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1895 Taiwan was ceded to Japan, and the inhabitants endured unequal 
treatment as colonial subjects. The Japanese Empire was interested in learning 
from the British model of colonialism: Michael Hoare notes a report from the 
London Times from 12 June 1903 that ‘Viscount Kodama, Governor of Formosa’ 
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was planning a visit to England and to ‘the Transvaal in order to inspect the 
working of the British Colonial System’.1 A generation later, a report in the Times of 
29 October 1936 stated that ‘when talking to Englishmen, the Japanese refer 
rather proudly to Formosa as “their India”’ (quoted in Hoare 2010). However, the 
British Empire’s colonial subjects also offered their own lessons, which came to the 
attention of Japan’s new subjects; the current paper is particularly concerned with 
the Taiwanese leader Lin Hsien-Tang ( 林 獻 堂 ), who followed advice from a 
Chinese leader-in-exile, Liang Chi-Tsau ( 梁 啟 超 ), to follow the Irish way of 
resistance to English rule. In Irish history, this paper considers the example of 
John Redmond as a possible counterpart to Lin in Taiwan; Redmond led the Irish 
Home Rule movement from 1900 until his death in 1918, coinciding with the period 
during which Lin launched his political career. It is interesting to consider why and 
how the Irish model inspired Lin’s moderate anti-colonialism, and to consider 
related questions: what was the nature of Lin’s anti-colonial movement? Was it 
successful? And finally, what comparisons and contrasts can be made between 
the careers of Lin and Redmond? 
   Lin came from a prominent family in central Taiwan, and played a most important 
role in leading the anti-colonial movement throughout the period of Japanese rule, 
which ended in 1945. Generally speaking, he was a moderate reformer rather than 
a revolutionary, and he sought to achieve his goals by peaceful means. There are 
various source materials for Lin’s political life, the most important of which are the 
three volumes of the Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series (1960, 1974) and the 
published correspondence between Lin Hsien-Tang and Liang Chi-Tsau (Hsu 
2007). Other sources include contemporary Chinese and Japanese newspapers. A 
number of works published in Taiwan discuss Lin’s anti-Japanese movement, and 
two in particular should be noted. Chang was the first scholar to discuss Lin’s 
political activities systematically (1981: 64–72). However, his book contains only 
eight pages on Liang’s visit to Taiwan in 1911, and he made little reference to the 
Irish home rule problem. Huang’s 2006 biography of Lin describes Lin and Liang’s 
dialogue in 1907 and Liang’s visit to Taiwan in 1911, and discusses their 
importance, but it does not go into details (22–27). There are also some relevant 
articles, such as works by Tsai et al. (1971), Huang (1965), Chen (1996), and 
Chou (1989), but most give only brief mentions of the topic and there are again few 
references to Irish anti-colonialism. The purpose of the present paper is to fill this 
gap. 
   The paper begins with a discussion of how Lin Hsien-Tang’s approach to anti-
colonialism was inspired by the Irish Home Rule movement, and shows why he 
adopted a peaceful approach to anti-Japanese colonialism. In particular, the paper 
describes how the Irish model was introduced by Liang to Lin when they met and 
had a dialogue in Japan in 1907. The second part describes the character of the 
Irish Home Rule movement, which, under the leadership of John Redmond, saw 
an Irish parliament written into law in 1914 after four decades of campaign and 
struggle. Despite this achievement, war in Europe and rebellion in Ireland ensured 
that this parliament, although legislated for, was never convened, and Irish 
nationalism took a very different course. The third part discusses the first stage of 
                                                 
1
 Hoare adds that the plan was abandoned when Kodama became Chief of General Staff of 
the Manchurian Army on the outbreak of war with Russia the following year. 
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Lin’s political movement, which included The Assimilation Association (20 
December 1914 to 26 February 1915) and the subsequent Law 63 abolition 
movement (August 1918 to November 1920), while the fourth part deals with Lin’s 
second stage of activism with the Taiwan Assembly establishment movement. 
Between 1920 and 1930 this movement aimed to establish an independent 
assembly in Taiwan to counter the tyranny of the governor-general. This 
movement declined when Japan tightened political controls after initiating its 
aggression against China in the 1930’s. The conclusion includes a brief 
comparison of Lin and Redmond.  
 
Lin Hsien-Tang’s Idea of Anti-colonialism as Inspired by the Irish Home Rule 
Movement 
 
Lin Hsien-Tang was born in Taichung, Taiwan, in 1881. His father was an 
intellectual, but his mother died when he was young and he was brought up by his 
paternal grandmother and received home-tutoring from two prominent scholars. 
This helped to form his personality and intellectual perspective throughout his life. 
   In 1895, the Ch’ing Empire lost a war with Japan, and Taiwan was consequently 
ceded to Japan. This had a strong impact on Lin, and he devoted his entire life to 
fighting for the freedom and dignity of the Taiwanese and against the Japanese 
colonial power. He was known to be a moderate, leading a peaceful, non-violent 
political movement. There were a number of reasons he took this approach. 
 
The Difficulties of Anti-Colonial Resistance through Military Measures in Taiwan 
 
Lin’s idea of peaceful struggle against the Japanese was formulated in relation to 
several factors. First, he learnt the lesson of the disorganization of the Taiwanese 
resistance forces during the initial stage of the armed struggle, between 1895 and 
1902 (Huang 2004: 14). Despite the initially high morale of the Taiwanese 
resistance, its forces were immediately overwhelmed by the well-trained and well-
equipped Japanese forces. The resistance lacked military discipline, modern 
weaponry and a competent leader to conduct a sustained armed struggle against 
the Japanese. 
   Moreover, the Japanese initiated a massive disarmament program, using the 
carrot and the stick to divide and destroy resistance forces and ensure stability. 
This was immediately successful: in 1903, the ‘stick’ approach obliged the 
Taiwanese to hand over any weapon which was deemed threatening to colonial 
rule (Lamley 1964), while the ‘carrot’ approach which followed offered locally-
respected Taiwanese individuals opportunities to become local officials. Some 
privileges were also offered, such as monopolies on the sale of opium and salt. 
   Furthermore, the Lin family was not very keen on the idea of armed struggle. 
Although his family was wealthy and would have been able to organize an armed 
force, he faced difficulties in coordinating different family members into united 
action. Lin himself was brought up in a family regarded by Taiwanese as 
‘educated’, ‘well-cultured’ and ‘moderate’ (Huang 2004: 15). He received a 
Confucian-style education which emphasized the values of civility, moderation, and 
politeness. These became Lin’s personal characteristics, which affected his 
approach in dealing with the colonial rulers. Therefore, he saw himself as a 
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political leader who was struggling for peace, and rather than as a revolutionary 
engaging in armed conflict. 
   A final factor was the lack of international help for the armed struggle against the 
Japanese colonial regime. Taiwan, by the terms of the Peace Treaty of 
Simonoseki between China and Japan, was a ceded territory, and therefore no 
nation could legally assist Taiwan, not even China. After the defeat of the 
Taiwanese resistance forces in 1895, there were further incidents of armed 
resistance in Taiwan against the Japanese in 1913 and in 1915, but they were 
sporadic and inconsistent. 
 
The Influence of the Dialogue between Lin Hsien-Tang and Liang Chi-Tsau in 
1907 
 
Although there was no international support for a potential armed struggle against 
the Japanese, Lin did receive moral support from a sympathizer in China, Liang 
Chi-Tsau. Lin met Liang in Nara, Japan, in 1907, and eagerly explained the ill-
treatment of the Taiwanese by the Japanese and sought Liang’s advice. Liang 
bluntly told Lin: 
 
China would not and will not be able to support Taiwan in its potential liberation from 
the Japanese colonial rulers. In such circumstances, it will not be wise to make any 
drastic move which would result in unnecessary loss of life. The best option is to 
imitate the Irish model in fighting against the British rule. In other words, Taiwanese 
political activists should try to build deep relations with prominent Japanese 
politicians in Tokyo, who may, in turn, curb possible political oppression of political 
rights in Taiwan by the Japanese general-governor. 
(quoted in Huang 2004: 15) 
 
This was Liang’s response and advice to Lin, which strengthened Lin’s belief in 
non-violent struggle as the means for gaining political freedom from the Japanese. 
Lin cherished this precious meeting and consequently invited Liang to visit Taiwan 
in the future. This shows the influence of the Irish Home Rule movement on Lin. 
 
The Influence of Liang Chi-Tsau’s Visit to Taiwan in 1911 
 
On 24 March 1911, Liang, accompanied by his eldest daughter and his close 
friend Tang Chue-Tun (湯覺頓), embarked on his first visit to Taiwan (Chang 1981: 
67–68). It was a highly publicized event, and subsequently caught the attention of 
the Japanese colonial regime. After their arrival, Liang was greeted by huge 
crowds of Taiwanese intellectuals in Keelung (the main port in northern Taiwan) 
and in Taipei. During their visit, Liang stayed in four different places and tried hard 
to understand the strong anti-Japan sentiment amongst the Taiwanese people. 
Ironically, he concluded and conceded that, although the Japanese colonial rulers 
were undemocratic and autocratic, their development programs in Taiwan, such as 
water irrigation, education, banking system, telegrams, newspapers, and radio 
broadcasting, were, to his mind, worth emulating in China (Liang 1975: 167). In 
other words, Liang was not very keen on drastic anti-colonial measures. Lin 
considered Liang’s words and regarded his anti-colonial activism as a peaceful 
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and political movement, which would not resort to the kind of armed revolution 
seen in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Following Liang’s 
advice to emulate the Home Rule movement in Ireland, Lin soon afterwards began 
to implement his approach by seeking the help of influential politicians in the 
Japanese central government, and in 1914 he cooperated with Taisuno Itegaki (板
垣退助) in organizing the Assimilation Association (同化會). This was followed by 
plans for the establishment of a Taiwanese Assembly, political parties, and cultural 
associations which were to consist of Taiwanese intellectuals, which will be 
discussed later. 
 
The Irish Home Rule Movement and the achievement of Redmondism (1900–
1918) 
 
It is perhaps significant that Liang was advocating the Irish Home Rule model in 
1907. Regrettably, it is not clear from the sources how or in what context Liang 
described the Irish Home Rule movement to Lin or indeed what was the extent of 
Liang’s knowledge of the Irish question. It is as likely that Liang was referring to an 
earlier phase in the Irish constitutional struggle as to current events in Anglo-Irish 
politics. Whether his information was derived from history books, newspapers, or 
word of mouth, it is probable that his concept of Irish history and politics 
constituted an idealized and somewhat simplified interpretation of the situation. For 
this reason, it is excusable here to present the course of modern Irish history and 
the Home Rule movement in broad terms rather than entering into the nuances of 
factionalism, regionalism, and parliamentary intrigues which dominate the modern 
historiography of constitutional nationalism.2 If Liang had learned of Home Rule 
through books – either directly or indirectly – a number of important works had 
been published prior to 1907 that may have had some bearing on his concept of 
Irish Home Rule.3 If this was the case, it is more likely that Liang was referring to 
the iconic struggle of Charles Stewart Parnell against the forces of Conservativism 
and unionism culminating in the failed 1886 Home Rule Bill. On the other hand, if 
Liang was keeping up with contemporary developments in Irish politics, 1907 was 
a pivotal year for John Redmond as chairman of the Irish Parliamentary Party. 
 
Background to Irish History: Contested Island 
 
As island nations with colonial pasts, there are similarities worth exploring in the 
Home Rule and independence movements in Ireland and Taiwan. While the 
history of British rule in Ireland has a substantially longer lineage than the 
Taiwanese experience of Japanese rule, in both cases these were the first 
overseas territory taken by the colonizer. In Ireland, numerous armed insurrections 
had been attempted against the rule of the English monarchy from the sixteenth 
century onwards. In the present context, notable uprisings occurred in 1798 and 
                                                 
2
 For example, Callanan (1992); Bew (1987); and Wheatley (2005). 
3
 Among the publications which may have had a bearing on Liang’s impressions of Irish 
politics could be McCarthy (1904, 1907); O’Brien (1898), and O’Connor (1886). 
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1867 under the banners of the United Irishmen4 and the Fenians5 respectively. 
From the 1540s onwards, owing to the concurrence of England’s Protestant 
reformation and the extension and consolidation of British rule in Ireland, Irish 
demands for political rights were inextricably linked with broader questions of land 
ownership and religious freedom.6 One fundamental difference between Ireland 
and Taiwan in this respect is that, whereas Japan was reluctant to settle its people 
in Taiwan, Ireland experienced waves of plantation by English and Scottish settlers 
in the early modern period.7 The success of plantation in the northeast of the 
province of Ulster led to sectarian and ethnic tensions that persist to the present 
day. In addition, the descendants of these Ulster settlers became the most vocal 
and credible defenders of the union with Great Britain from the 1880s onwards. 
During the nineteenth century, the peacefully orientated (constitutional) and the 
revolutionary (physical force) traditions of Irish nationalism ran simultaneously and 
often with an ambiguous degree of overlap and interaction.  
   Arguably the most significant event during Ireland’s nineteenth century was the 
outbreak of a devastating famine beginning in 1845.8 The famine had a lasting 
effect on the demographics and economy of the island and, in the political context, 
British mismanagement of the disaster added fuel to the fire of Irish nationalist 
sentiment for generations thereafter. Furthermore, the famine gave rise to 
increased tensions over land holding. The grievances of tenant farmers became an 
even more pressing issue in Irish life and politics than they had been prior to the 
famine. In this period, British governments and the newly emergent Home Rule 
movement began to focus on the resolution of the land question alongside the 
wider issue of governance (Mansergh 1975: 135–138). 
 
 
                                                 
4
 A society based on Enlightenment principles and religious egalitarianism. Despite these 
lofty aims, the actual rebellion in 1798 had sectarian overtones in certain parts of the 
country. The arrival of a French invasion force in the west of Ireland after the main action 
had been suppressed gave an international dimension to this episode. Alvin Jackson has 
dubbed the rebellion ‘a short but bloody civil war... the explosive release of pent-up 
economic and sectarian pressures’ (Jackson 1999: 20). 
5
 Having staged an unsuccessful rebellion in 1867, various groups committed acts of 
terrorism in both Ireland and Britain, including a dynamiting campaign and political 
assassinations in the 1880s, under the banner of ‘Fenianism’. The official leadership of the 
Fenians, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, remained operational up to the 1916 Rising – 
which it planned and orchestrated – and beyond. As such, it provided a strand of continuity 
between the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Moody 
ed. 1978). 
6
 David Thornley has referred to nationality, land, and religion at the ‘three great stimuli’ 
behind the common people’s resentment of their rulers (Thornley1964: 13). 
7
 On Japanese reluctance to settle its own people in Taiwan, apart from colonial 
administrators and police, see Song (2009: 83n).  
8
 The famine had been caused by the failure of the potato crop, in which blight was first 
observed in September 1845. The population of Ireland stood at 8,175,124 in the census of 
1841. Ten years later, starvation and emigration contributed to a fall of 1,622,739 in the 
population of the island. Figures taken from Foster 1988: 606–607. 
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The Origins of Irish Home Rule 
 
Beginning in 1870, the Home Rule movement sought to re-establish on Irish soil 
the parliament that had voted itself out of existence in 1800 when it passed the Act 
of Union with Great Britain. 9  Isaac Butt, the founder of the Irish Home Rule 
movement, was openly sympathetic towards the Fenians whose insurrection of 
1867 had ended in catastrophic failure. Despite initial ambivalence, mass arrests 
of Fenians had swung the sympathies of a large section of the public in favour of 
the rebels, who took their place in the pantheon of Irish nationalism (Lyons 1971: 
126–127). Butt’s legal defence of the Fenians at their trials provided him with a 
platform from which to launch his political campaign for Home Rule (Thornley 
1964: 19–20). Initially, the Home Rule movement had been moderate, gently 
pressing for the British Government to benevolently grant Ireland greater freedoms 
culminating in the restoration of a domestic legislature within a federalist 
framework (Jackson 1999: 12). However, oratory and reason alone were 
ineffectual methods for securing these aims. By the middle of the 1870s, a section 
of the Home Rule party began to adopt more radical, but still firmly constitutional 
methods. 
   By 1880, under the leadership of Charles Stewart Parnell, the Irish Parliamentary 
Party brought machine politics to Westminster. Its new aim was to grind the 
business of Parliament and, by extension, the entire British Empire to a halt 
through the application of obstructionist tactics.10 By so doing, it was hoped that 
the presence of Irish representatives in the British House of Commons would 
become such a burden as to convince the Government that Home Rule was the 
only solution.11 From the 1880s onwards, the Home Rule party dominated electoral 
politics in Ireland and, following franchise extension in 1884, the consistent 
election of roughly eighty pledge-bound and well-disciplined Home Rule MPs to 
Westminster became a source of exasperation and ire to successive British 
Governments, both Conservative and Liberal. Though never violent, Home Rule 
aligned itself with agrarian agitation in Ireland advocating boycott and civil 
disobedience. Between the 1880s and the first decade of the twentieth century, 
numerous nationalist MPs were imprisoned and nationalist public meetings in 
Ireland were subjected to police surveillance.12 
                                                 
9
 On the way in which the Irish Parliament was bribed and induced to pass the Act, see 
Foster (1988: 284–285). 
10
 Through long and rambling speeches, Irish MPs managed to force the House of 
Commons to sit for marathon sessions of several days. This eventually provoked 
reformative action from the Government and the liberties of individual members were 
consequently curtailed. On the origins of obstructionism among Home Rule MPs, beginning 
in July 1874, see Thornley (1964: 235–239) and Cruise O’Brien (1957: 21–23). 
11
 Interestingly, the burden of Ireland on the business of Parliament was cited by Prime 
Minister Asquith as a justification for the re-establishment of an Irish parliament when he 
introduced the third Home Rule Bill in April 1912 (see Hansard, 11 April 1912, col. 1404). 
12
 Detailed secret police reports relating to nationalist involvement in land agitation and the 
participation of nationalist MPs in public meetings in Ireland can be found in the files of the 
British Colonial Office (The British in Ireland, CO 904, Part One: Anti-Government 
Organisations, 1882–1921). 
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   The first great opportunity for the Irish Home Rule movement came when the 
British Liberal Party, traditionally more moderate on the Irish question, found itself 
relying on the numerical support of Irish Home Rulers to form a government 
following the General Elections of 1885 and 1892.. In both instances, a pact was 
made between William Gladstone, the Liberal Prime Minister, and the leadership of 
the Irish Parliamentary Party.13 In exchange for making possible the formation of a 
Liberal administration, Gladstone introduced a bill providing for the establishment 
of a Home Rule parliament in Ireland.  
   The first Home Rule Bill of 1886 proposed the establishment of a unicameral 
legislature – deliberately avoiding the term ‘parliament’ (Jackson 2003: 57) – and 
the removal of the 103 Irish representatives then sitting in the House of Commons. 
The new Irish legislature was to consist of two ‘orders’, one partially elected and 
with a property/wealth qualification, and the other fully elected and ‘wholly 
representative’ (Lyons 1977: 344). Importantly, although Ireland was to be 
relatively unrestricted in its legislative remit, 14 executive power was to remain in 
the hands of the monarch’s representive in Ireland, the Lord Lieutenant, and the 
assembly in Ireland was to remain strictly subordinate to Parliament at 
Westminster (Jackson 2003: 57–58). The Irish Parliamentary Party initially gave 
only a ‘guarded welcome’ to the 1886 Home Rule Bill, largely due to the clauses 
relating to finance, the creation of two orders within the legislature, and the 
restrictions on the powers that would be granted to this new body (Lyons 1977: 
345). However, it quickly became clear that the Bill had little chance of being 
passed by the Commons, and at this point the Nationalists threw their unequivocal 
support behind the Bill, aware that quarrel with Gladstone over particulars was now 
irrelevant (Jackson 2003: 61). 
   In 1886, the first Home Rule Bill was sufficiently unpalatable when it entered the 
House of Commons that it split the Liberal Party and the Bill was promptly 
defeated (Lubenow 1983). Between 1890 and 1891, the Irish Parliamentary Party 
experienced its own schism, this time owing to the involvement of its leader, 
Charles Stewart Parnell, in a divorce scandal.15 Despite the fragmentation of the 
Home Rule movement, in 1892, Irish nationalists again found themselves holding 
the balance of power at Westminster. A second Home Rule Bill was introduced in 
1893 and, this time, it passed through the House of Commons only to be thrown 
out by the House of Lords which enjoyed a veto over legislation.16 The second 
Home Rule Bill was modelled on the Bill of 1886 but it had several key 
modifications. Most notably, the parliament – and this time it was a parliament that 
was proposed – was to be bicameral, with both an upper and lower house. The 
other major alteration was that Irish representation at Westminster was to be 
retained, albeit at a reduced level and, in the initial draft of the Bill, Irish members 
were to be excluded from any business that pertained solely to Britain (Jackson 
                                                 
13
 For an in-depth analysis of the conversion of the Liberal Party to the cause of Irish Home 
Rule, see Mansergh (1975: 133–174). 
14
 All matters pertaining to religion as well as to police and imperial issues were to be 
reserved by Parliament at Westminster (Lyons 1977: 344). 
15
 On the split, see Callanan (992). 
16
 For a contemporary perspective on this from the then leader of the majority wing of Irish 
Nationalism, see McCarthy (1907: 462). 
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2003: 82).Finance remained problematic in the 1893 Bill and the blueprint for the 
financial relationship eventually settled upon in 1893 skimmed over complex 
structural and theoretical issues and its operability was questionable (Jalland 1983: 
236–237). 
 
Home Rule under John Redmond 
 
By the end of the bitter and divisive decade of the 1890s, the nationalist public 
were growing disillusioned with their political representatives and, in a bid to 
maintain their relevance to the nationalist electorate and threatened with newly 
emergent political forces, the opposing factions of the Home Rule movement re-
united in February 1900.17 The Irish Parliamentary Party chose John Redmond as 
its chairman and leader. Redmond had led the minority faction during the 1890s 
and was a loyal follower of his chief, Parnell, who had died in 1891. Redmond’s 
personality and outlook were intrinsically conciliatory. He was chosen as a 
compromise candidate for the chairmanship in preference to several stronger 
candidates who were bitterly opposed to each other (Bull 1988). Redmond fought 
hard to maintain the unity of the Home Rule movement in the opening years of the 
twentieth century. After Ireland had been brought to the brink of civil war in 1914 
due to unionist fears over the implementation of Home Rule, Redmond became an 
enthusiastic advocate of Irish participation in the British war effort. For Redmond, if 
both communities in Ireland fought side by side in the trenches of the First World 
War, then a new ‘all-Ireland’ national identity could be born that would focus on 
shared values and put aside sectarian strife. Michael Wheatley has neatly summed 
up the ideology of Redmondism as ‘advocating support of empire, conciliation with 
unionists, and the wooing of men of property to help lead the independent nation’ 
(Wheatley 2005: 10). It should be noted that Redmond’s view was never more than 
a ‘minority taste’ (79) within the umbrella of Irish nationalism. By contrast, the bulk 
of nationalist Ireland was steeped in a tradition of ‘conservative respectability’, 
machine politics, and the language of ‘Catholicity, sense of victimhood, glorification 
of struggle… and antipathy to England which suffused provincial, nationalist 
orthodoxy’ (Wheatley 2005: 266).18 Through his Catholic education and his lineage 
as a member of the Irish Catholic gentry, Redmond inherited a gift for oratory, a 
strong sense of duty to his community, and a deep social conservatism.19 
   In 1900, the re-united Irish Parliamentary Party was faced with an unsympathetic 
Conservative government which was keen to dilute the Irish demand for Home 
Rule through ameliorative public works and legislation aimed at solving the Irish 
land question, which many British politicians believed to be at the core of the Irish 
                                                 
17
 In the political vacuum, the 1890s saw the flowering of cultural nationalist movements 
such as the Gaelic League (an Irish language movement) and the Anglo-Irish Literary 
Theatre, which included such luminaries as W.B. Yeats and J.M. Synge. See Hutchinson 
(1987). 
18
 A literary insight into this world can be seen in Ó Faoláin (1934). 
19
 The influences of ancestry and education on John Redmond are explored in the opening 
chapters of Meleady (2008). 
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grievance with British rule.20 Faced with this, the Irish party reverted to the tactics 
of harassment and attempts to obstruct the business of the Parliament which had 
proved so effective in the 1880s. However, the re-election of a Liberal Government 
by an overwhelming majority in 1906 precipitated a massive tactical re-evaluation 
on the part of the Irish nationalists. As noted above, it is not clear as to which 
phase in the history of the Irish Home Rule movement Liang Chi-Tsau was 
referring when he counselled Lin Hsien-Tang to follow the Irish example. However, 
if he was thinking of moderation and the gradual extension of rights and privileges, 
then it is likely that the convivial interaction of Home Rulers with Liberal 
governments was to the forefront of Liang’s mind when he first discussed the Irish 
example with Lin in Nara in 1907. 
   As already stated, the British Liberal Party was decidedly more sympathetic to 
the concept of Irish Home Rule than their Conservative counterparts. However, 
since the death of Gladstone, a wide section of opinion within the upper echelons 
of the Liberal Party favoured a ‘gradualist’ or step-by-step approach to solving the 
Irish question (Lyons 1971: 260–261). In 1907, a bill that closely resembled an 
abortive Conservative scheme for the devolution of limited powers to Ireland – a 
measure that had shaken the Conservative Government in 1905 21  – was 
promulgated.22 The ‘Irish Council Bill’ proposed the setting up of a partially elected 
body to administer some of Ireland’s local affairs including education and 
agriculture. Just as in the previous Home Rule Bills, policing, finance, international 
diplomacy, and trade were to remain under Imperial control. 23  Despite initial 
optimism for this scheme, John Redmond and the rest of the Irish party leadership 
became disillusioned at the Government’s unwillingness to improve upon the 
original proposal. 24  In May 1907, while the Bill was still before the House of 
Commons, a caucus of the official Irish nationalist organization held in Dublin 
voted that the Irish Parliamentary Party should not support the Bill. It was the view 
of the delegates, and by extension the leadership of the Irish party, that Ireland 
would not settle for ‘half measures’ (Gwynn 1932: 148). Only full Home Rule would 
be acceptable. Following nationalist rejection of this genuine attempt by the Liberal 
Government to assuage the Irish grievance, no further efforts were made to 
address the question of Irish Home Rule until 1912. In the interim, a Parliamentary 
crisis in Britain and the results of two elections during 1910 left Redmond’s Irish 
Parliamentary Party holding the Parliamentary balance between the Conservatives 
and the Liberals as had been the case in 1886 and 1892.25 
                                                 
20
 Dubbed ‘constructive unionism’ or ‘killing Home Rule with kindness’, this outlook 
dominated Conservative policy towards Ireland at the turn of the last century. See Gailey 
(1987). 
21
 Unionist uproar over this ‘devolution scheme’ of 1904–1905 resulted in the resignation of 
the then Chief Secretary for Ireland, George Wyndham, and caused significant 
embarrassment to the Government (Hepburn 1971: 472). 
22
 For the reactions of the nationalist leadership to the devolution proposals of 1904–1905, 
see Lyons (1968: 274). 
23
 On the particulars of the Bill, see Jackson (1999: 154) and Lyons (1971: 261). 
24
 John Redmond to John Dillon, 13 May 1907 (Trinity College Dublin, Dillon Papers, MS 
6747/222). 
25
 On the parliamentary crisis of 1909–1911, Blewett (1972) remains a seminal text. 
TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  75 
 
 
 
   In the political turmoil of 1910, Redmond had forged a pact with the Liberals, 
promising support for the Government and for its programme of parliamentary 
reform in exchange for a new Home Rule Bill for Ireland (Callanan 1996: 470). The 
Bill of 1912 was modelled largely on that of 1893. It proposed a bicameral 
parliament with an accountable executive subordinate to Westminster, but with 
free reign over much domestic legislation and with predictable restrictions on 
issues such as religious discrimination and control of police. Financially, a scheme 
highly favourable to Ireland had been drawn up during 1911. However, when it was 
found that there was a deficit of roughly £1 million in Irish taxation, and that this 
would increase to £1.5 million the following year, much less ambitious financial 
clauses were written into the Bill. This deficit had arisen largely through new 
Liberal legislation on social insurance and pensions which applied equally to 
Britain and Ireland (Jalland 1983: 236–240). 
   Despite concerns over finance, the third Home Rule Bill represented the most 
comprehensive and far-reaching commitment to legislative autonomy for Ireland to 
date and it laid out a roadmap for the orderly transfer of a meaningful amount of 
political control from Britain to Ireland and the disestablishment of the Act of Union. 
When the third Home Rule Bill was put before the House of Commons in April 
1912, the veto of the House of Lords had been removed. From a legal perspective, 
Home Rule was virtually certain by this point. However, if finance was the most 
objectionable aspect contained within the third Home Rule Bill, then the most 
conspicuous absence from its clauses was any reference to the economically and 
religiously distinct region of Ulster. Mindful of the futility of constitutional opposition 
since the removal of the House of Lords’ veto, unionists on both sides of the Irish 
Sea now turned to extra-constitutional methods and began organizing and arming 
a paramilitary force to protect Ulster from being forced under the rule of a Dublin 
parliament. Six northeastern counties – containing approximately 802,500 mainly 
unionist Protestants and 407,000 mostly nationalist Catholics26 – would eventually 
preserve their union with Great Britain, excluding themselves from the jurisdiction 
of the Southern Parliament which was established in 1919 and officially recognized 
by London in 1922. 
 
The Shift from Constitutionalism to Physical Force: Irish Nationalism, 1912–1922 
 
To briefly summarize the evolution of the Irish question between 1912 and 1922, 
the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 saw the Home Rule Bill placed on the 
Statute Book only to be suspended for the duration of the European conflict and 
pending suitable accommodation for the unionist minority in Ulster. Having been at 
the height of his popularity in 1914, Redmond advocated the enlistment of Irish 
nationalists into the British army as a sign of loyalty to the powers that had just 
legislated for Irish Home Rule and also for the defence of other small European 
nations. As public opinion in Ireland turned against the War, Redmondism began 
to share this fate. Having been put on hold for the duration of the War, the Irish 
question stagnated. In April 1916, a small and unrepresentative minority of 
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 Figures (rounded to the nearest 500) are taken from ‘Mr Redmond’s Address to the 
Buckingham Palace Conference, 21 July 1914’ (Parliamentary Archives, Westminster, Lloyd 
George Papers MS C/20/2/9). 
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nationalists, believing the old maxim that ‘England’s difficulty is Ireland’s 
opportunity’ and pledged to achieving independence through physical force, 
staged an insurrection. With little action outside of Dublin, the rebellion was put 
down within a week. Public opinion was initially hostile to these unrepresentative 
rebels due to the fact that many nationalists were serving in the British army and 
because Dublin had been subjected to artillery bombardment during the hostilities. 
However, the public mood shifted rapidly when the British military authorities 
began to execute the ringleaders in early May. 
   This ‘draconian reaction’ (Foster 1988: 484), coupled with the extension of 
martial law to areas of Ireland that had not even seen fighting resulted in the 
political wing of the rebel faction witnessing a sudden and dramatic rise in 
popularity at the expense of Redmondism and the Home Rule movement. In the 
1918 General Election, this new status quo was confirmed. The Home Rulers 
managed to hold on to only six seats. Meanwhile, the rebels’ Sinn Féin party won 
seventy-three seats, taking over as representatives of majority Irish nationalism. 
Sinn Féin abstained from attendance at Westminster and set up a new 
administration in Dublin. Between 1919 and 1921, Southern Ireland found itself 
embroiled in a war of independence while in Ulster, six counties combined to form 
a new Northern Irish state (Buckland 1979). In the South, a truce was declared in 
the summer of 1921 and a treaty was drafted by December (Pakenham 1992). 
Although this treaty precipitated a civil war between rival nationalist factions in the 
South, an Irish Free State, with powers even greater than those proposed under 
the Home Rule Bills, was established in 1922. British control over Ireland was 
further eroded by successive Irish governments in the ensuing decades and 
Ireland severed its last political tie with Britain in 1949, exiting the Commonwealth 
of Nations and declaring itself a republic (Ferriter 2005: 484–485). 
   Through a mixture of antagonism and cooperation, nationalist involvement in 
Parliament ensured that the Irish question was not forgotten in British political 
circles. Indeed, at many points in this chronology it was, in fact, brought centre 
stage through the efforts of nationalist MPs.27 By courting the favour of Liberal 
politicians and by exploiting British political crises, Home Rulers managed to 
extract commitments and concessions from successive Liberal governments, 
culminating in the placing of the third Home Rule Bill on the Statute Book in 
September 1914. 
   With a commitment to Irish self-determination enshrined in law, the principle of a 
domestic legislature for Ireland had been conceded. Even the Conservatives had 
to content themselves with working towards the salvation of Ulster. Home Rule, for 
nationalist Ireland was an accepted fact by all sides from 1914 onwards. 28 
Ironically, the physical force wing of Irish nationalism, which so detested the 
insipidness and latent imperialism of Redmondism, would likely have faded into 
history as yet another failed Irish revolutionary movement had it not been for the 
monumental efforts of the constitutionalists since the 1870s. One Irish agitator 
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 This point has been made by Eugenio Biagini. Furthermore, Biagini claims that, in British 
Liberalism, Irish self-determination fed into a broader debate on liberty stretching back to 
the Chartist movement established in 1838 (Biagini 2007: 3–5). 
28
 On the carving up of Ulster between nationalist and unionist representatives in 1914, see 
Mulvagh (2007). 
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claimed that ‘Violence is sometimes the only way to secure a hearing for 
moderation’ (quoted in Lyons 1971: 131) but given the crucial spadework 
undertaken by the Home Rule movement which laid the foundations for Sinn Féin’s 
independence movement, the opposite is equally true. Until the principle of political 
freedom has been extracted from the ruling regime, violence only begets 
repression and restrictions on liberty. Regrettably for the Taiwanese Home Rule 
movement, while the principle of enhanced liberties and legislative powers had 
been conceded in 1935, the exigencies of wider geopolitics forced a reversal of 
policy from Tokyo within just two years. Just as the First World War would 
eventually prove to be the vehicle of change for Ireland,29 so too the defeat of 
Japan in 1945, and not the efforts of the independence movement, would force 
regime change in Taiwan. 
 
The First Stage of Lin Hsien-Tang’s Political Movement in Taiwan: The 
Assimilation Association（1914–1920）and the Law 63 Abolition Movement 
 
Lin rose to leadership of the Taiwan Assimilation Association and of the Law 63 
Abolition movement in the 1910s. These two political movements were both non-
violent, limiting their goals to winning equal rights and status between the 
Taiwanese and the Japanese. 
 
The Taiwan Assimilation Association (同化會) 
 
The ‘Taiwan Assimilation Association’ was nominally established by the Japanese 
human rights activist Taisuno Itegaki (板垣退助 ) and supported (and in fact, 
initatied) by Lin with the aim of unifying Taiwan and Japan as a community. In 
other words, the association wanted the Taiwanese to have the same political 
rights as the Japanese. 
   Itegaki had played a prominent role in the Meiji Reform period. He had been 
appointed as Secretary for the Senate and Minister of Civil Engineering in 1871, 
but resigned when his advocacy of ‘Korean conquest’ went unheeded. In 1874, he 
organized the ‘Patriotic Public Party’. In 1881, he founded the Liberal Party and 
became its leader, and was renowned for advocating liberalism. He later formed 
the Constitutional Party, and, in cooperation with the Reform Party, the first 
political party-led cabinet in Japanese history was formed in 1898. Shigenobu 
Okuma (大隈重信) became Prime Minister and Itegaki himself served as Minister 
of Internal Affairs. After stepping down in 1900, he still maintained a substantial 
influence on Japanese politics due to his reputation for incorruptibility (Chang 
1981: 80). 
   Lin kept in close contact with Liang Chi-Tsau after Liang’s visit to Taiwan in 1911, 
and he even received books and newspapers from Liang on numerous occasions; 
Liang was also a journalist and thus kept Lin informed of international 
developments, which would have included the Irish Issues (Hsu 2007: 32–152). In 
May 1913, Lin informed Liang that he would soon visit him in Beijing (Hsu 2007: 
153), and he did that autumn, meeting Liang and also some Chinese politicians. 
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Lin then went to Tokyo to call on Itegaki through the introduction of Wang Shue-
Tsien, a member of the Taichung Poetry Society (Chang 1981: 79–80). He 
complained about the distresses of the Taiwanese people and went further, inviting 
Itegaki to make a fact-finding trip to Taiwan. Itegaki was sympathetic with the 
Taiwanese people, though he was also a Pan-Asianist, advocating the idea of 
southward expansion. He considered that Taiwan would be a good fulcrum for 
promoting Sino-Japanese intimacy as Japan expanded in East Asia, and thus 
promised to help and accepted Lin’s invitation without hesitation (Chang 1981: 79–
80). We may safely assume that Lin’s actions must have been encouraged by 
Liang, who as early as 1907 had advised Lin to follow the Irish approach of making 
links with the influential politicians. 
   On 17 February 1914, Itegaki came to Taiwan for an inspection tour. In the 
autumn of the same year, Lin visited Tokyo again, and was introduced by Itegaki to 
Sir Shigenobu Okuma, a prominent Japanese political figure. Itegaki then began to 
put serious thought into the possibility of political co-operation between Japan and 
Taiwan, and formulated the ‘Taiwan Assimilation Association’. For this purpose, he 
came to Taiwan for the second time in November 1914, and on 20 December he 
officially launched the association at the Taipei Railway Hotel. Due to Itegaki’s 
reputation and Lin’s influence, many political and intellectual elites in both Taiwan 
and Japan became involved. It is also interesting to know that the British 
parliament passed the third Irish Home Rule Bill in 1914, which might have 
encouraged Lin and Itegaki in their actions. 
   However, the Association provoked immediate suspicion, leading to constant 
harassment and persecution at the hands of the colonial administration and the 
media. In particular, it was alleged that the chief member of the Association had 
cooperated with Mr Kuo, the Lin family secretary, and misused 50,000 Japanese 
Yen which had been raised through ‘fundraising’ in order to assist an individual 
named Lin Tsong-Gen (林熊徵 ) in acquiring a title of nobility. Therefore, the 
members of the Association were forced to resign en mass on 21 January 1915, 
and two days later the colonial administration revoked the Association’s permit to 
collect membership fees. The Association was forcibly dissolved on 26 February 
(Yang 1988: 76–77). Consequently, the first political movement developed by Lin 
was unsuccessful, and the measures advised by Liang did not work. 
   The purpose of the ‘Taiwan Assimilation Association’ was to encourage the 
eventual ‘cultural unification’ of Japan and Taiwan, which in theory could help 
strengthen Japanese political rule in Taiwan. If so, why did the association face 
such extreme opposition from the colonial administration and from Japanese 
residents in Taiwan? There are two reasons. First, the Japanese were deeply 
suspicious of Taiwanese intentions. Second, the Japanese were still not willing to 
share their political power and economic advantages with the Taiwanese, as 
‘assimilation’ between Japan and Taiwan would ‘dilute’ their privileges. 
   The failure of the Taiwan Assimilation Association was one reason why Lin was 
consequently forced to stay silent for the time being. Another reason was the 
bloodshed of the anti-Japanese Yu Ching-Fang Incident in 1915, which resulted in 
massive political oppression by the colonial regime. This was the first violent anti-
Japanese incident following the end of the first period of resistance to Japanese 
rule. 
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The Law 63 Abolition Movement 
 
After the brief appearance of the Taiwan Assimilation Association, Lin switched the 
focus of his political activism to abolishing the so-called ‘Law 63’ outside Taiwan. 
This legislation had been imposed by the Japanese colonial regime, which claimed 
that Taiwan had unique characteristics in the Japanese empire. Therefore, any law 
within mainland Japan was ‘inapplicable’ to Taiwan. Instead, Law 63 was 
proclaimed to give the government-general special authorization to conduct 
executive, military, and even some legislative powers in Taiwan. Many Taiwanese 
saw this Law as enslaving Taiwan. 
   After 1910, the number of Taiwanese students in Japan increased rapidly, and 
included Lin’s own children. Through receiving a modern education, many students 
learned political resistance through legal measures, as Japan had become a 
constitutional nation. In August 1918, Lin visited Tokyo with his private secretary 
Shih Chia-Pen, and had regular contact with Taiwanese students (Lin Hsien-Tang 
Commemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 54). He invited the students to a 
banquet at Jinbocho in Tokyo, where he discussed how Taiwan could move 
forward from its political stalemate. Various political ideas were discussed, ranging 
from independence, through to autonomy and the abolition of Law 63. Eventually, 
it was decided that the best political route was the abolition of Law 63, as proposed 
by Shih Chia-Pen. Thus was formed the Law 63 Abolition League, headed by Lin 
himself (Chang 1981: 106–107). Lin then focused all his efforts on achieving this 
new goal. 
   In April 1919, Lin used his residence in Tokyo as a base for organizing the first 
related activities, and he travelled from Taiwan to Japan again in October. During 
1919, Den Kenjirō (田健次郎) became the first civilian governor-general of Taiwan, 
and Lin formally visited him to express his anticipation of political reform (Lin 
Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 55). In 1920, Lin 
visited Tokyo again to meet Japanese political leaders and to call for the abolition 
of Law 63. 
   However, Lin again changed direction suddenly, after meeting Taiwanese 
students in a church in central Tokyo on 28 November. From this time, he began to 
call for the establishment of a Taiwan Assembly (Tsai et al. 1971: 68–69; Chang 
1981: 111 –112). There are three main reasons to explain this change: first, Japan 
was very protective of its political status in Taiwan, and so the abolition of Law 63 
was very difficult to achieve. Second, the students’ association which had pursued 
this goal had had to be dissolved due to fundraising difficulties 1919. Finally, the 
political movement had to follow constant changes in Taiwanese political ideas. 
 
The Second Stage of Lin Hsien-Tang’s Political Movement: The Taiwan 
Assembly Movement (1920–1930) 
 
Lin’s fight for equality between Taiwanese and Japanese had failed, and this led 
him to consider an alternative direction. Since the concept of ‘national self-
determination’ had become a trend in global politics after the First World War, Lin’s 
political activities developed to emphasize the uniqueness of Taiwan, aiming to 
establish a Taiwan Assembly as a check on the Taiwan governor. This change 
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was motivated by overseas students, and the main battleground shifted from 
Taiwan to Japan. The effort reached its climax between 1920 and 1927. 
 
The Background of the Taiwan Assembly Movement 
 
On 28 November 1920, members of the Enlightening Association (啟發會) and the 
Taiwan Youth Association (臺灣青年會) met in Tokyo to discuss the Law 63 
abolition movement. There were severe disputes between the two sides. Lin 
Cheng-Lu (林呈祿) advocated autonomy through a special assembly in Taiwan; 30 
Lin was convinced to terminate the Law 63 abolition movement, and instead 
focused on the establishment of a Taiwan Assembly (Tsai et al. 1971: 68–69; 
Chang 1981: 111–112). Subsequently, Lin became the head of the Enlightening 
Association in December (Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series Volume 1, 
1960, 1974: 54, 57; Chang 1981: 112), changing its aim to the setting up of an 
independent Taiwan Assembly (Chou 1989: 39–45). 
   The Taiwan Assembly movement was the result of three major factors. First, 
there was encouragement from US President Woodrow Wilson, who advocated 
the principle of national self-determination. Second, Taiwan was stimulated by the 
example of the Korean independence movement in 1919. Third, amendments to 
Law 31 in 1906 and to Law 3 in 1921 had made the Law 63 abolition movement 
pointless and fruitless. A more important factor was the sudden boom in 
Taiwanese students studying in Japan, which increased from 60 men in 1906 to 
more than 2000 in 1922 (Yoshino 1927: 247–248). These students became the 
forerunners of the political movement in Taiwan. 
   However, the young Taiwanese students differed over political ideas and 
courses of action, and so needed an older and competent leader to coordinate 
disputes. Lin, due to his scholarship, seniority, personality, and family wealth, was 
regarded as a common leader of the movement. 
 
The Leadership of the Taiwan Assembly Petition Movement 
 
Lin led the Taiwan Assembly petition movement in Taiwan between 1921 and 
1934, petitioning the Japanese Imperial Diet fifteen times. Unfortunately, his efforts 
did not bear fruit beyond educating or enlightening the Taiwanese public.  
   In December 1920, Lin and 178 Taiwanese activists signed and filed a petition 
for the establishment of a Taiwan Assembly for the first time in Tokyo. This was 
only days before the opening of the Diet (Imperial Parliament) commenced (Chou 
1989: 71). The main aims were: (1) the setting up of the Taiwan Assembly, which 
would have the right to approve or reject the budget of the governor and the 
                                                 
30
 Just as Lin Hsien-Tang can be compared to John Redmond, Lin Cheng-Lu might be 
compared to Arthur Griffith, who advocated parliamentary abstention and the establishment 
of a rival parliament and administration in Ireland. Based on the example of the Hungarian 
nationalist, Ferenc Deák, Griffith’s policy became the template for the Irish independence 
movement between 1919 and 1921. Griffith outlined his policy in a highly influential 
manifesto: The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland (2003 [1904]). In recent 
historiography, Michael Laffan has branded Griffith’s manifesto a ‘bizarre political tract’ 
(Laffan 1999: 3). 
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colonial administration; (2) that every adult resident of Taiwan, regardless of their 
racial and cultural background, should be entitled vote in elections. However, the 
petition was immediately rejected by both houses of the Diet between February 
and March 1921, because the colonial administration did not want to be overseen 
by the Taiwanese (Chou 1989: 72). 
   The colonial administration was very fearful of the petition movement, but its 
hands were tied due to the fact that petitioning did not breach the Japanese 
constitution. On 24 April 1921 Lin returned to Taiwan, accompanied by Tsai Pei-
Huo ( 蔡培 火 ). The colonial administration dispatched a secretary to Keelung 
harbour to oversee their arrival, and Lin afterwards received several anonymous 
threatening letters. Despite these threats and obstacles, mainstream Taiwanese 
society was encouraged by Lin’s political action. Lin then travelled around Taiwan 
to spread his message, which made him a recognized and popular Taiwanese 
political leader (Chang 1981: 133). To woo Lin, the colonial administration 
appointed him as the first ombudsman of the colonial administration on 1 June 
1921 (Chang 1981: 133). 
   Lin did not give up his activism, and he started a second petition at the end of 
1921 and the beginning of 1922. He received 350 signatures and again travelled to 
Japan to gather further names. He paid visits to prominent Japanese politicians 
and the press, but the Diet continued to refuse to act on the petition (Chang 1981: 
133–134). 
   In May 1922, Lin returned to Taiwan and continued his activities by making 
public speeches and explaining the progress of the Taiwan Assembly movement. 
The colonial administration again became nervous, but it was restricted by the 
constitution from taking drastic measures. However, from August 1922 the colonial 
administration started to oppress the petition movement through other channels, 
such as forcing Taiwanese employees to leave their posts, obstructing the 
financing of Lin and his members, and smearing Lin’s reputation (Lin Hsien-Tang 
Commemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 65–66). However, the belief that 
Taiwan should be given the right to home rule may have become widespread; the 
only Taiwanese magazine, Taiwan, advocated home rule, and an editorial in May 
1922 entitled ‘From Assimilation to Home Rule’ noted an international trend in this 
direction and mentioned the Irish case specifically (M. Wu and Z.-L. Wu 1992: 45–
46). 
   Lin filed the third petition in 1923. He even set up a Taiwan Assembly 
Association, although this was immediately banned by the colonial administration. 
The petition was again rejected by the Diet (Tsai et al. 1971: 124–126). This did 
not stop the flame of the movement in Taiwan, and so the governor-general 
intensified acts of suppression, such as ending Lin’s post in the colonial 
administration on 10 March 1923. This was followed by mass arrests of Taiwanese 
political activists in 1924. 
   In 1923, the head of Taichung Prefecture plotted to destroy the Taiwan 
Assembly petition movement. He not only forced Lin to join the pro-Japanese Sun 
Worshiping Association (向陽會), but also tempted him to meet the governor, 
Kakichi Uchida (內田嘉吉). On 29 September, Lin met Governor Uchida with eight 
other Taiwanese political activists. Uchida told them that although the Taiwan 
Assembly petition movement was a political right protected by the Japanese 
imperial constitution, he advised them not to go any further. The colonial 
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administration even disseminated the rumour that Lin had ‘promised to terminate 
the Assembly petition movement’. The activists in Tokyo were puzzled and 
agitated. It was rumoured that Lin had abandoned his political beliefs in return for 
300 acres of land, which deeply damaged his reputation (Chang 1981: 142). 
   Furthermore, the colonial administration started large-scale arrests of several 
members of the movement from 16 December 1923, on the pretext they had 
violated the ‘Public Order Law’. As a result, 99 people were detained or taken in for 
interrogation. The colonial administration claimed that the petition movement had 
been banned in February, but that a splinter group had been formed in Tokyo with 
the same name and the same members, and therefore violated the law. Lin 
immediately contacted his friend Yeh Rong-Chong (葉榮鐘) to dispatch a letter to 
Japan secretly, in which this mass persecution was described. In the period up to 7 
January 1924, Chiang Wei-Shuim (蔣渭水) and 18 other activists were prosecuted 
and were sentenced from three to four months in prison (Chou 1989: 82–84). 
However, this trial was the first ever public trial in the history of Taiwan, and so 
provided good political education for the public. 
   Due to intensifying oppression by the colonial administration, Lin temporarily 
stepped down from leadership and took on a supporting role. The nominal leaders 
were succeeded by Chiang Wei-Shui (蔣渭水) and Tsai Pei-Huo. They submitted 
the fourth and fifth petitions, but again without success. The colonial administration 
still continued their acts of oppression, and pressed pro-Japanese Taiwanese 
leaders to organize a gathering called ‘the Powerful Men’s Meeting’, attacking the 
petitioners. As a counter-attack, anti-Japanese activists organized ‘the Weakers’ 
Meeting’, by holding public meetings in Taipei, Taichong, and Tainan. When Lin 
gave his public speech in Taichung (Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series 
Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 73), the morale of the Taiwanese political activists had 
suddenly been given a big boost again. 
   At the same time, the political climate in Taiwan had changed favourably. 
Governor Uchida stepped down and was replaced by Izawa Takio (伊澤多喜男), 
who was friendlier to the Taiwanese. In addition, two reformist Japanese members 
of the Diet’s Lower House visited Taiwan, delivering speeches and meeting Lin to 
discuss political issues (Tsai et al. 1971: 132–133).31 Therefore, between 1925 and 
1927 Lin came out to lead the Taiwan Assembly petition movement for a sixth, 
seventh, and eighth time. The numbers of signatures increased drastically, and 
Lin’s political influence reached a further climax. 
   On 11 February 1925, Lin and three other key members of the Taiwan Assembly 
petition movement went to Japan and submitted the sixth petition. Lin even invited 
several prominent Japanese politicians from the ruling and opposition parties in 
Tokyo to support his political cause (Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series 
Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 76). Lin then returned to Taiwan in March and was invited 
to several places to give public speeches, especially in Er-Lin Village (二林), where 
there was a dispute which had led to local farmers resenting the Japanese colonial 
                                                 
31In the Diet, Daikichirou Tagawa (田川大吉郎) was deeply sympathetic to the Taiwanese 
and from time to time introduced the proposal of the Taiwan Assembly petition on behalf of 
the movement. 
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administration (Lin Hsien-Tang Commemorative Series Volume 1, 1960, 1974: 77–
78).32 
   In February 1926, Tsai Pei-Huo, the petition movement representative, went to 
Japan and submitted the seventh petition (Chou 1989: 91 –93). Once again, their 
demands were turned down. However, the key members of the movement made 
further efforts, by delivering more public speeches and showing films to gather 
public support. This time, the number of signatures reached 2,470 (Chang 1981: 
155). 
 
The Weakening of the Petition Movement 
 
Unfortunately, after 1927 the political movement in Taiwan stagnated, and even 
dramatically receded. There are two factors which explain this: there was a split 
within the anti-Japanese groups, and the rise of the Japanese militarism resulted in 
stricter controls over Taiwan. 
   The split and the deterioration of the anti-Japan groups: On 15–16 May 1926, Lin 
held a meeting of the Taiwan Cultural Association in his home to discuss forming a 
political party. Lin, Tsai Pei-Huo, and Hsieh Chun-Mu (謝春木) were named as 
leaders of the committee to coordinate this. In August, Lin met shareholders of the 
Taiwan New Daily, a major Taiwanese newspaper, again to discuss the formation 
of a political party, but the meeting ended without any firm decisions due to vast 
differences of opinion. On 17 October 1926, the sixth annual general meeting of 
the Taiwan Cultural Association was held in Hsin-Chu to discuss further details, 
but there was again no conclusion due to differences of opinion (Chang 1981: 
210). In order to put its principles into practice, Chiang Wei-Shui proposed that the 
Cultural Association should change its name to ‘Liberation Association’, aiming to 
‘achieve the political, economic and social liberations of the Taiwanese’ while 
giving up the idea of ‘autonomy’ within the Japanese empire. 
   Unfortunately, in January 1927 the Cultural Association formally split into left and 
right wings. The left wing, after achieving total control of the Association, 
concentrated its actions on social revolution and even clandestinely sought 
                                                 
32 Er-Lin Village, in present-day Changhua County, had been a poor area until the 
establishment of sugar factories in the Japanese period. The Lin Pen-Yuan Sugar Company 
was set up in 1909–1911, financed by the Lin family but actually run and controlled by 
Japanese managers approved by the Governor-General of Taiwan. In April 1924, the 
sugarcane farmers requested that the company raise its purchasing prices, which had long 
been lower than that of other companies, and their request succeeded in December. The 
Taiwan Cultural Association then went further to help organize the Er-Lin Sugarcane 
Farmers’ Co-operative to bargain with the company for farmers’ rights, but this was not 
recognized by the company. Lin Hsien-Tang was at one time invited to make a speech 
criticizing the sugar policy, and he received enthusiastic responses. In 1925, the company 
tried to harvest the sugarcane by force, and consequently provoked a conflict between the 
police and more than 100 farmers. The police subsquently arrested more than 400 farmers 
and sued them. This so-called ‘Er-Lin Incident’ stimulated farmers in other areas to set up 
their own respective co-ops, and a General Taiwan Farmers Co-operatve was established 
in 1926–1928 by Chi Chien (簡吉), the leading figure in Taiwan farmers’ movements, to fight 
for famers’ rights. (T.Y. Chen 2005 30–36). 
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Taiwan’s independence. The right wing retreated to form a ‘Taiwan People’s Party’ 
to continue the assembly petition movement. However, this party also split 
between moderates and radicals, thus weakening its standing (Chang 1981: 205–
208). These two political events severely tarnished Lin’s image as the overall 
leader of the political movements in Taiwan, and forced him to undertake global 
travel for a year until 1928 (Chang 1981: 86–87). Without effective leadership, the 
political movement declined (Chang 1981: 208–209). 
   Militaristic rule from the 1930s: Japan began the invasion of China in 1931, and 
the colonial administration in Taiwan consequently intensified the suppression of 
political activities. In 1936, Japan reinstated the governorship of Taiwan as a 
military position. The then-governor Kobayashi started the projects of 
‘Japanization, Industrialization, and Southern Expansion’, which extended control 
over the island’s social and political life. The internal and external problems 
strangled Lin’s activities. He resigned as the advisor of the Taiwan People’s Party 
in January 1931, and on 19 February the party was dissolved by the Japanese 
police on the basis that it advocated class struggle. The first-ever political party in 
the history of Taiwan had existed for only three years and eight months. Further, 
the party leader, Chiang Wei-Shui, died on 8 August, which symbolized the 
termination of a moderate political force in Taiwan politics. Lin’s role in anti-
Japanese activism was becoming less and less important. A comparison with 
Ireland was made by A.R. Byers, Consul to the British ambassador in Tokyo, in a 
letter of 26 March 1933; Byers observed that ‘there is no danger of Formosa 
becoming a second Ireland… The arm of the police in Formosa is long, sudden 
and ruthless’ (quoted in Hoare 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Lin Hsien-Tang dedicated almost his entire life to the improvement of the status of 
Taiwanese under Japanese colonial rule. However, how to achieve his goal was a 
great challenge, as Taiwan was a ceded territory and legally belonged to Japan. 
There were two potential ways, militant or peaceful, and he chose the peaceful 
route. 
   The current paper has tried to explain why Lin chose the peaceful route. We 
found that in addition to his own personality and the disadvantages of using force 
against colonial authority, Lin was advised and convinced by a prominent Chinese 
politician in exile, Liang Chi-Tsau, to follow the example of the Irish Home Rule 
movement. 
    In order to understand the Irish way of resisting colonialism, John Redmond is a 
good comparison for Lin, and the paper has therefore discussed Redmond’s 
leadership of the Home Rule movement up to 1918. He succeeded in passing the 
third Home Rule Bill in 1912, a major triumph for Irish nationalism. However, this 
achievement was nullified by the 1916 rebellion and, just nine months after 
Redmond’s death, the Home Rule movement was eclipsed by physical-force 
republicans. As a moderate politician, Redmond, like his predecessors, worked 
within the confines of the British parliamentary system to achieve concessions for 
Ireland. Through the efforts of the Home Rulers and the benevolence of 
successive British governments, the land question had been solved before the 
outbreak of the Irish revolution. Additionally, infrastructure, old age pensions, and a 
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new university had been set up in Ireland since the turn of the century. Despite 
these gains, radicals usurped the political leadership of nationalist Ireland in the 
turmoil of 1914–1918 and violent methods were applied in the pursuit of similar 
goals to those pursued by the Home Rule movement. 
   Turning to Lin’s political movements in Taiwan, these can be divided into two 
stages: first, the Assimilation Association and Law 63 abolition movements, and, 
second, the Taiwanese Assembly movement. We have seen that in spite of co-
operation between Lin and Taisuno Itegaki, a renowned Japanese politician, the 
Assimilation Association movement ended in failure due to the opposition of the 
governor-general and of Japanese residents in Taiwan. The Law 63 Abolition 
movement did no better, as it was not only rejected by the colonial government, 
but was also rejected by the younger generation of leaders, who regarded it as a 
complete subjugation of Taiwan to Japan, in which Taiwan would lose all national 
characteristics.  
   The second stage of Lin’s activism, the Taiwanese Assembly movement, 
involved a great deal of time, energy, and personal wealth. He at first led, and later 
supported, a lengthy and large-scale movement to petition the Japanese Diet 
fifteen times between and 1920 and 1934, in order to establish an independent 
Taiwanese Assembly elected by the Taiwanese people. He succeeded in 
enlightening and mobilizing the Taiwanese to support his challenging movement, 
but it was all in vain. On the one hand, the Japanese colonial administration feared 
that Lin’s demands would mean that it would lose its political grip on Taiwan. 
Further, the Imperial government gradually developed an aggressive policy in the 
1930’s which included unilateral suppression of dissent. On the other hand, the 
disruption of the Taiwanese leaders made things even worse. In 1927, the left wing 
rose to replace Lin in leading the anti-colonial movement, criticizing him as a 
collaborator with the colonial government. Lin even went abroad to avoid difficult 
situations from 1927 to 1928. Without a popular and honourable leader, the 
movement lost its momentum and came to an end in 1934. 
    Lin and Redmond both had similar experiences in fighting for Home Rule. First, 
they both adopted a moderate approach instead of opting for violence. In his role 
as leader of the Irish nationalist MPs at Westminster, John Redmond worked 
towards enhancing political rights and the social position of nationalists in Ireland 
while maintaining a peaceful political co-existence with his opponents, just as Lin 
wanted to achieve equality between the Taiwanese and the Japanese. Second, 
both the Taiwanese and Irish Home Rule movements faced opposition and 
suppression from the colonial rulers. Third, both succeeded in keeping the flame of 
national consciousness alight in their people. Fourth, both Lin and Redmond were 
sabotaged and attacked by radicals of their own side and lost the hegemony of 
their respective movements. Eventually, Lin and Redmond both ended their 
political careers in frustration and disappointment. 
   However, Ireland was comparatively more fortunate than Taiwan. Unlike Lin, 
Redmond did achieve the passage of the Third Home Rule Bill, which in theory 
should have established a peaceful political framework through which the Irish in 
different political camps could live in harmony and eventually enjoy an equal 
political status with Britain. Additionally, Redmond and the Irish Home Rule 
movement generally had great success in fundraising and garnering support from 
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the Irish diaspora in America and elsewhere.33 This played a key role in funding 
the Irish Parliamentary Party. Unfortunately, the passage of the Third Home Rule 
Bill led to the emergence of rival paramilitary organizations in Ireland and, in 1914, 
the island stood on the brink of civil war. This culture of paramilitary drilling and the 
arming of citizen-soldiers, which had begun with the tacit approval of 
democratically elected politicians – including Redmond – eventually led to an 
ideological shift towards independence by force of arms. In the process, the Home 
Rule movement was destroyed and the Irish state established in 1922 was one 
born out of bloodshed. 
   Taiwan was not as fortunate as Ireland in the pursuit of autonomy. It was always 
strictly controlled by the Japanese colonial government from 1895–1945. Further, it 
went on to experience a prolonged period of authoritarian rule under the Republic 
of China (ROC) after Japan surrendered in 1945, which lasted until the lifting of 
martial law in 1987. Despite their geographical distance, it has been shown here 
that there are many similarities in the historical experiences of Ireland and Taiwan 
and there is much fertile ground for comparison. 
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Abstract 
 
On the surface, A City of Sadness (Beiqing Chengshi, 1989, dir. Hou Hsiao-Hsien, 
Taiwan) and The Wind that Shakes the Barley (2006, dir. Ken Loach, UK) may 
have little in common. However, both films employ powerful filmic languages to 
express contested identities. While the latter depicts proactive and passionate 
heroism, the former embraces silent and passive endurance. A comparison 
between these two films will help illuminate the cinematic strategies adopted by 
filmmakers to reflect identity politics in different contexts. It will also demonstrate 
the complexity and diversity of resistance as a concept and as a form of action. 
 
Introduction 
 
According to Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Yueh-Yu Yeh (2005), it is important to 
consider carefully both the issues surrounding films as language and languages 
used in films. This is a useful approach that may be applied to resistance films for 
two reasons: first, film itself is a special symbolic language that is composed of 
cinematic codes such as camera shot, lighting, framing, performance, narrative 
structure, editing and montage, sound and music, mise-en-scène, etc (Monaco 
1981: 121–191). This has made cinema an effective medium for communicating 
and representing identities on many levels (personal, regional, national, cultural, 
social, and political). Second, the issue of languages employed in cinema can be 
extremely significant when used to express identities. For example, in Taiwan and 
in Northern Ireland, the troubled histories of both places mean that the use of 
verbal and written language in many of films may be, consciously or 
unconsciously, laden with political meanings. Language may evoke a sense of 
nostalgia or hostility, enhance regional flavour or promote national unity, or create 
intimacy or distance, for various linguistic communities and for different reasons. 
   This paper seeks to compare two seemingly unrelated films: Taiwanese 
filmmaker Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s A City of Sadness (Beiqing Chengshi, 1989, Taiwan), 
and British director Ken Loach’s The Wind that Shakes the Barley (2006, UK). 
Upon close examination, both can be categorized as resistance films, although 
they offer different discourses and representations of resistance. The term 
‘resistance film’ is loosely defined here to refer to cinematic works that foreground 
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the actions and notions of resistance. Most typical examples can be found in the 
cinema of anti-colonialism. One example is The Battle of Algiers (La Battaglia di 
Algeri, 1966, dir. Gillo Pontecorvo, France/Italy), which depicts events during the 
Algerian War against French occupation in 1954–1962. The film focuses on the 
years between 1954 and 1957, when the freedom fighters struggled to combat a 
systematic attempt by the French colonial power to eliminate them. 
   Studies of resistance cinema include Del Mundo’s (1998) book on native 
resistance in Filipino cinema and colonialism, and Burns (2006) on cultural 
resistance in Turkish-German cinema. Diawara (1988) pays particular attention to 
racial politics, and discusses how spectators of different racial backgrounds may 
problematize identification and resistance. For example, the ‘Gus chase’ sequence 
from The Birth of a Nation (1915, dir. D.W. Griffiths, US) shows a white young girl 
chased by a black man. Diawara points out that the editing, mise-en-scène and 
narrative content ‘all combine to compel the spectator to regard Gus as the 
representation of danger and chaos’ (68). The spectator, regardless of race or 
gender, is supposed to identify with the white hero, Little Colonel, in the film and to 
hate Gus. However the resisting spectator recognizes that 
 
The Birth of a Nation appears to misread history for ideological reasons. Not only is 
Little Colonel a fake father and hero’ as he symbolizes resistance to the ideals of 
democracy, ‘but the black experience is rendered absent in the text… It would be 
worthwhile to note how spectatorial resistance to the racist ideology encoded in The 
Birth of a Nation is expressed, often in ‘realist’ terms, by invoking an alternative 
account based on Afro-American historical experience. 
(Diawara 1988: 70) 
 
   In other words, ‘resistance films’ can be a vast and diverse discursive category. 
Yet when we situate A City of Sadness and The Wind that Shakes the Barley 
within this category, it becomes particularly striking how comparable these two 
films have become. In both cases, the filmmakers employ similar cinematic 
languages in distinctive ways to signify conflicting identities and to portray diverse 
forms of resistance. 
   Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 533) observe that ‘there has been a rapid 
proliferation of scholarship on resistance but little consensus on its definition.’ After 
surveying a wide range of literature in sociology, anthropology, and political 
science, the two authors recognize that the term ‘resistance’ is used to describe ‘a 
tremendous diversity of behaviors and settings’, among which 
 
the most commonly studied mode of resistance is material or physical, involving the 
resisters’ user of their bodies or other material objects. ‘Resistance’ is most readily 
thought to refer to social movements… and ‘contentious politics’. 
(Hollander and Einwohner 2004: 535–536) 
 
   Loach’s The Wind that Shakes the Barley deals mainly with the most overt form 
of resistance: military combat. The film is set in 1920, when the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) was fighting a guerrilla war against the British for the independence of 
Ireland. When a truce is reached and the Irish Free State proclaimed in 1922, the 
Irish Civil War then broke out between radicals and moderates. As the film critic 
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Nick James has noticed, many familiar elements of the resistance film can be 
found here. For example, ‘the training of rookies, the experience of torture, the 
near-rape of a lover, the first betrayals and the need for them to be punished by 
death, the difficult transition to wielding local power’ (James 2006: 26). According 
to a typology outlined by Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 544–545), what is 
portrayed in The Wind that Shakes the Barley is the least controversial type of 
resistance, as the action is both intended and recognized by the actors and the 
observers as resistance. 
   On the other hand, scholars have identified that in addition to the physical mode 
of resistance, other forms of resistance may be ‘accomplished through talk and 
other symbolic behaviour’ (Hollander and Einwohner 2004: 536). Hou’s A City of 
Sadness tells the story of a Taiwanese family during the turbulent years between 
1945 and 1949. This is the transitional period during which Taiwan’s former 
colonizer, Japan, left the island and Taiwan was taken over by the Nationalist (i.e. 
Kuomintang or KMT) government of the Republic of China (ROC). A City of 
Sadness depicts mostly a more subtle and less visible form of resistance than that 
performed in The Wind that Shakes the Barley. Described as an ‘everyday’ form of 
resistance, the film stops ‘well short of collective outright defiance’ (Scott 1985: 
29), but still qualifies as resistance because it allows the powerless to ‘deny or 
mitigate claims made by appropriating classes’ (302). As Hollander and Einwohner 
(2004: 539) note, low-profile techniques of everyday resistance ‘can go unnoticed 
by the powerful, which helps protect the powerless from repression by masking the 
resistant nature of their activities.’ 
   Nevertheless, explicitly confrontational actions and more implicitly commonplace 
resistance are not mutually exclusive. While A City of Sadness pays particular 
attention to ordinary details of how the characters in the film maintain their quiet 
dignity under difficult circumstances, we also learn of the formation of citizen 
groups that intend to voice oppositional opinions, and witness a riot involving 
everyday items as well as traditional weapons. Similarly, although The Wind that 
Shakes the Barley gives the viewers brutal accounts of guerrilla warfare, there are 
reserved moments which signal inner strength and resilience. It can be argued that 
both films echo Hollander and Einwohner’s (2004: 537) observation that while 
‘resistance is generally understood to be a political action,… resistance can also 
be identity-based.’ In other words, what is resisted is sometimes ‘not (or not only) 
political or social conditions but also the resister’s expected or attributed identity.’ 
   I will firstly offer an overview of the historical backgrounds to A City of Sadness 
and The Wind that Shakes the Barley. I will then investigate how both films employ 
cinematic strategies to deliver a representation of their respective histories. I aim to 
focus on how narratives and languages are used by Hou Hsiao-Hsien and Ken 
Loach to express different cultural identities. Finally, I will examine how the two 
filmmakers use the portrayal of female characters to express their own political 
convictions. 
 
Background to A City of Sadness 
 
A City of Sadness is Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s ninth feature film, and it is iconic in both 
the history of Taiwan and the history of Taiwan cinema. The island was under 
authoritarian rule for forty years, until martial law was lifted in 1987. Political reform 
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posed serious challenges to existing norms and ideology, but the process also 
brought with it anxiety and uncertainty. For the first time in living memory, people 
on Taiwan were able to have a needed open discussion about their suppressed 
history and identity in order to re-establish a new consensus. A City of Sadness is 
the first film to embark on this soul-searching journey. Hou Hsiao-Hsien admitted 
that he sees A City of Sadness as a ‘self-conscious practice of discovery, recovery 
and remembrance’ (Harrison 2004–2005: 13). He said that making this film was ‘a 
process of learning about history, people and life itself’ (13). When the film was 
first released in Taiwan, it attracted much attention and controversy. People fought 
to get into the theatre to watch it. As Reynaud (2002: 48) recalled: 
 
A City of Sadness had a tremendous, long-lasting effect on Taiwanese 
audiences. In one of his earlier made-for-TV dramas… Tsai Ming-Liang shows 
spectators lining up in front of the theatre to make sure they would get in, and 
poor people stockpiling tickets to sell them at higher prices. 
 
A City of Sadness has been canonized because it is part and parcel of the process 
of political, social, and cultural democratization in Taiwan. 
   Moreover, A City of Sadness was the first film from Taiwan to win recognition at 
a major European film festival, when it received the Golden Lion Award in Venice 
in 1989. Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s ‘minimalist imagery, complex framing, elliptic rendering 
of interpersonal relationships, and the disruptions created by his storytelling 
techniques’ has led A City of Sadness to be hailed as ‘one of the supreme 
masterworks of the contemporary cinema’ (Reynaud 2002: 9). The Golden Lion 
Award generated much pride and excitement in Taiwan. As a result of media 
frenzy over A City of Sadness, box-office receipts in Taipei alone exceeded US $3 
million and ‘it was the number one movie in both Taiwan and Hong Kong. It did 
even better outside Taipei’ (Curtin 2007: 97). This was a sensational box-office 
record for a domestically-produced film on the island, at a time when the home 
audience was beginning to lose interest in all Chinese-language films. In fact, 
Udden (2007: 193) notes that A City of Sadness enthused an imitative trend in 
Taiwan cinema in which many filmmakers, including newcomers (such as Lin 
Zheng-Sheng) and established veterans (such as Edward Yang), began to follow 
Hou’s distinctive style. 
   Furthermore, the subject matter of A City of Sadness is of particular significance 
to people on Taiwan. The film is set against the historical backdrop of the most 
contentious political event in pre-democratic Taiwan, commonly known as the 2-28 
Incident. This began when a relatively minor accident on the street on 28 February 
1947 ignited long-accumulated social tension which spiralled into a near-
revolution. As a result of 2-28, it is estimated between 10,000 and 20,000 citizens 
in Taiwan were killed by the Nationalist (KMT) army.1 The trauma of this tragedy 
has haunted Taiwan’s politics and society for several decades and the Incident 
itself was taboo until 1987, when the government finally lifted martial law. However 
Taiwan viewers’ immediate reaction towards the film was polarized. For example, 
                                                 
1
  For more details on the 28 February Incident of 1947, see Kerr (1966); Chen (1989); Lai, 
Myers, and Wei (1991); 2-28 Research Committee of the Executive Yuan (1994); Li (1998); 
Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2001: 77–106). 
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Liao (1999: 85–114) was bitterly disappointed that the film did not seize the 
historical moment of democratization of the 1980s and produce a more aggressive 
Taiwanese nationalist declaration. On the other hand, Qi (2000: 331–332) argued 
that Hou’s work has become a critical social text and thus has inspired 
multidimensional discourses. 
 
Background to The Wind that Shakes the Barley 
 
The Wind that Shakes the Barley is the nineteenth feature film of seasoned 
filmmaker Ken Loach, and it won the Golden Palm Award in Cannes in 2006. Prior 
to The Wind that Shakes the Barley, Loach had received numerous international 
film prizes, dating as far back as Kes (1969, UK), and including Looks and Smiles 
(1981, UK), Fatherland (1986, UK/Germany/France), Hidden Agenda (1990, UK), 
and Land and Freedom (1995, UK/Spain/Germany/Italy). Loach is well-known for 
his socialist ideals and political activism (Hayward 2004; Jacobson 2007: 21–22; 
Hill 2011). Interestingly, while The Wind that Shakes the Barley is a recognized 
British production, it also won the Best Irish Film Award in 2007 as voted by the 
audience of the Irish Film and TV Awards (IMDB, undated). 
   The film takes place between 1920 and 1922, and is based on historical events. 
It ‘employs a fictional cast of characters synthesized from the experiences of real-
life participants’ (Crowdus 2007: 55). While the Irish rebellion against the British in 
the early 1920s was a painful history, it has never been a taboo subject and public 
discussion has never been suppressed. Ten years prior to the appearance of The 
Wind that Shakes the Barley, Michael Collins (1996, dir. Neil Jordan, UK) was 
another high-profile project, similarly dealing ‘with the Irish War of Independence 
(1919–21) and the ensuing Civil War (1922–23)’ (55). This film was nominated for 
Academy Awards and won the Golden Lion Award at the 1996 Venice Film 
Festival. 
   Loach was thus on a very different historical and political trajectory from Hou 
Hsiao-Hsien when he produced The Wind that Shakes the Barley. In 1989, Hou 
dealt with the subject of the 2-28 Incident for the first time in Taiwanese history. 
Thus there was a tremendous sense of remembering, recovery, and reconciliation 
in Hou’s desire to produce the film. In contrast, Loach’s purpose in shooting The 
Wind that Shakes the Barley was not to search for an Irish identity, but instead to 
remind viewers ‘that the IRA’s original cause was irrefutably just, whatever its 
subsequent behaviour’ (James 2006: 26). As Loach’s scriptwriter Paul Laverty has 
revealed in an interview: 
 
I have always been fascinated about how empires tell lies about their history and 
there have been more lies told about Ireland, Britain’s oldest and closest colony, than 
anywhere else. 
(Archibald 2007: 29) 
 
Therefore, Loach and Laverty ‘have never shrunk from using their artistry to 
promote romanticized versions of history in what they see as a good cause’ 
(James 2006: 26). As a result, Loach and Laverty demonstrate repeatedly in The 
Wind that Shakes the Barley that ‘revolutionary violence, with its demand for 
94  MING-YEH RAWNSLEY 
 
 
internal discipline and purity, is inherently tragic… Loach has made a film for our 
moment, a time of bewildering internecine warfare’ (Denby 2007: 150–151). 
 
Narrative Strategies, Contested Histories and Identities 
 
In her study of Aborigines in Taiwan, Brown contends that: 
 
One of the most fundamental misunderstandings about identity is the widely 
accepted view that ethnic and national identities are based on common ancestry 
and/or common culture and therefore that identity is grounded in antiquity… 
However, culture and ancestry are not what ultimately unite an ethnic group or a 
nation. Rather, identity is formed and solidified on the basis of common social 
experience, including economic and political experience… [It is] real in the sense of 
being meaningful and motivating to people. 
(Brown 2004: 2) 
 
This allows us to begin to see Taiwan’s contested history in a new light. The 
importance of narrating this history as a journey of self-exploration and self-
discovery is also heightened. 
   In directing A City of Sadness, Hou Hsiao-Hsien did not aim to provide one 
authoritative account of past events or to speak on behalf of one particular political 
perspective, but to look at histories from bottom-up in order to reflect the previously 
suppressed, ‘the very personal, experienced-based feelings of individual members 
of identity groups’ (Brown 2004: 2). By representing the political reality of the late 
1940s indirectly through a fictional family saga, A City of Sadness chronicles the 
intertwining lives of four brothers in an apolitical Taiwanese family from the end of 
the Japanese colonization in 1945, to the breakout of the 2-28 Incident in 1947, 
and finally to the arrival of the Nationalist (KMT) government in Taipei in 1949. 
 
Family Saga and Brotherhood 
 
A City of Sadness opens with a credit sequence-shot of total darkness. The only 
background sound is the voice of the Emperor Hirohito in a radio broadcast, 
announcing the unconditional surrender of Japan. The setting is then faintly 
illuminated by candles. We witness an anxious Taiwanese family busy preparing 
for the imminent birth of a child in the middle of a power-cut; when the electricity is 
restored, the father-to-be tries to fix the light and then leaves the room. Hence the 
light that continues to shake slightly becomes the main focus of the scene, while 
outside the camera shot we hear the sound of a crying baby after the painful 
screams of the expectant mother. An inserted text then reveals that Lin Wen-
Heung’s mistress has given birth to a son, whom they name Kong-Ming, meaning 
light.2 The mise-en-scène is rich in meanings and metaphors. The parallel is with 
Taiwan’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, an event which had given people 
on the island a real sense of optimism, though also uncertainty; Kong-Ming is 
Wen-Heung’s illegitimate son, and his legal status may become a problematic in 
                                                 
2
 The Romanization of characters’ names is based on the English subtitles provided by the 
video released in the UK by Artificial Eye. 
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the future. This can be taken as a metaphor; identity has been a thorny issue for 
people on Taiwan since 1945, while Taiwan’s collective identity has been 
problematic for the international community since the Nationalists (KMT) were 
defeated by the Chinese Communists (CCP) in 1949. 
   Wen-Heung is the eldest brother of the Lin family. He is a local business owner, 
and has a background involving gangsters. He finds his livelihood constantly 
undermined by ambiguous government policies and subject to severe interference 
by politically-connected Shanghai gangsters. Eventually, his business is closed 
down and he becomes an alcoholic, before he is finally shot dead by the Shanghai 
gangster boss. Wen-Heung has one of the most memorable lines in the film: ‘How 
pitiful we are living on this island! First it is the Japanese, then the Chinese. Eaten 
by everyone, ridden by everyone, sympathized by no one.’3 
   We do not see the second brother, Wen-Sun, at all. He is a diligent physician 
and is missing in action in the Philippines. We are reminded of his existence by his 
wife’s insistence on cleaning his clinic every day in the hope that he will return one 
day and everything will go back to normal. 
   The third brother, Wen-Leung, was originally a victim of shell-shock during the 
Japanese campaign in Shanghai during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–
1945). When he recovers from hospital, he joins the family business but also gets 
involved with Shanghai gangsters. After a dispute with his business partners, Wen-
Leung is arrested and physically tortured. When his eldest brother secures his 
release from prison after bribing mainland officers through well-connected 
gangsters, Wen-Leung is already permanently brain-damaged. 
   The youngest brother, Wen-Ching, is a deaf-mute photographer. He 
communicates through photographs, and by pen and paper. Throughout the film, 
he is mostly an innocent observer, although he is sometimes forced to be a 
participant. The audience often witnesses events through the eyes of Wen-Ching 
and the narrator of the film, a young nurse named Hinomi4 who later becomes 
Wen-Ching’s wife. It is often commented that Wen-Ching’s ‘inability to speak 
symbolizes the Taiwanese as silenced by their oppression’ (Harrison 2004–2005: 
14). While some critics are deeply offended by Hou’s choice of a deaf-mute 
character to represent Taiwanese history, I will argue that by making the main 
protagonist a deaf-mute photographer, Hou Hsiao-Hsien turns Wen-Ching into an 
intense and perceptive witness of his surroundings, of people, and of his time. For 
the audience, Wen-Ching’s account of events not only conveys a more rounded 
and reflective impression of the past, but also represents in more depth the 
intricate and problematic process of history-writing. 
   The Wind that Shakes the Barley adopts a similar strategy, similarly dramatizing 
the history of the Anglo-Irish War from a grassroots perspective. For example, the 
Irish revolutionary leader Michael Collins is only glimpsed in a newsreel; Arthur 
Griffith, the founder and the third leader of Sinn Fein, does not appear; and Eamon 
                                                 
3
 The dialogue quoted here is based on the English subtitles provided by the international 
version of the film released by Era Communications Ltd at the time of the 1989 Venice Film 
Festival (Reynaud 2002: 13). 
4
 ‘Hinomi’ is the Japanese pronunciation of the female character’s Chinese name, written as 
‘Kuang-Mei’. During the Japanese colonial period, it was customary for the Taiwanese 
middle class to adopt the Japanese pronunciation of their Chinese names. 
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de Valera, who was against the Peace Treaty of 1921 and who later became the 
Irish prime minister, is not even mentioned. This perspective is like that of The 
Wind the Shakes the Barley, and Loach structures the major storylines around two 
fictional brothers from County Cork, Damien and Teddy O’Donovan. 
   The younger brother, Damien, is a junior medical doctor-turned-freedom fighter. 
He was on his way to London to embark on a medical career, but he was instead 
prompted to stay after witnessing insufferable harassment and injustice inflicted on 
ordinary Irish citizens by vicious British soldiers. He joins his elder brother, Teddy, 
and other IRA members including farm labourers, army veterans, and factory 
workers, to form a flying column to wage guerrilla warfare against the British army. 
When the Anglo-Irish Treaty is signed to establish the Irish Free State while 
preserving Ireland’s dependent status as a dominion within the British Empire, the 
O’Donovan brothers are finally forced to part ways, for their beliefs now differ. 
Damien continues to fight for complete separation from the United Kingdom and a 
socialist revolution in Ireland, while Teddy agrees to a ceasefire with the British by 
accepting the Treaty as the best possible compromise for the time being. 
   As Ken Loach has pointed out in an interview: 
 
There are many different points of view within the Republican side. We wanted to 
relive the experience of the people who went through it and to examine why the 
British acted the way that they did, which the character of Teddy understands better 
than anyone else. Teddy understands the realpolitik of why the Republicans are not 
going to get everything that they want in one go. That’s why he argues that the British 
are never going to cede full independence. 
(Loach, quoted in Archibald 2007: 28) 
 
   Loach’s primary political target ‘is not the British per se but rather the divisions 
sown among the [IRA] forces’ (James 2006: 26). What is problematized in The 
Wind that Shakes the Barley is not Irish identity, but the history of internal struggle 
for independence and the ideologies of socialist revolution. Therefore, in the first 
half of the film the enemy is clearly defined, as the audience can easily identify 
what and whom Damien and Teddy are resisting against. Yet towards the later part 
of the film, what and whom our revolutionary heroes should fight for becomes more 
opaque. As Denby (2007: 150) summarizes it, ‘The British are gone (except from 
Northern Ireland), but revolutionary solidarity among the Irish collapses into civil 
war. There’s our theme: the revolution devours its children.’ 
 
The Use of Languages and Sound 
 
In addition to the intricate narrative structures, characterization, and visuals, Hou 
Hsiao-Hsien inserts another layer of text that is equally compelling and intriguing 
and further enriches the complexity and meanings of A City of Sadness: languages 
and soundscape. I shall focus on these two elements to demonstrate how Hou 
creates an aural world that reflects Taiwan’s identities as multiple, fluid, and 
politically problematic. 
   This can be seen in relation to the languages used in the defining moment of the 
film; that is, the sequence depicting the events of the 2-28 Incident. Hou Hsiao-
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Hsien avoided retelling the Incident directly through one linear viewpoint or 
timeline, but to allow the tension and confusion of events to unfold before our eyes. 
   Governor Chen Yi’s heavily accented Mandarin is first heard in an 
announcement imposed against a rural skyline, informing the public that ‘on the 
night of the 27th, during an investigation in Taipei, someone unfortunately was 
killed… We have arranged treatment for a woman with slight injuries.’5 Meanwhile, 
we see a group of doctors and nurses gathering to listen to the radio. Wen-Ching, 
and the young nurse Hinomi’s brother, Hinoe, 6  are at the hospital waiting for 
Hinomi. When Hinomi appears, Chen Yi’s broadcast gradually fades out. Later, 
when we hear Hinomi’s narration in Taiwanese as she writes in her diary, we get a 
private account of the story that differs from the official version announced earlier. 
Hinomi writes: 
 
Today, the radio reported fighting in Taipei between Taiwanese and mainlanders. 
Taiwan is under martial law. At the hospital, we’re all afraid. A war has just ended. 
How can another begin? My brother came to see me. He’s going to Taipei with 
Wen-Ching. It’s so dangerous. They must have important business to do there. 
I’m very worried but I dare not say so. Wen-Ching with his handicap, you must 
take care of him, brother.7 
 
   Night falls. Hinomi is at home, but she can hear distant noise through her 
window. Next, we see the hospital becoming busy and chaotic. Civilians, doctors, 
and nurses rush in and out carrying the wounded. A group of people march 
towards the hospital carrying torches and shouting, but they are turned away by 
the doctors. At this point Chen Yi’s Mandarin speech again cuts in, to report 
‘measures to handle the unrest’. 
   As we see the doctors and nurses in the office listening to the radio, the 
transmission is interrupted by static interference. A young doctor fixes the receiver 
and Chen Yi’s Mandarin broadcast resumes, announcing that ‘a special committee 
will be set up. They will be representatives from government, the judiciary and the 
council member of the public will also be included in order to reflect the true 
opinion of the people.’ 
   The image turns to the hospital hall. Wen-Ching walks in and sits on the 
doorstep. There are dark circles around his eyes and he looks confused. He tries 
to scribble something, just before Hinomi finds him. She is worried, takes his 
notepad, and writes him a question. Wen-Ching manages to write her a reply and 
then passes out. The next day, over an empty landscape, we hear Chen Yi’s third 
Mandarin broadcast declaring martial law. He gives warnings to ‘the majority of 
peace-minded people’ and asks them: ‘do not listen to the rumours about spies… 
                                                 
5
 Chen Yi’s radio broadcast in the film follows the text of his actual broadcasts in 1947. 
English translations in this section are all based on English subtitles provided by the video 
released in the UK by Artificial Eye. 
6
 Hinoe is the Japanese pronunciation of the character’s Chinese name, Kuang-Rong. 
7
 Hou and his screenwriters ‘read government documents, interviewed survivors or victims’ 
families, reviewed diaries and personal letters’ in order to grasp and represent ‘the overall 
‘structure of feeling’ of the period’ (Yeh and Davis 2005: 166). Hinomi’s diary and letters are 
constructed based on materials from the creative team’s field research. 
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Our target is only a handful of rebels and traitors for each day that they are not 
eradicated peace-loving citizens must endure another day of unrest.’ 
   Hinomi pays Wen-Ching a visit at his studio. Through their exchanges we are 
given another piece of the jigsaw about what happened to Wen-Ching and Hinoe 
during their trip to Taipei. Wen-Ching writes: ‘Hinoe is safe. He sent me ahead. Mr 
Lin, the teacher, is on this special committee. Many in Taipei have died. People 
are scared.’ A flashback shows a train stopping in the middle of nowhere. A group 
of hoodlums with weapons chase after someone. There is shouting and 
screaming. Hinoe stands in the field looking disgusted by what is happening 
around him. Two hoodlums with sticks in their hands get onto the train. They cruise 
the corridor and spot Wen-Ching, who sits nervously, and they ask him in 
Taiwanese: ‘Where are you from?’ Wen-Ching stands up slowly, takes off his hat 
and mutters hesitantly in the same language but in a strange voice: ‘I am 
Taiwanese.’ Unconvinced, one of the hoodlums decides to ask the same question 
in Japanese: ‘Where are you from?’ Since Wen-Ching can neither hear nor answer 
the question, the hoodlums are just about to beat him up when Hinoe arrives in the 
nick of the time. 
   Hou Hsiao-Hsien does not directly imply in the long sequence described above 
who is right or who is wrong, but he portrays the fear, confusion, hatred, and 
danger that spread throughout the island at that time. Many mainlanders became 
victims of street violence during the riot, but the Taiwanese paid a harsh price in 
the aftermath. We can analyse the languages used in this sequence to understand 
how Hou Hsiao-Hsien expresses different cultural identities and political 
convictions in the film. 
   Chen Yi’s accented Mandarin is the official language and is identified as the 
oppressor’s language. The locals mainly speak Taiwanese among themselves. 
However, Taiwanese can be the language of aggressors, too: for example, the 
shouting and cursing outside the hospital is conducted in Taiwanese. The two 
hoodlums who almost beat up Wen-Ching on the train also speak Taiwanese and 
force him to articulate his identity in a language that he is not able to use. When 
Wen-Ching pushes himself to utter in broken Taiwanese about where he is from, 
the two hoodlums then ask him the same question in Japanese. 
   The use of the Japanese language, aside from the Japanese Emperor’s 
announcement at the beginning of the film, is less political than cultural. It 
symbolizes a shared life experience for the Taiwanese and is a part of the cultural 
identities of that particular generation. While many mainlanders from Fujian 
Province are able to speak Taiwanese, and some others have learned to speak 
local languages while living in Taiwan, most are unable to understand Japanese at 
all, as they did not live through 51 years of Japanese rule. Hence, the Taiwanese 
language as spoken by the native characters in A City of Sadness ‘is laced with 
Japanese words and phrases’ (Reynaud 2002: 61). 
   The second element that I would like to focus on concerns three songs: (1) a 
Mandarin song, Liuwang San Bu Qu (The Song of the Exiles); (2) a Japanese 
song, Huang Mache Zhi Ge (Song of the Carriage Sapporo); and (3) a Taiwanese 
song, Chunhua Menglu (Drifting). In an early part of the film, Hinoe and his 
intellectual friends have a social gathering in a restaurant where they swap 
amusing anecdotes about misunderstandings between Taiwanese and 
mainlanders. Although Hinoe admits that he does not trust Chen Yi, he and his 
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associates all feel hopeful about the future of Taiwan as the island has finally 
returned to the motherland. Hence when they hear from outside the restaurant 
some strangers singing The Song of the Exiles in Mandarin, they decide to join in. 
The act of singing in Mandarin expresses their desire to connect with their 
imagined motherland and mainland compatriots. 
   However, their dream of autonomy is soon dashed. Following the 2-28 Incident, 
we see Wen-Ching locked up in prison and sitting by a jail door. The guard comes 
and calls out two names. Two young men stand up and gather their things quietly. 
At this moment a Japanese song, sung by a male chorus, fades in. Because the 
framing of the cell on screen allows us to see only Wen-Ching and the two men 
who are led away by the guard, we cannot see the inmates who sing Song of the 
Carriage Sapporo. It was a popular Japanese song in Taiwan during the 1940s, 
and it expresses the mood of someone who is watching friends leave by a 
carriage, knowing that they will never meet again. When the song stops, we hear 
two gun-shots from outside the frame. The song not only suggests that these 
Taiwanese intellectuals are aware of the death penalty awaiting them, but also 
reveals their bitter disappointment with nation-building under the KMT (Chiao 
2000: 60–61). In contrast with the Mandarin song playfully sung earlier in the film, 
the Japanese song sung here before their lives are to be abruptly terminated 
seems particularly poignant. By singing farewell in a language to which the 
oppressor cannot make a claim, the disillusioned elites display their ultimate 
defiance and invisible resistance. 
   When Wen-Ching is released from prison, he visits one inmate’s widow and 
children in order to deliver the personal belongings of the deceased, including a 
will. It reads: ‘Face the world without shame. Your father is innocent.’8 As the 
widow cries over the will, non-diegetic music fades in and the screen cuts to Wen-
Ching’s family home, where Grandpa Lin and his folk-musician friends are playing 
and singing a Taiwanese tune, Drifting. The non-diegetic music turns diegetic.9 
The mournful sound and lyrics originally referred to the sorrow of Taiwanese wives 
when their husbands were drafted into war by the Japanese and never returned 
home; however, the same song sung here becomes an accusation against KMT 
brutality as Taiwanese women continue to grieve over lost husbands when the new 
regime kills innocent men in order to consolidate power (Chiao 2000: 56). 
   The soundscape does not occupy as prominent a position within The Wind that 
Shakes the Barley. However, Loach’s use of languages and music performs 
several important functions. 
   In an early part of the story, we see that the O’Donovan brothers’ revolutionary 
war efforts are aided by a young woman, Sinead, and her family members in a 
local farm house. Sinead’s brother, Micheál, was a 19-year-old lad who had been 
beaten to death by brutal British Black and Tans paramilitaries at the beginning of 
the film simply because he refused to speak in English. Micheál’s name is 
mentioned repeatedly throughout the film and turns him, and his insistence of 
speaking in his mother tongue, into a symbol of martyrdom and heroism. 
                                                 
8
 This writing is taken from a genuine historical document. 
9
 Diegetic music is defined as an integral part of the film, while non-diegetic music is added 
externally to the film (Gow 2010: 171). 
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Moreover, at Micheál’s funeral, we hear the Irish rebel song which is used as the 
title of the film, The Wind that Shakes the Barley, for the first time: 
 
T’was hard the woeful words to frame 
To break the ties that bound us 
But harder still to bear the shame 
Of foreign chains around us 
And so I said, ‘The mountain glen 
I’ll seek at morning early 
And join the bold united men 
While soft winds shake the barley.’10 
 
   The song is sung in English, just as most of the dialogue in the film is delivered 
in English. However, as the storyline progresses, the use of Gaelic increases. 
There is a sequence when a young member of the IRA unit is coerced into leaking 
information to the enemy. As a result, the O’Donovan brothers and their IRA 
brigade are captured by the British army. Teddy O’Donovan is interrogated and 
tortured. On screen we see the British officers pull out Teddy’s fingernails when he 
refuses to give names. In the next prison cell, Teddy’s IRA comrades at first feel 
powerless and helpless, until they begin singing in Gaelic in unison to show their 
moral support for Teddy. The sequence expresses a strong Irish identity and 
demonstrates the protagonists’ courage and defiance against the British. This 
passionate display of cultural and political identity inspires an Irish-Scots soldier in 
the British camp to defect in the subsequent sequence, and to help all but three 
IRA prisoners to escape. 
   Moreover, the skilful employment of the tranquil background Irish music 
complements Loach’s endeavour of depicting a cultural Ireland, as ‘the look, feel, 
and form of a film are just as important as its “themes”’ (Denby 2007: 150). The 
combination of the visual and the aural enhances Loach’s version of Ireland 
 
as a naturally gentle rural place populated by handsome freedom fighters battling the 
hateful, sadistic British solider. That they do so in fetching trench coats and dashing 
flat caps of sumptuous browns and reds set against vivid green countryside is 
certainly part of their appeal as cultural heroes — as freedom fighters shaking free of 
British rule at last. 
(James 2006: 26) 
 
   Nevertheless, The Wind that Shakes the Barley is not a standard, overly 
sentimental resistance film, because Loach refrains from relying too heavily on 
idyllic Irish folk tunes or rousing rebel songs. The written messages and letters and 
the arguments in late-night meetings add to the sense of the danger, excitement, 
and importance of the clandestine activities in which the protagonists engage. 
Further, in a sequence set in the courthouse, Loach allows the viewers to witness 
and listen to a heated discussion about what kind of an Irish society the freedom 
fighters should strive to establish. Similar debates resume among Teddy’s IRA 
squad after they are informed of the Peace Treaty, firstly through a written 
                                                 
10
 Based on the English subtitles provided by the DVD released in the UK by Pathe. 
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message delivered to them from their national leaders and later through the public 
screening of a newsreel. The ideological dilemma experienced and quarrelled over 
among the protagonists does not only lend a fresh look to the film (for it shows how 
public debate may contribute to shaping a future), but also offers an important 
moral anchor to the internal conflict that follows within (and without) the film. 
 
Female Roles, Civilization and Resistance 
 
While a patriarchal force is seen to drive forward the plotlines of both A City of 
Sadness and The Wind that Shakes the Barley, the female characters provide the 
story with a sense of hope and optimism. This is because women in both films 
represent stability and civilization. For example, in The Wind that Shakes the 
Barley, when Teddy’s flying column is losing ground, it is Sinéad and her family 
who offer them much-needed shelter, cover, and all kinds of assistance until the 
freedom fighters have regrouped and regained their strength. In the previously 
discussed courthouse sequence, it is the women (Lily, Sinéad, and another 
unnamed female character) who are in charge of the Republican Court and who try 
to establish a new social order that is different from that of the English Court. 
When Damien and Teddy finally part and the latter is forced to execute his younger 
brother, Damien writes his final letter to Sinéad declaring his eternal love and his 
dream of true freedom. It is through Sinéad’s tears over her lover’s letter that the 
audience is made to accept Damien’s sacrifice for the cause he believes in and to 
hope with Sinéad for a brighter future. 
   The female roles in The Wind that Shakes the Barley perform overt functions of 
resistance alongside the male characters, to great effect. They actively assist the 
men in their war effort, while at the same time offering emotional support and 
comfort when required, familial and social stability to the local community, and an 
attempt to build and maintain a new, free, and just society. 
   In contrast, the female characters in A City of Sadness are seemingly much 
more passive and inactive. Nevertheless, I women are indeed the real anchor of 
Hou’s masterpiece, even though many of them are background characters. It is 
through the female cast that Hou delivers the most subtle but long-lasting signs of 
everyday resistance. According to the typology categorized by Hollander and 
Einwohner (2004: 545), everyday resistance may be of at least three types: (1) 
covert resistance: this refers to ‘acts that are intentional yet go unnoticed (and, 
therefore, unpunished) by their targets, although they are recognized as resistance 
by other, culturally aware observers’ (545); (2) unwitting resistance: this ‘is not 
intended as resistance by the actor yet is recognized as threatening by targets and 
other observers’, even though sometimes such acts (for example, socially 
unexpected behaviours by girls) may not truly have a target; and (3) externally-
defined resistance: this refers to ‘those acts of resistance that are neither intended 
nor recognized as resistance by actors or their targets, but are labelled resistance 
by third parties’. For example, the unconscious act of using a specific language in 
verbal or written form, as well as the private expression of self-identity through the 
self-writing of history in a way that differs from the official account. 
   Two female roles depicted in A City of Sadness in particular demonstrate this. 
The first role is a category that includes several domestic women who do not 
necessarily have names in the film: the first brother’s wife and their daughter Ah-
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Shue, the first brother’s mistress, the second brother’s wife, and the third brother’s 
wife. These women stand for family, endurance, and everyday existence. Their 
collectivity offers stability and symbolizes civilization. For example, as previously 
mentioned, the second brother, Wen-Sun, went missing in action during the war. 
However, his presence is felt throughout the entire film because his wife keeps her 
daily routine of cleaning and tidying his clinic in preparation for his eventual return. 
Although the disused clinic accentuates a sense of loss (the loss of a husband, a 
father, a brother, and a son due to Japanese colonial rule), it at the same time 
sends a signal that life goes on and normality can resume. 
   The act of normality is not only a strategy of survival, but also a form of 
resistance: resistance to being consumed and beaten by grief and trauma. 
Whatever tragedy occurs in A City of Sadness, women are always calm and busy 
cooking, cleaning, taking care of children, working on household chores, and 
keeping things in an orderly, civilized manner. By maintaining a normal pace of life, 
these women in the film appear dignified and resilient, even though they may 
experience inner sadness. For example, when Ah-Shue finds the brain-damaged 
Wen-Leung eating offerings put on the altar of the ancestors, she tries to take the 
food off him gently, but without success. So, she simply leaves him be and makes 
herself busy in the kitchen without making too much fuss. Afterwards, it becomes a 
fixture of the film that we see Wen-Leung sitting quietly next to the altar gobbling 
food, and occasionally someone will try to stop him. Sometimes they succeed but 
sometimes they fail. It becomes a new normality for the Lin family. 
   After Wen-Heung is killed by Shanghai gangsters, we witness a funeral where 
everyone stands still. Wen-Ching is positioned in the centre of the procession as 
the new head of the household, and the atmosphere is sombre. The funeral scene 
then cuts to a long take and long shot of a silent landscape.11 We then begin to 
hear faint non-diegetic noise. As the sound becomes louder, the setting changes to 
Wen-Ching and Hinomi’s wedding, at which women are in charge. The family has 
moved on, everyone has a role to play, and the scene is full of life. 
   In the final sequence of the film, after we learn of Wen-Ching’s off-screen 
arrest and eventual disappearance through Hinomi’s narration in her letter to Ah-
Shue, we see on screen another family, gathering at a dinner table. The brain-
damaged Wen-Leung sits next to Grandpa Lin and both eat as normal. The 
brother of Wen-Hueng’s mistress comes in and out of the dining room, holding a 
rice bowl and eating casually. Meanwhile, domestic women are busy serving 
food for everyone and looking after the children. In his interview with Reynaud, 
Hou explains: 
 
A woman accepts what is happening outside – silently. Yet this is how woman 
becomes the really strong persistent force in the Chinese family. This is what I 
                                                 
11
 In cinema, a long shot is typically taken by a wide-angle lens to show the whole object (for 
example, an entire building, human figure, landscape, and so on). The purpose of using a 
long shot is normally to place the object in relation to its surroundings. A long take is ‘a 
single piece of unedited film, which may or may not constitute an entire sequence’ 
(Henderson 1992: 315). The combination of a long shot and long take has become one of 
Hou’s favourite techniques to achieve his desired narrative effect. 
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wanted to show by staging so many eating rituals, in which we see men eating and 
women standing on the side, taking care of domestic affairs, of the kids. 
(Hou, quoted in Reynaud 2002: 70) 
 
Moreover, the trivial activities performed by the female characters add another 
important function to the film: ‘they furnish an appearance of everyday life, adding 
small but significant details’ that enhance an appeal to the day-to-day reality of the 
time’ (Hallam and Marshment 2000: 16). In other words, the authentic atmosphere 
of emotions and feelings in A City of Sadness is grounded in the existence of these 
domestic women. 
   The second role that I would like to address in detail is that of Hinomi, Wen-
Ching’s female counterpart. According to Hou: 
 
Hinomi plays the role of an observer. It allowed me to create an ambiguity in the 
narrative structure which I found very exciting – how the whole story is told from the 
point of view of a woman, who reports the events while expressing her emotions – a 
point of view that is both objective and subjective. 
(Hou, quoted in Reynaud 2002: 69) 
 
The meeting between Hinomi and Wen-Ching proves an ingenious device for 
structuring and narrating the stories before and after 2-28. It is through Hinomi’s 
writing, her written exchanges with Wen-Ching, and her occasional letters to Ah-
Shue, that the audience receives an intimate, independent, and female viewpoint 
that has been largely ignored both by Taiwan history and Taiwan cinema. Her 
written words become an integral part of the film that conveys dreams, thoughts, 
passions, and memories in a measured way. It also relays a distant perspective 
that abolishes barriers of verbal language between the characters in the film. 
   Moreover, Hinomi’s demure disposition renders her quiet for most of the times 
when she is around men who can hear her. Hinomi’s silent modesty is sometimes 
interpreted as Hou’s exclusion of women from participating in history and another 
sign of Taiwanese people’s passivity in taking control of their own fate (Mi and 
Liang 1991; Qi 2000: 325–327). Nevertheless, I shall argue that, upon closer 
analysis of Hinomi’s character, she is much more proactive, independent, and 
determined than the first impression gives. In addition to the fact that A City of 
Sadness is a Taiwanese historiography woven through Hinomi’s active writing and 
narrating, two examples further demonstrate Hinomi’s courageous quality. 
   First, immediately after the 2-28 Incident, Hinomi accompanies her injured 
brother home. Their parents decide, for everyone’s safety, to send Hinoe away into 
hiding and to forbid Hinomi from going back to work or having further contact with 
the Lin family. However, as soon as she receives a letter from Ah-Shue telling her 
that Wen-Ching has been released from prison, Hinomi goes to visit the Lins 
against her own family’s wish. It is not surprising that Wen-Ching’s eldest brother, 
Wen-Heung, has to shame Wen-Ching for not proposing to Hinomi after her visit. 
Wen-Heung says to his brother: ‘When a girl visits us, with no regard for her self-
respect, it’s very clear what’s up. Can’t you see? What are you waiting for?’ This 
shows Hinomi’s quiet determination in steering the course of her own destiny. 
Therefore, shortly after Wen-Heung’s tragic death, Wen-Ching follows his brother’s 
advice and marries Hinomi. 
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   Second, the final section of the film is told through a series of silent images 
accompanied occasionally by the soulful theme tune of A City of Sadness as non-
diegetic background music, and by the soothing voice of Hinomi’s narration in two 
pieces of writing: a diary entry and a letter to Ah-Shue. These are dramatic events, 
yet Hinomi’s presence on screen and her voice-over remain poised and full of self-
dignity. Partly through her diary but mainly through the silent images, we learn that 
since the wedding, Hinomi has given birth to a baby boy, Ah-Chieh. Although, like 
most families at that time, they are living under a dark and oppressive political, 
social, and economic cloud, Hinomi says that she feels content as long as she has 
Wen-Ching and Ah-Chieh around her. They continue to make financial donations 
to Hinoe in the mountains and feel reassured whenever someone from Hinoe’s 
community is able to come and collect money from them, because this is the only 
way they know that Hinoe and his friends are safe and continuing to struggle for 
their ideals. 
   Hinomi’s diary entry ends here. What follows are several scenes without 
narration. We see that one evening, Wen-Ching receives notification that Hinoe 
has been arrested, and both Wen-Ching and Hinomi appear devastated. We then 
witness: a sequence showing the police making arrests in the mountains; Wen-
Ching, Hinomi, and Ah-Chieh on a platform with two small suitcases, watching a 
train leaving; and Wen-Ching dressed up, combing his hair carefully, and taking a 
family portrait for himself, Hinomi, and Ah-Chieh. We hear a camera click, and the 
frame freezes to form a photograph. 
   Afterwards, we hear Hinomi’s voice-over once again, narrating her letter to Ah-
Shue. Hinomi discloses the news that Wen-Ching has been arrested. Her letter 
reads: 
 
We thought of running away, but there was nowhere to go. I’m writing so long 
afterwards because only now do I feel calmer. The photograph was taken three 
days before Wen-Ching’s arrest. When they came he was taking someone’s 
portrait. He insisted on finishing the job before they led him away. I’ve searched 
and enquired everywhere in Taipei but I’ve no news. Ah-Chieh is teething. He has 
a lovely smile and he has your uncle’s eyes. Please come and see us soon. It’s 
getting colder in Chiu-Fen. The autumn blossom is out. The hills are all white. It’s 
like snow. 
 
   This is a letter written by a woman with tremendous self-control. Her passion is 
displayed through her stillness and silence, and her strength is manifested in her 
courage to lead a normal life as much as in the external circumstances which 
allow her to. The contrast between her description of the scenery here and her 
description of the scenery when she first appears in the movie reveals the 
change of space and time, and reflects her internal journey. Hinomi’s writing has 
invited the audience ‘into a cinematic space, not to understand, connecting 
cause and effect, but to experience’. It is ‘an aesthetic of deliberation’ that 
privileges ‘aura, ambiance, and mood, leaving temporal markers as mere 
footnotes’ (Yeh and Davis 2005: 134). This is why the history and identity 
revealed in A City of Sadness feel authentic but ambivalent, reserved and yet 
powerful. 
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Conclusion 
 
Resistance can be an enabling analytical concept. When we recognize that A City 
of Sadness and The Wind that Shakes the Barley share a central theme of 
resistance in dealing with the respective colonial histories of Taiwan and of Ireland, 
a comparative approach to the two movies not only enriches our readings of the 
narratives and characters in the stories, but also highlights vast variations in 
representations and notions of resistance. Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 547) 
note two core elements of resistance, which are action and opposition, and define 
‘“overt” resistance, which is intended by the actor and recognized by both targets 
and observers’. They also find that two issues, recognition and intent, lie at the 
heart of disagreement regarding the limits of the concept. 
   This paper has attempted to add to our understanding of resistance by analysing 
filmic languages employed by Hou Hsiao-Hsien and Ken Loach. While Loach’s 
The Wind that Shakes the Barley depicts proactive and passionate heroism, Hou’s 
A City of Sadness embraces silent and passive endurance. On the one hand, both 
films portray overt and covert resistance, in varying degrees, through familial 
storylines, grassroots perspectives, written and verbal exchanges, as well as direct 
and indirect representations of violence on screen. This shows commonalities of 
resistance against oppression, whether the background be Taiwan or Ireland. On 
the other hand, A City of Sadness articulates much more extensively an externally-
defined, identity-based resistance, which not all observers may interpret as a form 
of resistance. The differences between the two films therefore become particularly 
revealing of the different cultural, political, and historical trajectories taken by the 
two filmmakers when they produced their works. In this way, a comparison 
between A City of Sadness and The Wind that Shakes the Barley helps illuminate 
the cinematic strategies adopted by filmmakers to reflect identity politics in different 
contexts. The comparison also demonstrates the complexity and diversity of 
resistance as a concept and as a form of action. 
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Abstract 
 
Ireland and Taiwan, as two island nations, have always been comparable subjects 
in terms of their political and economic relationships with their respective 
mainlands. However, although their rapid economic growth stems, to a significant 
extent, from the contribution of the working classes, the voices of this social 
stratum are rarely accentuated, due to the mass media’s more usual focus on 
captivating and dramatic global and national issues. This paper will therefore study 
a selection of Irish and Taiwanese plays that address labour issues, in an attempt 
to show how playwrights use the theatre as a medium to counteract the domination 
of exploitative class relationships by considering minority communities. 
 
Introduction 
 
At first appearance, the working classes of Ireland and Taiwan do not appear to 
have much in common, living on opposite sides of the world and speaking 
unrelated languages. Further, the two countries have never established standard 
diplomatic relations or had much cultural exchange. The leaders of their labour 
unions do not engage in reciprocal visits, nor do they support each other on 
relevant issues. Nevertheless, the working classes of the two countries have 
affected each other at a distance, long before the term ‘globalization’ arose as the 
focal point of attention towards the end of the twentieth century and transformed 
social, economic, and cultural situations worldwide. Specifically, Ireland has borne 
the unpleasant consequences of Taiwan, and other Asian countries, dumping their 
low-priced and machine-made products on other countries since the 1960s. The 
consequences, interestingly, are illustrated in Frank McGuinness’s 1982 play The 
Factory Girls, which portrays Irish women workers’ failure to maintain their 
production of hand-made shirts after machinery has taken the place of human 
labour: ‘Do you know what a flooded market means? Shirts selling for half nothing 
from Korea and Taiwan’ (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 34).1 This mention of Taiwan, 
though brief, suggests that Taiwan should not be excused for its role in causing 
                                                 
1
 The distant but influential interactions between Irish and Taiwanese workers are discussed 
later in this article, including an analysis of female aspirations in McGuinness’ The Factory 
Girls. 
TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  109 
 
 
 
rising unemployment in Ireland in the mid-twentieth century, although Ireland may 
also have benefited from transforming its economy from reliance on labour-
intensive farming to high technology. Ireland’s (pre-crash) title of ‘Celtic Tiger’ and 
Taiwan’s title of ‘Asian Little Dragon’ was at the expense of socially marginalized 
workers. What is worth noticing is how, due to their under-representation in the 
public domain, lack of education, and the domination of transnational enterprises, 
workers in the two countries have been largely disadvantaged and their interests 
often ignored. Only a small number of playwrights, particularly those with a 
working-class background, have attempted to mark the vicissitudes of their lives 
with certain social agendas. This article will explore the similarities, differences, 
and contradictions in the theatrical representations of workers and the social and 
political concerns common to both countries. Interest will be focused most 
particularly on how contemporary Taiwanese playwrights create new dramaturges 
to illustrate new representations of exploited labourers and empower their once-
suppressed voices. A post-colonial approach will thus be adopted to examine the 
deprivation that has persisted into this century’s era of globalization. 
   Ireland and Taiwan are often treated as comparable subjects, in that 
geographically they are both small island countries on the fringe of a continent and 
liable to isolation. Economically, they do not possess substantial natural resources; 
politically, there is a history of tense relationships with their neighbor: Great Britain 
is Ireland’s former colonizer, while China is an emerging world power which takes 
Taiwan for granted as part of its territory. The working classes, as the silent but 
essential foundation of the industrial development of both countries, are objects 
easily neglected and unnoticed. However, Irish and Taiwanese playwrights, some 
with blue-collar backgrounds and sensibilities towards the deprived, have 
dramatized their nations’ dilemmas and concerns as a way that calls attention to 
social inequalities, unsettling national male-dominated social hierarchies. 
Moreover, many Taiwanese and Irish women labourers are still subjugated by 
ideologies which can hardly be resisted, Confucian or Catholic. Without other role 
models available, many women workers continue to be silent, submissive, and 
self-restrained in the context of male-centred families. 
   Despite liberation from colonialism, the working class may remain ‘re-colonized’ 
or continuously subjugated by political antagonisms, literary censorship (against 
leftism), or denominational vendettas. Local corporations and transnational 
enterprises dominate, and working-class subjectivity remains vague and divided. 
Oppression may also come from within workers’ social circles or unions. The 
dramas which this article will discuss illuminate, to differing degrees, the working 
class sub-culture and the prejudices which force the working classes into the social 
margins. In this way, they attempt to provide a voice for the deprived and to 
construct a recognizable identity with particular social agendas. 
   In the post-colonial perspective, theatres are perceived not only as places of 
entertainment, but also as centres for the exposition of different self-reflexive 
responses to national formation. Playwrights do not always endorse ‘the 
pedagogical’ discourse of nationalism, socialism, or religious ideologies, but, as 
proposed by Bhabha (1990: 293–322), instead manoeuvre the power of ‘the 
performative’ to critically examine political and cultural intricacies. In Bhabha’s 
view, ‘the performative’, which applies repetitious, recursive strategies in nation 
formation, conflicts with ‘the continuist, accumulative temporality of the 
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pedagogical’, in that the former always ‘intervenes in the sovereignty of the 
nation’s self-generation by casting a shadow between the people as ‘image’ and its 
signification as a differentiating sign of Self, distinct from the Other of the Outside’ 
(1990: 146–147). Acting as meta-novelists, some playwrights challenge 
conventional dramaturgies by presenting the fictional and the real in more 
ambiguous ways, questioning authority, omniscient authorship, and historical 
chronology. This article considers how dramatists jeopardize the pedagogical 
given, noting how socially marginalized characters interact with the politically and 
economically advantaged, and how dramatists produce recursive strategies. 
Issues of social hierarchy, gender, and politics are considered, as well as how 
some working-class dramas create a ‘third space of enunciation’, or a 
‘contradictory and ambivalent space’, for the isolated and unprivileged (Bhabha 
1994: 35, 37). 2  This article will attempt to reconstruct the ‘third space of 
enunciation’ of the working class particularly through the experimental tent theatre 
of Chung Chiao (鍾喬) in Taiwan. 
   The article focuses on several plays that address class issues with a distinctly 
political, but not necessarily socialist, agenda: Fred Ryan’s The Laying of the 
Foundations (1902); Sean O’Casey’s Juno and the Paycock (1924); Brendan 
Behan’s The Big House (1957); Castrated Rooster (1943), by Zhang Wen-Huan (張
文環) and Lin Tuan-Qiu (林摶秋); and The Wall (1946), by Jian Guo-Xian (簡國賢) 
and Song Fei-Wo (宋非我).3 The current article will also consider the Uhan Shii 
Theatre Group (歡喜扮劇團) and the Assignment Theatre Company (差事劇團), 
founded by Peng Ya-Ling (彭雅玲) and Chung Chiao (鍾喬) with the agenda of 
addressing the exploitation of labourers in the age of industrialization and 
globalization. 4 
   The ‘New Theatre’ movement (台灣新劇運動) (1923–1936) was initiated by a 
group of Japanese-educated Taiwanese elites, some with leftist leanings. They 
aimed to create new plays with Taiwanese scenarios, using more refined styles. 
                                                 
2
 The ‘third space of enunciation’ is phrased by Bhabha as a mode of articulation, referring 
to a hybrid identity emerging from a contradictory and ambivalent space. This ‘space’ 
‘m[ight] open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based… on the inscription 
and articulation of culture’s hybridity’ (Bhabha 1994: 38). It aims to blur and test the 
boundaries and limitations of existing identities and culture. 
3
 Jain was a novelist and playwright whose work was banned, and he disappeared during 
the 2-28 Massacre in Taiwan. Song was a cultural activist and radio broadcaster. 
4
 Other plays which also deserve mention in this context include A. Patrick Wilson’s The 
Slough (1914); Oliver St John Gogarty’s The Blight (1917); Daniel Corkey’s The Labour 
Leader (1919); James Plunkett’s The Risen People (1958); John Arden and Margaretta 
D’Arcy’s The Ballygombeen Bequest (1972); and Jimmy Murphy’s Brothers of the Brush 
(2001). The first three were premiered at the Abbey Theatre. The Slough was regarded as 
the first play at the Abbey Theatre that specifically addressed Irish urban poverty, and was 
written nine months after the Great Lockout of 1914, ‘indict[ing] the political and economic 
structure of the city for its urban conditions and to arouse his Dublin audience’s sympathy 
by exposing the plight of Dublin’s starving poor’ (Burch 2003: 66). The effectiveness of 
these dramas lay in the fact that the working-class struggle was brought to the Abbey’s 
predominantly middle-class audiences. The Wall, by Jian Guo-Xian, portrayed the huge 
social gap between rich and poor and was produced before the 2-28 Massacre. 
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The pioneers were the Star Drama Society (星光演劇研究會), founded by Zhang 
Wei-Xian (張維賢) in 1924, and the Ding-xin Society (鼎新社), and they garnered a 
great deal of critical acclaim. The Pacific War brought this dramatic movement to a 
halt after 1943.5 Most of the ‘New Theatre’ scripts are no longer extant, and are 
traceable only sparingly through secondary sources such as memoirs and 
newspapers.6 Martial law from 1949 to 1983 further cut off Taiwanese intellectuals 
from the theatrical legacy of their ‘New Theatre’ ( 新 劇 ) predecessors. 
Consequently, there are only a few plays which challenge sensitive labour issues. 
Zhang’s Castrated Rooster, which was commissioned by the Hou-sheng Drama 
Society (厚生演劇研究會), was performed in 1943 and was probably the final play 
of the movement. It was banned by the Japanese for having characters refer to 
Taiwanese folklore. Nevertheless, Zhang’s original short story is widely recognized 
as a masterpiece, and it is one of the very few ‘New Theatre’ stories which still 
returns to the stage from time to time, most recently in a 2009 adaption by the 
Tainaner Ensemble (台南人劇團) at the National Theatre in Taipei.7 Jian’s and 
Song’s plays provide an in-depth understanding of the social contexts of the 
following period, during which the KMT government retreated to Taiwan, while the 
contemporary Taiwanese theatres of Peng and of Chung show how the critical 
agenda of the ‘New Theatre’ has been restored through ground-breaking 
dramaturgies. 
   In the case of Ireland, although early scripts are still likely to be available, the 
public suspicion of playwrights’ political motives and denominational leanings 
would often dismay those who wanted to dramatize the truths they perceived. 
Riots following the premieres of W.B. Yeats’s Cathleen ni Houlihan and J.M. 
Synge’s The Playboy of the Western World are notable examples from the early 
twentieth century, even though these playwrights contributed to the revival of Irish 
                                                 
5
. The details of the ‘New Theatre’ movement can be seen in Chiu (1991). Jiang (1997) 
details all recorded performances up to 1997. 
6
 For possible reasons for this loss, and for the history of theatrical productions, see, for 
example, Lu (1961) and also Yang (1994). In 1991, Chiu Kuen-Liang expended Lu’s and 
Yang’s studies to cover ‘new dramas’ after 1936 (Chiu 1991). These publications, however, 
are mostly sociological and historical, and do not consider textual sources which would help 
to reconstruct the neglected experiences of labourers. In contrast to other forms of literary 
endeavour, research into theatre during the Japanese ruling period is very limited. 
   When writing up this article, the author attempted to approach the families of a few 
playwrights for scripts; for instance, that of Chen Qian-Yun ( 陳 乾 雲 ), the renowned 
organizer of Xun-Feng Theatre Group (薰風劇團) active from the 1930s to 1940s. According 
to his family, the scripts of his theatre might have been either destroyed out of fear during 
the ‘White Terror’, or simply lost during several home moves. It is likely that the 
unavailability of scripts is due largely to political considerations of the period. Public 
awareness of the historical significance of those playscripts came too late. Chen himself no 
longer gives interviews. A record of Chen’s contributions is provided in Chiu (2000: 227). 
7
 Zhang’s original short story was first published in Japanese and has had a number of 
translations. The original script for the 1943 premiere has been lost; the version used in this 
article was translated by Chen Ming-Tai (陳明台) and collected in Zhang (2002). According 
to Jiang, at least five amateur and professional theatre groups have worked on productions 
of Castrated Rooster in Taiwan since 1990. 
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culture and identity by highlighting working-class experience in rural and urban 
areas. 
   The Irish and Taiwanese dramas analysed below, though not quite inter-
textualized in terms of their plots and characters, will place them into a critical and 
international perspective. In other words, the intertextuality, if discernible, lies in 
the social, or sometimes socialistic, concerns that playwrights hold for the lower 
stratums of the working class. 
 
The Long Wall: War Between the Classes 
 
Irish and Taiwanese playwrights in the early twentieth century approached colonial 
bureaucracy and social corruption in a similarly Ibsenian style. Their shared 
approach testified not only to the effectiveness of modern dramaturgy in dissecting 
social issues, but also to their intention of making the theatre ‘perfomative’, in 
contrast to ‘the pedagogy’ of capitalistic and other prevalent mechanisms. One 
example is Fred Ryan’s The Laying of the Foundations, which was staged by the 
Irish National Drama Company in 1902, and which dealt with the conditions of 
tenement dwellers. Ryan exposed how jerry-builders and landlords would make 
fortunes by evicting tenants and using the land for other purposes. In this play, the 
tenements are demolished to make way for an abattoir, thus showing how the 
underclass and poultry are alike strangled for the benefit of the rich. The evicted 
tenants and their families become homeless or, if lucky, find temporary shelter in 
an asylum. No working-class characters ever appear on stage, but their living 
conditions (‘unfit for beasts’) and impoverishment are constantly brought to the 
audience’s attention through a socialist protagonist, Michael, who is also the son of 
a member of a building syndicate. The father and his contractors care only about 
maximizing profit through using ‘the worst class of yellow brick and… the cheapest 
stuff’ for a new asylum (Ryan 1970 [1902]: 30). The ‘rights of labour’ are for the 
most part absurd to the builders, who support Irish patriotism only when it can 
maintain their profit: ‘[patriotism] doesn’t run to two shillings a week for an Irish 
workman. Patriotism, to the capitalist, is for use only at election time’ (Ryan 1970 
[1902]: 28, 32). The class distinctions appear to be almost inviolable, while 
Michael, the young inheritor of the syndicate and a city architect in charge of public 
security, is firmly opposed to his father’s the contractors’ the municipal jobbery. His 
stance as a socialist is typified by his refusal of a bribe and insistence on justice as 
the basis for building a new Ireland: 
 
We are building a new city and we must build square and sure. In the city of the 
future, there must be none of the rottenness which you and your class made in the 
city of old; in the new city you will have no place… The city whose foundations are 
laid in Liberty and Truth… The city of the future demands it. It can be nothing else but 
war. 
(Ryan 1970 [1902]: 36–37) 
 
   Ryan’s play is socialist propaganda rather than a work of art, directing the 
audience to see current Irish troubles as a struggle between capitalists and 
proletarians, or between exploiters and the exploited, in contrast to taking a 
nationalist perspective. This socialist, or leftist, influence also gave intellectuals in 
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Taiwan a theoretical basis for how the oppressed could be liberated from their 
downtrodden condition. Some of the Taiwanese elite involved in the anti-Japanese 
movement in China greeted the ‘New Theatre’ with expectations that the 
movement would solidify ethnic identity and therefore strengthen cultural and 
nationalistic awareness; this was similar to how Irish Revivalism was received in 
Ireland, and it has been noted that many Taiwanese anti-imperialist advocates 
regarded Irish independence as a paradigm for Taiwanese cultural separation from 
Japan (Yang 1994: 50).8 
   Mid-twentieth century Taiwan, especially after the Japanese defeat, was marked 
by social corruption, inequality, price fluctuations, and political agitation, and there 
were the same kind of class exploitation as found in Ireland. Politically, most of the 
native Taiwanese elite were excluded from key government positions, and many 
were executed without trial during the 2-28 Massacre for suspected socialist 
leanings or for making anti-KMT criticisms. Disillusionment with the nationalistic 
KMT government led some playwrights to turn to Marxism to explore the social 
functions of literature. Their devotion to the exploited – who suffered hierarchal 
suppression – was in expectation of building up a new nation, not necessarily 
independent from mainland China, which would ensure proper social development. 
Jian Guo-Xian, Song Fei-Wo (宋非我), 9 Lu He-Ruo (呂赫若), and Lan Ming-Gu (藍
明谷), amongst others, endowed their dramas with socialist concerns about the 
suppressed Other, or the proletariat, whose own voices were censored by the KMT 
government, and promoted a new Taiwanese literature. 
   Like Ryan, Jian was deeply concerned about the divisions that created an 
underclass, and The Wall has similar concerns to those of The Laying of the 
Foundations. Jain portrays two families, from very different social classes. These 
are the families of Chen Jin-Li (陳金利), an affluent and snobbish landlord and 
business magnate, and of Beggar Hsu (許乞食), who rents a small and squalid 
next-door room from Chen. The stage is divided by a high wall, on either side of 
which Hsu and Chen lead strikingly different lives. The play begins with Chen 
repetitively calculating his income, identifying him as a miser at a time when a 
large number of families are just above the starvation line. As a landlord, he is 
delighted that his house is ‘awash with money’; he feels that ‘business is no 
different from playing a cheap trick’; and he experiences gastric distress from 
overeating (Jian 2006 [1946]: 159). 10  By contrast, Hsu, his tenant, is ill and 
impoverished, barely able to afford the rent and making his son earn a living as a 
peddler. Class distinctions are shown even more clearly when Hsu’s hungry son is 
forced to steal food from Chen’s livestock, which are well-fed on human leftovers. 
                                                 
8
 According to Yang, the example of Ireland was introduced by Liang Qi-Chao (梁啟超), 
during his visit to Taiwan in 1911. This was at a time when the Japanese colonial 
government was trying hard to erase Taiwanese culture and identity. Lin Xian-Tang (林獻堂), 
who hosted Liang at his estate in Tainan, was one of these. However, it seems likely that 
Liang meant ‘independence’ in the context of minimizing Japanese influences, rather than 
the political separation of Taiwan from China (Yang 1994:  50; Tsai et al. 1971: 285). 
9
 Song Fei-Wo was the pseudonym of Song Xian-Zhang (宋獻章), and was used from the 
age of seventeen to express his anarchist ideals. In Song’s own words, ‘Fei-Wo’ means ‘not 
I for myself’ (‘非我之我’) (cited in Lan 2006: 65). 
10
 Translation mine. 
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Having been caught stealing, Hsu’s family is evicted. Ironically, the eviction is 
carried out by a monk who is over-friendly with Chen and avaricious of secular 
wealth. Hsu, in despair, after poisoning his son and blind mother, commits suicide 
by banging his head against a wall. The play ends tragically with his cry of 
desperation: 
 
‘The wall, the wall! On the other side of you is rice hoarded as high as the house, 
with all the luxuries that only a paradise deserves, while you are only a hungry 
ghost on this side of the wall, scarce with food. I am so doomed in this hell that I 
cannot but end my life now… Oh, the wall is so thick and high that my little fists and 
thin arms cannot break it. Oh, the wall, the wall! Why cannot this wall be shattered? 
Oh, the wall, the wall!’ 
(Jian 2006 [1946]: 176) 
 
   The play, which realistically portrays the bitterness of the proletariat and 
contrasts the nouveau riche and the working class, enjoyed huge success and 
positive reviews. A reviewer from Xin-Sheng Daily (新生報) commented that, ‘The 
Wall, in order to present a contrast and dramatize the complex facets of society, is 
most critical of the unreasonable social hierarchy, and urges the necessity of social 
reform. This play, which has become popular through word of mouth, is worthy of 
recommendation’ (1946, cited in Lan 2001: 47). Another reviewer, Lin Qian-Da (林
千達), from People’s Directives (人民導報) (1946), elaborated on how a realistic 
play such as The Wall could promote the solidarity of the underclass, and speak to 
the needs of reformists: 
 
Arts enrich human spirituality, and human beings cannot be parted from community 
life and social reality. Thus, a drama that is both artistic and pragmatic must show 
social contradictions between the dominator and the dominated, and the struggle 
between the exploiters and the exploited. Only this kind of play can incur the empathy 
of the audience and maintain its modernity. 
(cited in Lan 2001: 51) 
 
However, The Wall was banned after four runs as ‘unsuitable for the public’ and for 
provoking class conflict (Lan 2006: 120). 
   Ryan’s The Laying of the Foundation and Jian’s The Wall share similar 
sympathies for those in the lowest social stratum, and provide a new perspective 
from which social injustice can be revealed to the audience. The stage, in this way, 
helps formulate a socialist discourse and possible solutions to relevant social 
complaints. In Ryan’s drama, Michael, the saviour or hero, is celebrated for his 
courageous stand against corrupt builders, with a call for ‘class war’. Intellectuals 
noted that The Wall’s banning ‘makes clearer the intention of the authorities 
concerned, for they expect citizens not to reveal the truth… If the government 
supposes that social satire is illegal, and is unwilling to overturn the ban, we could 
not feel more helpless’ (1946, cited in Lan 2001: 56). 
   The following year, Jian was arrested as part of the 2-28 Massacre, and he was 
sentenced to death in 1954. Lu He-Ruo and Lan Ming-Gu also perished during this 
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period of ‘White Terror’, while Song Fei-Wo was exiled to China.11 The KMT regime 
further suffocated theatrical development in Taiwan over the next four decades, 
until the late 1980s. Only dramas morally unproblematic and securely in line with 
the prevailing patriotism could be produced. 
 
The ‘New Theatre’ on Radio 
 
The playwrights of the ‘New Theatre’ movement also wrote radio dramas and 
worked as broadcasters, thus highlighting the close relationship between radio 
entertainment programs and political argument.12 Song Fei-Wo stated that ‘through 
the wireless I simply wanted to indirectly bring the anti-Japanese campaign into 
effect’ (cited in Lan 1993: 27), and in an interview with Lan Bo-Zhou (2006: 87), he 
recalled that ‘my scripts were often based upon Jian Guo-Xian’s drafts in 
Japanese… and I was the first one who criticized the government and its policies 
through drama.’ The mobility of underground broadcasting, and of radios, allowed 
broadcasters to evade censorship and brought drama to those unable to attend the 
theatre. Radio dramas therefore reached their anticipated performative effects 
against the rulers and deserve serious study.13 
   Jian’s The Wall was among the plays broadcast, and Song also produced a 
series of plays entitled Tour of the God of the Land around Taiwan (土地公遊台灣), 
which continued to be broadcast even after the defeat of Japan. These plays told 
the story of how Tu-Di-Gong (土地公), the God of the Land, a respected household 
deity, dealt with the social corruption prevailing in almost every corner of the 
island. Tu-Di-Gong and his wife, both in human form, are greatly displeased with 
the corruption of officials and the desperation of the people. As expected (by the 
audience), the deity became a man of justice, fearless of revenge from social 
superiors. The plays’ popularity derived from the truth they manifested. Although 
no scripts are extant, Song is known to have structured his plays in a lively 
                                                 
11
 Song returned to Taiwan in 1987 and left again in 1989. Reportedly, he died in a car 
accident in Quan-Zhou (泉州) in 1992. 
12
 The first radio station in Taiwan was set up on 16 June 1925, to Nipponize (皇民化) 
Taiwanese people and to celebrate the thirty-year anniversary of Japanese rule in Taiwan. 
Broadcasting lasted for ten days, and resumed on 1 November 1928. Despite its 
Nipponizing purpose, the station began to air radio dramas in Taiwanese from October 
1942. Although there are few records as to why the Japanese government started to air 
programs in the Taiwanese dialect, Lu (1961, cited in Chen 1999: 39) notes that many 
programs during this period were war-time propaganda, and it seems likely that the 
government wanted to counteract underground stations which they could not censor but 
which were popularizing anti-Japanese sentiment. 
13
 Research into radio dramas as a source of entertainment during the Japanese period has 
been hindered by the attitude of the KMT rulers after Japan’s defeat. The KMT had a 
Chinese-centred historiography, and Japan’s contribution to Taiwan went unrecognized. 
Documents were not preserved, and Japanese publications were banned, in the words of 
governor Chen Yi (陳儀), in order ‘to quickly eradicate the slave mentality of Taiwanese 
people and to construct a revolutionary mindset’ (cited in Huang 1991: 103–104). The ban 
effectively forbade Taiwanese elites and creative writers from using Japanese, their most 
familiar language, to communicate with the public. 
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manner, ‘calibrated with twists and humour’ so as to ‘allow the social problem to be 
dissected more precisely’ (Lan 2001: 66). Song’s mastery of the Japanese and 
Taiwanese languages also contributed to the popularity of his plays, which not only 
reflect the everyday situation of the underclass, but significantly deepen listeners’ 
understanding of social problems and of their government. Jian and Song’s 
collaboration continued until the outbreak of the 2-28 Massacre in 1947. 
   Similar to Song, Brendan Behan was also a prolific writer for both theatre and 
radio. One Behan radio drama, The Big House,14 revolves around an Anglo-Irish 
landowner who resides in a big house, and his tenants, who can only entertain 
themselves in a pub ironically named ‘The Big House’. The lives of all the 
characters are lived in or around ‘big houses’, while the rigid social class structure 
drastically differentiates them in terms of life quality. Mr Baldcock, the landlord, has 
strong prejudices against the Irish: ‘If an ass is born in a stable, does that make it a 
horse?’ (Behan 1978 [1957]: 362). In his eyes, nationalists such as Eamon de 
Valera, who are jeopardizing the given superiority of the Anglo-Irish aristocracy, 
are rebels to be condemned. As landlords become afraid of the growing Irish 
unrest and grow desperate to return to England, rent collection and evictions are 
entrusted to local police and to land agents, represented in this play by Mr 
Chuckles. Agents form a new class between landowners and tenants, and take all 
manner of advantage behind the landlords’ backs. Their lands are sequestered by 
agents who, politically, always fall between two stools like ‘a tea leaf’, should there 
be a fortune to make (374), and they justify their illicitly-taken advantages with 
observations such as ‘old Baldcock got the land off Cromwell’s soldiers by using 
his load… the same as I’m using mine’ (374). The greater suffering remains that of 
the proletariat, who own almost nothing but are subject to all the classes above 
them. Mr Chuckles is presented as deserving little sympathy from the audience. 
   Behan, Song, and Jian, amongst other Irish and Taiwanese playwrights, have 
contributed significantly to working-class historiography, challenging the official line 
that is usually imposed by the social elite and/or which favours the advantaged. 
Nevertheless, their shared sympathy for deprived labourers does not bar them 
from depicting their wickedness, but rather illuminates how oppression passes 
down unrelentingly from one social rung to another. In The Wall, the monk who 
works for the rich landlord as a messenger to Beggar Hsu, and those who refuse 
to give him spare change, are depicted metaphorically as the murderers of his 
family. Likewise, Behan, whose father had been a house-painter, stated about his 
community that: ‘I think that the Irish that I know and the Irish who I like, who are 
ordinary blokes, taxi-drivers, house-painters, bookies’ runners – I don’t say honest 
workers… some of them are extremely dishonest workers – but they’re the people 
I care about’ (Behan 1982: 145). The Irish and Taiwanese playwrights under 
discussion seem always to present their homelands in a bitter way, although 
another remark by Behan can also apply to his Taiwanese comparators: ‘the world 
is divided into two classes: invalids and nurses. I’m a nurse… I’m a nurse in the 
sense that in my plays and in my books I try to show the world to a certain extent 
                                                 
14
 Behan’s The Big House was first commissioned as a radio drama in 1957, and staged at 
the Pike Theatre Club on 6 May 1958. It can be said that the radio served as a more 
economical channel for playwrights as the budget for performances was limited, and that it 
possibly had further-reaching effects on a nationwide working-class audience. 
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what’s the matter with it, why everybody is not happy’ (Behan 1982: 142–143). 
Consequently, their characters are less the products of authorial imagination as 
drawn from real people with whom the playwrights once talked, drank, and 
celebrated life. However, they also form part of national memory, to be re-
awakened, re-justified, re-built, and possibly refuted, but not easily erased. 
 
The Silence and Defiance of Women Labourers 
 
The experiences of lower-class women also feature in Irish and Taiwanese drama; 
two examples are Sean O’Casey’s Juno and the Paycock (1924) and Castrated 
Rooster (1943), from a short story by Zhang Wen-Huan (張文環) and adapted for 
the stage by Lin Tuan-Qiu (林摶秋). 
   Castrated Rooster, as discussed above, is one of the most significant works 
performed during Japanese rule as part of Taiwan’s ‘New Theatre’ movement. The 
play depicts the rise and fall of two traditional families in the 1920s, when a town is 
about to be urbanized. As a plan to acquire some valuable land, Yu-Li (月里), the 
daughter of a Chinese pharmacist, is forced to marry the only son of a local 
shipping magnate, A-Yong (阿勇). The marriage is arranged for Yu-Li’s father to 
obtain the ‘golden area' near a planned train station in the neighbourhood of the 
shipping company, and for A-Yong’s father to procure the pharmacy as Yu-Li’s 
dowry. 
   As a woman labourer in a patriarchal society, Yu-Li, although possessing much 
passion and intelligence, has no freedom to acquaint herself with other suitors, nor 
is she able to protest against the arranged marriage. The marriage becomes a 
deadly shackle, for she is expected to be a decent woman ( 良 家 婦 女 ), 
unconditionally faithful to A-Yong so as not to disgrace her family. Unfairer still are 
the circumstances which soon follow; A-Yong’s father dies very soon after Yu-Li’s 
wedding, A-Yong becomes ill with malaria and is unable to work, and the 
government’s urban planners decide not to build a railway in the anticipated 
‘golden area’ after all. Facing huge debts and lacking options but unwilling to sell 
her soul, Yu-Li becomes a pig famer at home while also working part-time in the 
city, and has to endure jeers and derision levelled at her by her community. 
   Urban planning is a game involving various interested parties and the 
government; its decisions do not necessarily benefit the working classes, but 
rather further disillusions them with government. Unable to resist all these 
subjugating forces, Yu-Li can only repress herself, comforting her husband as a 
proper wife: ‘I am pleased that you don’t want to give up. You see how tearful I am 
now…’ (Zhang 2002 [1943]: 133). Lin’s stage adaptation simplified Zhang’s story 
to make Yu-Li less passionate and sexual, but his adaptation consolidates the 
sense of patriarchal morality and fits into the general expectation of an ideal wife, 
whose hardships are all for others but not for herself. 15  Regardless of Lin’s 
                                                 
15
 As noted in footnote 7, the original script has been lost. However, the stage version 
referred to in this article is believed to be closest to that of the premiere, although the ending 
is different from that of the original short story. In this stage version, Yu-Li is consistently 
faithful to her husband in her arranged marriage, while in the short story she has a love 
affair with an artist, with whom she later commits suicide. Yu-Li’s striving for freedom is 
remarkable, and so are the curses against her. 
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intention, Castrated Rooster shows how women labourers in a land-based farming 
community are constantly under exploitation and emotionally oppressed. Her tears 
are thus signs of all the unpleasant feelings and experiences in this arranged 
marriage. She is no more than an object, under double deprivation of traditional 
patriarchy and Japanese rule. Both Yu-Li and A-Yong are the embodiments of the 
‘castrated rooster’, which is not only physically incomplete but dysfunctional, and 
they both have to bear the capitalistic, colonial, and patriarchal violence that casts 
them from the social centre to the margin. 
   Yu-Li’s story exemplifies how Taiwanese women were/are subject to the 
patriarchal teachings of Confucianism, whether cast as loyal assistant or sole 
breadwinner. Likewise, their counterparts in Ireland were/are also under the double 
influence of Catholicism and Victorian culture, often restricted to the domestic 
arena as ‘the angel in the house’. Most women in Taiwan have to fulfil patriarchal 
obligations, behaving in accordance with the ‘three rules and four virtues of 
obedience’ (三從四德), as Confucian teachings prescribe. Self-esteem is bound up 
with devotion to sustaining the dignity of their fathers, husbands, male siblings, and 
relatives. The same expectation is also applicable to Catholic Irishwomen, who 
should by all means honour their husbands: ‘if [women] want to find out about 
something, ask their husbands at home. It is a disgraceful thing for a woman to 
speak in church’ (1 Corinthians 14: 35). Unmarried women should be as 
‘consecrated virgins’, and restrict themselves from any intimacy with men. This 
highly conservative ethos in Taiwan and Ireland thus prevented female workers 
from being prominent in labour movements, and usually from leadership positions. 
Only in recent years in Taiwan have female activists outspoken on issues of 
employee rights, domestic violence, female sexuality, and the rights of sex workers 
received some degree of respect and media attention. 
   In O’Casey’s Juno and the Paycock, Juno, the mother, is the only working 
member of her Catholic family, in contrast to her drunkard husband, Jack Boyle, 
who continually evades work by feigning illness. Her son, Johnny, has lost an arm 
in the Irish Civil War and is thus unable to work. Mary, her daughter, joins the lock-
out, as the trade union expects. The family is economically deprived by the forces 
around them and is almost below the starvation line. Worse, a lawyer who falls in 
love with Mary and makes her pregnant later brings a false message that a distant 
deceased relative has left them a large amount of money as a bequest. Expecting, 
but not having received, the money, the Boyles purchase a few luxuries on a 
mortgage. The whole course of events turns out to be a disaster for the family, as 
the lawyer disappears after taking advantage of Mary, and the Boyles fail to pay 
back the loan and are evicted by the landlord. Jack spends the last of their money 
in a pub; Johnny is killed by the IRA for being unwilling to join its campaign after 
losing his arm. Mary is disowned by her father and has to find shelter, with her 
mother, in a relative’s house. This play, overshadowed by the Civil War, criticizes 
the war’s inhuman consequences and how those in power take advantage of the 
underclass and drive them further into destitution. 
   The play has received mixed reviews. According to Raymond Williams, ‘O’Casey 
fails to dramatically engage with the “feelings of the fighters” or with the “need and 
the oppression” which drove them to take up arms… [The play became] the 
sound… of a long confusion and disintegration’ (Williams 1978: 151). By contrast, 
Christopher Murray judged Juno and the Paycock to be a social drama in which 
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the traumatic birth of the nation is ‘most passionately, most powerfully and most 
memorably dramatized’, with ‘a greater range of vivid and original characters, male 
and female’ (2001: 88). The mixed reviews of the play suggest that what concerns 
the playwright is not the social privileges enjoyed by the well-to-do, but the tyranny 
that is imposed on the oppressed. 
   O’Casey grew up in a working-class Protestant family, and was at one time 
secretary to Jim Larkin, a socialist leader during the 1913 Dublin Lockout. He 
skilfully draws the attention of the audience to the problematic natures of Irish 
patriotism and the labour movement, through the eyes of ignored female 
working-class characters and across denominational divisions. In other words, 
what prompts Juno to find work is not just her husband’s joblessness or idleness, 
but also the long-term political unrest that has resulted in a widespread economic 
depression. She can only take a few odd jobs on an irregular basis; as for the 
‘workers’ principle’, for which Mary is an enthusiast, she may not have realized 
that its anti-capitalistic agenda also involved an anti-colonial element, as most of 
the economic advantage from work went to the Anglo-Irish ascendancy and 
British investors. It is probable that she does not even think about the fact that 
the trade union, whose members are largely Catholic, does not consider gender 
equality. Her position in the union is doubly marginalized, so that its patriarchal 
nature remains secure. Her out-of-wedlock pregnancy further implies her failure 
in this power struggle, given that the runaway lawyer not only takes her virginity 
and leaves her holding the baby, but also shatters the family and leads to its 
dispossession. Johnny’s lost arm, meanwhile, makes him a damaged man with 
no job prospects. Ironically, the union, which has been incapable of helping 
those who are physically well but hungry due to joblessness, cannot secure 
Johnny’s working rights. That he is murdered by the IRA is thus no less different 
from being starved to death, as he has no chance either way. The Boyles, 
inarguably, are under the tight control of capitalism and can survive only with 
extreme difficulty. 
   Many of O’Casey’s works were banned in Ireland, including Within the Gates 
(1933), Windfalls (1934), I Knock at the Door (1939), and Pictures in the Hallway 
(1942).16 Comparing Juno and the Paycock with the Taiwanese dramas of Jian, 
Song, and Zhang discussed above, it can be seen that their plays were banned or 
led to controversy most probably because of their supposed Marxist standpoint in 
favour of the dispossessed. Further, the working-class characters whom these 
playwrights portray are either ill or disabled in some way; they are thus like the 
‘castrated rooster’ which is to some extent dysfunctional, but they still manage to 
live on with some little dignity. 
   The role of working-class women as breadwinners, or as the central pillars of a 
family during a national crisis, means that their voices need to be taken into 
account in social and political analysis. The following section will therefore 
examine how contemporary Taiwanese and Irish playwrights delineate the 
ignored experiences of women of the underclass, in order to build up a working-
class ‘her-story’, within a still male-led historiography. 
 
                                                 
16
 Clerical antagonism against works by James Joyce, Samuel Beckett, and O’Casey 
prompted O’Casey to forbid all professional productions of his plays in Ireland until 1964. 
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Social Minorities and Transnational exploitation 
 
As discussed above, theatres can be political or ‘performative’ spaces where 
dramatists express criticisms or suggest areas for reform. Theatres can provide 
the audience with an escape to the unreal, or a chance of self-recognition through 
the stories being enacted on stage. Contemporary Irish and Taiwanese dramatists 
engaging with this approach pay particular attention to minorities in different 
corners of society, whether defined by ethnicity, geography, or economic situation. 
   We Are Here (我們在這裡),17 was written and produced in 2000 by Peng Ya-
ling (彭雅玲), director of the Uhan Shii Theatre Group (歡喜扮劇團).18 The play is 
particularly concerned with the almost triply marginalized women of the Hakka 
diaspora. What is peculiar about this play is that it aims, as the dramatist specifies 
in the prologue, to unearth ‘the ignored experiences of this diaspora around the 
world, while their familial ethics, musical conventions, language, culture and 
traditional industry, of which they used to be proud, are being buried consciously 
and unconsciously’ (Peng 2002 [2000]: 237). The drama consists of four episodes, 
and features the lives of working-class Hakka women of differing ages and the 
hardships which they bear but which are largely ignored outside their community. 
The four episodes, though performed by different characters and consisting of 
disparate stories, are connected by the oldest actress carrying a blue cloth 
shoulder pack throughout the play. The working-class women of the Hakka 
diaspora are shown to be subjected to male domination throughout their lives: as 
infants, they can be ‘exchanged’ for daughters of other Hakka families as future 
‘daughters-in-law’ (童養媳).19 They are mostly deprived of personal choice, or even 
of an identity, long before they can be aware of having one. The price for choosing 
their own husband is heavy, as shown by the protagonist Jiao-Mei (蕉妹) in the 
fourth episode. She is disowned by her family for marrying a mainlander rather 
than a Hakka.20 She is warned by her own mother that she will be ‘chopped into 
pieces of pig food’, and further admonished: ‘do not ever come back home’ (Peng 
2002 [2000]: 274). Nevertheless, those of her siblings who marry Hakka men are 
                                                 
17  The play is available to watch online: <http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/dacs5/System/Exhibi
tion/Detail.jsp?OID=2510203>. 
18
 The Uhan Shii Theatre Group was established by Peng in March 1995. The actors and 
actresses are mostly seniors, aged 65 years old or older. Their repertoire consists of plays 
based on the real experiences of the theatre members, who come from different ethnic 
groups in Taiwan; these include Minnan, Hakka, and mainland-born. The aim of the group is 
to introduce theatrical performance to both seniors and young people, attempting to bridge 
the generational gap and to present the overlooked historiography of the socially 
marginalized. The group has toured with the Age Exchange Theatre Trust in Europe and the 
USA, and been well received. 
19
 This is probably done in order to maintain the purity of the Hakka diaspora, which is 
constantly on the move. Also, as soon as they are able, future daughters-in-law can provide 
labour for a working-class or farming family. 
20
 ‘Mainlander’ here refers to immigrants from China who are unable to speak Hakka. Their 
immigration to Taiwan began in the seventeenth century, and huge numbers arrived with 
the KMT from 1949. Mainlanders claimed most of the political and economic advantages, 
and tense relationships ensued with local ethnic communities. 
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not necessarily guaranteed a good life, but can usually expect to be ‘blamed, 
abused, without respect, spending their whole life with endless complaints’ (Peng 
2002 [2000]: 255). They can never be financially independent but must rely on the 
meagre incomes of their working-class husbands. The lack of money is a common 
cause of family dispute, and Hakka women are often forced to take odd jobs. 
Never receiving adequate attention within the patriarchal Hakka community, they 
often keep a blue cloth pack with them to take wherever they are exiled, and they 
have to come to terms with all manner of hardships. 
   The Hakka women in the separate episodes of the play do not know each other, 
although the audience can see that they share similar circumstances in that their 
happiness is determined by capitalism. Their individuality is usually undeveloped, 
and integrated within the male-led community, and they are triply marginalized by 
a multitude of political, economic, and cultural forces. As the Hakka community will 
never be a political majority in Taiwan, unlike the communities of mainlanders and 
Minnans, there is little political, economic, or social support they can claim. Lacking 
social assistance, many even choose to conceal their minority identity when 
outside their own community. Women in the Hakka community are thus 
disadvantaged and always remain lookers-on from the social margins. It is ironic, 
but also a factor evoking sympathy, that it is often only when these working-class 
Hakka women have retired, or after their children have started their own families, 
that can they start to reconstruct their own individualities. Peng’s Uhan Shii 
Theatre Group therefore provides these senior amateur Hakka men and women 
with a chance to demonstrate themselves as artists. 
   While We Are Here provides a voice for largely-neglected working-class women 
on the social margin in Taiwan, Frank McGuinness’s The Factory Girls (1982) 
might be its Irish counterpart. The Factory Girls realistically exemplifies how Irish 
female workers are subjugated by local patriarchal forces, and, distantly but 
influentially, by Taiwan’s extensive export trade. Superficially, the Irish and 
Taiwanese working classes have never shared any reciprocal relationships, but 
Irish workers have been affected by Taiwan’s cheap labour and low-priced exports; 
this is documented in The Factory Girls, as quoted at the beginning of this article. 
The low-paid Hakka women workers of Taiwan, along with other ethnic groups, 
have caused female factory workers in Ireland to lose their jobs. Underpaid and 
aware of the threat of being laid off, the women workers in The Factory Girls go on 
strike by locking themselves inside a factory, disregarding the condemnations of 
the parish priests and pressure from their own community. Although Taiwan is 
mentioned only in passing, it can be argued that McGuinness intended to show 
how workers, exploited by a socially privileged class, can clash across borders. 
The winners will never be the exploited but the entrepreneurs, who not only 
dominate their human resources but enjoy all the social and economic advantages 
that industry brings. 
   What makes The Factory Girls special amongst working-class dramas is not only 
that it revolves around issues concerning the working conditions of a small factory 
in Donegal, ‘a jiggeldy-piggeldy bit at the top of the country’ remote from Dublin, 
but that the factory is presented as an epitome of the power conflict between the 
classes during the early stages of globalization (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 23). 
That is, a global market can be of little benefit to those who are always on the 
lowest social rung, and they continue to be exploited. In McGuinness’s 
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observation, Irish entrepreneurs facing massive imports from abroad and possible 
bankruptcy are rarely concerned with the welfare of employees, but always with 
maintaining their pecuniary advantage: ‘A unit of production that I need to see go 
out this factory quicker and in greater numbers if against all the odds I’m to make 
this hole of a place survive’ (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 37). To increase the 
factory’s output of hand-made shirts and in the face of machine-made imports, the 
owner sacks older employees, cuts salaries, and, worst of all, disallows the 
workers from taking breaks. These female workers are therefore turned into cheap 
‘slaves’ competing against machinery, and describe themselves as such 
(McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 33). 
   Ironically, the workers’ union takes a condescending attitude towards these 
female labourers, who can get support from nowhere else and so resort to rioting. 
The union disapproves, and indeed helps the factory owner to turn down their 
petition, resulting in more tension between the oppressors and the female working 
class. The male representative from the union, Bonner, boldly condemns senior 
workers who do not accept ‘voluntary redundancy’ as ‘very foolish’ (McGuinness 
1996 [1982]: 35). Lacking community support but under tremendous pressure, 
these women workers are greatly isolated, or even demonized for not behaving 
with proper respect towards God. 
   McGuinness, by depicting a rather small-scale Irish riot in a remote shirt factory 
which is close to being closed down due to imports from Taiwan, demonstrates 
that the exploitation of the working class is transnational. In both The Factory Girls 
and We Are Here, inadequately educated female workers are deprived of career 
choices but devote themselves to working primarily for their families. We Are Here, 
as noted above, shows how Hakka girls would be exchanged with other families to 
provide labour from a very young age. There is no independent female role model 
for them to aspire to in their community. In The Factory Girls, women have to 
support themselves by either ‘tak[ing] the boat [to emigrate] or getting married’ 
(McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 45). Those who are unable to get married and cannot 
afford a passage abroad have to find a factory job, as the Irish economy was so 
depressed at the time. They ask: ‘where will [Irish men] get the work to support 
us?’ (McGuinness 1996 [1982]: 45) Compared with the frequently abused and 
underrepresented Hakka women, the Irish female workers, though not physically 
injured in The Factory Girls, suffer a similar mental suffocation. However, whether 
or not they choose to riot against the given power structure, their action will hardly 
change the fact that they are born to be ‘martyrs’ on the social fringe, lacking 
choices. If working conditions remain unimproved and there is continuing and 
relentless deprivation of workers, ‘martyr’ looks set to remain a current term in the 
context of globalization. A transnational corporation will probably be more 
desperate to find cheap labour from across national boundaries, but this will leave 
class conflicts unresolved and lead to prolonged suffering. 
   Although the reference to Taiwan in The Factory Girls implies that Taiwan gained 
the upper hand in the 1980s through cheap exports, its success actually resulted in 
even worse conditions for Taiwanese workers during the following two decades. 
The enormous impact of transnational enterprises on the disadvantaged working 
class, although not fully developed in The Factory Girls and We Are Here, 
resonates in the productions of the Assignment Theatre Company (差事劇團), 
founded in 1996 by Chung Chiao (鍾喬). Unlike the dramas discussed above, most 
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of Chung’s plays are in the style of magic realism, and are often produced in an 
open-air tent with an explicit concern for the most deprived of the working class in 
the age of globalization. The ‘assignments’ to which his tent theatre is committed, 
according to the playwright, include ‘to accommodate those completely broken 
souls in the dominion of imperialism and capitalism; the tent is thus a performative 
arena in which these souls can be conjured up through imaginative power 
struggle’, and so counteract the conventional, capitalistic manner of performance 
(Chung 2003: ix). Specifically, most of Chung’s characters have been injured or 
poisoned during the process of manufacture, or are characters on the social 
margin whose lives have been directly or indirectly subject to the actions of 
gigantic native and foreign corporations. 
   One example is The Platform of Memory (記憶的月台) (2000). A-Gen (阿根) is a 
victim of dioxin pollution to which he has long been exposed in a hardware factory; 
Little Red (小紅) and Shen Hui (沈惠) suffer from radiation poisoning emitted by a 
nuclear power station. In The Hotel at Sea (海上旅館) (2001), a group of nameless, 
illegally-hired Chinese fishermen work night after night in fishing vessels that offer 
little comfort. The Darkness of Tide (潮喑) (2004) deals with a larger number of 
people at the very bottom of the society, and their much-ignored voices; for 
instance, foreign brides living with domestic violence, illegal immigrants who are 
drowned; a dying veteran who has given most of his life to fighting in the civil war 
but received little in return; homeless and aboriginal people who are desperate for 
social recognition. These socially under-represented characters and the open-air 
venues substantiate a distinctive collective discourse and aesthetic, providing ‘an 
alternative to the highly stylized and commercialized mainstream theatres’ (Chung 
1999: 188). 
   By illustrating the misery of the socially marginalized, Chung’s dramas challenge 
not only imperialistic capitalism but also social bureaucracy and stereotypes of 
blue-collar workers. In this way, he reveals the distressing facts of gender 
inequality and the unequal distribution of social welfare. The playwright’s magic 
realism allows the traditionally less-attended working class to express freely their 
experiences and dreams in a convention that is more creative than naturalistic 
dramas. On the other hand, the visualization of neglected communities serves as a 
healing practice through which mentally scarred individuals may vent their 
resentments and rebuild their identities, although the harm caused is unlikely to be 
lessened so long as the tide of globalization keeps coming in. In terms of theatrics, 
Chung’s magic realism is a significant breakthrough in the dramatization of social 
and humanitarian issues. That is, his plays create a platform on which the socially 
suppressed can visualize their dreams, unconstrained by traditional realism. 
Chung’s series of tent dramas thus portrays exactly working conditions endured 
under the cloak of economic success. Notably, his theatre does not have a regular 
audience like other commercial theatre companies, but his non-mainstream, tent 
theatre allows him to conduct many theatrical experiments in characterization, 
theme, and setting. His theatre is, in the post-colonial sense, more ‘performative’ 
and conceptually radical, and in practice unerringly resists the transnational 
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exploitation which subjugates lower-skilled labourers during the process of 
globalization. 21 
 
Conclusion 
 
The story of Taiwanese dramas on labour issues as discussed in this article 
contains a hiatus between the 1940s and the 2000s. This is because of unrelenting 
censorship between 1949 and 1987 which left Taiwanese theatres and other 
media with few innovative dramas to produce, and which prescribed either patriotic 
and anti-communist or apolitical works. Critical plays on sensitive labour issues 
and social corruption like Jian’s The Wall are scarce, as they tended to irritate the 
KMT. Most media ‘consciously or unconsciously served themselves as a tool of 
propaganda for the ruling regime, and promoted the expected loyalism to the 
KMT/state’ (Chen 1999: 76); KMT censorship resulted in self-censorship. 
   Irish artists also had to deal with The Censorship of Publications Bill, passed in 
1928 and only gradually relaxed in the late 1970s. This censorship was not against 
alleged communist influences, as was the case in Taiwan, but rather had a 
religious mission of forbidding obscenity and information about abortion. This 
official censorship brought about a ‘spiritual emptiness’ which disabled Irish artists 
from producing new dramas as remarkable as those of their predecessors 
(Merriman 2003: 148). Once censored, playwrights in Ireland and Taiwan could 
only look inwards for insular and safe topics, rather than trying experimental 
theatrics. However, this in turn gave impulse to the playwrights of the next 
generation to produce works which either express critical views or are 
experimental. Taiwanese plays by Peng and Chung, for instance, are celebrated 
for their unconventional innovation and theatrical significance. It is worth noting 
that Chung and Peng, like their predecessors, Jian, Song, and Lu, and a 
contemporary critic, Lan, are all of Hakka origin. This does not mean that there are 
few playwrights of other ethnic origin prominent in Taiwan, but Hakka playwrights, 
being an ethnic minority, seem to know how to create plausible works from their 
usually harsh and exploitative everyday experiences. Ireland’s Fabulous Beast 
Dance Theatre, established in 1997, can be viewed as a counterpart of Chung’s 
experimental theatre, with a new dramaturgy that ‘fuses the visual immediacy of 
dance with the narrative strength of theatre’ (Fabulous Beast 2010). One key 
difference between Chung’s theatre and Fabulous Beast is that the latter has made 
a successful transition from local experimental group to globally-renowned 
commercial project, while their productions are no less artistic and creative. 
   Having examined different styles in representing labour issues on Irish and 
Taiwanese stages, it can be seen that playwrights in both countries have 
endeavoured to give voice to the politically and economically marginalized. They 
                                                 
21
 Another notable play is The Story of Nei-Wan (內灣線的故事, 1994), written and directed 
by Chiu Juan-Juan (邱娟娟), founder of the Corn Field Theatre (玉米田實驗劇場). This 
retrospective play documents the deprived life of miners during the period in which Taiwan 
was in a transition from farming to industrialization. Miners transferred to cement plants, 
which offered the most benefits but took little responsibility for deaths or injuries. These 
miners contributed to the globalization of Taiwan’s industries, but their lack of education and 
voice have meant that their contribution has not been well documented. 
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take either a journalistic approach to the working class, or audaciously try a 
mixture of experimental dramaturgies: from naturalism to magic realism, framed 
stage to open air, professional playwriting to amateur story-telling, and narrative 
drama to dance theatre. Ireland and Taiwan, culturally and politically, have both 
experienced a de-colonial process; many nativists and intellectuals have strived to 
raise public awareness of lost tradition by reviving local languages or ethnic 
identities. Working-class dramas should thus be given more recognition within 
discussion of nation-formation in Taiwan. Significantly, although Jian, Song, and 
Zhang always delineated the social problems of their times through an idealized, 
socialist lens, their plays were mostly produced in Taiwanese, a language most 
familiar to their less educated native audience, rather than in Japanese, a foreign 
tongue which can easily reveal a self-endorsing elitism. 
   The Irish playwrights discussed in this article, from Fred Ryan to Frank 
McGuinness, do not appear to have considered language issues, and their work is 
in English rather than Gaelic. Although the public prevalence of English in Ireland 
is due partly to a failure of cultural nationalism in the early twentieth century, the 
use of English for theatrical performances does not bar Irish playwrights from 
critiquing local or transnational enterprises which subjugate personal life or the 
State. Even before the crash, it was suspected that globalization, once so 
celebrated in Ireland, had not ensured the stability of the Celtic Tiger, but rather 
triggered an increasing number of redundant, low-skilled (migrant) workers. Irish 
labourers, both local and migrant, are still heavily exploited in the global market. In 
both locations, workers have become similarly aware of the imperative need for 
counteracting the exploitation of cheap labour. Theatrical performances may not 
bring immediate relief to the unemployed or the exploited, but the collaboration of 
playwrights across national borders, in different forms, can help create a securer 
space of enunciation, as Bhabha suggests, in which labourers can identify with 
each other and their pending challenges. They may be able to forge an alliance, 
rather than, as McGuiness prophesies in The Factory Girls, remaining as foes or 
competitors in a global sweat factory. The working classes of Ireland and Taiwan, 
co-acting more cohesively and amplifying their voices in this age of globalization, 
might more effectively resist (in)visible powers wishing to exploit them. The power 
they accumulate will only be louder through words on stage, and it will set an 
inspiring example for those still suffering in the Third World. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews theories of immigrant political incorporation and compares the 
social and political adaptation of two very different ethnic groups in American 
history and contemporary politics. Immigrants and their descendants from Ireland 
are now considered a symbol of success in social integration and political 
incorporation by becoming ‘white’ in US racial politics. Taiwanese Americans, on 
the other hand, are considered part of the migrant population from Asia who has 
been paradoxically characterized as a ‘yellow peril’, a ‘model minority’, and the 
‘perpetual foreigner’ throughout US history. What explains the paradoxical gaps in 
social and political incorporation among Taiwanese Americans? What accounts for 
the differences in political incorporation between Irish and Taiwanese Americans? 
And how can the Irish American experience help explain the prospect of political 
incorporation for Taiwanese (and other Asian) immigrants as well as the role of 
ethnic homeland politics in the process? We take stock of historical, institutional, 
and behavioral evidences related to the evolution of the two ethnic groups to 
challenge the validity of the conventional pluralist framework and liberalism’s 
assumptions of immigrant incorporation for an emergent, non-white, and majority-
immigrant community. We present empirical evidence and comment on the 
prospects of the political incorporation of Taiwanese Americans at the end. 
 
Introduction 
 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Irish Americans 1  and Taiwanese 
Americans2 appear to be two very different and unrelated population groups in US 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘Irish Americans’ refers to US residents of Irish and Scotch-Irish descent who 
may or may not be American by citizenship. 
2
 The term ‘Taiwanese Americans’ is here used broadly to refer to US immigrants from 
Taiwan and their US-born descendants, who may or may not identify themselves as 
Taiwanese or as Taiwanese Americans, who may or may not be American by citizenship. 
Due to the complexity in the transition of political power in China, especially after World War 
II, Taiwanese immigrants in the US today may include persons born elsewhere but latterly 
settled in Taiwan before migration to the US, as well as individuals who had ties to the KMT 
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society and politics. The two are set apart not only by racial and ethnic origin, 
dominant religion, population size, growth trend, and most other demographic 
characteristics, but also by citizenship status and political identity. The Irish have 
the reputation of being one of the oldest and most politically active immigrant-
turned-ethnic groups in American history. The Taiwanese are part of the ‘new’ 
Asian migration that was mostly blocked between 1882 and 1965 and, despite 
having a model minority image, the community has been striving to gain a distinct 
identity and fair treatment in US polity and society. In the politics of counting by the 
US Census, in recent decades the former group has faced the problem of declining 
identification, while the latter has enjoyed a rising interest in identification. 
Nonetheless, both communities face the same challenge of formulating an 
accurate account and full understanding of its population. Scholarship on the 
immigrant incorporation of both communities also holds an increasingly dubious 
attitude towards the unconditional claim of ‘success’ in the country of settlement. 
   The two US populations also share a history of colonization and divided politics, 
in that their respective island homelands are situated next to an empire nation. The 
island of Ireland was partitioned into two jurisdictions by the United Kingdom in 
1921. Today’s Ireland became a free state in 1922, gained full sovereignty from 
the United Kingdom in 1937, and declared itself to be a republic in 1949. The 
political history of Northern Ireland, which remains a part of the United Kingdom, is 
more colorful and has an uncertain future as regards reunification with Ireland. 
Although Taiwan was freed from Japanese rule and returned to the Republic of 
China at the end of World War II, it was ruled continuously until 2000 by the 
Nationalist Party (KMT), which had retreated to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese 
Civil War in 1949. Today, many consider Taiwan to be a de facto independent 
nation and a fully vibrant democracy. However, Taiwan is not officially 
independent, and the pursuit of political independence has been a controversial 
goal. The politics of ancestral homeland has been a subject that has both excited 
and divided the diaspora in the United States for both communities. 
   The similarities between the two US populations go beyond concern over group 
identity and the politics of homeland independence. Examining the history and 
experience of immigrants from Taiwan through the perspectives of ethnic Chinese 
in the United States, one finds an incredibly intertwined relationship with Irish 
immigrants, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century; this was when the first large 
wave of Chinese merchants and male laborers arrived in San Francisco to mine 
gold. The unequal treaties signed by the Chinese government with the British 
government at the end of the two Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860) led to the 
cession of Hong Kong, heavy taxation, and the Taiping uprisings (1850–1864). 
These were among the ‘push’ factors, in addition to famine and overpopulation, 
which led war-torn and impoverished Chinese to cross the Pacific from the late 
1840s (Chan 1991). Their perceived economic competition with the Irish and other 
white ethnics, compounded by cultural differences and white racism, explained the 
hostility towards the Chinese workers seen in brutal and systematic ‘ethnic 
cleaning’ that resulted in their legal exclusion in 1882 (Pfaelzer 2007). This 
occured even though immigration statistics show that the size of the Chinese 
                                                                                                                            
government in China prior to its relocation to Taiwan in 1949. These individuals may often 
be called Chinese Americans or Taiwanese Chinese Americans in other contexts. 
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population was only a fraction of that of the Irish, and even though Chinese 
workers were paid only half of what Irish workers earnt when both were hired by 
the Central Pacific Railroad to build the first transcontinental railroad (Takaki 
1989). 
   Despite interethnic conflicts, the two groups are nevertheless connected through 
a shared history of group discrimination, labor exploitation, as well as 
intermarriage. Compared to the Irish, the Chinese faced higher taxes, denials of 
citizenship and immigration, and were barred from testifying in court against white 
assailants. Compared with Anglos and Irish Protestants, Irish Catholics faced 
religious discrimination, economic subordination, and cultural denigration in the 
New World (Brown 1966; Jacobson 1998). During the first few years after the 
American Civil War, Irish and Chinese males were recruited from overseas as 
indentured workers to fill armies and build railroads (Nelson 2007). In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Chinese male immigrants in New York 
City and San Francisco frequently intermarried with Irish immigrant women (Tchen 
1999). 
   Some argue that the post-1965 immigration of highly educated and skilled 
individuals from Asia, and especially from Taiwan, is simply another, more 
contemporary form of globally recruited labor (Brodkin 2000). In recent US census 
data, Taiwanese Americans score a much higher level of educational achievement 
and per capita income than Irish Americans. However, the former also registered a 
much lower citizenship rate and a higher poverty rate that the latter. Moreover, the 
high skills, high education, and material resources of Taiwanese Americans do not 
seem to spare them from racial discrimination, nor do they lower the entry bar into 
mainstream American politics (Aptekar 2008; Toyota 2010). What explains the 
paradoxical gaps in social and political incorporation among Taiwanese 
Americans? What accounts for the differences in political incorporation between 
Irish and Taiwanese Americans? And how can the Irish-American experience 
provide insight into prospects for political incorporation by Taiwanese (and other 
Asian) immigrants, or into the role of ethnic homeland politics as part of this 
process? 
   Because migration to and from Taiwan are examples of movement in the 
Chinese diaspora and of the global transfer of labor, we maintain that a proper 
comparison of the political experiences of Irish and Taiwanese Americans will 
need to be situated and understood within the context of US racial politics and 
Asian/Chinese American experiences throughout US history. In this paper, we first 
define the meanings and discuss past research into the political incorporation of 
immigrants. We then take stock of historical, institutional, and behavioral evidence 
related to the evolution of the two ethnic groups, in order to challenge the 
conventional pluralist framework and liberalism’s assumptions of immigrant 
incorporation as they relate to an emergent, non-white, and majority-immigrant 
community. Among topics we consider, we compare and contrast the significance 
of race and racialization in group history and in US policies towards the admission 
and naturalization of immigrants from Asia and Europe. We also examine the 
mediating role of political parties as agents of (re)socialization/incorporation as well 
as the role of ancestral homeland in the development of nationalist identity and 
consciousness which, in turn, may mobilize political participation across the 
Atlantic/Pacific. This is followed by an evaluation of the latest statistics collected by 
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US government agencies to help assess the current social and political status of 
the two communities and how the evidence sheds light on theories of immigrant 
incorporation. We close by taking a critical view of the current status of political 
participation by Taiwanese Americans. We believe that a comparison of the 
unlikely pairing of Irish Americans and Taiwanese Americans may yield empirically 
and theoretically interesting results for the advancement of Taiwan Studies, 
American Studies, international migration, and political science research as a 
whole. 
 
A Review of Theoretical Frameworks on Immigrant Political Incorporation 
 
What is political incorporation? In a recent critical review of the literature, Minnite 
(2009) finds a conceptually muddled and over-stretched field. This is result of 
American political and other social scientists striving to comprehend the 
experiences of post-1965 immigrants, who tend to possess racial and social 
backgrounds that are different from those of earlier waves of immigrants. Political 
incorporation may involve either the inclusion or the absorption of outsiders. It can 
be studied as a process or as an outcome, or as both, of how new or subordinated 
groups enter the political system. Beyond mere participation and representation, it 
can refer to the extent to which a marginalized group is able to exert influence 
within the political system. Although Minnite does not dispute Jones-Correa’s 
(2005) observation that what is ‘political’ is often inconsistently conceived and 
applied, whether in relation electoral or non-electoral phenomena or both, she 
notes the relative neglect of the concept of ‘incorporation’ in scholarly 
deliberations. For her, ‘to incorporate means to unite into one body, to mix 
thoroughly together, to put into or include in the body or substance of something 
else – to form one integral body’ (53) under conditions set by the social contract in 
a liberal democracy. Because of this premise, she warns that we need to be aware 
of the biases in the two liberal assumptions regarding political incorporation: that 
all outsiders can be converted into insiders, and that outsiders want to be included 
in the liberal polity. If democratic institutions contain mechanisms that are 
considered discriminatory to a certain segment of the population, then insiders can 
be disincorporated and outsiders may be perpetually excluded. Thus, although 
incorporation is the expected outcome of the pluralist model of politics, and 
although it may be rational for outsiders to seek incorporation into the liberal polity 
under normal conditions, liberal assumptions may be wrong for some groups under 
certain conditions. In other words, political incorporation may be contingent, 
segmented, and reversible for some groups, with non-white, non-Christian, and 
non-Anglophone immigrant groups being more vulnerable to exclusion and 
marginalization than others. 
   Observers of American politics have typically invoked one of t two seminal works 
on political incorporation, depending on the centrality given to race in the 
experiences of the population(s) under investigation. Those who believe in the 
fairness and openness of the political system to all active and legitimate groups 
tend to cite Dahl’s (1961) study of New Haven politics as evidence for the 
possibility that pluralistic democratic government can absorb the interests of the 
working-class, who are mostly of white European descent. Dahl argues that all 
immigrants will eventually be assimilated into the American political system 
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through the mechanism of ethnic politics. However, he also believes that ethnic 
politics is a temporary phenomenon and that once working-class immigrants and 
their descendants achieve upward mobility, their ethnic-specific concerns go away 
and political assimilation occurs. Other observers of (white) ethnic politics 
disagree. Glazer and Moynihan (1963), in their study of New York City politics, do 
not see class politics replacing ethnic politics. Rather, they see the two co-existing 
as invigorating elements in local urban politics. Wolfinger (1965) notes that 
ethnicity can be sustained past the first-generation, and becomes a core 
component of partisanship that can be passed on to the next generation. Parenti 
(1967) goes further in insisting that upward mobility in class status might reinforce 
the political salience of ethnicity. Gimpel and Cho (2004) examine the persistence 
of white ethnicity in over 1,500 New England towns in six states. They find that 
support for the Democrats in contests between 1992 and 2000 correlates closely 
with support for the party in elections between 1956 and 1964, suggesting that 
ethnic groups do not de-align or become assimilated over time. Rather, group 
identity may persist despite social mobility, even if the relationship to partisanship 
is weaker today than fifty years ago. Irish Americans, for instance, become less 
Democratic in partisanship once they move to the suburbs. All of these scholars, 
nonetheless, treat issues affecting immigrants and native minorities as ethnic 
factors, and they do not address the influence of a dominant, white-supremacist 
ideology on the structuring of political institutions in American political development 
(King and Smith 2005). 
   Scholars focusing on the political incorporation of domestic racial minorities often 
cite Browning, Marshall, and Tabb’s (1984) path-breaking study of black and 
Latino politics in the San Francisco Bay area as a starting point. These authors 
were interested in the extent to which racial minority group interests are effectively 
represented in policy making. To them, the key to minority incorporation is 
mobilization, either by protest or by electoral strategy, and the formation of bi-racial 
or multi-racial coalitions in the governing process. This model has attracted a large 
following, in part because of innovations in the development of quantifiable 
measures of political incorporation. For instance, Wolbrecht and Hero (2005) 
suggest, in the introduction to their edited volume, that their concept of democratic 
inclusion, which is the incorporation, influence, and representation of various 
disadvantaged social groups within democratic institutions in the United States, 
can be measured by five sets of benchmark indicators: full access to participation; 
representation in important decision-making processes and institutions; influence 
on government decisions; adoption of public policies that address minority group 
concerns; and socioeconomic parity across groups. Acknowledging the sustained 
difficulties that face non-white groups in seeking incorporation, Hero (1992) 
postulates that there is a two-tiered form of pluralism: full incorporation for the 
racially whites and marginalization for the non-whites. Furthermore, he contends 
that while non-white groups are generally disadvantaged and less incorporated 
than whites, different non-white groups may occupy different positions in the 
continuum between fully incorporated and fully marginalized. 
   Although the racial hierarchy model is a considerable improvement over the 
ethnic integration model in understanding minority incorporation, critics point out 
that the racial model assumes group solidarity by race, and neglects intra- and 
inter- ethnic competition among non-black minority groups (Clarke 2005). Further, 
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minority elected officials may lack the resources to bargain, and are prone to co-
option during negotiations with the majority (Thompson 2006). Turning to the 
structural constraints of racial/ethnic change in local politics, Stone (1993) notes 
that powerful local regimes may not be easily dislodged through electoral 
mobilization alone. More importantly, this race-based model does not question the 
validity of liberal assumptions about racial minorities. Minnite (2009) notes that 
reliance on electoral strategy may be less useful for the incorporation of emergent 
immigrant communities who do not possess similar citizenship and voting rates or 
the same level of English language proficiency as more established groups. 
Moreover, incorporation does not necessarily shield contemporary immigrants and 
minorities from labor exploitation and political reversals and disincorporation, as 
happened to blacks in Los Angeles after the 1992 Riots (54). 
   None of the above models is based on examining the situation of an emergent, 
non-Christian, non-white, and immigrant-majority community that cannot be 
characterized working-class status alone. Questioning whether a black-based 
minority group model can be applied to the experiences of Afro-Caribbean 
immigrants, Rogers (2006) observes several major differences between African 
Americans and contemporary non-white immigrants. First, African Americans were 
for the most part involuntary immigrants, while most non-white immigrants came to 
the United States of their own free will. Second, the new generation of immigrants 
has the ability to maintain close homeland ties, due the availability and 
advancement of transoceanic transportation and communication technologies. 
Third, the history of and struggle against slavery is exclusive to the African-
American community. Arguably, the tactics developed by the African-American 
community in their struggle for political incorporation are in many ways a 
manifestation of its historical bondage. This is a group experience shared by no 
other non-white immigrant group. Appreciating the roles of pre-immigration 
socialization and post-immigration re-socialization, Rogers advocates using the 
political learning model in conceiving immigrant minority politics. In this approach, 
experiences formed in the home country and learned in the host county are both 
keys influences in the success of immigrant political incorporation. Although he 
does not use the term, Rogers’ model incorporates the concept of 
transnationalism, highlighting the key roles of home country ties and cues and their 
relationship to host country cues in the politics of immigrant incorporation. 
Nevertheless, he does look critically into the capacity and will of mainstream 
institutions to incorporate non-white immigrants, nor does he consider international 
relations between the home country and the host county as a factor, although 
these may have an impact on the opportunity for incorporation. 
   Scholars focusing on the political experience of Asian Americans, especially 
Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans, find it difficult to ignore the influence 
of negative images and perceptions of the homeland state in Asia, contentious 
US–Asia relations, and/or Asian ethnic groups’ mistreatment in the host country of 
the United States. The internment of Japanese American residents on the US 
West Coast during World War II, including US-born citizens who made up two-
thirds of the interned population, is a glaring example of citizenship violation due to 
presumed Asian homeland ties (Daniels 1988). The inept and corrupt Qing dynasty 
in nineteenth-century China and its racial violence against the US-Chinese is 
another. Ngai (2007) uses the term alien citizen to describe the unenviable 
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situation of US-born Asian Americans who acquire American citizenship by virtue 
of birth in the US but whose citizenship is suspect, if not denied, on account of the 
racialized identity of their immigrant ancestry. However, the issue of political 
disincorporation or exclusion is not restricted to the pre-1965 era. Gotanda (2001) 
links the 1996 US presidential ‘Asian Donorgate’ campaign finance scandal 
involving Taiwanese Americans with three US Supreme Court cases dealing with 
Chinese exclusion in the late nineteenth century to extend the theory of citizenship 
nullification, by which an individual is deprived of citizenship rights ‘through the use 
of the implicit link between an Asiatic racial category and foreignness’ (80). 
Looking also into the meanings and implications of ‘Asian Donorgate’ and the 1999 
Chinese espionage case of Dr Wen Ho, a naturalized American born in Taiwan, 
Michael Chang (2004) uses the term transnational citizenship to refer to the nature 
of citizenship as flexibly construed and applied in the age of globalization. His 
book’s primary theoretical framework is critical transnationalism, which specifically 
opposes celebratory discourses of transnationalism that wishfully foresee the end 
of world divisions and inequality in the era of globalization. Rather, as informed by 
prior conceptions of flexible citizenship (Ong 1999), racial formation (Omi and 
Winant 1994), and dual-domination and extraterritoriality (Wang 1995, 1998), 
Chang views as inevitable the emergence of new power hierarchies that may 
transcend national borders but still maintain the structures of inequality within each 
nation-state and other social and political boundaries. Because 
Chinese/Taiwanese and other Asian Americans are arguably the most 
transnationally-affiliated US population, Chang raises a grave concern, like the 
other scholars discussed above, about the possibility of non-incorporation and 
disempowerment for this relatively affluent but foreign and racially suspicious 
population. 
   This theoretical review shows that the concept of political incorporation can be 
variously defined, studied, and assessed. Due to the dramatic transformation of 
the racial, cultural, and social order of post-1965 America created by the influx of 
immigrants from Asia and Latin America, recent scholarship on political 
incorporation has increasingly been dissatisfied with traditional models that derive 
from observations of old, white European immigrant groups (such as Irish 
Americans) as well as old, US-born minority groups (such as blacks). 
Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008), for instance, call for new models for 
understanding immigrant political engagement, taking into consideration the 
structural inequality of civic engagement and political organization across groups. 
Expressing their own dissatisfaction with the status quo, Hochschild and 
Mollenkopf (2009) propose a kitchen-sink model for understanding the political 
incorporation and non-incorporation of immigrant groups in both the United States 
and Europe. Schmidt et al. (2009) empirically assess the political incorporation of 
non-white immigrants in terms of four frameworks: individual assimilation, ethnic 
pluralism, bi-racial hierarchy, and multiracial hierarchy; they find each to have its 
followers and challengers. We wish to complement these previous efforts by trying 
to identify theoretical framework(s) that may be better able to capture the political 
incorporation of Irish and Taiwanese/Chinese Americans. In the next section, we 
take a quick walk through a tangled history to attempt to compare the fate of two 
visibly different ethnic groups in the US, the Irish and the Chinese. 
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A Tale of Two Communities: A Quick Walk Through History 
 
Early Irish immigrants, many of whom came as semi-free indentured laborers, 
began arrive in the New World as early as the late 1500s. By 1790, there were 
approximately 400,000 people of Irish birth or decent residing in the US, making 
this the largest group of non-English immigrants during the colonial period 
(Blessing 1980). Being the first non-Protestant group to arrive in large numbers, 
the Irish often faced both religious and ethnic prejudice from the Anglo-Saxon 
population. The strength of the anti-Irish sentiment peaked in the mid-1850s, when 
the catastrophic Potato Famine (1845–1853) in Ireland triggered a mass exodus, 
in which the deliberate departure of the generally literate peasants also increased 
the chances of survival of those left behind. Many new arrivals were forced to work 
for low wages and lived in abysmal conditions. Anti-Catholic, particularly anti-Irish 
Catholic, feelings led to the formation of the Know-Nothing Party. Politically active 
from the early to mid-1850s, the party’s prominent members included the Mayor of 
San Francisco, Stephen Palfrey Webb, and the Governor of California, J. Neely 
Johnson (Anbinder 1992). Anti-Irish sentiment also led to the de facto barring of 
Irish Americans from entering middle-class, white-collar professions, thus 
concentrating them in domestic service, building, and factory work. This was the 
situation when large numbers of ethnic Chinese workers recruited from 
Guangdong by industrial forces associated with British and American companies 
arrived at San Francisco by steamboat. 
   The number of immigrants from China in the 1850s was only 36,000, a figure 
96.5 per cent lower than the number that emigrated from Ireland during the same 
period. However, in next decade the Chinese figure rose to 54,000, which was 
87.4 per cent lower than Irish immigration, due in part to aggressive recruitment 
efforts by the railroad companies who needed cheap, hard-working, and tractable 
stoop labor for dangerous work constructing the first transcontinental railroad 
(Nelson 2007). While the Chinese were first hired to break the threat of strikes by 
white workers, Chinese workers were paid less than European immigrant workers 
and subjected to harsher work conditions. These included whippings and a ban on 
quitting. When the Chinese workers protested against this mistreatment in 1867, 
the strike they organized was met with the stoppage of payment and food supply 
(I. Chang 2003). Meanwhile, perceived economic competition from the Chinese 
gave rise to the formation of the Workingman’s Party under the leadership of an 
Irish immigrant named Dennis Kearney in the 1870s. Herein, according to Saxton 
(1971), lies one of the ironies of US labor history. Whereas the Chinese were 
indispensable to the capitalists who needed cheap labor, they were also 
indispensable to the labor organizers who found that nothing united factions 
among whites more quickly than the cry of ‘the Chinese must go’. This popular 
sentiment eventually led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 
which barred the entry of all Chinese with exceptions for the merchant class, 
teachers, students, and clergy. The Act also included a ban of the naturalization of 
Chinese immigrants which was not lifted until 1943. 
   Economic competition was not the only reason for Irish–Chinese tension. Racial 
anxiety was another. In a nation and society that legally discriminated against the 
citizenship of blacks and other non-whites through the 1790 Nationality Act, the 
Irish in their struggle for equality and an American identity were eager to align 
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themselves with the superior white Anglo race by denigrating the Chinese who 
were defined as racially inferior, the men as sexual predators and the women as 
prostitutes. Ironically, these were the same terms that were used to associate the 
Irish with blacks in pre-Civil War era in the North, where the two groups competed 
for the same low-skilled and low-waged jobs (Roediger 1999). Even in 1876, the 
popular press ‘would place the Celt and the Negro on the same level of civic virtue’ 
(Jacobson 1998: 55). The Irish-born found a convenient scapegoat in the Chinese-
born for their unfittedness to assimilation and ineligibility for US citizenship. By 
defining Americanness as whiteness, Irish Americans were accepted into the white 
class while Chinese Americans were made into a permanently lower and 
excludable class. Facing high levels of racial discrimination, many Chinese 
workers turned inward to self-employment and thus created an ethnic niche in the 
laundry industry that was originally occupied by Irish women. 
   It would be unfair, however, to describe Irish–Chinese relations solely in 
competitive and hostile terms. Both were oppressed in their homeland by the same 
imperialist power, and both received similar mistreatment after their arrival in the 
US Further, in the nineteenth century, the two populations differed significantly in 
the ratio of men-to-women. Few married Chinese women accompanied their men 
on the journey to the New Golden Mountain. The small number of Chinese women 
who traveled alone to the American West Coast could often only find work as 
prostitutes or undertaking menial labor (Tong 1994). In 1975, the perception and 
fear that Chinese, Japanese, and other ‘Mongolian’ women were entering 
prostitution after arriving in the US prompted Congress to pass the Page Act. The 
dearth of single Chinese women, in combination with an excess of Irish working-
class women, more of whom had survived the Irish famine than Irish working-class 
men, led to a surprisingly high rate of intermarriage between Chinese men and 
Irish women (Tchen 1999). For example, between 1820 and 1870 in New York, 
there were 75 Chinese men, or roughly a quarter of the Chinese male population, 
who were either married to, or at least lived with, an Irish woman. Such Irish–
Chinese unions, however, were not received well by white society, and 14 states 
passed anti-miscegenation laws to prohibit both Asians and blacks from marrying 
whites. 
   While both immigrant groups initially suffered from discrimination and injustice, 
the two groups eventually developed different experiences of political incorporation 
in their adopted country. Whereas the Chinese were racially excluded from 
American polity, the Irish had the right to US citizenship. Proficiency in English and 
Western customs and the establishment of American citizenship helped Irish 
Americans secure their white status by becoming politically incorporated through 
involvement and dominance in Democratic Party politics. According to Blessing 
(1980: 535), Irish immigrants were advantaged in their political mobilization 
through their participation in mass-based anti-British efforts in the homeland 
organized by Daniel O’Connell’s Catholic Association. Their concentration in big 
eastern and midwestern cities (such as New York, Boston, and Chicago) enabled 
the operation of ward-based urban machine politics, where local ethnic politicians 
traded food baskets, coal in winter, access to governmental and legal assistance, 
and patronage for just a vote at election time. Meanwhile, the businessmen 
provided the bosses with bribes in return for favorable decisions or rulings. Though 
corrupt and undemocratic, these machines brought order to a fragmented city and 
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actively worked to incorporate working-class immigrant groups. Yet, this practice of 
political incorporation was selective and ethnocentric. Not only did the Democratic 
Party pass its first anti-Chinese resolution in 1852, only a few years after the 
group’s arrival in San Francisco, but none of the new immigrant groups that arrived 
from Eastern and Southern Europe after 1890 benefitted much from machine 
politics. In fact, Erie (1988) observes that, throughout most of their history, urban 
machines controlled by Irish bosses did not incorporate immigrants other than the 
Irish. Because the machine's benefits were of a scarce nature, the Irish could not 
readily translate political power into group economic advancement; and whatever 
prize that was won was of a limited nature and guarded jealously; the Irish only 
sparingly accommodated the latterly-arriving Southern and Eastern European 
immigrants and African Americans (6). 
   The practice of selective mobilization by political parties is also seen in 
contemporary politics dealing with African, Latino, and Asian American 
communities (Jones-Correa 1998, 2005; Frymer 1999; Leighley 2001; Wong 2006; 
Kim 2007). Unlike the parties described in Dahl (1961) and other pluralists, which 
played a key role in incorporating the Irish, today’s parties do not have the 
resources nor the interest to organize new immigrants, who happen to be largely 
non-white, into citizens and voters. Leighley notes that, because political parties 
are strategic institutions created to win elections, they seek to mobilize not voters 
in general, but supporters in particular. She finds that racial and ethnic minorities, 
especially small and emergent political communities, are exposed to substantially 
lower levels of campaign mobilization efforts than are Anglo whites. Even for 
established and proven minorities such as African Americans, Frymer contends 
that the Democratic Party would simultaneously expect the black vote while doing 
its best to keep race off the agenda so as to appeal to the median majority-white 
voters. Instead of political parties, Latino and Asian American communities have 
relied on community-based resources such as immigrant-serving organizations, 
church-based groups, and labor unions, to conduct citizenship classes, voter 
registration education campaigns, and get-out-the-vote drives. Inconsistent and 
limited funding support has rendered these organizations and groups unreliable 
and fragmented armies for political mobilization, which, in turn, hurts the chances 
of political incorporation for these communities. 
   Another issue worth investigating is the factor of homeland politics and its effects 
on immigrant groups in the United States. Immigrants’ involvement in homeland 
politics is usually treated with suspicion because of the loyalty issue (Harrington 
1980). However, in Irish American history, a paradoxical thesis has been advanced 
that links the development of Irish American nationalism to Irish American 
aspiration for incorporation in the host country. According to Brown (1956, 1966), 
the economic exploitation and religious prejudice experienced by Irish immigrants 
in mid-nineteenth century America contributed to feelings of homesickness and 
oppression that were in turn transformed into revolutionary nationalism for 
liberating the colonized homeland with an intensity and passion far beyond that 
which was felt by their kinsmen in Ireland. Their compulsive sense of inferiority, 
sensitivity to criticism, and yearning for respectability were rooted in their 
aspirations for equality, prosperity, and freedom in the New World. Instead, they 
found poverty and low status, which many blamed on the oppressive and 
discriminatory rule of the British. Consequently, many Irish Americans believed 
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that an independent Irish nation-state was necessary to help not only rid the Old 
Country of its oppressive ruler but also to help Irish Americans garner respect in 
American society (McCaffrey 1976). 
   Although Irish American nationalism had in many ways enabled the work of 
independence in Ireland, there were also moments of disjuncture in the 
nationalistic movements on either side of the Atlantic. In his detailed account of the 
Fenian movement in the United States, Brown (1956) contends that this movement 
reveals itself at times to be ‘directed toward American and not Irish ends’ (358). 
While many Irish American nationalist organizations existed at the time, such as 
the Fenian Brotherhood, it is often the case that ‘a free Ireland would reflect glory 
on the Fenians’. The practical purpose of these associations was to act as 
pressure groups for improving the lives of the Irish in America. Focusing on the 
role of women in Irish American nationalism, Janis (2009) notes that although the 
Irish Ladies’ Land League might have been founded to raise funds for the 
independence movement in Ireland, it quickly became an important forum for 
women to assert their own American-inflected concerns and convictions. 
   Irish Americans not only donated large sums of money to sustain every 
revolutionary and constitutional expression of Irish nationalism; some would cross 
the Atlantic in the hope of changing the fate of the homeland. Although the demise 
of Irish American nationalism came quickly after the treaty of 1921, which granted 
independence to the Irish state, fund-raising activities remained vigorous until 
1937. In the late 1960s, as public unrest in Northern Ireland increased, nationalist 
activists staged a series of equal rights campaigns for Catholics. In the 1970s, 
influential Irish American Congressmen attempted to negotiate a united Ireland 
through visits and pronouncements (Harrington 1980). Since then, the activity of 
militant Irish nationalists in America has waned and the majority of Irish Americans 
are support the peace process through diplomatic means (Almeida 2006). 
   Homeland politics also played a key role in the development of Chinese 
American history. Chinese Americans in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth century drew on a complicated network of 
transnational resources to fight racial injustice in the US immigration, social, legal, 
and political system, to negotiate their identities between being Chinese and being 
American, and to help improve the political and economic status of the homeland 
in the process (Chan 2006). Shehong Chen’s (2006) research on the 
transformation in Chinese America after the Chinese revolution of 1911 found that 
immigrants’ concern and frustration over homeland political development helped 
define and change their identity from being Chinese to being Chinese American. A 
further transformation occurred during World War II, when Chinese American 
women worked together with white women to solicit humanitarian aid for war-torn 
China and earned, in turn, respect as worthy allies and potential citizens (Leong 
and Wu 2008). Like Irish Americans, Chinese Americans saw an interlocking 
relationship between their fate in the New World and the political order in the Old 
World. Because of American racism, Chinese immigrants turned their struggle into 
a trans-Pacific effort by sending money from the United States to help strengthen 
and modernize their native homeland (Y. Chen 2006). The overseas community 
became a bastion of fund-raising for various projects dealing with homeland 
political change. Before the lifting of racist immigration quotas and the passage of 
the Voting Rights Act in 1965, which opened the door for blacks and other 
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minorities to participate in US electoral process on a more equal footing, non-
incorporation was the norm for Chinese Americans. 
 
How the Present-day Communities Compare: A Snapshot through US 
Government Data 
 
Immigrants from Taiwan do not have a recorded presence in data released by the 
US government until the 1950s, when a small number of mostly middle-class 
college-educated students entered to pursue graduate studies in elite universities 
(Ng 1998; Chee 2005; S. Chang 2006; Gu 2006; C. Chen 2008). Among this group 
were mainlanders who had been born in China and who had evacuated to Taiwan 
around 1949; others were Islanders or native Taiwanese whose families or 
ancestors had migrated from southern China and settled in Taiwan before 1945.3 
The oppressive KMT rule, which featured a Mandarin-only language policy, 
compulsory military service, strict media censorship, ideological indoctrination, and 
the brutal handling of the 2-28 Incident in 1947, was a push factor for the exit of 
the latter group (Williams 2003). These students-turned-immigrants played a key 
role in founding the Taiwanese independence movement in North America (Shu 
2002; Williams 2003; Lin 2006). For those who were displaced from China, their 
journey to America can be considered either a continuation of their exile or as a 
search for a second or third home (Fung 2002). The literature on these Taiwanese 
Chinese Americans is scarce, and their stories are both under- and 
misrepresented due to being lumped together with Chinese from mainland China, 
Hong Kong, and elsewhere (48–49). This is also the case with the few scholarly 
publications on Taiwanese Americans. Consequently, there has been hardly any 
scientific study of identity differences among immigrants from Taiwan or the factors 
which have an impact on their political attitudes and behavior toward homeland 
and host country politics (although see Lien 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). 
   Immigration statistics published by the US Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) show that there were 721 immigrants from Taiwan who were admitted as 
legal permanent residents between 1950 and 1959. That number grew more than 
eight-fold, from 15,657 in 1960–1969 to 132,647 in 1990–1999.4 This exponential 
growth partly reflected changes in US immigration policy made in 1965 that lifted 
discriminatory quotas and created an opportunity for highly-educated and highly-
skilled individuals from Taiwan to emigrate as professionals. The normalization of 
                                                 
3
 This mainlander–islander dichotomy is an over-simplification of the identity issue in 
Taiwan. Following Storm’s (2008) argument, the preference for this usage, rather than a 
‘Chinese–Taiwanese dichotomy’, is to emphasize the fragmentation and hybridity of both 
concepts (41). However, this formulation does not represent the identity of those who are in 
or from a ‘third-generation mixed marriage’. 
4
 Statistics for legal immigrants only are recorded here. According to Zhao (2009), a further 
649,000 to 780,000 Chinese persons from the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan may have 
arrived undocumented by 2000. This represents 23–27 per cent of the Chinese population 
in the 2000 US Census for those who are either solely Chinese or in combination with other 
race and ethnicity. The majority of illegal immigrants are individuals who over-stayed their 
visa permit. Undocumented entry through routes such as people-smuggling is a relatively 
minor source. 
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US relations with the PRC and the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 
created another wave of emigration from Taiwan, tending to consist of middle- or 
upper middle-class families who sought stability and better educational 
opportunities for their children. Until Taiwan lifted its own emigration restrictions in 
1980, seeking graduate education abroad was the only means of exit for the 
unconnected and those with fewer resources. The creation of a separate annual 
quota of 20,000 for Taiwan in 1982, heavily lobbied for by Taiwanese-American 
organizations, helped bring in large numbers of family members and relatives of 
immigrant professionals. 
   Between 1950 and 2008, the total number of immigrants admitted to the United 
States from Taiwan was 435,783, which is smaller than the comparable figure from 
Hong Kong (481,398), and much smaller than that from China (1,084,293). 
However, migration from Taiwan was about five times that of the number from 
China in the 1970s, and it peaked in the 1980s and 1990s when Taiwanese 
numbers exceeded those of Hong Kong. Between 2000 and 2008, there were 
significantly more migrants from Taiwan than from Hong Kong, although the 
number of migrants from China was almost tenfold the number from Taiwan. By 
contrast, there were only 12,670 migrants from Ireland5 in 2000–2008, which is just 
less than 98 per cent smaller than the figure from China. This is the opposite of the 
immigration pattern seen in the 1850s. These migration patterns beg the question 
of who the ‘new’ Chinese Americans from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are. 
How do they compare with the old Irish and the new Irish immigrants? More 
importantly, will we see a discontinuity in the political incorporation of the 
Taiwanese and the Chinese because of the removal of discriminatory laws and 
changing demographic patterns? 
   A brief methodological note is in order. The US Census provides the single best 
resource for studying US population groups. However, any attempt to study the 
two in a truly scientific manner is marred by methodological limitations, such the 
unequal census enumeration method between the Chinese and the Taiwanese, as 
well as the challenge of declining interest in identifying with the ancestral origin of 
Irish. The collection of Irish-American data using an open-ended ancestral 
question (rather than a check-box under the racial question) may also add to the 
problem of under-counting the population. In addition, the practice of tabulating 
only the first two ancestral answers excludes multi-ethnic Irish Americans who do 
not list Irish as their first two responses to the ancestry question. The Taiwanese-
American community has sought to alleviate the under-counting of the population 
in the census enumeration scheme, which provides a check-box for the Chinese 
but permits only a write-in option for those who identify as Taiwanese.6 Taiwanese 
Americans are urged by community advocacy groups such as the Taiwanese 
American Citizen League to check ‘other Asian’ in the section on Race and 
Ethnicity and to write in ‘Taiwanese’ to show a distinctive identity other than 
                                                 
5
 This figure also refers solely to legal immigrants. Almeida (2006) estimates that about 
50,000, or 15 per cent, of the new migrant population from Ireland may be undocumented. 
6
 An official with the Census Bureau admitted that ‘Taiwanese’ could not be listed as an 
Asian American category along with ‘Chinese’ due to political concerns over international 
relations with China (Kim 2007: 103–104). 
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Chinese. Readers are advised to keep these caveats in mind when reading the 
latest statistics regarding these populations. 
   According to the ancestry data reported in the Census 2000 Brief prepared by 
Brittingham and de la Cruz (2004), the percentage of Americans who identified as 
of Irish ancestry dropped from 38.7 million (15.6 per cent) to 30.5 million (10.8 per 
cent) between 1990 and 2000. Those of Scotch-Irish7 decent experienced a similar 
decline from 5.6 million (2.3 per cent) to 4.3 million (1.5 per cent). Meanwhile, the 
number of those who entered ‘Taiwanese’ in the ancestral question rose from 
192,973 in 1990 to 293,568 in 2000, representing a 52 per cent increase, even if 
they were still no more than 0.1 per cent of the US population. The rise and fall of 
these populations is consistent with the pattern observed among the largest 
European and Asian ancestries. Holdaway (2007) uses the 5 per cent Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), and finds that the percentage among the 
Taiwan-born who report their ancestry as ‘Chinese’ decreased from 73 per cent in 
1980, to 54 per cent in 1990, and to 32 per cent in 2000. Yu and Chiang (2009), 
using responses to the write-in race question in the US Census to study the 
phenomenon of the rising Taiwanese identity, find that both the older generation 
and recent Taiwanese immigrant arrivals, as well as those who live in Los Angeles, 
are more likely to identify as Taiwanese than Chinese. In contrast, those who are 
acculturated, more fluent in English, or who migrated to the States at a young age 
before the 1980s, are less likely to switch their identity from Chinese to Taiwanese. 
The authors suggest that entering ‘Taiwanese’ on the census form appears to be a 
political act of asserting identity and expressing solidarity with their compatriots in 
Taiwan. 
   To enable some sense of a systematic comparison between the Irish and the 
Taiwanese, as well as other related population groups covered in the literature 
review, we collect and report in Table 1 (see page 16) statistics from the 2006–
2008 American Community Survey (ACS)8 three-year estimates, which are based 
                                                 
7
 ‘Scotch-Irish’ is a term invented and used almost exclusively in North America. It refers to 
Protestant Irish immigrants, who came from the Province of Ulster primarily during the 
eighteenth century, and their descendants. The equivalent term in Britain for the same 
group is ‘Ulster Scots’. 
8
 The American Community Survey (ACS) is an annual survey conducted nationwide in 
every US county and Puerto Rico, with the intention of providing the most current economic, 
social, demographic, and housing information about the US population. It uses a series of 
monthly samples to produce annually-updated data for the same small areas (census tracts 
and block groups) formerly surveyed via the decennial census long-form sample. Each year, 
approximately 3 million housing unit addresses in the US and Puerto Rico are selected for 
participation. The data collection operation for housing units (HUs) consists of three modes: 
mail, telephone, and personal visit. The ACS includes twelve monthly independent samples. 
Data collection for each sample is for a period of three months, with mail returns accepted 
during this entire period. In January 2006, the ACS was expanded to include the population 
living in group quarter (GQ) facilities such as college dorms, nursing homes, correctional 
facilities, and homeless shelters. Field Representatives collect data from approximately 
195,000 GQ sample residents each year. To ensure the participation of non-English 
speakers, the ACS language assistance program provides translated instruments and other 
survey materials, the recruiting and training of bilingual interviewers, and the provision of 
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on data collected between January 2006 and December 2008. These represent 
average characteristics over a three-year period and have a larger sample size 
than the one-year estimates, although they are also less current than the one-year 
estimates. It is deemed the best dataset to date for comparing our populations of 
interest, due to the possibility of analyzing information by ancestry group, ethnic 
group, and country/place of birth (for the foreign-born) using data collected 
contemporaneously and by a rigorous and comparable research procedure. 
   To facilitate discussion from reading this fairly complex table, we have selected 
several pairs of groups for comparison as a starting point for assessing the relative 
social status and prospect for political incorporation in our populations of interest: 
   A. Between Irish and Scotch-Irish: Our data show that there are still two Irish 
Americas in the twenty-first century, separated by religion, partisanship, and class. 
Those Irish Protestants who identified as ‘Scotch-Irish’ are older, per capita more 
affluent, and better educated than those who identified as ‘Irish’. Among the tiny 
foreign-born population, a much higher percentage of the Scotch-Irish population 
reported being born in North America than in Europe; the reverse is true among 
foreign-born persons identifying with Irish descent. Although the number of 
persons of Irish descent was seven-times higher than those who identified as 
being of Scotch-Irish ancestry, to this date only one of the 19 US presidents who 
have been able claim an Irish tie has been Catholic. Being non-Protestant may 
continue to be a hurdle in contending for the highest office in the US 
   B. Between Irish and Taiwanese: Compared to persons who identified 
themselves as Irish, persons who identified themselves as Taiwanese are slightly 
younger in age and predominantly foreign-born. Among immigrants, a higher 
percentage among the Taiwanese identifiers did not enter the US until 2000 or 
later. Despite their belated entry into the host country, the Taiwanese have a 
higher naturalization rate than the Irish. Still, only 77 per cent among the 
Taiwanese have US citizenship, compared to 99 per cent of the Irish. The heavy 
immigrant background among the Taiwanese identifiers is reflected in the high 
usage of a non-English language at home. Living up to the positive group image, 
Taiwanese identifiers are much better educated, have much stronger presence in 
professional/managerial occupations, especially among males, and are better-off 
in all economic indicators than Irish identifiers. 
   C. Between Taiwanese and Taiwan-born: Not all Taiwanese identifiers were born 
in Taiwan (only 69 per cent were), and not all who registered their country/place of 
birth as Taiwan would identify themselves as Taiwanese but as not Chinese. Given 
that the number of Taiwan-born is more than three times the size of Taiwanese 
identifiers, the numerical gap between the two may be more than an issue of 
census under-enumeration, as Taiwanese American lobbying groups would 
contend. It may be an issue of political preference. A 2007 survey of US 
immigrants from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong shows that just over half of the 
native Taiwanese respondents (individuals from Taiwan who were born in Taiwan 
                                                                                                                            
telephone or Internet assistance in multiple languages. The ACS, CATI, and CAPI survey 
instruments are currently available in both English and Spanish. Interviewers can conduct 
interviews in additional languages if they have that capability. 
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Table 1: Comparison between Irish, Taiwanese, and Chinese Americans by 
Ancestry, Ethnicity, and Country/Place of Origin, 2006–2008 
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and who have either of their parents born in Taiwan) but only 17 per cent of 
Taiwanese mainlander respondents (individuals from Taiwan who were either born 
in China or Hong Kong or were born in Taiwan but have parents born in China) 
would call themselves Taiwanese or Taiwanese American, while 58 per cent of 
mainlanders would identify themselves as Chinese or Chinese American (Lien 
2008b).9 Alongside this observed ethnic identity gap, we note from Table 1 that if 
those who identify as Taiwanese in the US Census project a highly successful 
group image,10 those who were Taiwan-born in the same dataset may seem even 
more successful in their economic adaptation and citizenship acquisition, in spite 
of having a higher degree of language isolation and of being older. 
   D. Between Ireland-born and Taiwan-born: Using data in the country/place of 
birth columns, we attempt to provide fairer comparison of the evidence of 
incorporation between contemporary Irish and Taiwanese immigrants. Compared 
to the Taiwan-born, Irish immigrants were on average much older, have had a 
much longer tenure in the United States, and have the highest per capita income 
and mean earnings of all groups, especially among males. These are factors that 
should give the Irish immigrants an edge in becoming politically incorporated 
through naturalization. However, the Irish naturalization rate is actually three 
percentage points lower than for the Taiwanese. Politically-motivated migration 
from Taiwan and the desire to situate family members in a society with greater 
educational opportunities and a better quality of life may account for the greater 
Taiwanese naturalization rate. Compared to the Taiwan-born, the Ireland-born also 
have a much lower share of college-education as well as proportion of persons in 
professional/managerial occupations. This observation, that new Irish immigrants 
are less educated and have less occupational prestige than Taiwanese immigrants 
but enjoy a greater income reward, provides evidence supportive of the racial 
disadvantage thesis in the workplace for well-qualified Asian immigrants (Woo 
2000). 
   Finally, we wish to make a few brief comments concerning the differences found 
between Taiwanese and Chinese as well as between the Taiwan-born and the 
China-born. Because of differing reasons for exiting and differing conditions of 
entry, immigrants from Taiwan are expected to have far better social and political 
standing than early immigrants from Guangdong. Taiwanese immigrants are not 
only voluntary immigrants who tend to be equipped with personal or family 
resources upon arrival, but they are eligible to seek naturalization and reap the 
benefits of US citizenship (such as voting and sponsoring immediate family 
                                                 
9
 The Chinese American Homeland Politics (CAHP) survey was a telephone survey 
completed between October and November 2007, based on 603 US adults residing in 
Chinese-surnamed households who can trace their personal or ancestral origin to China, 
Taiwan, or Hong Kong. The sample was drawn from a national list of phone numbers of 
Chinese households identified by two different sampling firms through a listed surname 
approach. Due to the uneven distribution of the US Chinese population, the national sample 
was drawn to target five metropolitan areas with the heaviest concentrations of Chinese: 
Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Huston, and Chicago. 
10
 Theses statistical averages may obscure the class divisions within Taiwanese and 
Chinese Americans communities discussed by several authors (e.g., Kwong 1987; H.-S. 
Chen 1992; Zhao 2009). 
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members and relatives to the United States). The timing of their entry made them 
the first group of ethnic Chinese who have an equal opportunity to seek political 
incorporation in the US The selective preference system in US immigration 
policies, combined with differences in the degree of development and affluence in 
the Asian homeland, may have contributed to the relatively high socioeconomic 
profile of the Taiwanese American community. Compared to immigrants from 
China, average immigrants from Taiwan (and Hong Kong) are better educated and 
have a higher occupational standing and income. The allowance of dual citizenship 
by the government in Taiwan may also help explain the higher naturalization rate 
of immigrants from Taiwan than from China, whose government prohibits dual 
citizenship. Nevertheless, we also note that the gender gap among Taiwanese 
immigrants and Taiwanese identifiers tends to be much wider than is found among 
immigrants from China and Chinese identifiers, with women receiving less college 
education and less income reward for their work. Women’s economic 
subordination among Asian Americans may be the intersectional outcome of 
racism, sexism, and capitalism (Espiritu 1997). However, the wider gender gaps 
found among Taiwanese than among Chinese Americans is a curious 
phenomenon worthy of further investigation. 
 
Assessing the Political Participation of Taiwanese Americans 
 
To make a small advance toward assessing the political incorporation status of 
present-day Taiwanese Americans, we examine the extent their of political 
participation as voters, candidates, and public officials, as well as their involvement 
in political activities beyond voting, such as lobbying and contacting public officials, 
making donations to political campaigns, attending political rallies, protests, and 
demonstrations, and signing petitions. There are no publicly available mass 
opinion datasets gathered specifically for the study of Taiwanese Americans. 
However, there are datasets on Chinese, Asian, and other Americans that include 
persons from Taiwan or of Taiwanese descent that are used here. Because there 
is no mass opinion survey of contemporary Irish Americans, we use average 
figures regarding non-Hispanic white Americans as surrogate measures of their 
level of political participation. 
   Without a doubt, one reason why Irish Americans are considered a mainstay in 
US electoral politics is the presence of prominent American politicians of Irish-
Catholic descent, such as the Kennedy family, as well as numerous Irish-
Protestant Americans who have served as US presidents, US Supreme Court 
justices, US senators and representatives, and in other high government offices. 
Comparatively few Americans of Taiwanese descent or migrants from Taiwan 
have made it into the political arena. Among the pioneers are Lily Lee Chen, who 
was elected to the city council of Monterey Park, CA in 1982 and became a mayor 
in 1984, and S.B. Woo, who served as Delaware’s twenty-first Lieutenant 
Governor from 1985 to 1989. In recent years, the election of David Wu (D-Oregon 
1st) to the US Congress in 1998, and the appointment of Elaine Chao as US 
Secretary of Labor (2001–2009), are considered to be the high watermarks of 
Taiwan-born Americans in the national political arena. At the state level, John 
Chiang has been a popular California State Controller since 2006, and Ted Lieu, 
who has been a vocal California Assemblyman since 2005, recently came short in 
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a run for the position of state Attorney General. Both Chiang and Lieu are the sons 
of Taiwanese immigrants. Elsewhere in the nation, a Taiwanese immigrant named 
Jimmy Meng became the first Asian American to win a seat in the New York 
Assembly, in 2004. He was succeeded by Ellen Young, another immigrant from 
Taiwan, who was succeeded in turn by Grace Meng, daughter of Jimmy Meng. At 
the local level, John Liu, who emigrated from Taiwan at a young age, was the first 
Asian American elected to the New York City Council (in 2001), and he currently 
holds the position of New York City Controller (since 2010). 
   These examples show that Taiwanese Americans have been able to make small 
but increasingly significant political gains, despite their limited immigration history 
and population size and the declining role of political parties in mobilizing and 
organizing the ethnic vote. The lifting of racial restrictions to immigration, 
citizenship, voting, and other civil rights, the rise of candidate-centered politics, the 
availability of transnational capital and other resources, as well as the group’s 
superior socioeconomic status, have made it possible for members from a 
previously excluded, non-native English-speaking, and non-Christian community to 
contend and win popular offices and key political appointments, even within the 
first generation. The electoral victories of well-qualified Taiwan-born candidates is 
a phenomenon not predicted even by Robert Dahl or by other advocates of ethnic 
pluralism and integration. In this case, Taiwanese Americans seem to face an 
easier time than Irish (especially Catholic) Americans in becoming politically 
incorporated into the adopted land. Nevertheless, their prospects for becoming 
fully incorporated may be overshadowed by the perpetual foreigner image and 
other factors not experienced by the preponderance of Irish Americans in the 
present-day. Previous research also demonstrates that being incorporated into the 
electoral process at the governing elite level is not sufficient to assume full, 
substantive citizenship for the ethnic community. Other necessary components 
include policy responsiveness and full access to political and social rights. 
   Data from the November 2004 elections show that, compared to non-Hispanic 
white Americans, Taiwanese Americans have an overall lower citizenship rate, but 
a higher naturalization rate among the foreign born (see Table 2, page 20). 
Because of the predominance of the foreign-born, voting-age Taiwanese 
Americans have significantly lower voter registration and voting turnout rates than 
voting-age whites. These racial gaps are significantly reduced when we examine 
eligible persons only (i.e., citizens eligible for voter registration and those 
registered for voting). Also, among the US-born, Taiwanese Americans are not 
less likely to become registered and have a voting rate only five percentage points 
lower than their white counterparts among the registered. Other entries in this table 
show that, compared to other Chinese respondents from China and Hong King, 
and to Asian American respondents are a whole, respondents from Taiwan are 
relatively more likely to become naturalized (except those from Hong Kong), to be 
more active in becoming registered, but to be less active in their voting turnout. 
This is true regardless of whether or not they were US-born. This is a curious 
phenomenon awaiting further investigation. 
   While voter turnout provides a preliminary understanding of the ‘simplest’ form of 
political participation, it does not fully illustrate the scope of political participation 
among the citizenry. As for other indicators of political activity, limited data from the 
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Place of 
Origin/Race* 
Taiwan China Hong 
Kong 
Asia
n 
Non-
Hispanic 
White 
Foreign Born 87% 88% 77% 76% 5% 
Citizenship 78 64 85 69 98 
Among Foreign 
born 
74 59 81 59 60 
Registration 48 32 38 36 74 
Among Citizens 62 51 45 53 75 
 --Foreign born 60 47 44 53 70 
 --US born  74 66 47 52 75 
Voting 30 29 33 31 66 
 Among the 
Registered 
80 89 85 85 89 
 --Foreign born 80 90 85 85 91 
 --US born 84 87 86 85 89 
Weighted N 
(x1000) 
432 1,731 184 9,44
9 
151,410 
Source: US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Current 
Population Survey: Voter Supplement File, November 2004 [Computer 
file]. ICPSR04272-v1. Washington, DC: US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau 
of the Census, 2005. Distributed by the Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [distributor], Ann Arbor, MI, 2006. 
 
*Except for the Non-Hispanic white column, figures reported are for voting-age persons who 
either themselves or at least one of their parents was born in Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, or 
anywhere in Asia. All tests of significance are conducted with re-weighted data calculated 
by subtracting the mean adult weight from the final adult weight for each case, in order to 
adjust the size of standard errors. 
 
Table 2: Voting and Registration in November 2004 Elections among 
Taiwanese and Other Americans 
 
2000–2001 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS) show that, 
among those who originated from Taiwan, 20 per cent report having done 
volunteer work with others to solve a community problem, 13 per cent report 
having attended at least one meeting or rally, and 11 per cent report having 
contacted government official(s). These figures are comparable to the average 
figures for Asian Americans, but higher than those for respondents originating from 
China or Hong Kong. Contrary to media stereotypes, ordinary Taiwanese 
Americans are among the least likely group to donate to political campaigns. Only 
6 per cent report having donated to a political campaign in the four years 
preceding the 2000 election, which is half of the rate reported for Asian Americans 
as a whole and much lower than the average rates reported by white and black 
respondents in national surveys. Results from the 2007 CAHP survey, which 
differentiates between Taiwanese and mainlanders among Taiwanese Americans, 
show that only 8 per cent of Taiwanese report having made campaign donations to 
a US political candidate, in contract to 19 per cent of mainlanders. Rates of 
148  PEI-TE LIEN AND JEANETTE YIH HARVIE 
 
 
campaign donations to candidates in Taiwan are in the same order, but at a 
smaller scale. For both Taiwanese and mainlanders in the US, the most common 
participatory act beyond voting is activism in ethnic community organizations and 
hometown associations (Lien 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this preliminary attempt to compare the process of political incorporation of the 
Irish and Taiwanese populations in the US, we make a case for the need to 
broaden the scope of inquiry into the historical construction of the white race and 
of the Chinese/Asian race, in order to contextualize the observed experiences. In 
addition, we see a need to take a more critical look into the theories and 
assumptions of political incorporation for racial minorities and immigrants. It is in 
the context of a white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant, and capitalist society that one 
understands the sources of conflicts between two working-class and culturally 
subordinated immigrant groups, the Irish and the Chinese, in nineteenth-century 
America. It is in the separate issues of immigration and citizenship policies, as well 
as in differential capacity and strategy of the major political parties (especially the 
Democratic Party) to mobilize the Irish and non-Irish groups, that one sees the 
different degrees of political incorporation by race and ethnicity, both then and 
now. And it is through their sense of a symbiotic relationship between oppression 
felt in the home country and discrimination faced in the host country that 
immigrants developed nationalistic feelings for the homeland which, in turn, helped 
immigrants develop their sense of being American. Because of these factors, we 
do not believe the political incorporation of Irish immigrants can be satisfactorily 
explained by the ethnic integration model. And we see that it is the combination of 
factors dealing with race, culture, and class that help to account for the 
exclusionary immigration and citizenship policies against early Chinese immigrants 
as well as, to a large extent, the continuing barriers to accessing equal citizenship 
and political rights among the very successful ethnic Chinese immigrants from 
Taiwan and elsewhere in the post-1965 era. In this sense, the political 
incorporation of Taiwanese Americans, when it happens, may be temporary, 
contingent, and reversible. Getting citizenship is a good beginning, but it is hardly 
sufficient and secure. An example for this is a current proposal to remove the 
birthright citizenship warranted to children of immigrants in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. If successful, it will have severe consequences on the predominantly 
foreign-born population. It will also send a very chilly message to all US minorities, 
foreign-born or not. 
   Except for the few who entered prior to 1965, today’s immigrants from Taiwan 
entered United States at a time when equal rights are protected and naturalization 
is allowed and welcomed. They also arrived from a homeland that has undergone 
a profound but peaceful political transition from an authoritarian regime in the post-
war era to an economically prosperous and vibrant democracy since the mid-
1990s. Yet, even if today’s Taiwanese immigrants may be very well connected with 
their homeland in Asia and show a high level of interest in and concern over 
politics in that homeland, unlike in the past it is difficult to imagine a mass 
mobilization of the overseas community based on homeland independence or 
some other political cause. This is because increasingly homeland-regarding 
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politics among Taiwanese Americans is divided along partisan ideological, 
ethnicity, and class lines. And, like Irish Americans, the middle- and professional-
class background of today’s Taiwanese Americans may make them more 
interested in the type of homeland politics that engages peaceful rather than 
radical means of change. Regardless of their internal differences, Taiwanese 
Americans may be expected to band together and work on enhancing the 
protection of immigrants and minorities in US laws, such as passing hate crime 
legislation and improving elements in US trade and immigration policies to facilitate 
business transactions and migration across the Pacific. 
   Given the preliminary nature of this investigation, we have hardly scratched the 
surface of the various other ways to measure political incorporation for Taiwanese 
Americans. Future research will need to explore other indicators of political 
incorporation such as interest representation in the making and implementation of 
public policies and the issue of equity in social outcome. So far as we can see, 
even though Taiwanese immigrants may have a much better opportunity for 
political incorporation than the earlier Chinese immigrants, their political fate is 
inseparable from the other ethnic Chinese in the country of settlement, as well as 
from those who were left behind. Their prospect of future success will depend as 
much on the degree to which their host county of the US is moves away from white 
Protestant domination as on the degree of trust and respect the US government 
will extend to the homeland governments across the Pacific. 
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Abstract 
 
Both the Republic of Ireland and Taiwan have followed distinct developmental 
nation-building projects of economic development since the 1950s. Both late-
developing countries have since transformed from predominantly agricultural 
societies to ones characterized by the rapid expansion of human capital and high 
levels of recent immigration. The main focus of the paper is upon explaining the 
influence of Irish developmental goals and choices upon recent immigration policy. 
Irish choices are contextualized by reference to similarities and differences with 
Taiwan. This approach highlights the role of national ideological and political 
influences on economic goals, responses to globalization, and immigration 
policies. 
 
Introduction 
 
The notion of a ‘Celtic Tiger’ resulted from comparisons drawn with East Asian 
‘tiger states’. The initial analysis was facile (Ireland had achieved levels of 
economic growth akin to, but of far lesser duration than, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and Taiwan), but the name stuck. Subsequent comparative analyses 
of the Irish and East Asian tiger economies found some commonalities and several 
differences between the nature of inward investment by Multi-National Companies 
(MNCs) and where it came to the roles of states in fostering economic 
development. Ireland and Taiwan both embarked on developmental nation-building 
projects of economic modernization from the 1950s, and in both cases these 
intersected in complex ways with political nationalism. Developmental 
modernization resulted in societies with ‘new immigrant’ populations, a term 
needed to distinguish these from immigration by co-ethnics in both cases. In 
seeking to understand how Ireland, a mono-ethnic nation-state with a long history 
of emigration, came to proactively promote immigration, the aim here is to make 
comparisons and draw contrasts with Taiwan, where nationalism and ethnic 
politics are uniquely configured. Firstly, this analysis fleshes out the comparisons 
drawn between Ireland and Taiwan during the 1990s. It then locates the narrative 
of Irish economic modernization – a story of conflicts between developmental and 
cultural nation-building goals – alongside that of Taiwan. A focus on comparative 
nation-building narratives, as distinct from economic comparisons (the initial 
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comparisons were between ‘tiger’ economies), is employed to interrogate how both 
countries instigated large-scale immigration and responded to its consequences. 
   Until its mid-1990s boom, Ireland had a long history of large-scale emigration, 
punctuated by a few short periods during which some members of the diaspora 
(former emigrants and descendants of emigrants) returned to live in Ireland. By 
European standards Ireland’s experience of immigration – immigrants became 
more than 10 per cent of the population in less than a decade – is unusual, but so 
too, the academic literature on the ‘Celtic Tiger’ phenomena has argued, was 
Ireland’s trajectory of economic development. When Ireland began to achieve very 
high growth rates compared to other European countries, attention turned towards 
comparison with the East Asian tiger countries that included Taiwan. This literature 
suggests some value in further comparisons between Ireland and the so-called 
East Asian tiger countries. A key focus of comparison is upon how both states 
precipitated and responded to large-scale immigration. To a considerable extent in 
both cases the drivers of immigration were indigenous labour shortages. Both 
cases suggest developmental nation-building projects within which economic 
growth potentially superseded other political goals. Yet the economic nationalisms 
that in both cases sanctioned immigration were accompanied by essentialist 
ethno-nationalist legacies that again in both cases influenced how immigration was 
regulated. 
 
Tales of Two Tigers 
 
The term ‘Celtic Tiger’ was first coined on 31 August 1994 in an article published in 
the newsletter of the American investment bank Morgan Stanley, suggesting 
comparisons with the East Asian tiger economies (Gardiner 1994). It was quickly 
adopted by Irish financial journalists and economists and soon became ubiquitous 
within media and political debates. That this re-branding of Ireland coincided with 
the Irish Republican Army ceasefire was significant; one of the themes of this 
article is the complexity of intersections between economic nationalism and ethnic 
nationalism. The Northern Ireland peace process dominated Irish politics, yet a key 
element of this was the abandonment by the Republic of Ireland of aspirations to a 
united Ireland except by the consent of the Northern Irish population. In effect, the 
‘Celtic Tiger’ was a metaphor for a break with the past as well as one for rapid 
economic growth. Comparative analyses on how and to what extent the Irish 
‘economic miracle’ bore resemblance to East Asian experiences came later. 
   In Inside the Celtic Tiger: The Irish Economy and the Asian Model (1998), Denis 
O’Hearn argued that the few widely agreed characteristics of tiger economies were 
largely descriptive and superficial. The deeper that one looked at particular cases 
the more disparate these ‘tigers’ appeared to become and the greater the 
differences seemed to be how and why particular countries achieved their 
economic success. Yet, the original four East Asian ‘tigers’ shared some core 
economic characteristics. Each had maintained average annual economic growth 
rates of more than 8 per cent from the 1960s until the 1990s (O’Hearn 1998: 3–5). 
Between 1960 and 1990 Taiwan’s GDP rose by an average of 9.3 per cent per 
annum. Such growth rates were very high compared to European averages of 2 
per cent across the same period. During the same period Ireland’s GDP expanded 
at almost twice the European rate (averaging 3.9 per cent per annum) but also at 
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about half the rate of those East Asian countries to which it was being likened 
(O’Hearn 1998: 61). Whilst Irish growth rates stood out compared to the rest of the 
European Union, these were modest compared to Taiwan and the other East 
Asian economic tigers. But by the early 1990s Irish growth had begun to 
accelerate, for reasons that suggested that comparisons with East Asian economic 
development were valid. During the 1970s, productivity per capita was only half 
that of the United Kingdom. By 1996 it had exceeded British levels (O’Hearn 1998: 
65). 
   Ireland and Taiwan were still poor, peripheral, and technologically backward 
societies in 1950. By the end of the 1960s, state-led industrial development 
policies had emerged in both. Both countries rapidly expanded levels of indigenous 
human capital between 1960 and 1980 (Breznitz 2007: 7), and in both cases the 
state actively promoted economic development. There are some similarities in how 
they went about this. Both countries introduced duty-free export processing zones 
(at Shannon Airport in Ireland in 1961 and near Kaolsuing in Taiwan in 1964) 
aimed at encouraging foreign manufacturers to establish factories. Ireland 
attracted a mixture of European- and American-owned companies, Taiwan 
attracted predominantly Japanese firms. Both have sought to attract Multi-National 
Companies (MNCs) and pressure these to source a significant percentage of their 
components locally (Breznitz 2007: 194). 
   There were some broad similarities between the development trajectories of the 
Irish and Asian tiger economies. All benefited from large-scale inward-investment 
MNCs. Each developed strong niche sectors in high tech production – computers 
in all cases and also pharmaceuticals in the Irish case. However, the nature of 
MNC investment differed in the Irish case from that experienced in East Asia. 
Inward investment into Europe and Ireland predominantly came from the United 
States. American MNCs typically established US-owned subsidiaries whereas in 
East Asian cases inward investment was predominantly from Japan and Japanese 
MNCs had tended to established joint-owned enterprises. Partly, this came about 
because Japanese MNCs favoured sub-contracting over direct investment in 
subsidiaries. Its domestic labour supply was small compared to that of the United 
States and labor shortages precipitated the shift of productive capacity to other 
countries. This encouraged the growth of domestic industrial sectors in countries 
where they invested. This involved the downward shedding of technologies and 
was met in host countries by concerted efforts to then upgrade their technological 
capacity. For example, Taiwan built steelworks to supply Japanese industry and 
then used the steel to build a machine-tool industry (O’Hearn 1998: 22). 
   There were also some crucial differences. Since the late 1960s Ireland has 
focused mainly on foreign direct investment-based industrial development policies. 
In Taiwan the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), mistrusted large-scale private 
industry. The state took on a larger role in fostering industrial innovation, for 
example through state-led research agencies. In Ireland the role of the state in co-
ordinating industrial development was more hands-off. The state actively solicited 
inward investment and provided through its Industrial Development Authority (IDA) 
advance factory sites and other facilities to attract inward development, but the 
nature and extent of state co-ordination in both cases came to differ. Taiwan had a 
Japanese-style state bureaucracy where civil servants and even politicians tended 
to have specialist skills: for example, qualifications in engineering. Ireland inherited 
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an English-style bureaucracy dominated by non-specialist civil servants. This 
contributed to a less-direct management of industry by the state in the Irish case. 
   Both states successfully attracted foreign-owned computer industries. Unlike 
Ireland, Taiwan then pushed these to procure an increasing number of 
components locally and to transfer production expertise to local suppliers. The 
state also promoted the use of Taiwanese venture capital to expand the 
information technology sector (Breznitz 2006: 684). Taiwan developed a viable 
computer manufacturing industry that included internationally successful brands 
such as ACER. In the Irish case, the state neither prioritized capital investment into 
computer manufacturing nor did it seek to compel foreign-owned companies to 
foster Irish supply chains. Partly for these reasons computer manufacturing 
faltered. American MNCs characteristically shared technology with and purchased 
components from their own subsidiaries. More sustainable successes were 
achieved in software design where human capital was a key factor of production. 
   Different models of inward investment were met by somewhat different state-led 
developmental policies. Comparative analyses have emphasized differences 
between the East Asian Bureaucratic Developmental State (BDS) model and what 
emerged in the Irish developmental state approach. The BDS model adopted from 
Japan combined elements of protectionism and state enterprise that differed 
considerably from what pertained in the West. East Asian developmental states 
articulated projects of economic nationalism by means of state control over finance 
and the labour market. These blurred distinctions between public and private 
ownership and, more generally, between the state and the market (Woo-
Cummings 1999: 21). Characteristically, the state intervened directly in the 
economy, for example by controlling wage levels and promoting indigenous capital 
formation (Huff 1995). 
   Academic comparative analyses of the Celtic and East Asian tigers have 
identified much stronger state controls over the factors of production in East Asia 
than were evident in the Irish case. During the 1980s the Irish state put in place a 
system of developmental corporatism or ‘social partnership’ that negotiated 
national development plans and wage agreements with employers and trade 
unions which fell considerably short of the degree of state control and coordination 
of economic activity found in the East Asian tiger countries (Ó’Riain 2000: 158). In 
Ireland, through semi-state agencies like the Industrial Development Authority 
(IDA) the state gave grants and subsidies to MNCs. It expanded the education 
system to provide skilled workforces. However, it also removed all protectionisms 
against foreign capital in 1964. It also introduced low rates of corporation tax that 
succeeded in attracting disproportionate levels of inward investment into the 
European Union to Ireland. Between 1988 and 1998 Ireland attracted 40 per cent 
of American electronics investment into Europe. A similar but smaller 
agglomeration of pharmaceutical companies occurred during the same period 
(O’Hearn 1998: 73). 
   Taiwan’s Bureaucratic Development State approach to economic modernization 
emerged through top-down directives within a system of authoritarian capitalism. 
During the period of martial law between 1948 and 1988 strikes were illegal and 
labour was organized into a government-controlled union (L. Cheng 2002: 95). The 
policy-making processes of the ruling Kuomintang KMT party and the state were 
effectively indistinguishable (Lin 2008: 53). Later, during the 1980s and 1990s 
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social movements and civil society emerged to open out political decision-making. 
An opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was founded in 
1986. Martial law was lifted in 1987 after thirty-eight years. Democratic elections to 
the National Assembly were held in 1991 and to the Legislative Yuan in 1992. In 
1994 the constitution was amended to allow presidential elections. In 2000 the 
DPP won the Presidential election for the first time. 
   In the Irish case, according to Ó’Riain (2006), a ‘flexible-developmental state’ 
emerged whereby the state encouraged (rather than coerced) corporatist planning 
along neo-liberal responses to globalization. Unlike Taiwan, Ireland was a multi-
party democracy where the state had a limited capacity to command the economy 
and direct the productive capacities of society. Free-market neo-liberal responses 
to globalization were managed through a system of ‘social partnership’ 
agreements between the state, employers, and trade unions. Under Ireland’s 
‘competitive corporatist’ or ‘competition state’ model the role of government was to 
facilitate the free movement of capital, goods, services, and labour (Roche and 
Craddon 2003: 73). In articulating these neo-liberal goals Irish politicians and 
media used terms such as Ireland Inc. or Ireland PLC. 
   Between 2001 and 2004 Ireland was ranked as the most globalized country in 
the world according to the AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine Globalization 
Index. During the same period Taiwan was ranked as considerably less globalized: 
32nd in 2002, 34th in 2003, and 36th in 2004.The index measures four kinds of 
global integration: ‘economic integration’, ‘personal contact’, ‘technological 
connectivity’, and ‘political integration’. ‘Economic integration’ (where Ireland 
ranked highest), contains combined data on trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), 
capital flows, and investment income payments and receipts. Taiwan ranked 27th 
in this category in 2004; in 2002, an AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine report 
noted that Ireland attracted an FDI inflow of US$ 24.7 billion. ‘Personal contact’ 
compares international tourism and cross-border remittances; Ireland ranked 
second for 2004, while Taiwan ranked 32nd. In the ‘technological connectivity’ 
category, Ireland ranked 14th and Taiwan ranked 17th. The ‘political integration’ 
category tracks state membership of international organizations and ratification of 
international treaties; Ireland ranked 11th, while Taiwan ranked as the lowest of all 
62 countries included in the Index. That Singapore ranked 2nd on the composite 
index for 2004 (high on economic integration, low on political and personal 
integration) suggests the need for caution about grouping all East Asian ‘tigers’ 
(Hesham 2006: 7). However, comparisons between Ireland and Taiwan reveal that 
the Irish economy is considerably more open, and that the Taiwanese economy is 
considerably more protected. This suggests considerable underlying differences in 
the nature of state developmental approaches in both cases. 
 
Cultural Contexts of Economic Development 
 
Taiwan’s experiences of state formation and ethnic politics clearly differ from any 
norm (Chun 2007: 77). Taiwan formally became a province of China (the Taipei 
Prefecture) in 1886, but was ceded to the Japanese Empire in 1895 and remained 
under colonial rule until after World War Two. The dominant sense of ethnic 
nationality in Taiwan – The Republic of China (ROC) – has developed in complex 
symmetry with that of the mainland People’s Republic of China. Lucie Cheng 
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identifies the emergence of a diasporic concept of ethnic Chinese as Zhongguoren 
during the early twentieth century. Both Chinese states came to enshrine ethnic 
conceptions of nationality whilst at the same time contesting the legitimacy of one 
another since 1948 (L. Cheng 2002: 92). The arrival of over a million migrants from 
mainland China in the aftermath of Chiang Kai-Shek’s defeat by the People’s 
Liberation Army, in essence China’s old government and army in exile, profoundly 
changed Taiwan’s ethnic and cultural composition. Before 1949 mainlanders made 
up just one quarter of Taiwan’s population. By the early 1950s two million refugees 
from the mainland were claimed to live Taiwan, forming one third of a total 
population of six million. Excepting only small minorities of Aboriginal peoples, 
most of the rest of the Taiwanese population consisted two Han Chinese ethnic 
groups, Minnan and Hakka. Other accounts in Taiwanese peer-revised journals 
put the number of mainlander migrants at a much lower figure (Lin and Lin 2005: 
71). 
   Post-1949, Taiwan has been characterized as ‘a newly formed quasi-nation 
seeking a new republican identity to mark itself off from the colonial past, as a 
capitalist society performing some socialist practices and as an allegedly 
democratic polity under military dictatorship’ (Wang and Heath 2008: 22). The 
Republic of China (ROC) based in Taiwan retained a government structure that 
claimed sovereignty over all 35 provinces of China as well as layers of ‘local’ 
government. The ROC was based in Taiwan but symbolically and institutionally 
distinct from the province of Taiwan. By the 1950s, as the exile of the ROC in 
Taiwan looked increasingly long-term but political goals of preparing for return to 
power remained, a new state-led modernization project emerged. The population 
of Taipei rose from 200,000 in 1949 to more than one million by the mid-1960s. By 
2005, Taiwan had a population of 23 million. Mainlanders and their children 
comprised 13 per cent of this population (Lin and Lin 2005: 71). 
   The cultural politics of post-1949 Taiwan encompassed a period of de-
Japanization followed by a pronounced ‘Sinic Revival’ during the 1960s (Wang and 
Heath 2008: 35). In reaction to Mao’s 1966 Cultural Revolution on the mainland 
Chinese culture was strongly promoted by the ROC in school curricula and other 
areas. As put by Cheng-Yi Lin and Wen-Cheng Lin: 
 
Through politically-screened teachers and deliberate design of the school curriculum, 
the ROC government promoted China as the motherland as well as a Chinese 
national identity among Taiwanese. Mandarin was stipulated as the sole language, 
and other dialects were banned at schools, in the military, and at all levels of the 
government. TV and radio programming in dialects was kept to a minimum. To an 
extent, political socialisation in Taiwan was successful during the first four decades of 
KMT rule. The majority of the people in Taiwan identified themselves as Chinese and 
supported Taiwan’s unification with China in 1989. 
(Lin and Lin 2005: 72) 
 
   In effect, the post 1949 period witnessed the growing dominance of Chinese 
culture. As summarized by Wang and Heath, citing the work of Alan Chun, this 
occurred in several phases (Wang and Heath 2008: 37, Chun 1996: 55). Firstly, a 
period of ‘cultural reunification’ (1945–1967) saw emphasis on reconsolidating 
Chinese culture, purging Japanese influences, and upon suppressing local 
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Taiwanese cultural expression. This included imposing Standard Mandarin as the 
official language and banning Taiwanese and Japanese from the mass media. It 
also saw, through the ‘Model Taiwan’ policies of the 1950s, a strategic focus on 
modernization and industrial development (Chun 1996: 45). Secondly, a ‘cultural 
renaissances’ period witnessed a systematic attempt ‘to cultivate a large-scale 
societal consciousness’ of traditional Chinese culture. Here the ROC deployed the 
classic nation-building techniques as depicted in the West by Benedict Anderson 
(1983) and Ernest Gellner (1987). As put by Chun: ‘By invoking “tradition”, the 
authorities appeared to resuscitate elements of the past, but they were clearly 
inventing tradition (by virtue of their selectivity). The government in effect played 
an active role (as author) in writing culture’ (Chun 1996: 56). However, this did not 
result in an uncontested ‘Chinese’ national identity. 
   Ireland achieved independence in 1922, having been part of the United Kingdom 
since 1801. Its post-independence politics were preoccupied with cultural 
nationalism and de-colonization. Its education system prioritized the 
intergenerational reproduction of Catholicism and cultural identity (the Irish 
language) over the expansion of human capital. Cultural protectionism was 
paralleled after 1932 by economic protectionism that included a prohibition on the 
investment of foreign capital. Its politics were preoccupied to a considerable extent 
with the ideal of a 32-county united Ireland, meaning the incorporation of Northern 
Ireland into the 26-county Irish Free State that in 1948 was declared the Republic 
of Ireland. 
   The political sanctioning of large-scale immigration would have been difficult to 
foresee given the mono-ethnic history the Irish nation-state constructed for itself 
and given Ireland’s long history of emigration (Fanning 2010). In many respects 
Ireland was a typical European kulturnation, built upon the foundations of 
nineteenth-century romantic nationalism to create a dominant shared sense of 
ethnic shared identity made possible by mass literacy, education, and other 
aspects of modernity. This Irish-Ireland nationalism came symbolically to dominate 
the new state from the 1920s to at least the 1960s (O’Tuataigh 1991). After 
independence Irish-Ireland cultural nationalism served to promote both cultural and 
economic isolationism. According to Garvin: 
 
From the 1890s to 1960s, nationalist and nativist themes were used to erect 
ideological and organisational defences against the cultural and political assaults 
seen to be emanating from the Anglo-Saxon world and elsewhere... In particular, the 
fear of secular individualism, seen as threatening Irish communal values, was often 
associated with a fear of the modern and an imperfectly camouflaged hatred of 
Protestant culture. 
(Garvin 1998: 146) 
 
The 1932 Fianna Fáil government was elected on a platform of economic 
isolationism. Eamon de Valera, the dominant political figure for the next two 
decades, promoted a doctrine of economic self-sufficiency, preventing imports, 
discouraging foreign capital, and promoting import substitute manufacturing. Once 
elected in 1932 he introduced the Control of Manufactures Act. This required that 
the majority of capital in Irish companies should be Irish-owned. The aim was to 
undermine British dominance within Irish industry. De Valera also imposed tariff 
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barriers aimed at fostering import substitution. This precipitated the so-called 
‘economic war’ with the United Kingdom, of mutual tariff barriers, that lasted until 
1938 when the British removed restrictions on imports from Ireland (Garvin 2005: 
113). 
   To some extent the economic development policies of the post-independence 
era resembled those of the KMT. In addition to restrictions on foreign capital, these 
centred on the formation of semi-state companies to produce electricity (ESB), 
harvest turf for use as fuel (Bord na Mona), process sugar beet (Comhluacht Sucra 
Eireann), or develop air travel (Aer Lingus). This predominance of state-led capital 
investment in the Irish economy coincided with a de-colonizing period of 
pronounced cultural nationalism. 
   ‘Irish-Ireland’ nationalism depicted the new state as homogenous, even though 
there were a number of distinct minority communities. These include the Travelling 
People, whose claims of ethnic distinctiveness continued to be opposed by the 
state; a small Jewish community, who experienced overt discrimination before, 
during, and after the Holocaust (Irish anti-Semitism resembled that found in other 
European nation-states); and the once-dominant Protestant minority, who became 
marginalized within the new state (Fanning 2012). Catholic nationalism became 
the bearer of a sectarian and exclusionary religious-ethnic conception of nation. 
   From the 1950s the ‘Irish-Ireland’ nation-building project became contested by a 
developmental modernizing one, which came to emphasize economic and human 
capital reproduction as utilitarian nation-building goals. Political conflicts centred on 
the education system as a mechanism for cultural reproduction. The institutional 
narrative of Irish developmental modernization has tended to focus on influential 
state-of-the-nation reports seen to exemplify emerging new political and economic 
orthodoxies. Protectionism unravelled during the 1950s when import substitution 
policies proved unable to sustain employment (O’Grada and O’Rourke 1996: 141). 
The emergence of a new developmental paradigm was signalized by the high-
profile publication in 1958 of a report entitled Economic Development. Its 
significance was that it institutionalized the perspective that protectionism did not 
work. An OECD/Irish Government report of 1965, Investment in Education, has 
been credited with jolting the focus of Irish education from character development 
and religious formation to one on economic development and the human capital 
needed for industrial development. Investment in Education amounted to a 
paradigm shift whereby a combined mercantile and human capital paradigm broke 
earlier approaches to education. The state promoted educational reform to support 
economic development objectives. For example, in the Second Programme for 
Economic Expansion, expenditure on education was described as ‘an investment 
in the fuller use of the country’s primary resource – its people – which can be 
expected to yield increasing returns in terms of economic progress’ (Government 
of Ireland 1964: 193). 
   Key landmarks in the liberalization of trade included the removal of restrictions 
on foreign capital investment in 1964, the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement in 
1965, and EEC membership in 1973 (Fitzgerald 2000: 3). In an example of 
developmental realpolitik a 1976 report from the National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC) argued that if the foreign investment needed to provide new jobs 
were discouraged Irish people would still have to work for foreign capital, but would 
be doing so outside of Ireland rather than at home (1976: 20). The Irish 
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developmental settlement occurred partly due to the co-option of erstwhile blocking 
coalitions within a competitive corporatist system of social partnership. Trade 
unions and employers repeatedly signed up for the pursuit of economic growth as 
a national project (Ó’Riain 2006: 213). Symbolic political preoccupations with a 
United Ireland seemed unfeasible. Urbanization and the expansion of education 
fostered secularism. Economists achieved an influence once held by clerics 
(Garvin 2005; Fanning 2008). In sociological terms a modernization of belonging 
occurred that prioritized human capital over forms of cultural capital (Fanning 
2010). In the language of sociologists, the pursuit of economic growth became a 
hegemonic neo-liberal ‘competitive corporatist’ national project. ‘Social partnership’ 
agreements negotiated by the Irish state with employers and unions were in effect 
national plans for economic development. In this context, large-scale immigration 
later became justified within ‘a national interest discourse’ of economic growth 
(Boucher 2007: 6). 
   In summary, in Taiwan cultural nation-building co-existed with economic nation-
building whilst in the Irish case the main phase of cultural nation-building 
proceeded developmentalism. Irish academic narratives emphasize the role of 
developmental modernizers who broke with the shibboleths of cultural nationalism. 
The ideological conflict was one between economic liberalism and protectionism. 
Having abandoned all forms of protection by the mid-1960s Ireland was open to a 
neo-liberal development project that resulted in it becoming the most globalized 
economy in the world. The underlying political acceptance of such openness – 
exemplified by various social partnership agreements – contrasted with a 
resistance to some forms of globalization in Taiwan. Clearly the uneasy 
relationship between the ROC and the PRC has kept the politics of nationality in 
the foreground whereas there has been little emphasis on cultural nation-building 
for several decades in the Irish case. Simply put, the goal of economic 
development came to subordinate other political goals in the Irish case more than 
it appears to be the case in Taiwan. Both states – Ireland before the 1960s and 
Taiwan until more recently – witnessed the subordination of education systems to 
cultural-nationalist goals. Sociological accounts of Irish modernization infer that 
increased emphasis on human capital alongside a corresponding de-emphasis 
upon religious or ethnic rules of belonging produced de-ethnicized rules of 
belonging. Such an analysis suggests a hypothesis that Irish society might be 
more open to immigration than in the case of Taiwan where cultural nationalism 
remains in the political foreground. 
 
Developmental Contexts of Immigration 
 
A 2004 report prepared for the World Bank grouped Ireland and Taiwan together 
amongst a small group of countries that have benefited economically from 
recruiting from their diasporas. It noted that both countries had ‘reverse brain drain 
programs that offer generous research funding and monetary incentives, as well as 
services and assistance to attract medical professionals’ (Lucas 2004: 14). 
Another attributed Taiwan’s leapfrog technology advancement in no small degree 
to returning scientists (Saxenian 2002). For example, Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science-
Based Industrial Park, a government-led initiative to attract Taiwanese R&D 
professionals back to Taiwan, had 2,563 returnees in 1996. This number had more 
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than doubled by 2000, reaching 5,025 (Lucas 2004). By 2000, over half of the 
companies in the Hsinchu Industrial Park had been started by expatriates returning 
from Silicon Valley (Saxenian 2000). Taiwan has tended to recruit professionals 
and highly skilled workers from Taiwanese working abroad (Lee 2009: 335). 
However, the number of such migrants was miniscule when compared to Taiwan’s 
23 million plus population. 
   The East Asian tigers experienced rapid economic growth from the 1960s that 
led to chronic labour shortages. Economic growth was initially concentrated in 
labour-intensive activities, which used up more unskilled and semi-skilled labour 
than was being supplied by migration from rural to urban areas and rising female 
participation in paid work (Breznitz 2007: 113–114).Taiwan reached full 
employment by the late 1960s and chronic labour shortages became a problem 
thereafter. Between 1976 and 1980 wages doubled due to these pressures (Gold 
1986: 98). By the mid-1960s in Taiwan one third of the workforce consisted of 
young women who moved in and out of the workforce according to their marriage 
and child-bearing status (Gold 1986: 89). Low-skilled labour shortages in export-
orientated manufacture and other sectors were exacerbated by rising levels of 
education and skills and the increased unwillingness of Taiwanese to undertake 
so-called 3D (‘difficult, dangerous, and dirty’) low paid jobs (L. Cheng 2002: 95). 
   Since the late 1980s Taiwan has recruited temporary unskilled foreign migrant 
labour. In 2008 some 373,336 low-skilled migrants were resident in Taiwan out of 
a total 417,385 foreign residents. Those other than low-skilled migrants included 
3,474 traders, 2,072 engineers and 6,009 teachers, again very small numbers 
when put beside the population of Taiwan. Well over half of all foreign residents 
were female. In 2008 only 7,332 of Taiwan’s foreign population were children 
under 15 years of age. The majority of migrants entered Taiwan with temporary 
visas, administered restrictively (Lee, 2009: 345, Table 22-5). 
   In Ireland, as in Taiwan, labour shortages fostered immigration following a period 
of growing female participation in paid employment. During the late 1990s women 
took some 70 per cent of new jobs (O’Hearn 1998: 99). However, labour shortages 
persisted in the face of continued economic growth. As in Taiwan, the state 
encouraged the return of highly-skilled Irish working abroad, though the scale of 
returnees was proportionally much larger than in the Taiwanese case. The return 
of highly-skilled Irish migrants was one of the factors of paramount importance 
behind the fast and successful development of the Irish IT industry (Asish and 
Gambardella 2004). The aforementioned World Bank report concluded that Irish 
efforts to tap into its diaspora exceeded those of other countries that tried to do so, 
including Taiwan (Lucas 2004: 14). A state-funded ‘Jobs Ireland’ initiative ran from 
2000–2002, aimed at attracting skilled co-ethnics in areas such as information 
technology. It held employment fairs in cities around the world with Irish emigrant 
populations (Hayward and Howard 2007: 50). However, as the pool of such high-
skilled Irish appeared to become exhausted the Jobs Ireland campaign then 
extended its remit to potential high-skilled immigrants from Britain, EU member-
states, Eastern European states, and non-EU English-speaking countries like India. 
The demographic profile of immigrants shifted over time as the supply of persons 
of Irish ancestry willing to migrate to Ireland declined over time. Between 1995 and 
2000 almost one quarter of a million people (248,100) immigrated to Ireland. This 
amounted to an aggregate figure of seven per cent of the total population as 
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recorded in the 1996 census. About half were returned Irish emigrants: some 18 
per cent (45,600) were immigrants from the United Kingdom; 13 per cent (33,400) 
came from other EU countries; 7 per cent (16,600) came from the United States; 
and 12 per cent (29,400) came from the rest of the world. From 2000, non-Irish 
migrants exceeded migrants with Irish citizenship or ancestry: 18,006 work permits 
were granted to migrants from non-EU countries in 2000, 36,436 in 2001, 40,321 
in 2002, 47,551 in 2003, and 34,067 in 2004. When the EU enlarged in 2004, the 
Irish state decided to permit migrants from the ten new Eastern European member 
states to live and work in Ireland without visas. All other pre-2004 EU states except 
Sweden and the United Kingdom delayed doing so for several years. This 
accelerated the pace of immigration. Between 1 May 2004 and 30 April 2005 some 
85,114 workers from the new EU-10 were issued with National Insurance numbers 
entitling them to work in Ireland, This amounted to more than ten times the number 
of new work permits admitted to migrants from those countries in the preceding 12 
months (National Economic and Social Council 2005: 26). By 2005 Ireland’s 
proportion of 10.4 foreign-born (as estimated by the OECD; see Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2007) exceeded that of the United 
Kingdom (8.3 per cent), and was a similar proportion to countries with a longer 
history of immigration. By 2005 this included an estimated 75,000 migrants from 
China admitted on student visas as part of a policy by the Irish state to pursue 
economic links with China. In effect, Ireland became more open to migration from 
mainland China than Taiwan, even though under the Taiwanese constitution 
mainlanders have a right to citizenship. The 2006 Irish census identified 610,000 
(14.7 per cent) of the population of 4,239,848 persons to have been born outside 
the state.1 Taiwan in 2006 had a smaller foreign-born population even though its 
overall population was four times greater than that of Ireland. 
   A 2006 National Economic and Social Council (NESC) report, Managing 
Migration: A Social and Economic Analysis, strongly advocated large-scale and 
on-going immigration as a means of sustaining economic growth (2006: xxi). The 
foreword of the report stated that ‘immigration did not create the Irish economic 
miracle but, properly managed, migration can sustain Ireland’s economic growth 
and generate many other benefits’ (2006: xxi). The report argued that from the 
1960s and 1970s government policies concerning trade liberalization and foreign 
direct investment began to improve the domestic economic situation and hence, 
eventually, reversed the net loss of population due to migration. Weak economic 
performance during the 1980s was accompanied by a net outflow of migrants, a 
trend that was reversed in the mid- to late-1990s. Economic growth during the 
1990s saw the rapid expansion of the labour force from about 1.4 million in 1994 to 
just over 2 million in 2005. This increased labour demand was met initially by Irish 
nationals who had been previously unemployed or outside the labour market and 
then by returning Irish migrants, whose proportion in relation to in-migration by 
non-Irish migrants became smaller; by 2004 Irish returnees constituted less than 
25 per cent of the total number of immigrants. Managing Migration claimed that on-
going immigration was likely to make the Irish economy more adaptive and boost 
economic competitiveness (2006: 93). 
                                                 
1
 See the Central Statistics Office Ireland: www.cso.ie. 
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   In 2007 the Office of the Minister of State for Integration Policy published its first 
major report, Migration Nation: Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity 
Management. This stated that recent immigration was the result of the 
developmental ‘opening to the world’ institutionalized as a political project during 
the 1960s. Other key reports have emphasized education, welfare, and labour 
market policies aimed at promoting social conditions that would nurture and 
sustain individual adaptability, flexibility, and risk-taking; a ‘sustainable balance 
between dynamism and security’ (National Economic and Social Council 2005: 
36). In this context, it was unsurprising that subsequent major statements about 
immigration and integration policy examined here have de-emphasized ethno-
cultural rules of belonging. 
   In summary, state-fostered recruitment of migrant workers in both Taiwan and 
Ireland occurred when the labour needs of both respective expanding economies 
could no longer be met domestically by the entrance of women into the labour 
market. From the 1960s in both countries female participation rose significantly, 
although high percentages of married women remain outside the labour market. 
Both countries also encouraged the recruitment of high-skilled co-ethnics. Taiwan 
was restricted in doing so due to its problematic relationship with mainland China. 
Ireland, by contrast, overtly encouraged co-ethnic migration. This included 
descendants of Irish emigrants to the United States, Britain, and Australia. Once 
the available supply of skilled migrants declined the move towards actively 
encouraging non-Irish migrants was seamless. Irish labour migration policy in 
many respects reflected its economic openness to globalization. 
 
Ethnic Politics, Citizenship, and the Regulation of Immigration 
 
Ireland is considerably more open to immigration than is the case with Taiwan. It 
operates no visa or residency restrictions for citizens of EU states. In effect a 
country of about 4 million people has opened its borders to a population 100 times 
this size. It has also effectively opened its borders to over 70 million people of Irish 
ancestry who are entitled to claim Irish citizenship under jus sanguine criteria. In 
Ireland much of the debate on the regulation of immigration has related to non-EU 
migrants, where the state continues to have latitude. Taiwan, because of its 
problematic relationship with mainland China, at once entitles mainlanders to 
Taiwanese citizenship yet effectively restricts their access to this and to work visas. 
The 1992 Employment Act made a clear distinction between guonin, a term that 
translates as ‘nationals’ or ‘citizens’, and waiguoren or ‘aliens’. 
   In 1992 Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council proclaimed that nationals of mainland 
China were also nationals of the Republic of China and that they had permission to 
enter Taiwan to live and work, but the edict also contained a caveat that because 
of ‘population pressure, national security and social stability, it is necessary to 
impose certain limitations’ (Mainland Affairs Council 1992, cited by L. Cheng 2002: 
9). Entitlements to citizenship in Taiwan were on the basis of descent and ancestry, 
and whilst the key basis for solidarity was ethnic there were limits to this solidarity. 
As explained by Lucie Cheng: 
 
The principle of descent and ancestry gave the Taiwan state a rationale for claiming 
special affinity with Chinese in the diaspora, but political and economic 
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considerations operate to differentiate among them. While mainland Chinese are 
excluded, overseas Chinese, especially who are highly trained or from whom Taiwan 
can benefit, are given preferential treatment in law and in practice. The fact that the 
Nationality Law specifically allows some highly skilled occupational positions to be 
held by Chinese with dual citizenship, while excluding other positions, is a clear 
example. 
(L. Cheng 2002: 92) 
 
   The Constitution of the ROC defines mainland Chinese as compatriots rather 
than foreigners – a colloquial term for ‘foreign workers’, wailao, distinguishes these 
from benlao, meaning ‘local labour’. According to Cheng, wailou are presumed to 
be temporary migrants and to some extent mainland Chinese are treated as such, 
exempt from some of the restrictions applied to wailou, but not to others. The 
specific concern that distinguishes their treatment from that given to other 
members of the Chinese diaspora is anxiety within the state about being overrun 
by mainland China (L. Cheng 2002: 93). 
   Under Article 67 of the Employment Services Act (1992), Chinese persons 
(Zhongguoreu) resident in the state who hold foreign nationality are regarded as 
guonin irrespective of what other nationality they possess. Yet Article 68 stipulates 
that the hiring and regulating of ‘people of the mainland region’ must adhere to 
criteria affecting foreign workers. This ambivalence towards mainland co-ethnics 
reflects sovereignty conflicts between the ROC and the PRC (L. Cheng 2002: 93). 
   In Taiwan, when the Act was introduced to regulate immigration, there were 
44,441 foreign residents living in the country. By 2009 some 403,700 foreign 
residents lived in Taiwan, constituting just 1.75 per cent of the then-estimated 
population of 23,063,027. The restrictions on foreign workers in Taiwan imposed 
by the 1992 Act were strict by international standards. In common with many other 
countries, work permits were generally temporary (restricted to three years) and 
more restrictive conditions applied to unskilled workers than to professionals and 
high-skilled foreign workers. Employers in designated industries, including 
domestic employers, were required to apply for a quota permit before they could 
hire a foreign worker. Under the 1992 Act employers had to demonstrate that posts 
could not be filled by Taiwanese workers and non-transferable work permits were 
granted to the employers rather than to the migrants themselves; similar measures 
applied in the Irish case. In both cases, this fostered exploitation of migrants by 
employers. Specifically, such restrictions undermined the rights of migrants under 
employment legislation. Cheng, for example, described how employment 
standards mandated by the Council on Labor Affairs have not applied to migrant 
workers: 
 
…The Council clearly violated this position by prohibiting foreign workers from 
organizing unions or going on strike, rights that are accorded to local labor. According 
to law, foreign workers should be paid the same wages as locals, work the same 
hours, enjoy the same numbers of days off, and have the same mobility. But in 
actuality none of the above obtain. Such inconsistencies abound but are almost 
never challenged, partly due to the underdevelopment of administrative law and 
partly to the way the legal profession is structured. 
(L. Cheng 2002: 101–102) 
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   In the Irish case, migrant workers faced similar barriers as a result of state 
neglect, although from poor enforcement of employment standards rather than 
from having lesser rights under employment law. The end result is the same. Both 
countries have Filipino migrant populations who have experienced quite similar 
forms of exploitation, especially in domestic work. In both cases this pattern of 
exploitation is influenced by trans-national factors, as well as by the acts or 
omissions of host societies (S.-J. Cheng 2003; Nititham 2011). 
   In Taiwan, the criteria for admitting foreign workers under the 1992 Act were 
broadly similar to those imposed on non-EU emigrants by Irish legislation, yet 
somewhat more stringent when it came to preventing entry by family members (L. 
Cheng 2002: 93). Under the 1992 Act migrants were required to have regular 
physical examinations, including pregnancy tests, with pregnancy deemed grounds 
for deportation (until 2003 according to Lee 2009: 338). Migrant workers were 
prohibited from bringing their spouses to Taiwan or getting married, all measures 
designed to prevent permanent settlement (L. Cheng 2002: 98). These restrictions 
account for the very low numbers of migrant children living in Taiwan. Some of 
these restrictions have been removed or ameliorated over time. 
   Hsiao-Chuan Hsia locates such restrictions on immigrant families and state 
antipathy towards immigrant children within a discourse of national anxiety about 
immigration. In particular, popular anxiety about ‘foreign brides’ has been 
highlighted as a pivotal issue in immigration debates. In a 2003 The Earth 
Geographic Monthly survey, 60 per cent of respondents believed that the number 
of foreign brides, whether from Southeast Asia or from mainland China, should be 
restricted. A sociological study reported beliefs amongst officials and journalists 
that such marriages would cause the quality of the Taiwanese population to 
deteriorate (cited in Hsia 2007: 75). This emphasized a mixture of essentialist 
chauvinism – a general antipathy towards immigration shared with other Asian 
countries like Korea and Japan (Skrentny, Chan, Fox, and Kim 2007: 797–802) – 
with entrenched beliefs amongst policy makers (contradicted nevertheless by 
research) that ‘foreign brides’ were predominantly from lower socio-economic 
groups and that their children would lag behind Taiwanese children in schools. A 
statement in 2004 by the Junior Minister of Education exhorting foreign brides ‘not 
to give too many births’ exemplified a wider moral panic (Hsai 2007: 77). 
   Prior to the 2000 Nationality Act there was no specific provision for naturalization 
except through marriage. The 2000 Act sets out conditions for naturalization. 
These include five years of continuous residence in the ROC, having no criminal 
record, and the possession of a certain amount of property or professional skills. 
Lucie Cheng has argued that this Act, taken together with the 1992 Employment 
Services Act, enforces a very strong conception of jus sanguine dominated by the 
notion that ‘blood is a very special juice’: 
 
When we juxtapose the Nationality Act with the Employment Services Act we find 
that it is impossible for a designated foreign worker to acquire ROC nationality, since 
she is prohibited from marrying or residing in Taiwan for more than three years! As 
the Chinese adage goes: ‘For every policy issued by the state there is a way to 
circumscribe it by the people.’ A foreign worker who intends to marry a Chinese 
national will leave Taiwan according to the legal requirement and return as his 
168  BRYAN FANNING 
 
spouse. Quite a large proportion of so-called ‘foreign brides’ are a result of this 
arrangement. 
(L. Cheng 2002: 103) 
 
According to Article 3 of the 2000 Nationality Act, long-term migrants (those 
resident for more than 183 days each year for more than five years) can apply for 
citizenship. However, the Act appears to be administered in concert with visa 
requirements for migrant labour so that many migrants do not become eligible to 
apply for citizenship. The Law also allows spouses of Taiwanese citizens to 
naturalize after three years. In 1990, two thirds of foreigners naturalized as 
Taiwanese citizens were women. By 2007 this rose to 99 per cent (Lee 2009: 346). 
Most of these were naturalized as spouses of Taiwanese citizens. In 2007 some 
10,764 persons were naturalized, of whom 10,670 were female. The intention to 
prevent foreign workers becoming citizens of the ROC was explicitly stated in the 
2002 revision of the Employment Services Act. Article 52 extended the length of 
permissible employment from three to six years. However, to guard against foreign 
workers applying for naturalization on the grounds that they had met the residence 
requirements stipulated in the Nationality Act, the revised Employment Services 
Act mandated a 40-day break in residence after the first three days of employment 
(L. Cheng 2002: 103). The defining political response to immigration in the 
Republic of Ireland has been the 2004 Referendum on citizenship. In 2004 more 
than eighty per cent of the Irish citizens who voted in the Referendum endorsed an 
amendment to the constitution that removed the birthright to Irish citizenship of the 
children of immigrants. This removed the jus soli citizenship criteria that had never 
previously been problematic, because Ireland historically had rather experienced 
emigration. The new settlement retained jus sanguine provisions which permitted 
the descendants of Irish emigrants to claim Irish citizenship. Specifically, the 
Referendum was directed against asylum seekers, who were not entitled to work, 
rather than migrant workers and their families (Fanning and Muwarasibo 2007). 
The contemporaneous government decision in 2004 to engineer rapid large-scale 
immigration from within the EU barely caused a political ripple. This suggests a 
distinction between immigration and naturalization debates in the Irish case, with 
stronger opposition amongst existing citizens to the latter than to the former. The 
main political party in government ran a campaign in 2004 using the slogan 
‘Commonsense Citizenship’. However, the crucial cognitive distinction in the 
debate leading up to the referendum, made repeatedly by government officials, 
politicians, and the media was a distinction between ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’. 
Immigrants were generally referred to as ‘non-nationals’. 
   The term ‘non-national’ derived from the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 
(2001) that superseded the Aliens Act (1935). This systematically replaced the 
term ‘alien’ in Irish legislation, and was used by the Department of Justice Equality 
and Law Reform in security debates – in reports about crime, human trafficking, 
and illegal immigration – and by the Department of Enterprise and Employment to 
describe immigrant workers. By 2004 the ‘national/non-national’ dualism had 
become the prevalent common-sense conceptual framework for political and 
media debates about immigration. Various opinion surveys on immigration have 
reported a similarly large majority of citizens supportive of ethnic chauvinism. All 
Irish political parties contain significant numbers of supporters who endorse strict 
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limits on the numbers of immigrants coming to Ireland. The findings of the Irish 
National Election Study (INES) 2002–2007 indicate that some 62.4 per cent of 
respondents in 2002 (falling to 58.8 per cent in 2007) agreed or strongly agreed 
that there should be ‘strict limits’ on immigration (Marsh and Sinnott 2009: 137). To 
a considerable extent, Ireland’s strongly pro-immigration settlement has been 
managed by elites, whether in politics, social partnership, or business. Irish 
immigration policy is consistent with the country’s wider neo-liberal openness to 
globalization. During 2010, in the midst of an economic recession precipitated by 
an international banking crisis and economic mismanagement by the Irish state, 
both GNP and GDP levels fell into decline. Emigration reached its highest levels 
since the 1980s (second quarter of 2010). Yet non-Irish nationals accounted for 
12.4 per cent of the workforce (and 46,000 of these were unemployed; see 
Economic and Social Research Institute 2010). 
 
Discussion and Analysis 
 
This article has examined how intersections of cultural and economic nation-
building goals might account for the respective immigration policies of Ireland and 
Taiwan. Simply put, a different balance of cultural and economic preoccupations 
seems to have informed the modernizing projects of the Irish and Taiwanese 
states. In Ireland, economic development became foregrounded when a post-
colonial cultural nation-building project had become exhausted. In Ireland, this 
seems to have contributed to a seamless acceptance of large-scale immigration 
during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom years. Ireland’s political acceptance of large-scale 
immigration was in keeping with other aspects of Irish open economy 
developmentalism. One sociological reading of the Irish case might be that cultural 
rules of belonging have come to matter less than human capital, or, put otherwise, 
that neo-liberalism has crowded out nationalism (Fanning 2010). Comparisons with 
the Taiwanese case, where opposition to immigration is strong and where cultural 
nation-building goals co-exist with economic ones, seem to bear out this analysis 
(see Figure 1 overleaf). 
   Taiwanese responses to immigration are dominated, according to Chen, by a 
‘monocultural nationalist hegemony’ that, if anything, has deepened in the post- 
Kuomintang era: 
 
In many regards the DPP has extended the KMT’s cultural nationalist mindset and 
policies to new heights, evidenced partly by the first revision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act in seventy years, with its slow phasing out of dual nationality, bringing 
in new containment policies regarding foreign labour and more ‘liberal’ policy towards 
permanent residence, which now enables non-ethnic Chinese to live long-term in 
Taiwan but only as a permanently invisible caste, like Japan’s Koreans… People 
seem to have only recently discovered the advent of foreign labour, e.g. Filipino 
maids and Thai construction workers, despite their long presence. Even at Academia 
Sinica, when colleagues talk about the massive influx of foreign researchers (mostly 
South Asian and East European post-docs), they are not referring to their ethnic 
Chinese research fellows (a quarter of whom probably have US green cards or 
passports). 
(Chen 2007: 80) 
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In Ireland In Taiwan 
A post-independence cultural nation-
building period coincides with economic 
protectionism and high emigration. After 
1958 the state plays a key role in shifting 
towards a new phase of developmental 
nation building. 
 
Developmental nation-building coincides 
with constitutional claims on Northern 
Ireland. However, Ireland becomes anti-
isolationist, abandoning protectionism in 
1964, joining the EEC in 1973. 
Notwithstanding a political focus on the 
Northern Ireland conflict (1969–1994), 
Irish-Ireland cultural nationalism declines 
in influence. Emigration persists from 
much of this period particularly during the 
1950s and 1980s. 
 
Economic nation-building coordinated by 
the state and legitimized through 
corporatist politics. Ireland becomes a 
flexible developmental state with a 
strategic focus on encouraging 
unrestricted MNC capital investment 
(incentives include low corporation tax 
and tariff-free access to European 
community markets) and availability of 
Irish human capital. 
 
During the Celtic Tiger Period (post-
1994) developmental nation-building 
unhampered by cultural nation-building 
goals. National interest predominantly 
defined in terms of GNP. 
 
Celtic Tiger fed by on-going expansion of 
labour market to include women, return 
Irish migrants and, from 2000, new 
immigrants 
 
. 
Cultural nation-building coincided with 
economic nation-building in the post 1947 
period. An authoritarian state plays a strong 
command role in both cultural and economic 
nation-building. 
 
 
Economic expansion occurs in a context of 
problematic relationships between the 
Republic of Taiwan (ROC) and the Peoples’ 
Republic of China (PRC). It coincides with 
decolonization, yet Japan becomes a key 
inward investor. Taiwanese development 
emphases indigenous control of capital 
investment and bottom-up growth of 
industrial capacity. Taiwan categorized as a 
Bureaucratic Development State. 
 
 
Economic-nation building directed by the 
state within a Bureaucratic Development 
State/ Authoritarian capitalist model. The 
state retains the power to direct economic 
development. It fosters inward capital 
investment but prioritizes Taiwanese 
ownership of capital. 
 
 
 
 
Although martial law is abandoned and multi-
party democracy emerges, cultural nation-
building persists as a political priority under 
the DPP. 
 
 
Taiwanese economic expansion produces 
labour shortages leading to expansion of 
labour market to include women, return 
Taiwanese migrants, and new immigrants 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Cultural, Developmental and Immigration Nation-Building Trajectories in 
Ireland and Taiwan (continues on next page) 
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In Ireland (cont.) In Taiwan (cont.) 
 
Irish state proactively recruits skilled 
emigrant Irish from abroad and explicitly 
encourages immigration from Irish 
diaspora (those with Irish ancestry 
entitled to Irish citizenship). Low-skilled 
co-ethnics not encouraged to migrate to 
Ireland 
 
 
Irish state proactively encourages large-
scale immigration from new EU member 
states (2004) and non-EU states. 
 
In 2004 Irish constitution changed to 
remove jus soli rights to citizenship. New 
immigrants face barriers in becoming 
naturalized. Jus sanguine citizenship 
rights of Irish diaspora unrestricted. 
 
Policy of ethnic preference for high-skilled 
overseas Taiwanese and Chinese migrants. 
Taiwan state proactively recruits skilled 
emigrants, opposes immigration by low-
skilled Chinese entitled to Taiwanese 
citizenship. Low-skilled co-ethnics 
prevented from migrating to Taiwan. 
 
Taiwanese state imposes strict controls on 
labour migration from select countries. State 
inability to control ‘foreign bride’ immigration 
expressed as moral panic. 
 
1992 Employment Act designed to prevent 
new immigrant family formation. 2000 
Citizenship Act designed to impede 
naturalization by new immigrants. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 (continued) 
 
   In both Taiwan and Ireland academic debates about immigration seem to have 
focused to a considerable extent on dominant ethnic group narratives of diaspora 
and return migration. Wider cultural and economic nation-building narratives 
present national stories that in each case have yet to come to terms with new 
immigrants. A combination of domestic economic prosperity and new patterns of 
global migration have in both countries resulted in immigration by co-ethnics and 
by new immigrants. In both countries, new immigrants have been at once invisible 
within nation-state identity politics and narratives of belonging, yet the subject of 
state regulation. When Irish or Taiwanese scholars write about immigration it is 
often difficult for them to break free of dominant nation-building narratives that find 
no place for outsider ‘non-nationals’ or ‘waiguorem’. In both countries there has 
been considerable debate about relationships with co-ethnics – Han Chinese in the 
case of Taiwan and descendants of emigrants in the Irish case – but there seems 
to have been scant discussion about how new immigrants fit into either nation. 
   For example, a 2006 academic study of second-generation migrants from 
mainland China drew analogies with post-1960s migrations from Castro’s Cuba to 
the United States and with migrations of asylum seekers into Fortress Europe from 
the 1990s (Tsay 2006: 751). The thesis of the article, that the descendants of post-
1947 migrants shared characteristics with refugee migrants in other countries, is 
curious, not least because migrants from mainland China dominated Taiwan. 
Generally, refugees do not manage to politically dominate a host state or arrive 
with a large standing army. How such second-generation migrants have faired is 
obviously of immense interest to Taiwanese policy debates. Yet obvious 
comparisons (from a non-Taiwanese perspective) with new immigrants in Taiwan 
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who, like Cubans in America or refugees in Europe, are not co-ethnics of the host 
population are not discussed. A non-Taiwanese reader such as this author might 
wonder why, until informed that the numbers of second-generation new immigrants 
(children of foreigners born in Taiwan) are very low because of strict labour 
migration rules. 
   Ireland by contrast already has a large rising second-generation immigrant 
population. It placed some restrictions on family immigration by non-EU migrants, 
but has otherwise not sought to prevent immigrant family formation. The defining 
response of the Irish state to immigrant children was to remove the citizenship 
birthright from these in 2004. Although overt essentialist nationalism has declined 
in the post-‘Irish Ireland’ developmental era, some vestiges of cultural chauvinism 
have continued to be politically influential. For example, the Belfast Agreement in 
1998 stated that ‘the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish 
ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.’ New immigrants 
and their children to a considerable extent remain invisible within social policy 
debates that tend to focus on the social inclusion of citizens. In the Irish case there 
remains a disjuncture between economic rules of belonging and those pertaining 
to naturalization and citizenship. Ireland’s inclusive response to its diaspora and its 
ambivalence to the integration of new immigrants through naturalization suggest 
that essentialist ethnic conceptions of Irishness continue to have considerable 
salience. Yet, in Ireland as in Taiwan the response of the state to co-ethnics 
abroad has often been ambivalent. The Irish state actively recruited high-skilled 
Irish living abroad and high-skilled descendants of emigrants, but it also prioritized 
the recruitment of high-skilled migrants from other countries. Prior to the 1990s 
economic boom, and now once again, the Irish state has presided over high levels 
of emigration in the national interest. 
   Writing in 2002, Lucie Cheng argued that Taiwan ‘as a state-in-formation in need 
of outside labour, must re-evaluate its state-building ideology’. There were, she 
argued, two possible routes, both calling for new modes of incorporation. Taiwan 
could either privilege foreign labour over mainland Chinese and change its 
descent-centred exclusionist policy, or privilege ethnic Chinese and relax its 
political vigilance towards PRC residents. What seems to have happened is the 
persistence of vigilance towards both. Irish debates have not presented such 
either/or options. During the Celtic Tiger era, the diaspora proved incapable of 
meeting Irish labour shortages, and while symbolic expressions of solidarity with 
the Global Irish play well within Irish debates the dominance of developmental over 
cultural nation-building goals resulted in large-scale immigration from both within 
the EU common travel area and from non-EU countries such as China. 
   Comparative analysis of Taiwan and Ireland has much to contribute to self-
understanding as well as to mutual understanding, particularly in the domains of 
sociology and political economy. In the Irish case the dominant academic literature 
sets up conflicts between cultural and economic nation-building, the dominant 
perception being that hegemonic post-colonial cultural nationalism held the country 
back. Cultural and economic modernization co-existed to a greater extent in the 
Taiwanese case, suggesting that this need not have been the case in Ireland. The 
kind of economic nationalism attempted by the Irish during the 1930s – since 
represented by Irish historians as reckless, but perhaps now worthy of reappraisal 
as an attempt to achieve economic sovereignty – proved successful in Taiwan. At 
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a time when Irish sovereignty appears to have been seriously undermined by the 
global economic crisis, Ireland could learn useful lessons from the Taiwanese 
approach to globalization. 
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Abstract 
 
The movement to promote Taiwanese language has been in existence for many 
years, but despite this the language is still struggling for survival. Taiwanese 
literature is still almost invisible in Taiwan, and although Taiwanese language 
education was introduced seven years ago it has not so far succeeded in 
revitalizing the language. By contrast, the Irish Gaelic language revitalization 
movement has proved a success. This paper considers what the Taiwanese 
language revitalization movement can learn from the Irish, by comparing the 
political contexts in each location, the native literature movements, the language 
policies, and the language movements. In particular, it considers the significance 
of the principal institutional supports which have been put in place to foster Irish 
since the establishment of the Gaelic League in 1893 and the foundation of the 
Irish Free State in 1922. These range from cultural gatherings, print and broadcast 
media to education and law. The Taiwanese language movement needs to 
emulate its successful Irish counterpart, and draw attention to Gaelic Revitalization 
in ways that show their similarities. 
 
Fort Zeelandia 
 
——For the first Taiwanese national hero, Guo Huay 
 
Zeelandia: when transliterated from 
Dutch 
Means to shield from the heat 
To block it outside the fort 
Lock it in the never-ending stretch of 
Brightness 
As if a million poisonous roses 
Bloom on the Jianan Plains 
On the backs of old water buffalos 
In the fort the structures are high 
To cover the sky 
And all of the sights 
From inside the fort 
Outside, a prosperous land 
Inside, brimming silos 
Living in the fort are ever-hungry 
Red haired wolves 
So outside the fort are 
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Ever-hungry water buffalos 
Because for the colonized 
There is nothing but the thorny sun 
 
To comfort them 
Nothing but tired buffalos 
To cry with 
Only the empty silo at home 
To tell of each 
Exploited harvest 
(Oh! The luscious plains 
Each grain of rice shakes her head) 
‘Huayi’ means the remembrance of 
the motherland 
The motherland is a religion 
A religion that allows no heresy 
The god of the Taiwanese 
Huayi believed as his fellow people 
That God will come 
And deliver them from the mouths 
of the red-haired wolves 
They waited and waited 
Persevered and persevered 
Until one day they know that God 
has abandoned them 
That their own fate 
 
Rests in their own hands 
The moon shines on the ides of 
August 
Equally 
On the happy Zeelandia 
And the saddened plains 
On the face of each Taiwanese 
Oh the gods 
May you guide the spirits of those 
who died by the wolves 
May you light up the path of those 
who suffer 
We need a road 
To the battlefield of revolution 
Those we climb over our heads 
We will overthrow them 
Anything we can grasp 
Will become our weapons 
All the years of desperation 
Turned into the tension on our 
bows 
We shot out arrows of fury 
The celebrating red-haired wolves 
suddenly 
 
Ran for their lives 
Blood splattered on them 
Their red fur became more crimson 
Wolves became demons 
Demons increased in number 
Wolves became less and less 
The victory was imminent 
Hope was almost born 
Huayi never would have guessed 
Someone, out of fear and weakness, 
Leaked their plans 
Unthinkably 
That someone was his own blood 
brother 
Out of nowhere 
Like a tidal wave 
Packs of red-haired wolves charged in 
Bared their sharpened fangs 
Lashed at the lives of our brothers 
Took away the glow of hope 
Huayi was killed on the road 
 
Taking nothing but an eternal hatred 
(Oh! The luscious plains 
Each gust of wind sighs) 
But – the blood of the Taiwanese 
will not be shed in vain 
It seeps into the soil 
Nourishes the land 
Protects all generations to come 
One person’s determination 
Became a million seeds 
Hiding under the soil of the luscious 
plains 
Waiting to break free 
Waiting to blossom 
 
──December 1979. 
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Introduction 
 
According to Rubin (1983: 8),1 many Irish scholars believe Gaelic Revitalization2 to 
have been unsuccessful, due to the fact that the originally-intended goal of 
establishing Irish as the household language remained unfulfilled. However, this 
stated aim was not in fact the movement’s real goal. The real goal was for Ireland 
to realize freedom, and to become an independent nation. From this perspective, 
Gaelic Revitalization was quite successful, although not entirely so, given that 
Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom today. Still, even if one 
considers only the language movement of Northern Ireland, there are successful 
aspects that warrant our study. 
   Taiwanese nationalists have enthusiasm for discussions relating to Ireland, 
particularly those that relate to literary and cultural areas. The fact that English 
settlers in Ireland continue to write and speak in English has often been used to 
rationalize how the Taiwanese continue to speak and write in Mandarin, even as 
far as to assert that eliminating Chinese ways is both unnecessary and 
impossible. 3  However, Gaelic Revitalization was one of the key factors in 
facilitating Irish independence, and one of its core tenets was, in the words of a 
speech at the Irish National Literary Society in Dublin in 1892, ‘The Necessity for 
De-Anglicizing Ireland’. 
  Taiwan needs to further understand Gaelic Revitalization, and to see what can be 
learnt from the Irish. 
 
Political, Language Census and Structure 
 
Gaeilge is considered to be a form Gaelic, in modern days represented by three 
main languages: the modern Irish, the Scottish Gaelic, and Manx (collectively 
known as Q-Celtic4). According to Ahlqvist (1993), the Irish language ceased to be 
commonly used as a mean of communication among all economic classes by 
around 1600, and by 1851 there were 32,000 Irish speakers out of a population of 
about 6.5 million. 5  The Gaelic League was formed in 1893 to revitalize the 
language, and by 1926 the number of Irish speakers had risen to more than 
500,000, about a sixth of the total population of the Irish Free State. In 1981, 1 
million of the 3.2 million citizens of the Republic of Ireland spoke Irish (Ahlqvist 
1993: 10), and a recent census has shown that a third of the current population of 
3.9 million speaks the language.6 
                                                 
1
 Rubin uses the term ‘language planning’. 
2
 ‘Ireland’ in this paper refers to both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
3
 This is the view of prominent Taiwanese political and cultural activists such as Lim Lo-Tsui 
and Li Bin-Long. 
4
 Q-Celtic or Goidelic, which includes Welsh and Breton, is different from P-Celtic or 
Brythonic, which includes Cornish (Hale 2001: 299). 
5
 According to Máirtín Ó Murchú (1985: 2), fewer than 12.66 per cent of children under ten 
in Ireland could speak Gaelic at the time he was writing. 
6
 In 1990, only 10,000 people were native speakers of Gaelic (Ahlqvist 1993, quoting 
Hindley 1990: 251). 
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   In Northern Ireland, 131,974 individuals speak Irish out of a population of 1.6 
million.7 This is approximately 8.8 per cent of the population; 78.1 per cent of the 
Irish-speaking group are under the age of 44, and 59.9 per cent of Irish speakers 
can read and write Irish. This shows the success of the Gaelic Revitalization in the 
North. 
 
Gaelic Revitalization 
 
The Language Movement of the Republic of Ireland 
 
Ever since the beginning of Irish nationalism, the revitalization of the Irish language 
has been emphasized. Douglas Hyde, later the first president of the Republic of 
Ireland (1937–1945), joined W.B. Yeats and others in 1892 to create the Irish 
Literary Society, which was where he delivered his manifesto ‘The Necessity of 
De-Anglicizing Ireland’. Hyde explained the importance of language to culture, 
stating that ‘I wish to show you that in Anglicizing ourselves wholesale we have 
thrown away with a light heart the best claim which we have upon the world's 
recognition of us as a separate nationality’ (Daly 1974). 
   The following year, Hyde established the Gaelic League. It declared itself to be a 
non-political, non-partisan organization, with the goals of protecting and revitalizing 
the Irish language, literature, music, dance, and recreation, and of encouraging 
Irish arts. It welcomed anyone who was interested in Irish culture, and especially 
unionists. To many people’s surprise, the movement soon successfully spread 
throughout Ireland, each branch attracting between 50 and 300 members from 
across all social classes and ages. The League's most important task was the 
teaching of the Irish language; wealthier members who owned houses used their 
spare rooms for classes and meetings, while others used public halls or school 
classrooms (Coffey 1938: 58). Support for unionism weakened. 
 
Northern Ireland's Language Revitalization Movement 
 
In Northern Ireland, the Irish language was virtually extinct as a native language by 
the 1950s. In the following decade, however, eleven families decided that they 
wanted an environment in which their children could be raised to speak Irish. Their 
goal seemed difficult: they lived in an English-language city, and they themselves 
had learnt Irish only in their adolescence. At economic cost to themselves, they 
came together to form a Gaeltacht community. This community not only survived 
the pressure of an English-language environment; they had a decisive influence on 
their neighbourhood, creating a dual-language neighbourhood. The Shaw's Road 
Community further stimulated other Northern Ireland businesses, particularly 
relating to the media and education. 
 
Comparison with the Taiwanese Language Movement 
 
Although the beginning of Gaelic Revitalization can be identified as the founding of 
the Gaelic League in 1893, the beginning of the Taiwanese language movement is 
                                                 
7
 According to the 2001 census, the exact figure was 1,685,267. 
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more difficult to pinpoint. We could consider the movement to have begun in 1930, 
although at this time it was limited to written texts and did not encourage language 
revitalization, Taiwanese education, or change in language policies. As will be 
discussed below, it was a ‘Taiwanese literary movement’ rather than a ‘Taiwanese 
language movement’, and it was brought to an end in 1937, when the Japanese 
banned all Chinese language. Its goals were far from those of the Gaelic League, 
which promoted both language and cultural identity. 
   In the 1970s, several writers expressed their determination to write in 
Taiwanese, but there were no organizations or community until the 1990s, when 
several groups were established 
 
• 1991: The Sweet Potato Poetry Club; 
• 1992: The Taiwanese Writing Forum; 
• 1992: The Association for Taiwanese Language and Literature; 
• 1995: The Association for Promoting Taiwanese; 
• 2001: The Association for Taiwanese Romanization. 
 
Some of these organizations emphasize literature or linguistics, while others 
emphasize language. However, even though the movement is no longer a 
competition among individuals to showcase their own ideas of orthography, the 
movement is now a competition among organizations. Each has its own system of 
pinyin, creating inconvenience and stymying the overall progression of the 
language movement. By contrast, because the Irish language movement began 
with a charismatic leader and transliteration has long since been standardized, the 
Irish have had the advantage of organizations unifying quickly. Consequently, even 
though their first few years did not see vast growth, they quickly saw 
breakthroughs. 
   However, in March 2004 World United Formosans for Independence was 
established, combining the resources of organizations in support of the Taiwanese 
language movement both on Taiwan and worldwide. This organization is the only 
one that approximates with the Gaelic League. Due to the youth of this 
organization, it remains to be seen whether its efforts on behalf language 
revitalization will match those of the Gaelic League. 
 
Language Movements 
 
The Literary Movement in Ireland 
 
The Gaelic League was first established with two goals: revitalizing the Irish 
language into a daily language and publishing new Irish literature. The leader of 
the Gaelic League, Douglas Hyde, already used Irish to compose poems, plays, 
and publish folklore; Hyde and the movement were fervently supported by his good 
friend W.B. Yeats, and Yeats even predicted that the future would consider their 
time to be the time of Hyde. This prediction was completely accurate; Hyde later 
became the father of Ireland, influencing Ireland even today. 
   Yeats’s own poetry is full of Irish myths and legends, and, as Hyde suggested, 
these were absorbed by his readers. However, although he encouraged friends 
both to learn and to use Irish, he did not himself understand Irish, and his own 
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writing was in English (and was thus ‘Anglo-Irish’). He was deeply conflicted over 
language, observing that ‘Gaelic is my native language but it is not my mother 
tongue’, and asking, ‘Can we not build a national tradition, a national literature 
which shall be none the less Irish in spirit from being English in language?’ 
   Ireland's most celebrated poet at the present time, Seamus Heaney, was born in 
1939, the year of Yeats’s death. He declined to be classified as an ‘English poet’ 
when his work was chosen for the Oxford Anthology of English Poetry. 
 
Comparison to Taiwan's Literary Movement 
 
As noted above, the first wave of the Taiwanese language movement was as a 
literary movement. This Ue-bun movement is widely considered to have begun in 
1930, when Ng Si-Hui published his essay ‘Why Not Promote Cultural Literature?’ 
in a newspaper, Ngoo-jin. This essay instigated the first historical Taiwanese 
cultural-literary war. However, references to using the mother tongue in literature 
pre-date 1930. For example, in 1922 Chhoa Poe-Hoe published ‘To Spread the 
Use of Taiwanese Language and Culture’, suggesting the use of Roman letters, or 
Peh-Oe-Ji (POJ), for Taiwanese orthography (Lim 2006: 26). In 1924, Lian Un-
Khing published ‘Taiwanese Language of the Future’,8  while in 1926, Lua Ho 
published ‘Comparison of New and Old Literature in Taiwanese-Japanese 
Newspapers’.9  Meanwhile, Lua Jin-Sing published a Taiwanese novel in 1924, 
entitled Mother’s Tears, and this was followed Tenn Khe-Phuan’s Out of Dead Line 
the year following. 1925 also saw Chhoa Poe-Hoe publish a collection of 
Taiwanese essays, Chap-Hang Koan Kian. Li Khin-Huann suggests that the 
Taiwanese language movement can be traced back to as early as 1916, when 
Rev. Thomas Barclay published a Taiwanese Bible written in POJ, since this 
influenced the usage of Taiwanese. Some people even suggest that the movement 
goes back to Barclay’s Taiwan Church News,10 which began in 1885 and which 
was the earliest newspaper written in Taiwanese. 
   1978 saw the second wave of the cultural-literary war in Taiwan, and the genre 
of ‘Taiwanese literature’ was established. However, mainstream literature 
continued to be written in the colonial language of Mandarin, which was imposed 
by the KMT from 1949 onwards. It was not until 1991 that the Sweet Potato Poetry 
Quarterly became the first publication of an organization created to promote 
Taiwanese, and this folded after seven issues. In 1996, Tai-Bun Bong-Bo was 
established, and there is also a sister magazine, called Tai-Bun Thong-Sin. Tai-
Bun Bong-Bo is published monthly, at eight pages per issue, and as of summer 
2011 176 issues have been published. Two more initiatives were established in 
2001. In January, several mother-tongue literary organizations joined in an alliance 
to form the ‘New Taiwan Native Society’, publishing Taiwanese E-Literary Arts. 
This lasted for just five issues, although the Hai-ang Taiwanese Literary Magazine, 
which was established the following month, was more successful and has so far 
published 115 monthly issues. Taiwanese publications have all either had a small 
                                                 
8
 Published in Taiwan Bin Paper, 2, 20–21. 
9
 Published in Taiwan Bin Paper, 89. 
10
 The original publisher was the Taiwan Hu-siann Church Press, now known as the Taiwan 
Church Press. 
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circulation or short lifespan, and it is arguable whether they have had any 
noticeable influence on the mainstream of Taiwanese literature, which is written in 
Mandarin. 
   In Ireland, literature written in the colonial language does not always dare to call 
itself Irish literature, but often uses the term ‘Anglo-Irish literature’. Writers of 
Anglo-Irish literature are highly respectful of writers who use Irish, as seen in 
Yeats' attitude towards Hyde. This isn't the case in Taiwan, though. Mandarin 
remains the mainstream literary language, and writers of Taiwanese literature do 
not receive respect from Mandarin writers. 
 
Language Policy and Mother-Tongue Education 
 
In the Republic of Ireland, the national language is Irish, and it is also the official 
first language. English is the official second language. 
   In 1995, the United Kingdom and the Irish government signed the ‘New 
Framework for Agreement’, in which both agreed to cooperate on four basic 
principles, including: to reach agreement between the self-governed and the 
governed; to reach ways that are democratic and peaceful; to ensure and respect 
the rights and opinions of both cultures; to facilitate ‘equal and respectful 
treatment’. In 1998, these principles were ratified by the Northern Ireland Peace 
Treaty, which stated that 
 
All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance 
in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, 
Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which 
are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland. 
 
In 2001 the British government agreed to adopt the European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages, allowing positive action to promote the widespread use of 
the Irish language. The Irish language was categorized under Part III of the 
Charter, which gives extensive application to areas such as educational, judicial, 
and administrative systems, as well as to social services, the media, and cultural 
organizations. It also promotes positive measures, such as economic and societal 
and international exchange (Articles 8–14) (Si 2002: 214). The Charter 
encouraged public speaking and writing in Irish, expanded measures to protect 
and develop the language, instructed the Department of Education to place an 
emphasis on teaching the Irish language, and called for funding for Irish film and 
television productions (Si 2002: 212–213). In all elementary and middle schools, 
Irish is a compulsory subject. Some schools even use it as the language of 
education. Irish is also a mandatory subject when testing for admissions to some 
public universities. 
 
Language Policies of Northern Ireland 
 
Currently, the Northern Irish Executive and Assembly has several departments 
relating to language policies. These include: the newly established Department of 
Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL); the Linguistic Diversity Branch, established in 
1999, which is responsible for implementing the European Charter for Regional or 
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Minority Languages; the Office of the First Minister/Deputy First Minister 
(OFMDFM), which is concerned with methods for promoting peace and equality 
among different ethnic groups; the Department of Education, under which is a 
council responsible for handling class grades and curricula involving Irish 
language; and the Council of Ethnic Relations, established in 1990, and its Cultural 
Diversity Programme, responsible for sponsoring related community activities. In 
addition, in accordance with the Northern Ireland Peace Treaty, 1999 saw the 
establishment of the North/South Language Body, directing responsibility for the 
Council of North/South Department Heads, under which two departments are set 
up. These are the Irish Language Department and Northern Ireland Language 
Department, both of which are responsible for promoting their respective 
languages, encouraging both public and private writing and speaking, and 
providing funds, suggestions, support, and research for their parent agencies (Si 
2002: 214–215). 
 
Comparing Taiwanese Language Policies, Mother-Tongue Education 
 
Taiwan's language policy has always been to maintain the colonial language as 
the ‘national language’; during the Japanese occupation this was Japanese, and 
after the war, this was Mandarin. The colonial language has always been 
privileged, and the mother tongue oppressed. This situation did not improve until 
the era of Li Teng-Hui, and even then the improvement was small; although the 
mother tongue was no longer oppressed, it was still neglected. The national 
language policy that continues to privilege Mandarin was not eliminated. However, 
in 2000 the Democratic Progressive Party came to power; the DPP was localist, 
and in 2001 it began to implement mother-tongue education programs. Mother-
tongue education was mandatory during the six years of elementary school, and 
subsequently available as an elective for three years in middle school. However, it 
was a weekly course of only forty minutes. The Mandarin policy remained. 
   In comparison with the political situation of the Irish, the DPP’s advocacy of 
Taiwanese independence takes similar form to that of the Irish Free State in 1921; 
even though independence was not declared, for most purposes the country was 
de facto independent. During this time, the government of the Irish Free State 
supported the ideology of language revitalization. Hence, once the DPP came into 
power it implemented policies in accordance with their language ideologies. 
However, although the leader of the DPP was sympathetic to the mother tongue, 
he did not pursue mother-tongue education with enthusiasm, leading to a state of 
stagnation in this area even after four years of DPP government. 
 
Factors that Contributed to the Success of Irish 
 
Many factors contributed to the success of Gaelic Revitalization, and six major 
elements are outlined below. If the Taiwanese language movement wants to 
succeed, then it must consider carefully, learn diligently, and readjust the ways by 
which the movement approaches various situations. 
 
 
 
184  KHIN-HUANN LI, WITH LIAM MAC MATHÚNA 
 
 
1. Healthy Literary Tradition, Standardized Writing System 
 
Ireland has long had a healthy literary tradition and a standardized writing system; 
hence, even though the language was dying, the mother-tongue revitalization 
movement had tradition as a foundation from the start. This is not the case with the 
Taiwanese language movement, which instead emphasized writing systems. 
Authors invented their own words and writing systems and used idiosyncratic 
grammar; the result was that many people cannot read Taiwanese, and hence do 
not support the movement. The process of standardizing the Taiwanese writing 
system must be sped up. 
 
2. The Direction of the Language Movement was Correct 
 
The Gaelic League established the direction of their revitalization movement from 
the start, aiming to restore their mother tongue to everyday use. With this theme in 
mind, they established branches throughout Ireland, opening classes to teach the 
mother tongue. The League did not place any emphasis on political factors, and as 
an apolitical, cultural movement was able to attract many supporters. As they 
became more familiar with the Irish mother tongue, culture, and history, they 
became increasingly sympathetic to the idea of independence. The Taiwanese 
language movement, by contrast, was overtly political from the beginning, and 
became categorized as a ‘Taiwanese independence’ movement in an era that 
looked unfavourably upon that name. This is another factor that may have 
contributed to the movement's ill start. 
 
3. The Irish Independence Movement was Led by Language Revitalization 
Supporters 
 
The majority of the Irish independence movement's leaders were advocates of 
language revitalization. The Gaelic League's leader, Douglas Hyde, was a 
professor of Irish language as well as a writer and poet in the mother tongue. 
Because of his leadership, the Gaelic League went on to become an important 
organization within the independence movement. For this reason, Hyde was 
elected to be the first president of Ireland following independence. In the 
Taiwanese language movement, even though many linguists and writers are active 
participants in the independence movement, there has not been a situation where 
language movement activists have led the Taiwanese independence movement. 
Meanwhile, political leaders of the Taiwanese independence movement lack 
consciousness of the language movement, especially the current DPP leaders. 
 
4. The Movement's Employment of Many Language Discourses 
 
According to O'Reilly (1999: 148), the Irish language movement utilized many 
strategies of language discourse: cultural discourses, ethnic language discourses, 
minority language discourses, and endangered language discourses. These 
strategies were used in stages as well as concurrently, strategically selecting when 
they were to be used and so reaching optimal effect. If only the ethnic language 
discourse is strongly and repeatedly emphasized, such as is the case with the 
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Taiwanese language movement, then the result may not be the desired goal. The 
movement in Taiwan stresses that if one fails to speak Taiwanese, then one is not 
Taiwanese. 
 
5. Knowing How To Utilize International Movements To Promote Minority Ethnic 
Groups’ Mother Tongues 
 
In the European Union, Northern Ireland took advantage of the sympathy and 
protection which the European Union promotes for minority ethnic languages to put 
pressure on the United Kingdom to great effect (Si 2002: 216). In 2001, UNESCO, 
on International Mother Language Day, declared a list of endangered languages, 
including all of Taiwan's minority mother tongues, and not counting Mandarin. The 
Taiwanese language movement should also use this type of international attention 
to promote Taiwan's minority ethnic mother languages. 
 
6. Establishing a Reward System 
 
Gaelic Revitalization gave the reward of a gold or silver ring to those who passed 
the mother-tongue exams. This is considered a great honour, and one who wears 
such a ring is recognized as one who knows their mother tongue. One also must 
pass the mother-tongue exam to enter public universities, so this can also be a 
type of reward. The Taiwanese language movement should also start establishing 
similar reward systems. 
 
Appraisal of the Contemporary Position of Irish in the Republic of Ireland 
 
The promoters of the Irish language revival did not realize that the race they were 
running in was a marathon, not a sprint, and by the 1960s they were out of breath 
and disheartened. Official Ireland continued to pay lip-service to the aspirations of 
the language movement but no longer really believed in it. This became clear 
when the government did not seek to have Irish – the first language of the State 
according to the 1937 constitution – accorded full official working status, when the 
country joined what was then known as the Common Market in 1973. It was 
content to have Irish designated an official ‘treaty’ language with only a small 
number of core symbolic documents being translated into Irish. At a more popular 
level, this crisis of confidence was paralleled by the fact that the number of schools 
teaching through the medium of Irish outside the Gaeltacht collapsed to just a 
handful at both first and second level by 1973. In retrospect, the 1970s can be 
seen as a watershed, a time of regrouping, when those favouring the language 
revival laid the foundations for the current, reasonably successful, position of Irish. 
The earlier policy of trying to engage the entire population simultaneously in 
language acquisition, use, and shift had been only partially successful. From now 
on, interested groups focussed their efforts on promoting and supporting initiatives 
which were directly linked to increased use of Irish. These efforts were often, but 
not always, actively supported by the state, and tacitly supported by the wider 
community. 
   The past decade has seen many advances in institutional underpinning of Irish. 
The Official Languages Act (2003) sets out the general parameters for the public 
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use of Irish, e.g. in written notices and public address announcements, in the 
obligation on public-funded bodies to provide an Irish version of their annual 
reports, and in the adoption of incremental language promotion plans. Influenced 
by the Canadian experience, this act also established a language commissioner, 
An Coimisinéir (the Commissioner), with an office, Oifig Choimisinéir na 
dTeangacha Oifigiúla (Office of the Official Languages’ Commissioner). January 
2007 saw the coming into operation of changes to the EU Treaty which made Irish 
an official and working language of the European Union, albeit introduced on a 
phased step-by-step basis, inter alia to allow for capacity-building among 
translators and interpreters, editors and copy-editors, and legal and other 
administrators, etc. This work has been outlined and contextualized by Dr Regina 
Uí Chollatáin in her paper ‘From Tracts to Twitter’ (2009), particularly in relation to 
Lárionad de Bhaldraithe do Léann na Gaeilge, UCD (The UCD de Bhaldraithe 
Centre for Irish Language Scholarship), of which she is the founding Director. 
Proceeding from these positive developments, the Government approved a 20-
Year Strategy for the Irish Language on 30 November 2010. The Strategy was 
launched by An Taoiseach (Prime Minister) on 21 December 2010. As it was 
supported by all the main political parties, it is expected that it will be implemented 
over the coming years. The Government’s Strategy as set out in this document is 
organized around: 
 
• increasing the knowledge of Irish; 
• creating opportunities for the use of Irish; 
• fostering positive attitudes towards its use. 
 
Visitors to Ireland coming through Dublin airport and driving into the city centre can 
scarcely fail to notice that Irish is all around. Irish appears alongside English on 
airport signage, place-names in Irish are seen above English versions on the 
motorway, Dublin’s street names are bilingual, every car registration plate bears 
the name of a county in Irish only, the universities have bilingual signage, and the 
bus lanes have ‘Lána Bus’ (‘Bus Lane’) painted on them in Irish only. Irish is an 
official language, and it in fact makes things official – if your car is clamped, the 
document fixed to your wind-screen wiper will be very much in Irish as well as in 
English. But visitors won’t hear much Irish. If they travel on the Luas light-rail and 
train systems, they will hear pre-recorded announcements in Irish as well as 
English. Visitors may encounter Irish-medium TV and radio and hear Irish being 
spoken on air as they check out the various stations on the remote controls in their 
hotel rooms. But they won’t hear much conversation in Irish; why not? 
   The simple answer is because relatively few people speak Irish at home or 
socially. That is certainly true, as demonstrated by census statistics concerning 
Irish use. But there are other reasons, less obvious ones, such as social norms 
which create barriers. Conventionally, Irish is spoken by people who know each 
other, and who know that their interlocutors are competent in Irish and prefer to 
use the language. However, if three people speaking Irish together in a group are 
joined by a fourth person who has English only, the three Irish-speakers will switch 
to English. They will not want to exclude the English-speaker, and it is considered 
impolite to do so. It is scarcely ever done. This is because in Ireland there are not 
really two different language communities, as there are in Canada, or multiple 
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language groups as there are in Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland. There is no 
great divide between English-speakers and Irish-speakers. All Irish people speak 
English and a considerable number, over 40 per cent, are to some extent bilingual, 
on a spectrum from complete fluency in Irish to those having just a few words, 
known as the cúpla focal (‘a few words’). Irish tends to be spoken in more formal 
situations, in school, in the media, and at meetings, which are more predictable 
and easier for learners to handle. Informal situations in the home or in noisy pubs 
at closing time do not lend themselves to accommodating learners or strangers. 
But the English–Irish spectrum is being extended. On her visit to Ireland in 2011, 
Queen Elizabeth of England spoke a few words of Irish at a dinner in her honour: 
‘A Uachtaráin agus a chaired’ (‘President and friends’). A few days later, the US 
President, Barack Obama, urged on an enthusiastic crowd in Dublin city centre 
with the slogan ‘Is féidir linn’, an Irish version of his catch-cry ‘Yes we can’. In other 
words, the cúpla focal is going global, finding its place within Anglicized Western 
culture in general. 
   But there are certainly other, more home-grown, positive indicators of the 
progress that Irish has made, perhaps none more so than the success of the 
television channel TG4, which broadcasts primarily, but by no means exclusively, 
in Irish. If we fast-forward from Douglas Hyde’s experiences of around 1890, when 
native speakers of Irish were ashamed to speak the language, to 2011, we can 
see an amazing difference. In the latest general election held in the Republic of 
Ireland in February 2011, we find that for the first time ever it was possible for 
there to be a party leaders’ debate in Irish. The three leaders of the main political 
parties participated in an hour-long discussion. All three had learned Irish mainly 
through the educational system, and they all acquitted themselves well in their 
second language. This event created quite a public stir and the broadcast on TG4 
attracted over 400,000 viewers. 
   It can be argued plausibly that the current globalizing phenomenon of English as 
a second language and the consequent reduction in the domains of activity and 
use available to many, if not most, of the world’s other languages, big and small, 
means that the situation of Irish is no longer as singular as it once seemed. 
Indeed, the unfolding Irish, European, and global linguistic scenarios have the 
potential to create in the twenty-first century a more or less stable Irish-English 
bilingualism which was not envisaged when English began to replace Irish as a 
community language 300 years ago. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Aside from languages brought by recent immigrant, languages found in Ireland are 
Gaelic, Northern Ireland Scots, and English. In contrast, there are 14 languages in 
Taiwan. This high number creates complications; because the Holo-speaking 
subgroup of the Taiwanese language population was stronger, they were often 
stereotyped as ‘Holo chauvinists’, a contradiction that those opposed to the 
Taiwanese language movement and supporters of unification both use against the 
movement. However, this should not be an excuse for the movement's progress to 
stagnate. The Taiwanese language movement needs to emulate its successful 
Irish counterpart, and draw attention to Gaelic Revitalization in ways that show 
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their similarities. In this way, differences between the two movements cannot be 
used as a reason to oppose the Taiwanese language movement. 
   The nature of the Taiwanese language movement is close to that of the Gaelic 
Revitalization of the Gaelic League, although the Taiwanese language movement 
is young still. We hope our course will be like that of the Gaelic Revitalization, and 
that in 27 years, we will see the same fruit of success as was seen by Gaelic 
Revitalization. 
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Introduction 
 
The unresolved conflict between the Republic of China in Taiwan (RoC, hereafter 
Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains one of the world’s 
great potential flash points. While largely contained over the last six decades by, 
amongst other things, the involvement of the United States, which supplies a 
security blanket in the region, the PRC still maintains the right to use force if 
necessary to deal with any unilateral declarations of independence on the part of 
Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwan maintains a de facto independence, while trying to 
carve out its own international space under significant military and diplomatic 
pressure from Beijing. 
   In the last decades, policy makers on both sides of the Taiwan Straits have 
looked at models that might potentially offer some sustainable resolution to this 
inherently destabilizing situation. This paper will look at what lessons from the long 
negotiations over the status of Northern Ireland in the UK might give to resolving 
the issues between Taiwan and the PRC. While there is much dissimilarity, the 
handling of Northern Ireland does show the final need for a political process 
beyond the threat of the use of military or other forms of violence. And it also offers 
some specific policy measures that might be transferable to other areas of conflict. 
While all conflicts like this are necessarily very specific, there are certain key 
elements that they share. This paper will attempt to identify those. 
 
Northern Ireland: The Long March to Peace 
 
The modern conflict in Northern Ireland has its source in centuries of complicated 
migrations, political, religious and social conflicts, and mismanagement by local, 
and mainland British, elites. The historian Norman Davies, discussing the mass 
migration, over the space of only a decade, of settlers originally from Scotland into 
the six northern counties of the island of Ireland after the conquest of the territory 
                                                 
1
 I am grateful for Dr Rex Li of Liverpool John Moores University and Keith Bennett for 
reading over a draft of this and offering comments and corrections. I am also grateful to Dr 
F.-L. Shih for suggesting the idea of this essay, and for the very helpful comments made by 
members of the seminar held at the LSE in May 2010, which I have attempted to reflect in 
this paper. 
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during the Tudor period in the sixteenth century, calls this a ‘fatal harvest’. 
Supported by the government in London, new settlers set up crown colonies and 
implemented segregation against the local inhabitants. They came with different 
religious and cultural values, and created a new economy. But as Davies wistfully 
comments, the conflicts created by this process were to be deep and long-lasting: 
‘Nearly four hundred years later, the fatal harvest is still being reaped’ (Davies 
1999: 482). 
   These conflicts ebbed and flowed over the coming centuries, but the strong 
desire for independence, at least in the southern part of Ireland, led to the Home 
Rule movement in the nineteenth century, and, after a guerrilla war from 1919 to 
1921, and Civil War from 1921 to 1923, to the creation of the Irish Free State, 
largely autonomous from the mainland British government. It adopted its own 
constitution in 1937, and assumed the status of the Republic of Ireland in 1949. 
The six counties of Northern Ireland were also largely self-governing over this 
period, operating as a division of the United Kingdom under the Government of 
Ireland Act 1920. Large parts of its population, mostly descended from Protestant 
settlers, opposed moves to Home Rule and unification with the southern part of the 
island because of the fear that they would be a minority overwhelmed by ‘Catholic 
hegemony’. The province maintained its own parliament and prime minister till 
1972, when direct rule was imposed from Westminster. 
   The roots of this modern period of unrest can be found in long-simmering 
discontent about discrimination practised against Catholics in the province, from 
housing, to work, to education. Tied to the protest movements elsewhere in 
Europe in the 1960s, these found widespread support amongst the Catholic 
population. One march in 1969 ended in violence, which, as it spread, caused the 
government in London to send in the British Army to restore order. This ushered in 
the era of the Troubles, which were to take over 3,500 lives. From 1970, the army 
was to play an increasing role in the security control of the area. Ironically, while 
they had first been involved in order to protect the Catholic population from Loyalist 
attacks, they were to become the main focus of aggression and anger afterwards 
from Catholics, and cited as proof that the province was in fact under illegitimate 
occupation.2 
   Northern Ireland under direct rule was to enter a bitter period of almost three 
decades of bloodshed and conflict. The main body agitating for full independence, 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), was initially able to fund armed 
attacks against the local security forces, and against Loyalist opponents. Its main 
political supporting arm was the political party Sinn Fein. In the late 1970s, and into 
the 1980s, violence continued, and any political settlement eluded a succession of 
British Prime Ministers. Only with renewed attempts to negotiate with Sinn Fein in 
the early 1990s under the leadership of the then-British Prime Minister John Major 
did the possibility of a political resolution to the problems in the province become 
greater. This was pursued by Tony Blair on his election in 1997, resulting in the 
Good Friday Agreement a year later, providing the framework for a model of 
devolution and power-sharing between the various political parties and interest 
groups in the province. The elements of this will be discussed below. A local 
devolved parliament was set up in 2001, and existed until its suspension in 2005, 
                                                 
2
 For a brief account of the start of the Troubles, see Marr (2007: 315 onwards). 
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after which it was finally re-established in 2007. In 2010, one of the most important 
landmarks was passed, when responsibility for courts and security was handed 
over to the Northern Ireland Assembly leaders. Alongside the IRA declaration of 
the end of the armed struggle in 2004, and an acceptance of pursuing their 
objectives through the political process, this has contributed to a cessation to most 
(but not all) of the violence, and stable governance in the area. Tony Blair’s 
dogged, persistent commitment stands out as perhaps his most important 
achievement. ‘Peace in Northern Ireland was Tony Blair’s crowning claim to have 
achieved something of enduring historical greatness with his premiership’, as one 
political commentator has written, summarizing his period in power in the UK 
(Rawnsley 2010: 433). 
 
Taiwan and the PRC 
 
The island of Taiwan, off the southeast coast of mainland China, had become a 
part of the Qing Empire (1644–1911) during one of the empire’s most expansionist 
periods in the late seventeenth century (Rowe 2009: 76–78). Annexed by the 
Japanese from 1895, the island returned to the victorious Nationalist (KMT) 
government on the mainland for a mere four years from 1945, while the 
Nationalists fought a bitter civil war with the Communists (CCP). This was to end in 
1949 with the defeat of the KMT, and the flight of over a million of their people, and 
the leadership itself, to Taiwan. From here, the KMT leader Chiang Kaishek 
claimed sovereignty over the whole of China, and took China’s seat at the United 
Nations. Neither the CCP in Beijing, nor the KMT in Taipei, ceded defeat, and both 
maintained their own specific version of the Cold War throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, from time to time coming close to outright conflict without ever actually 
tipping into war. While the PRC under Mao Zedong was preoccupied with various 
massive internal political struggles, like the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 
1961, and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, the KMT in Taiwan enjoyed 
recognition and protection from the United States, and the ability to build up 
Taiwan’s economic capacity. By the 1970s, Taiwan was one of the best-performing 
economies in the region (Brown 2009: 2–3). 
   A major setback for Taiwan was the reestablishment of diplomatic links between 
the US and the PRC in 1972 with the visit or President Richard Nixon to the PRC, 
and the loss by the KMT of its seat at the United Nations only the year before. With 
the shifting of formal diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan to the PRC in 1979 
by the United States, the only consolation was the passing of the Taiwan Relations 
Act, which committed the US to helping Taiwan defend itself in the event of a 
military attack from the PRC. In the 1980s, Military Law was lifted, and opposition 
parties were tolerated, leading in 1996 to the first ever direct elections on the 
island. By 2000, one of the opposition parties, the DPP under Chen Shui-Bian, had 
won power, forcing the KMT into opposition for the first time in six decades. 
Taiwan had made the transition to a full democracy. 
   The conflict with the mainland, however, continued, causing frequent diplomatic 
hiccoughs and conflicts. From 1972 and the Shanghai Communiqué, the US and 
much of the rest of the world had started to adopt a ‘One China Policy’, stating that 
‘there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China’. This avoided taking sides in the 
conflict, and allowed for the maintenance of the status quo. But both Taiwan and 
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the PRC proactively attempted to win diplomatic recognition from third parties 
throughout the following years, as at least one sign of legitimization. The PRC, as 
its own economic opening-up and reform policy from 1978 started to have impact, 
took increasingly assertive positions on the status of the island, even undertaking 
major military manoeuvres in the Taiwan Straits during the 1996 elections. This 
may have had the unintended consequence of increasing Li Teng-Hui’s share of 
the vote. 
   There remains no peace treaty between the two. In addition, their political 
systems have become increasingly different from each other. The PRC, in the 
words of the US Department of State 2008 Human Rights Report on China, has a 
government structure which is ‘an authoritarian state in which the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) constitutionally is the paramount source of power. Party 
members hold almost all top government, police, and military positions. Ultimate 
authority rests with the 25-member political bureau (Politburo) of the CCP and its 
nine-member standing committee.’ It is one of only five remaining states in which a 
Communist Party maintains a monopoly of power. Taiwan, on the other hand, has 
held a series of elections which have been notable for their openness, 
competitiveness, and stability. Power returned to the KMT in 2008 with the election 
of Ma Ying-Jeou. There is an independent judiciary, and a free media. 
 
Northern Ireland and Taiwan: Differences 
 
The issue of sovereignty lies at the heart of the conflict in Northern Ireland, and 
also over Taiwan. For Northern Ireland, it is a case of one significant portion of the 
population of the six counties saying that it wants self-determination and 
independence, and opposing the sovereignty of the government of the United 
Kingdom in Westminster. The Republic of Ireland also claims sovereignty over the 
North, in its constitution. In Taiwan, it is the case of a territory with de facto 
sovereignty which is threatened with military action and reprisals if this is asserted, 
and which is also denied international space within which to assert sovereignty. 
These remain two different aspects of one issue. Sovereignty and self-
determination also relate to the recent conflicts in the Aceh province of Indonesia, 
and the Occupied Territories in Israel. There are plenty of other, less high profile, 
examples. 
   In terms of the internal impact of this, there are significant differences. For 
Northern Ireland, from 1970 onwards there were high levels of violence, suffered 
by all sides in the dispute. The willingness of the IRA and Loyalist paramilitary 
groups to deploy violence for political ends gave the conflict its distinctive 
characteristics. It also made it particularly dangerous and destabilizing. The IRA 
was able to secure funds internationally from the USA, and from other terrorist 
groups, to arm themselves, and to build up a powerful capacity. While the military 
activists may never have numbered more than a few hundred, there were enough 
to cause huge economic disruption, and to allow for the waging of a number of 
bombing campaigns on the British mainland. The IRA was also able to assassinate 
major political figures from the UK, including Earl Mountbatten, the Queen’s 
cousin, in 1979. Conservative MP Airey Neave was murdered by a Republican 
splinter group, the Irish National Liberation Army, the same year. As a self-
described ‘liberation’ movement, these groups were able to establish a 
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sophisticated and very real security threat, seen most dramatically in the bombing 
of the Brighton Grand Hotel in 1984 during the Conservative Party conference, 
while Margaret Thatcher and most of her cabinet were in the building. The British 
internal intelligence service made combating the IRA one of their main objectives 
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, and the IRA’s campaigns had a 
significant economic impact (see Andrew 2009: 734–752). 
   Between Taiwan and the PRC, while there has been the continual threat of 
violence, and, in the early period from 1950, skirmishes involving both sides over 
islands lying off the coasts of the PRC, there has not been any overt movements of 
pro- or anti-unification forces in Taiwan, or anti-Taiwanese independence forces in 
the PRC, that have mounted campaigns, or which had either the capacity or the 
desire to assassinate, bomb, or use disruption and violence for political ends. The 
threat of violence has been government-to-government, between the Beijing and 
the Taipei regimes, through the huge build-up of military capacity along the 
Fujianese coast. In Northern Ireland, it has largely been the army of the central 
British state pitted against that of the IRA or other para-military groups. These are 
absent in the conflict between Taiwan and the PRC. This is not to say that violence 
has not figured in the recent history of the PRC and Taiwan. In 1989, for instance, 
there was the bloody suppression of the student demonstrations in Beijing, and in 
Taiwan under martial law there were several clampdowns from 1949 and into the 
1980s. But these were internal incidents, rather than related to the question of the 
relationship between each other, and their separate statuses. 
   Nor does religion enter into the Taiwanese–PRC situation, as it does in Northern 
Ireland. While there were significant numbers of native aborigine Taiwanese on the 
island when the KMT established its government there in 1949, they have become 
a minority in Taiwan today, and the PRC in its language about Taiwanese 
‘compatriots’ likes to stress that they are of one blood, and one culture. They 
certainly share large linguistic similarities. In Northern Ireland, however, religion 
has been a dominant issue, with those largely supporting independence being 
Catholic, and those wishing to remain in the Union being Protestant. This has 
given deep ideological and cultural traction to the differences between the 
conflicting parties. 
   Finally, while Taiwan and the PRC remains a dispute between two parties over 
who has legitimate rights over the sovereignty of Taiwan, the dispute in Northern 
Ireland involves four parties: there are those in Northern Ireland who are pro-
independence and those who are against independence and wish to remain within 
the Union of the United Kingdom, as well as the central British state and the 
Republic of Ireland state. 
 
Conflict Resolution 
 
Despite these significant differences, there is nevertheless a feeling that conflict 
reduction and resolution measures that worked in one case might be useful in 
another. This motivated Sinn Fein leaders to offer to help negotiators in the 
Palestinian–Israeli conflict in the 1990s and 2000s. Mediation through the Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs was effective with getting the Indonesian 
government and the Acehnese resistance groups around the negotiating table in 
2004, leading to what has turned out to be an enduring peace agreement over an 
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area that had known deep, and violent, conflict since 1976. Can the Northern 
Ireland peace process have any implications for others looking to resolve long-
term conflicts, in particular that between Taiwan and the PRC? 
   To answer that, one must look at the basic agreement between all sides, 
embodied in the Belfast, or Good Friday, Agreement, which was signed on 10 April 
1998 after months of negotiations. To get to this stage, there had been big 
compromises on the part of Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionist Party. For Sinn Fein, 
there was a realization that armed conflict through the IRA had run out of steam, 
and was unable to deliver the final outcomes that were desired. These were a 
political settlement, one that would be sustainable, and the route for that, as Gerry 
Adams (Sinn Fein’s main leader and a key supporter of the whole peace process) 
said at the time, was through the ballot box. For the Ulster unionists there was also 
a feeling that continuing with zero-sum confrontations was leading nowhere. 
People in the province were tired of over two decades of constant violence, and of 
its economic impact. Many of the old divisions and bigotries had weakened, and in 
some places disappeared. The highly tribal element of some groups in society had 
diminished. While the rest of the UK and Europe were enjoying a continuing 
economic boom, Northern Ireland felt that its economy was still performing badly, 
with high unemployment and over-reliance on central government and EU, 
assistance. Public pressure and international diplomatic pressure on the 
leadership of both sides was increasing. With Tony Blair’s focus on resolving the 
issues in the province, the final piece of the jigsaw puzzle fell into place, and the 
conditions for reaching an agreement were finally reached. 
   The Good Friday Agreement addressed a number of concerns. A high priority 
was given to starting a process of reconciliation, along with doing something about 
the continuing existence of weapons and arms being used in the province. A third 
priority was to create the political structures that would give all parties in the 
dispute a fair voice and an opportunity to put across their views, through 
proportional representation in the province and constitutional guarantees of 
inclusive governance. The Agreement, therefore, set out firstly the existence of a 
Northern Ireland Assembly, elected by local people, with devolved powers. 
Proportional representation methods were used to ensure that the full complexity 
of public opinion in the province was recognized. There were a range of other 
issues dealt with in the agreements: 
 
• Release of prisoners from organizations observing the ceasefire; 
• Establishment of a human rights commission; 
• Legislation to promote equal opportunities between Catholics, Protestants, 
and other sectors of the population; 
• Reform of the police and security services, agreement for the cantonment of 
weapons, and the demilitarization of the province; 
• Commitment by all parties to use democratic and peaceful means and to 
strive for cross-community consensus; 
• Agreement with the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the UK over 
cross-border issues. 
 
   There were a number of elements in the agreement that addressed the repeal of 
previous legislation, such as the Government of Northern Ireland Act 1920, and the 
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sensitive use of language about the actual name of the territory.3 In order to carry 
legitimacy, the agreement was put before the public of Northern Ireland and 
Ireland in the form of a referendum in May 1998, and passed with large majorities 
in both (71 per cent in Northern Ireland in favour, 94 per cent in the Republic). 
 
The Mainland and Taiwan Proposals for Peace 
 
The Good Friday Agreement was the result of painstaking negotiations between 
two widely divergent sides, with a number of other partners in between, in order to 
forge political consensus on how to handle the status and governance of Northern 
Ireland. The key agreement, however, was to use ‘democratic and peaceful 
means’ and to deal with issues through the ballot box and the political process 
rather than through violence, with the objective of arriving at cross-community 
consensus. Without acceptance of this on the part of all those involved, nothing 
would have been possible. One of the most successful strategies of the agreement 
was to put the most difficult and contentious issues down for discussion later in the 
process. The first steps were simply to agree to talk, within a broad political 
framework. I remember, in looking at the Northern Ireland Peace Process as a 
potential model in some respects for the Aceh conflict in Indonesia while working 
as a Foreign Office official, interviewing officials from the Northern Ireland Office in 
2004. One of their observations was that beyond the acceptance of the peace 
process, the key objective was to stop violence, to have an agreed framework for 
political settlement, and to deal with issues like ‘obnoxious legislation’ (the freeing 
of those formerly imprisoned for terrorist acts) and cantonment of weapons. All of 
these were eventually achieved, and helped build confidence between the various 
parties in the peace process. 
   For Taiwan, there is an overarching framework for agreement between the two 
sides across the straits. This was first reached in 1992 during meetings between 
officials from the PRC and Taiwanese governments, when they agreed that there 
was only one China. Of course, depending on which side, there is the massive 
issue of which part of China has sovereignty over the other: the PRC or Taiwan. 
But this very informal agreement, subsequently called the ‘1992 Consensus’, at 
least gave the basis for future discussions by parking the most difficult issue of all, 
and remains in place, despite disagreements from independence-supporting 
groups in Taiwan, to this day. It has been referred both by former president Chen 
Shui-Bian and current president Ma Ying-Jeou as the basis for any future 
discussions on the status of relations between the two entities. 
   On the part of the PRC there have been two major policy statements about the 
approach to resolving cross-straits issues. One was made by the former President 
of the PRC, Jiang Zemin, in January 1995. This has been called the ‘Eight-Point 
Proposal’. These points are: 
 
a) Adhering to the principle that one China is the basis and prerequisite for 
peaceful reunification. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity must never 
be allowed to suffer division; 
                                                 
3
 The full text of the agreement can be found on the website of the Northern Ireland Office. 
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b) Allowing for the development of nongovernmental economic and cultural ties 
between Taiwan and other countries; 
c) Holding negotiations with Taiwan authorities on the peaceful reunification of 
the motherland; 
d) Aiming to achieve the peaceful reunification of China, since Chinese should 
not fight Chinese, but willing to use force to resolve the issue if necessary 
against foreign forces who intervene; 
e) Developing economic exchange and cooperation between the two sides 
separated by the Taiwan Straits; 
f) Promoting cultural tie keepings; 
g) Respecting the rights of Taiwanese; 
h) Welcoming and encouraging leaders of Taiwan to visit the mainland and 
mainland officials to visit Taiwan.4 
 
These eight proposals combine a series of what can be called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
measures to bring the two sides together. Cultural and logistic links belong to the 
latter. Developing political links is also important. However, the key provision in this 
proposal is the non-relinquishment of the right to use force, and the firm 
commitment to maintaining the issue of Taiwan as a domestic, and not 
international, issue. The link between international support and the resolution of 
crisis in a domestic conflict does have some parallels with Northern Ireland, and is 
something that is worth reflecting on. The UK government did regard the status of 
the province as a purely domestic issue. However, funds for the IRA in their 
struggle, and their supply of arms, came from supporters outside of the province, 
and indeed outside of the UK. There were constant issues of funds coming from 
Irish-Republican sympathizers in the US, and frequent high-level representations 
by the British government to stop this happening. There was also in the 1980s 
supply of arms and funds from the regime of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya. This meant 
that there was an unavoidable international aspect to the situation, and one which 
had to be acknowledged by including international actors like the US and the EU in 
the final process. Only with the final control of these, and other, international 
sources of support was a political settlement in Northern Ireland made possible, 
and indeed the involvement of the US through an independent observer was 
maintained throughout the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. While 
the PRC has resolutely asserted its desire not to see the issue of Taiwan 
‘internationalized’, therefore, one thing it might learn from the Northern Ireland 
peace process is that the outside world can be the source of solutions as well as 
problems. The main issue is how to include it in the whole process. 
   That the PRC has not renounced force in the issue of Taiwan remains a major 
symbolic block to pursuing deeper proposals for political dialogue. The vision of 
policy makers around paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s was that ‘one 
country, two systems’ could be used to resolve the issue. However, this was in the 
end brought to solve the issue of Hong Kong’s status after reversion to PRC 
sovereignty in 1997 from the British. Once Taiwan had become a fully functioning 
democracy by 1996, this model became much harder to envisage ever working. 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to this day, remains only a partial 
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 For a full summary of the text, see People’s Daily Online (2007). 
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democracy, with a proportion of its legislative council elected, and the rest 
appointed. Arguments continue over the introduction of universal suffrage for the 
position of Chief Executive, something which was promised in 2012, and which 
has now slipped to 2018, and may go even further. 
   Current President Hu Jintao has also made a six-point ‘Proposition on Taiwan’, 
supplementing the issues put forward by Jiang Zemin over a decade earlier, and 
pulling back from the more strongly pro-unification impulses in the previous 
president’s thinking. These included: (1) reaching a common understanding on the 
principle of one China; (2) ending hostility and reaching peaceful agreements 
under the one-China principle; (3) starting discussions between the two sides 
about political relations as a preliminary to reunification; (4) stepping up contacts 
on military issues ‘at an appropriate time’; (5) developing transport and 
communication links across the Straits; (6) promoting cultural exchanges. 
   With the return to power of the KMT in the presidential elections in March 2008, 
the new President Ma Ying-Jeou was seen as pursuing a more conciliatory path 
with Beijing, and Hu’s points have, at least in terms of creating transport and 
communication links between the two sides, been partially implemented. But this 
goes hand-in-hand with the deployment of over 1,000 missile launchers on the 
Fujian coast opposite Taiwan, emphasizing that President Jiang’s threat to deploy 
force if necessary has still not been renounced. 
   Ma’s own position on the status of cross-states relations was contained most 
recently in his National Day Address in October 2009. There he states that the 
objectives of policy towards the PRC were: 
 
• Acceptance of the 1992 Consensus; 
• Support for links through visits to Taiwan by mainland tourists, direct air, 
sea, and postal links, food safety inspections, and cross-strait legal 
assistance; 
• An attempt to extend these into the economic realm with a free trade 
agreement; 
• Defence of Taiwanese national sovereignty and interests, in particular 
protections of its democratic system; 
• Development of friendly relations with both Taiwan and mainland China 
and the promotion of ‘flexible diplomacy’; 
• A national defence strategy of ‘effective deterrence and resolute defence’ 
developing a professional military based to protect the security of Taiwan. 
 
(summarized from Ma 2009) 
 
Despite high-level contacts over the last two years, however, there has been no 
major breakthrough, simply because the main issue, resolving the conflict over the 
sovereignty of Taiwan, remains hugely contentious. Some of the feelings aroused 
by this whole issue were clearly illustrated soon after President Ma’s election, 
when a high-ranking envoy dealing with the Taiwanese issue from the PRC was 
attacked while visiting Taipei on 21 October 2008 (BBC News 2008a). This 
preceded the visit by the head of the Mainland Chinese Association for Relations 
Across the Straits, Chen Yulin, in November, the first visit ever by someone in this 
position (BBC News 2008b). Agreements on direct air, sea, and postal links were 
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made. But with President Ma’s fall in popularity over 2009 because of the state of 
the Taiwanese economy, momentum behind drawing closer to the PRC has 
dropped. Talks, for instance, of a free trade deal in the form of an Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement have proved difficult to progress, though it 
now seems that these are close to finalization. 
   The greatest impediment, however, to any immediate resolution of the issue of 
possible discussions over reunification between the PRC and Taiwan remains that 
they now have two wholly opposed political models. The PRC remains one of the 
world’s last countries (there are only four others) where a Communist Party 
continues to enjoy a monopoly of power. Taiwan has undergone a largely 
successful transition to a democratic model, where there has been a major shift in 
power from one party to another and back again, without any social unrest. This is 
a remarkable achievement. It means that while some Taiwanese might emotionally 
like the idea of reunification, they cannot be relaxed about any final settlement with 
a system which is so different from their own, and where many of their hard-won 
freedoms might be jeopardized. This is reflected in public opinion surveys in 
Taiwan. Were Taiwan and the PRC to start talks about unification tomorrow, what 
sort of model would they use? How would their separate political structures be 
combined, when they are so radically different? How would Taiwan be able to 
assert itself against a country which is many times larger, economically now 
becoming much more powerful, but with very different values and systems, not 
least around those of the rule of law and civil society? It seems that the consensus 
in Taiwan remains, therefore, that until the PRC fundamentally changes its political 
system, talk of deeper unity has to be put on hold. And, being realistic, a 
harmonious unification looks more and more unlikely. Meanwhile, a generation has 
grown up with a much stronger sense of being Taiwanese, who find talk of being 
‘of the same blood and family as the PRC’ increasingly mysterious. The sort of 
family links that existed between those of their parents’ and grandparents’ 
generations have become much weaker with the PRC. To this generation, talk of 
reunification comes down finally to what might be in it for Taiwan, and what they 
seem to gain and lose. On those grounds, the PRC offer is too vague, and has 
decreasing appeal. This remains a unique characteristic of the Taiwan–PRC 
dynamics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Tolstoy famously said at the start of his novel Anna Karenina, ‘Happy families are 
all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.’ The same could be said 
of conflicts between and within countries. This paper has shown that the Northern 
Ireland issue had very specific roots, and that the final agreement to resolve these 
issues came after a long, painful, and sometimes very bloody process. The unique 
feature of the Northern Ireland problem was the community within a territory 
broadly divided along religious and historic lines. These created social and 
economic injustices, which in the 1970s provoked protest and led to an 
independence movement, and the imposition of direct rule and military 
intervention. Searches for a political solution remained elusive until the 1990s, 
when the political commitment of both Prime Ministers John Major and Tony Blair 
finally brought about a framework agreement. The implementation of that, and the 
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renunciation of violence with the creation of a local assembly and devolved power, 
have taken over a decade. 
   There are, however, a number of practical lessons that the Northern Ireland 
process does give. These can be summarized as follows: 
 
• The need to have an overarching political framework agreed by all sides in a 
dispute, where issues are sequenced, and the methods of discussion are 
accepted. The Good Friday Agreement supplied this, and meant that parties 
with a long history of distrust and hostility were at least able to sit down and 
use a common language to try to resolve their differences. Without this 
framework, discussion would have been impossible; 
• The crucial need for top-level political support on both sides of a dispute. 
Prime Ministers John Major and Tony Blair, and even Gordon Brown, over 
the issue of transference of security powers to the Northern Ireland devolved 
assembly in 2010, gave the peace process their full support, and put 
immense political capital into it. Prime Ministers of Ireland also supported it, 
along, finally, with key members of the international community. Therefore, 
for any discussions to be meaningful across the Straits, the support of 
leaders on both sides would be necessary. As of 2012, it is hard to see 
President Hu Jintao or the other key leaders of the CCP being in this 
position where they would be able, and would have the political will, to offer 
this kind of support. They are hugely preoccupied with other issues. This 
means that they are content to support the status quo. Any future moves to 
closer dialogue and discussion would need the absolute support of key 
political figures. And for that, the CCP in particular would have to be highly 
unified in its detailed policy on the treatment of Taiwan, something that is not 
the case at present; 
• The involvement of the international community has to be factored into any 
process. Any moves by the PRC towards Taiwan become, in effect, moves 
that bring in the US. The US remains committed to supporting Taiwan’s 
security through the Taiwan Relations Act 1979. It sent aircraft carriers to 
the region during a difficult period when the first elections were held in 
Taiwan in 1996. According to one analyst I spoke to in 2008, `While Taiwan 
is a democracy and the PRC remains as it is, it would be impossible for the 
US to stand by if the PRC were to make aggressive military moves against 
the island.’ On the other hand, as the Bush presidency showed with Chen 
Shui-Bian, any declarations from Taiwan’s leaders leading towards talk of 
out-and-out independence would also not be supported. While the 
leadership of the CCP in the PRC might, therefore, be highly resistant to 
involving the international community, and suspicious of its role, they should 
also see it as playing a potentially positive role. 
 
   For Taiwan and the PRC, inter-communal violence and religious differences 
have not been important. The main issue has been the status and sovereignty of 
Taiwan, and its right to have self-determination. Since 1949, both sides have 
sparked low-level clashes, especially on some of the smaller islands within 
Taiwan’s territory, but there have not been any outright hostilities. Instead, there 
has been increasingly intense diplomatic movement, with the PRC largely eroding 
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Taiwan’s international space, taking its seat at the UN, winning US diplomatic 
recognition, and then circumscribing and controlling Taiwan’s international space. 
Allowing observer status for Taiwan at the World Health Authority in 2009 was 
considered a major compromise on behalf of the PRC. 
   All this, as stated above, is due to the huge differences between their political 
models. If and when this issue is resolved, most likely through the PRC introducing 
political reforms, then perhaps a reconciliation process and the sorts of structures 
introduced in Northern Ireland might be possible. But that is a huge ‘if’ and is 
unlikely to happen any time soon. 
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Abstract 
 
Given China’s crucial role as one of three actors in a triangular relationship across 
the Taiwan Straits, China’s domestic politics have relevance to developments both 
in Taiwan and in American policy. This paper examines recent changes and 
developing trends in the PRC’s leadership, nationalism, localism, and public 
opinion, all of which will have implications for Taiwan. 
   The Hu–Wen Administration, which marks the fourth generation of PRC 
leadership, advocates using The New Three People’s Principles to implement a 
Harmonious Society of people-centred politics within the context of a ‘New Deal’. 
Although this sentiment was received positively by James Soong during his visit to 
the PRC in 2005, the Administration’s aim is to give long-term legitimacy to the 
CPC’s one-party government, and to ease rising tensions in China’s society. While 
the new leaders make political use of economic growth, they continue to maintain 
strict control over mass media and in many cases remain willing to use force to 
maintain stability. Hu Jintao’s praise of the North Korean regime reflects his 
unwillingness to make any dramatic ideological alterations, although the 2005 
memorial given to Hu Yaobang indicates he is willing to make some popular 
changes. The Anti-Secession Law is for the internal purpose of balancing China’s 
nationalism and localism, rather than for the external purpose of deterring Taiwan 
from seeking to change the status quo. Although the government attempts to make 
use of Chinese nationalism, its huge impact and new form will shake the CPC’s 
legitimacy and the economic growth on which its stability relies. Trends towards 
reverse-nationalism and transnationalism are more concerned with China’s 
democratization than its reunification. Further, given the increasing development 
gap in different regions of China, the emerging localism has conflicting ideas on 
development priorities and distribution, and on the Taiwan question. Three 
perspectives on Taiwan can be found from China’s north to its east and southeast 
regions: war, peace, or compromise. Further, among public opinion, there are 
liberal, realistic, ideological, and identity-constructivist ideas which have evolved in 
relation to the Taiwan question and China’s politics. 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2003, I was the chief editor of and main contributor to a book entitled Jiedu Xin 
Zhengfu (Interpreting New Government]. This was just after the formation of the 
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Hu–Wen Administration at the 16th CPC Congress and the 10th National People’s 
Congress. Several contributors to the book attempted to predict China’s policy and 
the measures it would adopt on topics such as governmental structural reform, 
finance and taxation, state-owned enterprises, agriculture, peasants and rural 
areas, and anti-corruption. I wrote the first chapter, which was a general analysis 
of the new leadership, and the last chapter, which considered foreign affairs policy 
and China’s reunification: i.e., the Taiwan question. However, the publishing 
house, the CPC History Press, thought the topic of Taiwan was so sensitive and 
complicated that the chapter was deleted to avoid possible political trouble. 
   In my deleted chapter, I conclude that that the PRC’s new leadership, consisting 
of comparatively young technocrats, will be less dogmatic in its ideology and more 
pragmatic in governance. As it attempts to spur economic growth, it may also 
carefully initiate long-delayed political reforms and approach social problems in a 
scientific way, thus maintaining lasting stability and giving long-term legitimacy to 
their governance. Since Taiwan is a strategic problem rather than a tactical one, it 
needs much more time and greater attention from China’s economy and politics in 
order to achieve reunification. However, given that the leadership has only from 
five to ten years in power, so long as the authority in Taiwan does not declare an 
independent Taiwan Republic, it will do more than reaffirm the ‘one country two 
systems’ principle, in order to maintain the status quo. If Taiwan’s leaders provoke 
China verbally or promote a referendum, Chinese leaders will probably reduce the 
pressure of rising Chinese nationalism by reaffirming their willingness to use 
military means, either through words and media attacks or by launching a military 
exercise. It may, though, be better to wait and see: Hu Jingtao doesn’t like to 
express the same kind of rhetoric as of that often used his predecessor, Jiang 
Zemin. 
   Since 2003, there have been many changes in China’s politics and policies. On 
the one hand, the Chinese leadership has promoted the idea of ‘the Harmonious 
Society’, but on the other hand it takes tough measures in relation to Chinese civil 
rights activists and has enacted an Anti-Secession Law to reinforce commitment to 
reunification. While China is arguing that its rise is a peaceful development, it 
eagerly wants the EU to remove its arms embargo, and the violence of anti-
Japanese demonstrations makes the world worry again about Chinese 
nationalism. Further, although the Chinese economy is growing continuously, 
internal economic conflicts have increased progressively due to uneven 
development. An emerging localism is challenging the central governmental 
authority, not only in the socio-economic field (trade, investment, taxation, 
environment, education), but also to a greater or lesser extent in relation to political 
and foreign affairs. News media remain tightly controlled, but public opinion is 
diverse and this is widely reflected on the internet and in word-of-mouth 
conversations. This paper will examine the recent changes in PRC leadership, 
nationalism, localism, and public opinion, all of which will have specific implications 
for Taiwan. 
 
Leadership 
 
Since Hu Jintao (head of the CPC, PRC, and People’s Liberation Army) and Wen 
Jiabao (PRC Premier and Member of the Standing Committee of the Political 
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Bureau of CPC) came into power in 2003, their so-called Fourth Generation 
Leadership has made many changes in China’s politics, ideology, society, and 
policy on Taiwan. Overseas Chinese media labelled these as changes as ‘Hu–
Wen’s New Deal’, and domestic media applauded their measures as a ‘People 
First Policy’ or ‘Humane Administration’. There is constant media coverage of their 
inspections and close contacts with ordinary people, along with reports of Hu’s 
words on people’s welfare, as well as Wen’s tears for the poor and the help he 
gave to a peasant-worker for her to get her wage. I will analyse the political 
implications of the Hu–Wen New Deal. 
 
Change 1: From Three Represents to New Three Principles of the People 
 
Although Hu has been a Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo or 
many years, he used to be careful to give the spotlight to Jiang Zemin and other 
leaders. After he became President, he emerged from Jiang’s shadow and began 
to build his own authority. Jiang’s political legacy is the theory of Three Represents, 
which had been put into CPC’s charter before Jiang retired. Since Jiang’s Three 
Represents was long, abstract, and difficult to grasp (The Chinese Communist 
Party ‘must always represent the requirements of the development of China's 
advanced productive forces, represent the orientation of the development of 
China's advanced culture, and represent the fundamental interest of the over-
whelming majority of people in China’), Hu simplified its meaning and concentrated 
on the last Represent, the interest of the people. He developed his own ideas, 
which are: ‘(1) Power must be used for the sake of the people; (2) [Cadres’] 
sentiments must be tied to those of the people; and (3) material benefits must be 
sought in the interest of the people.’ This is called ‘The New Three Principles of the 
People’. 
   The name was a reminder of Sun Yat-Sen's original ‘Three Principles of the 
People’ (‘nationalism, democracy, people's livelihood’), which was central to the 
doctrine of the KMT. When James Soong, Chairman of Taiwan’s People First 
Party (an opposition party which had split from the KMT), visited China in 2005, he 
quoted Hu’s New Three Principles and wrote the following words in Sun Yat-Sen's 
Mausoleum in Nanjing: ‘Government of the people, by the people and for the 
people; Three Principles of the People will unify the Greater China.’ 
   Like Abraham Lincoln, Sun Yat-Sen stressed the power of the people, meaning 
that power belongs to the people. Government by the people means democracy, 
and the power of government or the ruling party comes from people. However, 
Hu’s principle stresses the power of the CPC rather than the power of the people. 
According to him, the party should use its power for the people, but he does not 
explain who gives the party its power, how the party gets its power, and who can 
supervise or balance the power. Consequently, although Hu’s principle seems to 
be an improvement on the CPC’s older doctrine, it falls short of the belief 
expressed on Taiwan, that sovereignty belongs to the people (‘zhu quan zai min’). 
 
Change 2: From Building a Well-Off Society to a Harmonious Society 
 
The Harmonious Society is another change in Hu’s thinking. Previously, both Deng 
Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin aimed at building a well-off society. Deng encouraged a 
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proportion of the population to get rich first, and Jiang advised ‘fewer words, bigger 
fortune’ (‘men sheng fa da cai’). Deng and Jiang tried to use economic growth and 
market prosperity to maintain social and political stability, but following thirty years 
of economic reform under a deadening political stability, there are numerous social 
problems, and a large-scale social crisis is emerging. The gap between the rich 
and the poor, between urban and rural areas, and between east and west is 
widening. Chinese society appears to be well off, but there is everywhere 
corruption, pollution, unemployment, poverty, violence, large-scale accidents, 
drugs, AIDS, prostitution, and organized crime. Education, housing, and health 
care remain unaffordable, there is a loss of respect and morality, and conflicts 
between the haves and the have-nots. So, in order to build up his authority and 
maintain a lasting stability, Hu initiated the idea of building a harmonious society 
instead of, as previously, a well-off society that focuses on material prosperity only. 
   The new leadership also revised the concept of ‘Two Civilizations’. Previously, 
this referred on the one hand to material civilization (economy and wealth), and on 
the other hand to spiritual civilization (culture and value). Now, there are ‘Three 
Civilizations’; political civilization has been added, which refers mainly to 
constructing democracy and the rule of law under the leadership of CPC. However, 
this ‘on the third hand’ has another connotation in Chinese: only a thief has three 
hands. 
   To build a harmonious society, the government has taken some popular 
measures. For example, some amendments have been made to the constitution to 
confirm that the country preserves human rights and protects private property: the 
long-standing agriculture tax was abolished in 2006 to decrease the burden on the 
rural population, and the central government calls on local government and real 
estate developers not to press ahead with demolishing houses without the prior 
agreement of the owner or occupier. 
   However, the concepts of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘political civilization’ are 
controversial. Some argue that a harmonious society requires respect for human 
rights, the fair distribution of public power and social wealth, the giving of a wide 
role to civil society, and allowing independent media to scrutinize the government, 
etc.; political civilization, meanwhile, requires democratization, transparency, 
general elections, and the rule of law rather than the rule of the party. Given the 
current situation and the CPC’s dictatorship in China, Hu’s theory is just an ideal to 
ease tensions in Chinese society. Real harmony and a real renewal of Chinese 
civilization would require substantial political reform in China, which the new 
leadership seems to have no intention to promote. That is why the PRC has no 
political attraction for democratized Taiwan. 
 
Change 3: Keep Advanced Education [bao xian jiaoyu] 
 
With the increasing decline of communist ideology in China, especially with the 
huge impact of the Nine Commentaries on the CPC (jiu ping), and systemic 
corruption among CPC cadres, in 2003 Hu launched a nation-wide movement to 
educate CPC members and to mobilize the masses. This movement is called 
‘Keep Advanced Education’, and its aim is for the CPC to become an advanced 
force leading China, with CPC members acting as role models in every aspect for 
the masses to follow and to learn from. The idea is not just for CPC members to be 
TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  205 
 
 
educated in various forms of propaganda or to study the teachings of Marx, Deng, 
Jiang, and Hu himself, but rather for all the Chinese people to know about the 
latest developments, just as they are influenced every day by news media. 
   I doubt the motive and effectiveness of this expensive and time-consuming 
movement. For Hu, he may want to renew the Party during his term of governance. 
On one hand, he is maintaining a link with communism to ensure the Party’s power 
and attraction; on the other hand, he is using the movement to build his own 
authority, prestige, and popularity, through constant reporting on his speeches, 
comments, and opinions, as expressed either at conferences or during 
inspections. Like many other brain-washing movements since China’ s opening up 
and reform, the Keep Advanced Education movement has not worked as well as 
Hu expected. Chinese people seem to believe in pragmatism and consumerism 
rather than communism. There are even many jokes at the expense of the 
movement: ‘Advanced’ in Chinese pronunciation sounds like ‘xian’, which means 
‘fresh’. So, the Chinese say it is better to put the CPC into a huge fridge to keep 
fresh. Further, there is also a similarity with ‘xian jin xing’, which means ‘advanced 
sex’. 
   Hu may personally have a deep belief in orthodox communist ideology. Soon 
after he came to power, he stated that ‘the comrades in North Korea and Cuba are 
always correct in politics’. This sentence astonished most Chinese. Kim Jong Il’s 
visit to China in 2006 was kept out of the Chinese media. Further, the Chinese 
government has reinforced control over the media and army during Hu’s term. The 
CPC’s Ministry of Propaganda remains a powerful governmental organ which 
reaffirms the theory of ‘pen and gun’; this was revealed in 2005, when an editor at 
China Youth Daily (a newspaper under the direct control of the Communist Youth 
League) posted an open letter on the internet complaining about censorship. This 
letter stated that the CPC remained committed to ‘pen and gun’, meaning media 
and army, to keep one voice and to safeguard political stability. Afterwards, a 
weekly section of that newspaper called Freeze Point (Bin Dian) was discontinued. 
   In Chinese, ‘pen and gun’ can also be called the ‘Theory of Two Sticks’ (‘liang 
gan zi’). However, ‘liang gan zi’ is often read as ‘er gan zi’, which in northern China 
means ‘foolishly bold’. ‘Pen and gun’ helped the CPC win and maintain power, and 
nowadays it seems that Hu still wants to use this approach to safeguard the 
regime. It is not a surprise that some liberal newspapers, such as the South 
Metropolitan Daily (Nan Fang Dou Shi Bao) and New Beijing Daily (Xin Jing Bao), 
were reorganized, and some staff were fired, punished, or put into jail. For the 
heavily-controlled internet, the Chinese government is using its Golden Shield 
Project to block many foreign websites and to monitor many popular discussion 
forums in China. 
   In a larger sense, both Keeping Advanced Education and ‘pen and gun’ are 
strategies to avoid a so-called colour revolution (such as the Velvet Revolution) 
breaking out in China, and to avoid the CPC losing power, as happened to the 
KMT during the process of democratization. So, the CPC leaders fear both a 
colour revolution, as occurred in Eastern Europe and central Asia, and the 
democratization process as occurred in Taiwan. 
   The implications for Taiwan are that Beijing and Taiwan are getting closer in 
economy, trade, and even in culture, but further apart in politics and ideology. A 
lacking of common ground in politics is one of the obstacles to reunification. 
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Hu’s background and experience might explain his belief in communist doctrine. 
He began his career as a political tutor at Tsinghua University in the 1960s. Most 
of his political years were in the leadership of the Youth League in the 1980s, then 
as CPC General Secretary in Guizhou, Tibet. He returned to Beijing in the early 
1990s and was put in charge of ideology, propaganda, and the Party School. His 
promotion came from taking full advantage of the existing system; he is very 
familiar with its ideology and institutional structure and wants to make full use of 
these for his position and interest. In his on-going 10-year term, he has no need 
and no intention of changing the system. 
   The problem is that in today’s China there seems to be no one but Hu who 
believes in communism. It would be fortunate if all the Chinese were to believe in 
communism, or fortunate if all the Chinese did not do so; however, it would be 
unfortunate if none of the Chinese believed in communism besides Hu, the 
country’s leader. 
 
Change 4: Peaceful Rise to Peaceful Development 
 
The term ‘China’s rise’ was probably first used in the early twentieth century by 
Zhou Enlai, when he was asked in his boyhood why he went to school. Prior to that, 
Sun Yan-Sen used the term ‘restoring China’, later replaced with ‘reviving China’. 
Since then, ‘reviving China’ has been widely used in different periods and in many 
cases, but ‘China’s rise’ did not become part of the discussion until 1998, when 
Professor Yan Xuetong published a book entitled Assessment of the International 
Situation for China’s Rise. However, Yan’s term was controversial at the time and 
was criticized by Chinese officialdom because it conflicted with Deng Xiaoping’s 
foreign policy strategy: ‘conceal abilities and bide time’. ‘Rise’ was also very 
sensitive, since it was thought to remind the world of the rise of Hitler’s Nazi 
regime. However, Jiang later made several references to ‘bringing about a great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’, which seemed have the same meaning as 
‘China’s rise’ in the Chinese context. In 2002, Jiang officially declared during the 
CPC’s 16th congress: ‘strive for a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. At the 
same time, with China’s entry into the WTO and successful bid for the 2008 
Olympics, Chinese media and scholars came to make frequent use of ‘China’s 
rise’ or ‘China’s peaceful rise’. 
   Hu Jingtao also accepted the term ‘China’s rise’. Consequently, the Chinese 
government has given a great deal of money to the CPC’s Party School and 
Ministry of Propaganda to develop a theory of ‘China’s Peaceful Rise’. However, 
the word ‘rise’ remains ambitiously aggressive, and has connotations of political 
and military aspects. Therefore, Chinese officials began instead to use the term 
‘peaceful development’, which implies mainly economic and social affairs. 
   However, ‘peaceful rise’ and ’peaceful development’ remain debatable at home 
and abroad, due to the meaning of the word ‘peaceful’. Externally, the Chinese 
government hasn’t renounced war as a solution to the Taiwan question, and is 
lobbying the EU to abolish its arms embargo. Internally, the CPC regime seems 
more and more dependent on the army, as well as armed and secret police to 
maintain stability. Facing rising social conflicts, the government is more often 
willing to use force to suppress the increasing mass assemblies and 
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demonstrations for civil rights, as seen in the shootings at Gongdong, Shaanxi, 
and Hebei. Further, Falun Gong followers and sympathizers continue to be 
intensely persecuted. Externally, there is a potential war across the Taiwan straits; 
internally, there are conflicts and oppressions. In such circumstances, can China 
indeed rise peacefully? 
   In the history of the world, there is no nation which rose without a war. China 
may be an exception due to its unique culture and huge domestic market, and the 
different international structure today. It may be assumed that China would rise 
peacefully, but if there is no democracy its rise may develop like that of Nazi 
Germany or the Soviet Union. 
 
Change 5: Hu’s Four Points on Taiwan before and after the Anti-Secession Law 
 
Regarding China’s Taiwan policy, Ye Jianying outlined Nine Principles in 1979, 
Deng announced ‘one country two systems’ in the mid-1980s, and Jiang’s listed 
Eight Points in 1995 (Chinese leaders like to play number games). Since Hu Jintao 
came to power, he has outlined two slightly different Four Points on the Taiwan 
question. 
   The first Four Points were announced at the 10th NPC, when Hu was elected 
President of PRC: 
 
1) Always adhere to the principle of One China; 
2) Increase economic and cultural exchange between the two sides; 
3) Pin the hope of reunification on the Taiwanese people; 
4) Unite the people of both sides to promote the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation. 
 
The second Four Points came after the Anti-Secession Law. These were four 
‘Absolutely Nots’: 
 
1) Absolutely not waver on the principle of One China; 
2) Absolutely not give up efforts for peaceful reunification; 
3) Absolutely not change the guideline of pinning hope on the Taiwanese 
people; 
4) Absolutely not compromise in fighting against Taiwan secession activities. 
 
Comparing these two four-point guidelines, we can find, apart from repeating the 
One China principle, Hu pays more attention to Taiwanese people, and he thinks 
that sooner or later the majority of the Taiwanese will support reunification. That is 
why the Chinese government valued so highly the visits of Lien Chan and James 
Soong. Chinese leaders think that Taiwan’s domestic politics will change in favour 
of the One China policy when the KMT returns to power, since CPC can do no 
more but repeat the ‘one country two systems’ principle. Nevertheless, it is 
unknown whether Hu is aware that Lien and Soong wanted to make use of their 
mainland visits to make up for their loss in the presidential election. What they said 
in China is one story, and what did after they returned to Taiwan is another. What 
is more, Ma Ying-Jeou, the new chairman of the KMT, strongly advocates 
democracy, and that is the biggest challenge to the CPC’s legitimacy. 
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Facing increasing pan-Green challenges for Taiwan’s independence, the CPC now 
prefers the KMT, its historic rival, much more than any other group in Taiwan. The 
CPC always highlights the so-called ‘1992 Consensus’, in which both sides agreed 
in the One China principle – although from Taiwan’s perspective this refers to the 
ROC rather than the PRC. This is enough for Hu Jintao. He can use the 
resumption of this ambiguous term to ease the pressure of Chinese nationalism. 
   Further, Hu Jintao has made some changes; for example, commemorating Hu 
Yaobang, a liberal leader whose death triggered the movement in 1989. Having no 
direct link with the suppression in Tian’anmen Square, Hu is attempting to come 
out from Jiang Zemin’s shadow and to build up his own prestige. Hu is 
comparatively young among Chinese politicians, and he has been in power much 
longer than the presidents of Taiwan. 
 
Nationalism 
 
The CPC was formerly opposed to nationalism, and prevented its growth in the 
PRC. Prior to the 1980s, it instead engaged in communist-style internationalism; 
for example, exporting revolution, involvement in the Korean War and in wars in 
Indo-Asia, and huge assistance to Third World countries and to Albania. Today, 
although China it is still governed by a communist party, it is run along lines of 
nationalism rather than communism. With the economic boom and the realization 
of the dream of China’s rise, Chinese nationalism has become much stronger than 
before. 
   Chinese historically have a negative attitude towards several countries: Japan, 
for its invasion of China; the US, for its strategic containment, for the 1999 
embassy bombing in Belgrade, and for the 2001 Hainan Island Incident; towards 
Russia, for lost territory; and even towards South Korea, which used to be behind 
China in development but which has now become China’s economic competitor 
and cultural model (South Korean television series, pop music, and fashion are 
astonishingly and increasingly popular, although many Chinese are concerned 
about the impacts of han liu, a mania for Korean pop culture). However, 
concerning the Taiwan issue, Chinese nationalism is much more complicated. It 
involves not only history, territory, and sovereignty, but also shared culture, a 
prosperous community, and a love-hate relationship. 
   Like many other governments, the Chinese government wants to make use of 
nationalism, and so it is more likely to take control of it. That is why American and 
British diplomats were puzzled when there was sudden silence after two days of 
angry student demonstrations and protests at their embassies after the Yugoslavia 
embassy bombing. I was at Tsinghua University and witnessed how the 
government organized the demonstrations to ease an urgent pressure, and then 
stopped them out of a fear that rising nationalism would disturb its negotiations and 
compromises with the USA. 
   The reason for controlling Chinese nationalism is that the Chinese government is 
concerned that the continued growth of nationalism will cause instability, 
undermine the CPC’s authority, and force it to take drastic measures against the 
provocative words of Taiwanese politicians. However, given that they cannot 
control Taiwan’s voice, they instead try to control Chinese voices. This control 
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ranges from conventional mass media to the internet, and to mobile SMS at the 
2005 anti-Japanese demonstration. 
   From 2006 on, all pay-as-you-go mobile users in China have had to re-register, 
giving their real name, address, and profession. The reason, aside from fraud and 
the sending of pornographic messages, is that SMS is often used for spreading 
political information that undermines the CPC’s governing. At the anti-Japanese 
demonstration, there seemed to be no visible organizers or coordinators. Instead, 
many mobile users read and forwarded texts they had received, which told them 
the time, route, and even the slogans for the upcoming demonstration. People 
went to protest spontaneously and simultaneously. It was hard for police to find the 
organizer of the demonstration, though afterwards a man in Chongqing (named Xu 
Wanping) was arrested and sentenced to 12 years in prison. He was accused of 
illegally forming an organization with the intent of overthrowing the government by 
organizing anti-Japanese activities. 
   In terms of controlling nationalism, the Chinese government may relax controls 
on individual protests against Japanese militarism and Taiwanese secessionism, 
but they will maintain strict control over mass demonstrations and organized 
protests. Otherwise, such movements would naturally lead to the development of 
political organizations or underground parties calling for real freedom of 
expression, assembly, and symbolic association, as protected by the PRC’s 
constitution. So, nationalism can develop into democratization. In particular, 
Chinese nationalism in relation to Taiwan is regarded nation-wide as a form of 
patriotism that is helpful to the cause of unification and of maintaining territorial 
integrity. The CPC regime is in a dilemma caused by nationalism: if nationalism is 
allowed free rein, the resulting democratization will probably mean the CPC losing 
power, as happened to the KMT in 2000; but if it oppresses nationalism in relation 
to Taiwan, it will be criticized by the Chinese people for a lack of patriotism, and 
lose legitimacy. 
   Of course, extreme nationalism is dangerous for China too: violence and 
damage to Japanese property (including Japanese-made cars) will frighten 
Taiwanese and foreign investors, who are rather important for maintaining the 
growth of the Chinese economy. 
   On the other hand, the Chinese government might need be vigilant over two 
related trends: these are reverse nationalism and transnationalism, both of which 
may challenge the CPC’s legitimacy and cause political change in China. 
   Reverse nationalism refers to a form of fundamentalist nationalism which rejects 
perceived shortcomings in contemporary Chinese culture. Adherents attack the 
CPC for its past misconduct, and complain that its imported communist ideology 
has damaged or twisted the traditional culture and values of the Chinese nation. In 
contrast, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan are regarded as having made good 
use of Chinese culture, and China needs to learn from them. 
   Transnationalism refers to Chinese nationalism as spread overseas through 
Chinese immigration and diasporas. Adherents have absorbed ideas of 
democracy, liberty, and modernity, and they remain in constant contact with 
mainland Chinese through websites and other means of communication. The 
information that their websites convey often has a nationalist perspective. Although 
this is popular among Chinese both at home and abroad, such sites are disliked by 
the CPC and are usually shielded or monitored. Since the creators of these sites 
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have more opportunities to have contact with Taiwanese, their ideas on Taiwan 
are more tolerant and moderate. 
   With the development of new technology and increasing shuttling by Chinese 
between home and abroad, the CPC government will have to find a balance 
between the various new forms of Chinese nationalism. It is hard for the CPC to 
deal with the combination of nationalism, patriotism, and potential democratization; 
the last of these is often identified by Taiwan as a condition for a rather lengthy 
process of reunification. 
 
Localism or local Protectionism 
 
‘Localism’ often means ‘local protectionism for economy and trade’. There are 
numerous examples of such localism in China. For example, in cities such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan, only locally-made cars are licensed as taxi-cabs. In 
2006, an explosion at a chemical factory along a river in Jilin Province caused 
serious river pollution; this caused severe panic and loss in the province of 
Helongjiang, which is downstream, but the government of Jilin denied responsibility. 
A third example is a complaint made by the Vice-Minister of Education at a press 
conference in 2005, that the central government’s policies could be implemented 
only within Zhongnanhai, where the government is based. This was because many 
provinces often ignored education policy, and did not like to offer financial aid to 
poor students. 
   An economic gap and the uneven regional distribution of resources mean that 
residents care only about their local economy and prosperity. Local officials quarrel 
with other regional leaders, and they bargain with central government. Powerful 
leaders at the centre, such as those from the wealthy areas of Shanghai, 
Guangdong, and Fujian, have to take measures favourable to the coastal 
provinces in order to get political and financial support. In the 1990s, smuggling 
was seen as a way to become rich, and there was organized smuggling in China 
from along the coastal areas of Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, 
to Fujian, Gongdong, Gongxi, and Hainai Island. Most of this organized smuggling 
was permitted by the local government, and customs officials and local police 
provided assistance to the smuggling companies. The scandal of the Xiamen 
(Amoy) Yuanhua smuggling case, in which many high officials were involved, was 
just the tip of the iceberg; such smuggling is always linked with corruption. The 
administration of Zhu Rongji spent a long time and put a great deal of effort into 
dealing with the smuggling, which caused considerable damage to the national 
economy and social order. 
   The emerging localism has come to have a great impact not only on China’s 
economy and society, but also on Chinese politics and its Taiwan policy. In the mid-
1990s, Zhu Rongji divided the national tax system into state taxation and local 
taxation. When, during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Lee Teng-Hui 
threatened to attack Shanghai with missiles if the mainland bombed Taiwan, public 
opinion in Shanghai as expressed on-line suggested that Shanghai’s huge local 
tax revenue meant that it could build an independent Theatre Missile Defence 
system if the central government did not have a sufficient national defence budget. 
   A popular Chinese saying fully expresses the impact of localism impact on 
China’s Taiwan policy: ‘Beijing prefers war, Shanghai prefers peace, Amoy prefers 
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surrender to Taiwan’ (‘Beijing zhu zhan, Shanghai zhu he, Xiaomen zhu xiang’). 
While Beijing is the military centre and political capital, Shanghai by contrast has 
attracted a large amount of Taiwanese investment and thousands of Taiwanese 
residents, and Xiamen/Amoy (the closest city to Taiwan) has a considerably tight 
economic tie with Taiwan. People in Shanghai and Xiamen are afraid that war 
would destroy their prosperity, and that tension would prevent economic 
cooperation with Taiwan. Xiamen people in particular admire the Taiwanese 
lifestyle, and they would probably like to become a part of Taiwan, as Jinmen 
(Kinmen). 
   The passing of the Anti-Secession Law also reflects differing local perspectives. 
Although the overwhelming majority of the NPC’s more than 2,000 representatives 
voted in favour if the law, there were two abstentions and three non-responses. 
Given that the people’s representatives come from different parts of China, this 
rare case might reflect signs of localism. 
   The articles of the Anti-Secession Law indicate that the law’s targets include 
localism or those with different views on Taiwan. Two articles out of the total ten 
relate to all Chinese people, rather than just ‘Taiwan secessionists’: 
 
Article 2   …Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common 
obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included. 
 
Article 4   Accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred 
duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included. 
 
In the long history of the Chinese empire, there were always struggles between 
central government and local forces. The death blow to the Qing Dynasty was 
when several provinces declared independence after the nationalist rebellion in 
Wuhan. Consequently, the Chinese government has to control emerging localism, 
preventing it from misleading or obstructing Taiwan policy, or from perhaps even 
leading to other provinces seeking separation. 
 
Public opinion 
 
Theoretically, the mass media sets the agenda of public opinion, and public 
opinion is reflected by the mass media. In China, however, media are tightly 
controlled and subject to strict censorship, and are instead treated as a 
mouthpiece through which the CPC publicizes policy. Consequently, information 
about Taiwan is often one-sided and misleading. For example, instead of 
explaining Taiwanese democratization and giving an even-sided view of political 
affairs, China’s media are more likely to report verbal abuse or physical conflict in 
the Legislative Yuan, and to give coverage to demonstrations and temporary 
disorders on the streets. In contrast, there is hardly any reference to the fact that 
society as a whole remains stable. In my opinion, Taiwan politicians’ quarrels or 
fights in congress are much more preferable than the fights that occurred during 
the Cultural Revolution, or the shooting in Tian’anmen Square. The scandals in 
Taiwan politics are problems in the process of democratization; however, China’s 
media suggests to the public that this shows the poor quality of Taiwan politics, the 
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ridiculousness its elections, and why the same kind of the democracy would not be 
good for Chinese people. 
   My research on Chinese public opinion relating to Taiwan is not based on 
Chinese media reports of comments. It is instead derived from an independent 
questionnaire involving students at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Thirty 
student volunteers from different family backgrounds and from different areas of 
China were sent to rural and urban areas in the east and in the west. Each student 
took 20 copies of the questionnaire on China’s domestic affairs and Taiwan. This 
was done twice, during the winter and summer vacations of 2005 respectively. The 
valid return rate was 522 copies, representing 87 per cent. 
   The interviewees were asked to rank a list internal issues with which they were 
most concerned. The reunification of the motherland did not come in the top five 
concerns, but instead came after housing, anti-corruption, social security, 
education, and pollution, but before unemployment, hosting the Olympics, travel 
safety, and inflation. 
   However, in a list of external affairs, it ranked second after China–US relations, 
but before Diaoyu Island, exports, and study abroad. Table 1 shows how 
differences are perceived. 
 
What is the biggest difference between the mainland and Taiwan? 
Economy 49 per cent 
Political system 35 per cent 
ideology and education 12 per cent 
People 3 per cent 
Language 1 per cent 
Culture 0 per cent 
What is the most important reason for Taiwan’s secession? 
Conspiracy by the USA 31 per cent 
Secessionists in power 27 per cent 
Economic gap 26 per cent 
Political and ideological 
differences 
10 per cent 
Changes in Taiwanese identity 6 per cent 
Which is the most important factor to achieving reunification? 
The rise of China 32 per cent 
Economic and personal 
exchanges 
21 per cent 
War 18 per cent 
A change of Taiwan’s authority 17 per cent 
Chinese military deterrent 12 per cent 
 
Table 1: Chinese attitudes to Taiwan 
 
   For most ordinary Chinese, the Taiwan issue is not as important as their 
housing, education, or health care. However, in a large sense, Taiwan is regarded 
as a strategically important territory of China and a vital issue in China–US 
relations. 
TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  213 
 
 
 
A further analysis of the questionnaires, placing the relevant information into a 
theoretical framework, reveals four kinds of thinking in Chinese public opinion 
about Taiwan. 
 
Realistic Thinking 
 
This perspective sees Taiwan’s secession as due to two factors: China lacks the 
force to deter it, and China cannot risk confrontation or conflict with US before it 
can match US power militarily and strategically. The continued growth of China’s 
economy and defensive power will solve the Taiwan problem. The realistic view, 
also called the ‘power’ or ‘strength’ approach, is more popular among ordinary 
Chinese people. 
 
Liberal Thinking 
 
This perspective stresses free trade, and takes the view that increasing exchange 
of economy and individuals on both sides will gradually lead to an interdependent 
integration. 
   During this process, both sides will increase existing cooperation and construct 
new institutions to extend cooperation from the economic to the political level. The 
liberal view puts great emphasis on cooperative institutions and organizations, 
which it is believed will lead to deeper union, like the development from the EEC to 
the EU. This perspective is also called ‘institutionism’, and it is popular among 
industrial and commercial groups. (In Chinese, ‘money’ and ‘forward’ have the 
same sound of ‘qian’. ‘Xiang qian kan’ will lead to ‘xiang qian kan’; that is, looking 
at money together will result in looking forward to a mutually beneficial union.) 
 
Ideological Thinking 
 
In this perspective, Taiwan’s secession is due to the different ideologies and 
political systems of Taiwan and China. The reunification of a nation-state, as a 
highly political matter, needs common ground in politics and ideology. Since it is 
ridiculous for Taiwan to give up its democracy, the only possible way is to promote 
China’s democratization. However, thus far there is no other party which can 
replace the CPC’s dominant role in the mainland, and the cost of political change 
in China will be unbearable. Without stability, the economy will experience crisis, 
and China will experience a crisis like that of the former Soviet Union. In that case, 
China will lose not only the CPC’s totalitarianism, but also Taiwan or other 
territories. Witnessing what happened to Russia, many Chinese officials think that 
to seek reunification with Taiwan is also a struggle or competition between 
Taiwan’s system and mainland socialism with Chinese characteristics. At the 
moment, they think ‘one country two systems’ is sufficient. 
 
Identity Constructivism 
 
This view is taken by many intellectuals, who think that Taiwan’s different history 
and its long-term lack of contact with the mainland have resulted in Taiwan 
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constructing its own identity, consciousness, values, and way of living. Taiwanese 
speak Chinese, just like many people in Singapore and Malaysia also speak 
Chinese, but they are not Chinese like mainlanders. Military means or two systems 
can unite the country physically, but hardly mentally. For real and lasting 
unification and reconciliation, both sides need to construct a common ground in 
culture, tradition, value, and religion respectively in the process of building a civil 
society. 
   There may also be some other public opinions; for example, some Chinese say 
‘let it be, let Taiwan go as it likes. Do not spend so much money to bid for 
diplomatic relations in Latin America, Africa, and Oceania. Concentrate on China’s 
economy and defence; once China rises and becomes a superpower, it will take 
over Taiwan and maybe more.’ 
 
Conclusion 
 
Facing increasing separation from Taiwan, China’s politicians have two options: 
peaceful means or military means. Both options require them to take into account 
their leadership position and many changing aspects of China’s domestic politics. 
If Taiwan will maintain the status quo for five to ten years, China would like to 
choose a peaceful solution, which is simply to repeat stiffly the policy of ‘one 
country two systems’ without substantially effective measures. 
   However, choosing a peaceful way does not mean that China’s present leaders 
believe that Taiwan will return to the motherland peacefully and willingly. Rather, it 
is chosen because they do not want to risk their term of office, economic growth, or 
political and social stability. The problem can instead be passed to the next 
generation of leaders, just as their predecessors passed it on to them. Deng 
Xiaoping promised that China’s reunification was one of the three great tasks that 
would be accomplished in 1980s. Later, in the mid-1990s, he said he firmly 
believed that the future generation would find a wiser and better way to solve the 
Taiwan problem. 
   If Chinese leaders choose military means, there will be three possible outcomes: 
victory, defeat, or stalemate. Stalemate would be as same as the current status quo, 
and so declaring war would serve no purpose. Defeat would mean Taiwan’s 
complete independence, and this is another reason not to choose war. Victory would 
certainly bring about China’s reunification, but it would be hard to obtain while the US 
remains a superpower and while there are other uncertain variables relating to the 
Taiwan issue domestically and internationally. These difficulties mean that Chinese 
leaders would not wish to declare war; they will instead continue to seek a possible 
peaceful solution, hoping that authority over Taiwan can be achieved through 
negotiation. At the same time, their focus is on domestic politics, and the need to 
reinforce stability and legitimacy in a country where nationalism is rising along with 
the economy, and where it is difficult to block democratization. 
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Book Reviews 
 
 
Dublin James Joyce Journal (2008 onwards), published by the UCD James 
Joyce Research Centre, ISSN 2009-1850, E-ISSN 2009-4507 
 
This brief review focuses on the inaugural issue of the Dublin James Joyce 
Journal, published in 2008. The journal offers itself as a forum not just for Joycean 
scholars but also for the wider audience of Joyce. In line with this stated aim, the 
journal opens up the possibilities for scholars working in other fields to keep 
abreast of Joyce studies and to contribute to discussions across fields. Amongst 
the articles published in the journal, Cóilín Owens’ article ‘“The Charity of Silence”: 
“After the Race” and the Emmet Centenary’ offers a particularly stimulating 
analysis of Joyce’s short story that might not immediately have been apparent to 
the casual Joyce reader. Although all the articles are enlightening, and the journal 
itself offers up an appropriate mix of historical research and literary analysis, 
comparative studies were somewhat lacking in the journal. Given the post-colonial 
bent of the articles by Malcolm Sen and Fintan O’Toole, which focus on Joyce’s 
Orientalism, and the historical and political bent of the other articles, comparative 
studies might have offered up new possibilities of looking at Joyce’s work in new 
ways and, indeed, assessing the expanding audience of Joyce as his work 
continues to be translated and received by new generations and cultures; a 
milestone of which was marked by the completion of the Chinese translation of 
Ulysses into Chinese by Xiao Qian and Wen Jieruo in 1995, although many 
extracts had been translated previously. 
   Using the relatively young field of Taiwanese Literature Studies as an example, 
we can find several parallels in the colonial and post-colonial histories and 
literatures of Ireland and Taiwan. Liang Qichao’s exhortation for Lin Xiantang to 
use the example of Ireland’s resistance to British rule to resist the Japanese in 
Taiwan spurred a series of comparisons between Taiwan and Ireland, which have 
continued to this day. Despite the differences between the two, they have 
undergone similar journeys from the colonial era to post-modernity. Taiwan has 
looked to Ireland, and Joyce’s work in particular, as a mirror for itself in some 
ways. The Irish Literary Revival in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its 
opposition to the literary modernism of those like Joyce (who recognized the 
globalization of the world and rejected the insularism of the Celtic Twilight, as 
Fintain O’Toole points out in his article, ‘“I Suppose They’re Just Getting Up in 
China Now”: Joyce, the City and Globalization’), are echoed in the Nativism versus 
Modernism debates that came with the transition to democracy gripping Taiwan in 
the 1990s and beyond. Indeed Wang Wenxing was singled out specifically for the 
influence that Joyce had on him, criticized as absurd for being a Taiwanese author 
who did nothing but ‘swallow the author’s words whole, like a date, pit and all, 
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without any critical or skeptical reflection. Then he’d publish an article brimming 
with high expectations and self-confidence, referring to himself as “Taiwan’s 
Joyce”’ (as charged by Song Zelai, writing in 1981; translated in Helmut Martin, 
Modern Chinese Writers: Self Portrayals, 1992: 235). According to research by 
Professor Lin Yu-Chen, Joyce was first introduced to Taiwan through Canadian 
missionaries and Chinese scholars who fled to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War 
(Joyce in Taiwan, 1). Parts of his work were later translated by the magazine 
Modern Literature, founded by Bai Xianyong and Li Oufan, amongst others, and 
had a profound impact on the Taiwanese modernist movement. 
   Many of the articles made interesting insights into the inspirations behind Joyce’s 
work, and its critical reception; these include Anne Fogarty’s article on the role of 
sculpture in Joyce’s work, Terence Killeen’s exploration of Alfred Hunter as the 
inspiration for the character Leopold Bloom, and Christian O’Neill’s exploration of 
the role of Niall Montgomery as one of the first critics to see value in Joyce’s work. 
The article by Stephanie Rains provides an interesting insight into nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Orientalism in the bazaars that attempted to represent 
cultures including Japan; this offers an interesting comparison with the way Japan 
represented the Orient, itself, and its imperial dominions at around about the same 
time in the exhibitions which were frequent during Japanese Colonial Rule in 
Taiwan – and in fact how ‘Oriental Orientalism’ functioned as a part of the narrative 
behind Japan’s imperial ambitions (see Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined 
Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895, 2006, 13) 
compared to the European Orientalism that Rains touches upon in her article. The 
postcolonial tone of her article when it refers to the protagonist’s reaction in 
‘Araby’, faced with the woman with the English accent at the bazaar, puts one in 
mind of the Taiwanese protagonist of Yang Yunping’s (楊雲萍) ‘Curry Rice’ (1927) 
and his reaction when he spends all his money on a plate of curry rice and is 
intimidated by the Japanese girls in a Japanese restaurant, which only goes to 
underline the commonality in the postcolonial writing of Taiwan and Ireland. 
   There is a plethora of Taiwanese scholars currently engaged in Joyce Studies 
from which to draw comparative and analytical studies, including: Lin Yu-Chen 
(National Sun Yat-Sen University), who has published a wealth of papers on Joyce 
including ‘James Joyce’s Portrait: Writing and Gender Inversions’ (in Studies in 
English Literature and Linguistics, 24: 213–233, 1998), ‘Joyce on the Eastern 
Edge: Globalization, Localization, and Joyce Studies in Taiwan’ (in John Nash, ed., 
Joyce’s Audiences, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), and ‘Justice, Language, and Irish 
Identity: Trials in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake’ (in Chung Wai Literary Monthly, 
26.5: 55–79, 1997); Yen-Yen Hsiao (National Tsing Hua University), author of 
papers including ‘Imaging Motherland in Ulysses: Rethinking a Global/Local 
Gendered History’ (in James Joyce Journal, 14.2: 29–49, 2008), and ‘The 
Narrative Poetics of Geographical Imagination—In Search of Otherland in Joyce’ 
(presented at the 20th International James Joyce Symposium, June 2006, 
Budapest-Szombathely); Li-Ling Tseng (National Taiwan University), whose work 
includes Textual Politics of Ulysses (Taipei: Bookman, 2001) and 'Historical Re-
imagination and Re-writing in Lilia Formosana 1947 and Ulysses' (in Chung Wai 
Literary Monthly, 26.8: 156–183, 1998); Liang Sun-Chieh (National Taiwan Normal 
University), whose papers include ‘Joyce’s Malapropism in “The Sisters”’ 
(presented at the Eleventh Annual Miami Joyce Conference, Miami, 1997), 
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‘“Wonder what I Look Like to Her”: Joyce’s Views on Animals in Ulysses’ (in Chung 
Wai Literary Monthly, 32.9: 7–40, 2004), and ‘Joyce, Language and Postcolonial 
Conditions’ (Chung Wai Literary Monthly, 27.9: 44–63, 1999); Iris Tsung-Huei 
Huang (National Taiwan University), who authored the papers 'The Gift that 
Always Reaches Its Destination?’: The Economy of Gift in Ulysses’ (in Concentric: 
Studies in English Literature and Linguistics, 29.1: 175–197, 2003) and ‘The 
Desire to Feed or the Desire to Be Fed?: The Entangled Relation Between Bloom 
and the Maternal Figure in Ulysses’ (in NTU Studies in Language and Literature, 
12: 23–49, 2003); and Chuang Kun-Liang (National Taiwan Normal University), 
editor of Joyce in Taiwan (Taipei: Bookman, 2008). Hopefully, through more 
comparative studies the journal will be able to encompass a larger range of 
interpretative perspectives.  
 
Mr Conor Stuart is studying for a Masters’ in Taiwan Literature at National Taiwan 
University. Shu-Ling Horng is professor in the NTU's Graduate Institute of Taiwan 
Literature and in the Department of Chinese. Address for correspondence: 
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Immigration and Social Cohesion in the Republic of Ireland, by Bryan 
Fanning, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011, 224pp., £15.99 
paperback, ISBN 978-0-7190-8479-9 
 
A Hungarian friend of mine has visited Dublin several times over the past seven 
years. Her daughter, who originally went to Dublin for her law degree, had married 
a fellow student, from South Africa. Later, Dublin became home to this immigrant 
couple from Hungary and South Africa with their locally born mixed-race son. 
Integration into Irish society is part of their daily life, and the citizenship of their son 
is an issue that emerged as early as his birth in the republic. Focusing on 
integration, Bryan Fanning’s Immigration and Social Cohesion in the Republic of 
Ireland illuminates challenges to immigrants such as the family of my friend’s 
daughter, as well as to the host Irish society. The transformative experiences of 
Irish society, from being an emigration society to an immigration destination (19), 
render comparative insight for Taiwan, an island that is also experiencing such a 
quantitative and qualitative transformation. 
   Fanning’s survey of recent immigration to Ireland begins with a cautious note 
about viewing immigration within the framework of multiculturalism. Post 9/11, 
multiculturalism in the west as a political discourse and a set of public policies is 
besieged by counter-discourses of anti-terrorism and calls for strengthening 
security and border control. Fanning’s studies of immigration to the Irish Republic 
are valuable resistance against this kind of overarching discourse. In line with 
Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive freedom, Fanning argues 
that immigrants’ integration is as much an issue of desirability as one of ability (6–
7). Located in ‘concrete situations’ (2), his research draws on social policy that 
aims to induce social integration, and he explores the impact of social policy on 
immigrants’ well-being. In this undertaking, social integration is defined as the 
process by which ‘immigrants become accepted into a society, both as individuals 
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and as groups’ (1). With the insight that integration requires an immigrant to 
acquire not only the knowledge of social norms, values, beliefs but also economic 
skills to survive in the new environment, Fanning examines social integration 
through concepts such as social capital, cultural capital, human capital, and human 
capacity (2). More importantly, he broadens the concept of integration to ‘social 
cohesion’, which not only involves immigrants’ adaptation to the social norms of 
the mainstream society but also the inclusion of the host citizenry, particularly 
those who are socio-economically deprived (55).  
   Notable elements of immigration to the Irish Republic are its rapid growth and the 
diverse national origins of the immigrants. Fanning informs us that in one year, 
2004–2005, Ireland found itself hosting foreign-born residents making up as much 
as 10.4 per cent of the total population. The 2006 Census identified foreign born 
residents as making up 14.7 per cent of the population, and nearly 10 per cent of 
the total population as ‘non-Irish nationals’. Fanning attributes the surge of 
immigration to a policy announced in 2004, that there was to be no quantitative 
control of immigration from the ten new EU member states (16, 60). He notes that, 
on average, immigrants to Ireland are strong in terms of their human capital 
advantages. In 2001, the percentage of those who obtained tertiary education was 
1.8 times more than that of their host population. Not only was this found amongst 
high skilled non-EU workers, it was also evident amongst asylum seekers (63). 
Behind Ireland’s open door policy is, Fanning argues, an ‘institutional narrative’ 
that advocates developmental modernization as new social and economic 
orthodoxies. This is found in Managing Migration: A Social and Economic Analysis, 
a report published by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) in which 
large-scale and ongoing immigration is promoted for sustaining economic growth 
(17). The commitment to development and pursuing economic modernity, Fanning 
argues, makes Ireland a ‘growth-oriented’ society, and this developmental 
mentality becomes an element of nation-building (22). 
   As an island country that is known for its economic ‘miracle’, Taiwan in recent 
years has also become a major migration destination within East Asia. Facilitated 
by the state, in 1992 Taiwan’s domestic labour market was opened to foreign 
labour from selected countries in order to supply workers for those industries that 
suffered from a shortage of labour. However, this rationale of ensuring economic 
growth is as far as similarities with immigration to Ireland go. Under Ireland’s 
immigration laws, long-term residency is available to migrant workers, and, on 
being granted a residency permit, immigrants are permitted to take part in local 
politics as voters and candidates (173). Fanning explains that immigrant 
organizations in Ireland, such as the African Solidarity Centre (ASC, later renamed 
the African Centre), have exercised collective pressure on political parties to 
incorporate immigrants’ welfare into their election manifestos (154–156). In 
addition, the Polish community has designated representatives in the two major 
political parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (158–159). 
   In contrast, Taiwan is amongst several East Asian countries where guest 
workers remain guests of the host society, and no residency or family reunion is 
available. Productivity and security, rather than integration, is the priority agenda of 
Taiwan’s immigration policy. In spite of their rising numbers, without allying 
themselves with local activists migrant workers in Taiwan have less capacity to 
develop into independent pressure groups such as ASC, which have direct input to 
TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  219 
 
 
the political system. Another contrast to the Irish case is that immigration to Taiwan 
is marked by the dominating number of female migrants. Not only is more than 60 
per cent of the foreign labour force female, the great majority of foreign residents 
are the wives of local citizens. They are from China and Southeast Asia, and their 
marriages to local citizens enable them to migrate to Taiwan. 
   Although these immigrant wives also encounter racism and discrimination based 
on their ethnic or national origin, just as immigrants in Ireland also do (73), the 
former are imposed upon via a different set of discriminatory attitudes intertwined 
with gender. Unlike many immigrants in Ireland, who have a higher educational 
attainment than the host population, Chinese and Southeast Asian wives on 
average have received lower education than the host population, as found by a 
2003 census and 2008 survey. Because of this lower education, and lack of ability 
in the Chinese language, they are imagined to be incapable mothers who have 
difficulty in raising their children. Compounded by their presumed higher birth rate, 
they are blamed for ‘downgrading’ the quality of the future population. As a 
consequence, it is believed that they will erode the base of Taiwan’s economic 
prosperity, an integral element to Taiwan’s self-identity as an affluent democracy. 
This eugenics-tainted scenario is characterized as a national threat by the 2006 
National Security Report. Therefore, while immigration is imagined as contributing 
positively to Ireland’s economic modernity, immigration to Taiwan is said to 
undermine the sustainability of Taiwan’s economic prosperity. 
   Fanning notes that, in spite of the immigrants’ higher educational attainment and 
the belief that immigration contributes to economic growth, immigrants’ human 
capital advantages do not necessarily translate into easy employment in Ireland. 
Lower English-language proficiency is a key explanatory variable to this 
occupational handicap (65). In the case of Taiwan, lower Chinese-language 
proficiency is also identified by the above mentioned 2003 census and 2008 
survey as the key obstacle to immigrant wives’ employment. However, while 
employment in both societies is recognized as essential to integration, the 
employment of immigrant wives in Taiwan is additionally impeded by prevalent 
gender norms. These norms affect immigrant women’s employment in two ways. It 
is believed that their sole motivation for seeking marriage in Taiwan is to find 
employment and to send remittances back to support their family. However, if they 
are permitted to engage in waged employment outside of the home, they will be 
under the influence of unscrupulous elements including fellow immigrants or 
Taiwanese gangsters. They will be either pushed by the former into competition to 
achieve a higher remittance, or duped by the latter into sex work. As a result, they 
may desert their homes, a scenario socially known as ‘runaway’. To prevent 
runaway, some consular officials or immigration officers suggest to Taiwanese 
husbands that they should provide their immigrant wives with monthly allowances, 
so that they will have no incentive to work outside of the home. Gender norms are 
also invoked by the state when it comes to decisions about work for immigrant 
wives, because their wages are seen as supplementary to the family income. In 
other words, immigrant wives’ right to work is not premised on their individual need 
to survive independently but on their collective contribution to the health of the 
family economy. 
   In addition to applying the concepts of social capital, cultural capital, and 
capacities to analysing immigrants’ prospects for employment or for functional 
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integration, Fanning also explores whether these critical means can contribute to 
political integration, characterized as civic and political participation (96–100). 
Drawing on small-scale research of eighteen candidates who have stood for local 
council elections, Fanning finds that identity with their immediate local area and the 
desire of to improve local facilities and amenities is a common interest shared by 
all immigrant candidates (96). It is worthwhile to note that in Ireland, immigrants 
having children living with them seems to be one driving force for participation. As 
an African respondent explained: ‘Yes, I am a migrant, but I’m also a woman. I’m 
also a mum who has got children who are in school like everybody else so 
participation would have been a very big issue’ (96). 
   This candidate’s statement resonates with the results of my interviews with 
immigrant women in Taiwan. Vietnamese, Filipino and Indonesian Chinese women 
explained they would go to vote because they cared about their children’s well-
being and would want to elect a good government to ensure a sound living 
environment for their children. In spite of this similar motivation for civic 
participation, a critical difference in the two countries is that immigrants cannot 
vote in Taiwan until they acquire citizenship. This marks the fundamental 
divergence between the conceptualization of voting rights in Taiwan and in Ireland. 
In Taiwan, voting rights are carefully guarded and reserved for formally admitted 
citizens, whereas in Ireland, as also in a few other European states, civic 
participation at local level is encouraged as a channel conducive for integration.  
   Voting is an important aspect of civic participation. Not only is it an indication of 
social integration, but also a channel for realising positive freedom. Nevertheless, 
preliminary research on Taiwan’s political parties’ election campaigns and policy 
platforms suggests that immigrant votes have not been seriously sought by 
political parties, and that Chinese immigrants are peculiarly overlooked in the 
already-limited publicity. This is a critical deficiency given that the ratio of 
immigrants’ acquisition of citizenship in Taiwan is not low (44 per cent), and the 
number of male and female foreign spouses who acquired citizenship has risen to 
204,640 in August 2012. Fanning’s research on politics and citizenship also shows 
that in spite of the rapid growth of the immigrant population, major political parties 
had little or no engagement with immigrant communities, or ‘had never given the 
issue of immigrant participation in politics any thought’ (55). Given that the two 
island republics are transforming from an emigrant society to an immigrant society, 
and the incorporation of outsiders with differences will be a fundamental challenge 
to both nations, the lack of interest or professionalism on the part of the major 
political parties calls for more study. What is critically needed is to go beyond 
election campaign rhetoric (or ‘immigrant populism’, as defined by Fanning, 154) to 
scrutinize how political parties evaluate the impact of immigrant voters on electoral 
politics, such as their vote share, and whether they have tangible policy platform to 
attract immigrant voters. Potential subject areas include immigrant voters’ 
motivations for political participation, the decision-making of party manifestos, 
interaction with immigrant advocacy groups, strategies of candidate nomination, 
management of local factions, and the development of immigrant communities. 
Research on the development of immigrant communities may lead to discussion of 
integration to a group level where individual agency may converge and the 
collective agency will be utilized for organizational mobilization. Studies such as 
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these will deepen our understanding of migration as an ongoing process and 
integration as a two-way interaction between the host and the outsiders. 
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A New View of the Irish Language, edited by Caoilfhionn Nic Pháidín and 
Seán Ó Cearnaigh, Dublin: Cois Life Teoranta, 2008, 288pp., £28.50 
paperback, ISBN 978-1-901176-82-7 
 
Viewed comparatively from the perspective of a Taiwanese-language activist, the 
grass must seem much greener (including as a political hue) on that other 
‘beleaguered isle’ where Irish enjoys constitutional status as the first official 
language. From its inception the Irish state, whilst acknowledging English, 
declared Irish its national language. There was a commitment to maintain the Irish-
speaking region (the Gaeltacht) in the west of Ireland. The new independent state 
sought to promote or resuscitate the Irish language across the country (where it 
very much played second fiddle to English). Irish was made a compulsory subject 
in schools; basic competence in Irish was required for employment in the public 
sector; efforts were made to modernize and standardize the Irish language; and, to 
quote Geróid Ó Tuthaigh, ‘a range of incentives were introduced to encourage 
increased competence in Irish within the apparatus of the state’. Since the turn of 
the current century, there appears to be evidence of the continued valorization of 
Irish. In 2003, the Official Languages Act was passed, giving the right to provision 
of public services using the Irish language. In 2007, Irish secured recognition as 
the 23rd official language of the European Union. According to Suzanne Romaine, 
‘The 2006 census reports that 1.6 million of the four million population can speak 
Irish… Proportionately speaking, the numbers represent a remarkable upsurge in 
the percentage of the Irish-speaking population from 24.5 per cent in 1861 to 41.9 
per cent in 2006.’ Further, ‘in terms of status and the legal framework guaranteeing 
it… few languages rival Irish.’ If we focus upon the status dimension and policy 
pronouncements and read census statistics selectively, then Irish bucks the 
general trend of minority languages losing or forfeiting their ethno-linguistic vitality. 
In these respects, Irish might be viewed as a touchstone against which to gauge 
the revival or otherwise of, inter alia, the Taiwanese language. 
   At the other extreme, however, there are those who see Irish more in terms of 
tombstone than touchstone. They view efforts to revitalize Irish as failing 
defibrillation for a language suffering a chronic and life-threatening condition. Most 
prominent of these prophets of doom is Reg Hindley, who pulled no punches in 
titling his 1990 volume The Death of the Irish Language: A Qualified Obituary. 
Such commentators base their pessimistic prognoses on analyses of survey data 
among native Irish speakers, and making altogether different sense in how they 
disambiguate census statistics. When attention shifts from the question about how 
many can speak Irish to how many actually do speak it, and with what degree of 
fluency, then an argument that Irish may be in its death throes seems, unlike the 
language itself, to be sustainable. The policies devised and the measures 
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implemented over the last century seem ineffectual and may, in fact, contribute to 
what they were supposedly designed to prevent. The first definitive results of the 
2011 Census were released by the Central Statistics Office earlier this year (March 
2012). The census found that Irish with 82,600 people speaking it daily outside the 
school context is now the third most used language in Ireland, lagging behind 
English and the 120,000 or so who speak Polish at home. Even in the Gaeltacht 
areas, only a third of respondents said they speak Irish on a daily basis outside of 
the education system. Such findings might well temper the enthusiasm of a 
Taiwanese-language activist for the Irish-language model as precedent. 
   Not that surprisingly, the twenty essays that comprise A New View of the Irish 
Language eschew both extremes and give mixed reviews of the contemporary 
state of play. Overall, verdicts tend toward the view that policy and provision with 
respect to the Irish language are not so much ‘cure it all’ as ‘curate’s egg’ (partly 
bad, but with some redeeming features). According to the two editors, ‘the 
contributors tell the story as it is, a glass both half-empty and half-full’ (viii). There’s 
something of the ‘blind men describing an elephant’ about the collection, as each 
essayist views the situation from their own partial perspective, providing their own 
independent storylines and assessments. Thus, Pádraig Ó Riagáin in his piece on 
‘Irish-language Policy 1922–2007: Balancing Maintenance and Revival’ concludes 
that in Ireland there are ‘major problems with both the processes of bilingual 
production and of bilingual reproduction’ (64); Conchúr Ó Giollagáin and Seosamh 
Mac Donnacha, writing on ‘The Gaeltacht Today’, lament that ‘the Gaeltacht as a 
linguistic entity is in crisis and struggling with the pressures of an advanced stage 
of language shift’ (119); Suzanne Romaine‘s thoughtful essay on ‘Irish in the 
Global Context’ acknowledges various declines in the language, but opines that 
‘Irish would certainly be a lot worse off without all the work on its behalf. Most 
threatened languages will not achieve anything like the relative success of Irish’ 
(24). 
   Aidan Doyle adopts a condemnatory tone in his piece on ‘Modern Irish 
Scholarship at Home and Abroad’, suggesting that deficiencies in Irish scholarship 
will not be addressed because ‘it would mean officially acknowledging that the 
teaching of Irish has failed across the whole educational system’ (206). Also in the 
realm of education, Anna Ní Ghallachair is concerned about the questionable 
return on the investment of an average per pupil 1,500 hours of tuition in the Irish 
language over 13 years (192). This point is reiterated and amplified by John Harris 
who argues that ‘the key challenges… [are of] a significant minority of children 
fail[ing] to make worthwhile progress in learning to speak Irish and… a substantial 
long-term decline in standards of proficiency over the last two decades or so’ 
(178). 
   There is a marked contrast of viewpoint depending on whether the vantage point 
is from prose or poetry. In a lyrical essay, Liam Ó Muirthile starkly concludes that 
‘The poem in Irish is in freefall’ and goes on to say that ‘Literacy in the language 
has all but collapsed… since 1968’ (150). Caoilfhionn Nic Pháidín, whose topic is 
‘Corpus Planning for Irish – Dictionaries and Terminology’ similarly regrets the 
‘decline in written standards’ and reckons that ‘the sustainability of any meaningful 
literacy is now in question’ (94). In marked contrast, Máirín Nic Eoin, in writing of 
‘Prose Writing in Irish Today,’ is considerably more upbeat:  ‘The sheer volume of 
prose works published in recent years is in itself remarkable…’ (131) ‘Popular 
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fiction in Irish today is cool and contemporary…’ (133) ‘Irish-language journalism is 
also healthier than ever…’ (137). Also, ‘there is no indication that the recent 
flowering of literacy activity in Irish is going to cease…’ (138). Lillis Ó Laoire, in her 
essay, suggests that ‘the current situation of music and language in Irish is a 
moderately healthy one’ (130), a prognosis midway between those for prose and 
poetry. 
   If the previous three paragraphs feel rather discursive (in the sense of running off 
in different directions) then, in miniature, this is what the book felt like to me, too. 
The essays are on twenty different topics. Each has its merits, and there are some 
tasty morsels in this smorgasbord of a book. Given the wide array of topics, it is 
inevitable that some essays will appeal to some readers more than others. In their 
brief foreword, the two editors tell us that ‘we adopted the title of A New View in 
honour of the ground-breaking View of the Irish Language (1969)… edited by Brian 
Ó Cuív’ (vii). There is something rather quirky about this claim. Only two authors 
make any substantive reference to the earlier work. And, given the way in which 
each essayist develops his or her own narrative, like ‘the blind men and the 
elephant’, the point seems to be that there is no singular viewpoint. Why, then, A 
New View? The viewpoints are multiple, and there has been no attempt to 
orchestrate or review – or, indeed, allocate a structure to – the score of essays. 
The whole is not more than the sum of its parts, consequently. I am not suggesting 
that the essays be shoehorned into consensual convergence, but a critical meta-
view or theorized guidance as to how the multiplicity of perspectives might be 
synthesized to allow a more comprehensive view of the ‘elephant’ would have 
been appreciated. The foreword is a mere four pages, rather anodyne in tone, and 
seems to hover over, rather than engage with, the contributions. 
   What is lacking is a concerted and comparative perspective. Each chapter 
stands aloof from the others, and the findings of one essay are not compared with 
those of the others, whether by the authors or the editors. My reading would have 
benefitted from a directive introduction, and, ideally, a critical reflection on what to 
make of this batch of essays. There was only occasional reference to the situation 
of Irish in Northern Ireland, a comparative perspective that could be fruitful, given 
developments there in the last decade or two. Similarly, Suzanne Romaine’s essay 
aside, there is a dearth of comparative perspective on the situation of minority 
languages elsewhere. A comparative perspective invokes understanding 
relationally, an understanding derived not from looking in depth at the thing under 
scrutiny for an essentialist understanding, but from looking laterally at what that 
thing isn’t, what it’s similar to, and how it’s significantly different from. An 
understanding of the Irish language can be enhanced by looking at, for instance, 
how Welsh or Catalan or, indeed, Taiwanese fare in their separate contexts. 
Furthermore, to understand the place of Irish in Ireland it is incumbent upon the 
analyst to research the wider linguistic ecology of the island (and beyond) where 
English (the language which Irish is not) is so dominant, but other languages 
(Polish and French, in particular) have a significant presence. 
   Lastly, on the issue of a comparative perspective, I want to address the editors’ 
opening sentence: ‘This book is the most substantive, dispassionate overview of 
the Irish language by practitioners and scholars, in almost forty years’ (vii). Is its 
substantive stance one that is to be compared to a theoretical perspective, and, for 
that reason, an excuse for not providing an orchestrated overview of the essays? 
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Why stress the dispassionate nature of the volume? Is this because the book’s 
contributors, without exception, ‘speak and write the language fluently and the vast 
majority use it daily in their professional lives’ (ix)? This is hardly a representative 
sampling, in that case, of the fast-dissolving communities of Irish-speakers. Should 
a dispassionate view not include the views of English monoglots and others who 
are not passionate about learning Irish? Ciarán Mac Murchaidh, in his essay on 
‘Current Attitudes to Irish’, gives a flavour of such a counter-position, when he 
quotes a 16 year-old school student. She stated: 
 
Ireland is not bilingual, and if it ever will be, the second language will be Chinese or 
Polish, not Gaeilge… In fact I don’t think that Irish is alive any more… Nothing 
irritates me more than all of these great government initiatives to keep Irish alive… 
foisting the responsibility for upholding a decayed language on us simply isn’t fair. 
(215) 
 
More such qualitative (quasi-ethnographic?) materials might provide a worthwhile 
antidote to the quantitative approaches for which Romaine has tailored the epithet 
‘Irish By The Numbers’. 
   The Irish government has claimed that Irish is the ‘oldest spoken literary 
language in Europe’ (24). Ruairí Ó hUiginn, in his essay on ‘The Irish Language’ 
which opens the volume, tells us that ‘it has been postulated that the first speakers 
of Celtic language came to Ireland around 500 BC’ (3), and that from ‘the late sixth 
century onwards we have copious written materials in the native vernacular’ (4). 
Till the seventeenth century, Irish was the language of the vast majority of the 
people of the island, but over the next two centuries the establishment of an 
English administration and the Plantation of English-speaking settlers led to a 
marked decline in the proportion of the population speaking Irish. Ó Tuathaigh 
judges that ‘approaching the end to the 19c, Irish as a living language seemed 
doomed to extinction within a relatively short interval.’ (26) Also, ‘by the early 20c 
Irish was spoken by less than one in five of the population: its heartland was 
overwhelmingly in the western periphery, its core-base, of agricultural smallholders 
and fishing families, an economically depressed and vulnerable community, 
experiencing heavy emigration’ (27) – a scenario which is a close match for 
contemporary Taiwan. This is the unpromising situation which the Gaelic League 
and then the newly formed Irish state inherited and sought to address through the 
twentieth century. A hundred years ago – indeed, as far back as 150 years ago – 
Irish was a language on the wane. There are precious few examples globally of the 
successful resuscitation of a language ‘making a comeback’. Suzanne Romaine’s 
essay on ‘Irish in the Global Context’ is, in my opinion, the keynote address of the 
volume. Her verdict is that, when viewed in a comparative perspective, what has 
been achieved with the maintenance and revival of Irish, despite definite 
shortcomings, is ‘hardly failure’ (24). 
   Pádraig Ó Riagáin starts his essay on Irish-language policy with the view that 
‘there has always been a good deal of confusion about the ultimate objective of 
Ireland’s Irish-language policy’ (55), particularly whether it is the ‘displacement of 
English by Irish’ or the setting up a ‘bilingual state’. He convincingly demonstrates 
that  
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from an international perspective, the bilingual policy pursued by the Irish state... 
contain[s] two key objectives. The first was the maintenance of Irish as the spoken 
language in the Gaeltacht areas where it was still the community language… [while] 
elsewhere the objective was the revival of Irish… In this region, the bilingual policy 
was not, therefore, one designed to meet the needs of an already existing bilingual 
community, but rather it sought to create one. This feature gave a unique character to 
Irish-language policy. (56) 
 
The state did not, and has not, lived up to its own aspirations, but then, perhaps, it 
was always a goal too far. Even in the Gaeltacht, the numbers speaking Irish in the 
home or community or with their peers have diminished to such an extent that the 
language is no longer being viably reproduced outside the educational context. 
There are some notable achievements, as Breandán Delap notes, in the 
establishment of Irish-language radio and television, and other authors allude to 
the propitious utilization by (green?) grassroots groupings of new media forms in a 
bid to create virtual communities of Irish-language adherents. Some of the failings 
certainly seem to be iatrogenic in character – the outcome of governmental 
policies themselves. As Ó Tuathaigh affirms, ‘the state’s revivalist commitment 
was most aggressive in the education system’ (29). Schooling carried an 
inordinate weight, and too heavy a load, to be able to ‘compensate for society’ (to 
use the phrasing of the pedagogical theorist Basil Bernstein). There are interesting 
and promising developments with the relatively recent growth of Irish-language 
medium schools (outside the Gaeltacht) giving some propulsion to the production 
of Irish-language speakers (and listeners and TV-viewers) through education. 
There is still a widespread attitude, tied up with a key sense of identity, that ‘Irish is 
good for you’, or, rather, that it is good for the next generation to have a taste of it. 
   The Irish state’s effort over the last century to revive the Irish language through 
the vehicle of education when viewed in terms of its own aspirational targets – 
rather than in comparative terms – are (pace Romaine) hardly successful. If a 
Taiwanese-language activist is to find an example of a minority language being 
revived through educational enforcement (though not through educational 
enforcement alone) to become both the official language and the language 
reproduced through the home as well as produced through the school, then he or 
she might consider the situation closer to home, where, since the late 1940s, the 
KMT (Nationalist) regime could be regarded as having successfully revived what 
was then a minority language, and the third language of Taiwan (behind 
Taiwanese and Japanese), guoyu (Mandarin Chinese). 
 
Mr Stuart Thompson is a member of the Advisory Committee of the LSE Taiwan 
Research Programme. Address for correspondence: Taiwan Research 
Programme, Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics, Houghton 
Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK. 
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In the Limelight and Under the Microscope: Forms and Functions of Female 
Celebrity, edited by Diane Negra and Su Holmes, London: Continuum, 2011, 
352 pp., £19:99 paperback, ISBN 978-0-8264-3855-3 
 
The meaning and significance of celebrity in the modern world is a topic of 
burgeoning debate and critical engagement: aspects that particularly provoke 
vocal – and often scornful – reactions are the ‘celebritization’ of news and politics, 
and the ascription of fame to ordinary individuals who have become (and maintain 
being) ‘famous for being famous’ rather than because of special achievement or 
exceptional ability in a particular career path. This is, therefore, just the right 
moment for increased academic interest in popular fame. The journal Celebrity 
Studies was founded in 2010 (by one of the co-editors of the volume under 
review), and the international and cross-cultural relevance of the subject was 
demonstrated in the same year with the publication of Celebrity in China (co-edited 
by Louise Edwards and Elaine Jeffreys, and published by the Hong Kong 
University Press). The achievement of In the Limelight is to relate celebrity studies 
to critical gender studies, drawing on case-studies from the UK and the USA. 
   The book’s juxtapositions show that the fame of female celebrities has been 
deployed in a variety of ways, and ascribed meanings that are either exemplary or 
cautionary. In the former category, the late Hollywood actress Hedy Lamarr has 
found new posthumous fame as a role-model for girls interested in technology, 
based on her war-time invention of a Secret Communications System. In the latter, 
we have female stars whose private lives (and, in some cases, professional 
performances) have collapsed into ‘train-wreck’ chaos: ‘One reason why stories of 
professionally accomplished/personally troubled female celebrities circulate so 
actively is that when women struggle or fail, their actions are seen to constitute 
‘proof’ that for women the ‘work–life balance’ is really an impossible one’ (2). Of 
course, there is also media fascination with troubled behaviour by male stars, but 
scandals ‘characteristically (though not inevitably) fortify conventional 
understandings of gender, age, class, sexuality, and race/ethnicity’ (3). Hedonistic 
excess by male stars is read as an expression of ‘essential’ masculinity’ (203); by 
contrast, the singer Britney Spears is abused by sections of the public in 
sexualized terms (‘whore’, 320) for her perceived failings as a performer and as a 
mother. One article argues that Spears’ image ‘came to represent a larger threat to 
the structuring principles of American national identity’ (330), and that ‘as a target 
for misplaced public hostility’ (329) she served as distraction from critical scrutiny 
of George W. Bush during setbacks in the Iraq war. 
   The subjects of In the Limelight range from Lily Langtry (a former royal mistress 
who became a stage actress in the late nineteenth-century) to the singer MIA; the 
book is organized roughly chronologically, and there are no wider thematic 
groupings of chapters. Singing and acting remain the most active sites for the 
generation celebrity status; there is a chapter on Mia Farrow in the context of the 
social changes of the 1960s, and an analysis of the ‘cool postfeminist’ aesthetic of 
Sofia Coppola. In the case of MIA, the essay charts how the contemporary Sri 
Lankan-born British rapper has transitioned her politically controversial public 
persona into the American mainstream. 
   However, other forms of celebrity are also given consideration. A chapter on 
Helen Keller discusses how she used public fascination with her physical 
disabilities to promote political causes, while an essay on the television presenters 
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Suze Orman and Rachel Maddow explores how their public presentation of their 
lesbian sexualities relies on ‘homonormative, postfeminist, and neoliberal 
conventions’ (253). Another chapter draws attention to Ruth Synder, who can be 
fairly described as a ‘celebrity “murderess”’ (66), and whose execution by electric 
chair in 1928 provided newspapers with a dramatic (surreptitiously taken) front-
page photograph. Other essays take a thematic approach: there are chapters on 
the older actress as a ‘grotesque’, on discourses of mental distress in the memoirs 
of British female celebrities in the context of 1990s ‘pop-feminism’, and on the 
meanings of the ‘2007 “flashing” fad among young female celebrities in Hollywood’ 
(224). The reception and consumption of celebrity culture are also given their due, 
as well as the meaning of the desire for fame. 
   In the case of Langtry, the chapter author notes that her success, and public 
criticism of it, show that ‘the concerns of our mid-Victorian ancestors remain – in 
many ways – peculiarly familiar today’ (35). However, while the analysis here is 
solid and convincing, it does not surprise. Similarly, it is unremarkable to observe 
that the media generation of high-profile women criminals in the 1920s ‘threatened 
many long-held stereotypes about the female subject’ (78). However, some 
chapters urge us to reconsider commonplace assumptions about fame. An 
empirical study of young women on performing arts courses argues that ‘the image 
of young female “wannabe” has psycho-pathological undertones, where girls’ 
desires to become celebrities are read as deluded fantasies in need of correction. 
These debates do not capture the complexity of young women’s relationship with 
contemporary celebrity’ (150). Similarly, it would be easy to regard the 
performances of older female actresses in grotesque roles (most memorably, Bette 
Davis in the film Whatever Happened to Baby Jane?) as ‘self-travesty or feminist 
false consciousness’, but such roles in fact allow actresses ‘to dramatize the 
problems of female celebrity’ and to ‘display their talents as performers’ (107). 
   The relationship between celebrity and postfeminism underpins much of the 
book’s analysis; several essays draw on Angela McRobbie’s work on postfeminism 
and popular culture, and postfeminism is the most extensively indexed theoretical 
term in the book. Postfeminism is interrelated with pop-feminism, which marked 
‘the popularization and commodification of seemingly feminist sentiments 
regarding the empowerment… of young women in the West’ (200). In 1990s 
Britain, this pop-feminism was most memorably enacted in the way the Spice Girls 
pop group was marketed as representing ‘Girl Power’. The ‘playful sexuality’ of the 
group was set against more traditional (and, many would argue, more substantive) 
forms of feminism, which was undermined and even sometimes explicitly 
repudiated in dismissively clichéd terms: ‘bar-burning lesbians’, in the words of 
group member Geri Halliwell. A few years later, memoirs by Halliwell and other 
members of her milieu have tended to ‘self-pathologize’ their pasts, with accounts 
of eating disorders and addiction formulated as ‘penitent tales of “unfeminine” sin 
and “feminine” regret’ (221). Contemporary female celebrity can thus be situated in 
relation to a ‘postfeminist backlash’. Postfeminism is also used to describe Sofia 
Coppola, whose ‘girlish’ persona ‘dismantles and diffuses the potential threat of 
her status as a female director-as-star’ (196). 
   This is part of a wider debate about ‘Girl Power’, which has been discussed in 
relation to Taiwan by Fran Martin. Martin draws on the analysis of Catherine 
Driscoll, who sees ‘Girl Power’ as a potentially positive formulation that is 
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sometimes devalued because of its mainstream positioning. Martin, in her essay 
‘Feminist Girls, Lesbian Comrades’ (in Jennifer Helgren and Colleen Vasconcellos, 
Girlhood: a Global History, 2010, and based in part on earlier articles), discusses 
the Mandopop singer Sandee Chan in the context of ‘Spice Girls fever across the 
East Asian region’ (91). She notes that ‘the rise of girl rock in Taiwan is inherently 
linked to transnational cultural flows and the globalization of musical girl cultures. 
One particularly interesting way in which this happens is in the local reworking of 
globalizing discourses of pop feminism and “girl power”’ (90). 
   In the Limelight demonstrates the creative potential of critical gender studies in 
relation to celebrity studies. Read in conjunction with Martin’s essay, we can 
glimpse how the fields of enquiry which the book opens up might be applied 
fruitfully to East Asia in general, and to Taiwan in particular. 
 
Dr R.E. Bartholomew is the managing editor of Taiwan in Comparative 
Perspective. Address for correspondence: Taiwan Research Programme, Asia 
Research Centre, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 
2AE, UK. 
 
 
Gender, Ireland, and Cultural Change: Race, Sex and Nation, by Gerardine 
Meaney, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, 252pp., £33.99 paperback, ISBN 978-0-
4158-9647-4 
 
Gerardine Meaney over the last decade has worked on uncovering and 
challenging patriarchal discourses in Irish national identity and culture and, indeed, 
in Irish Studies. Her book Gender, Ireland, and Cultural Change is a theoretically-
sophisticated collection of essays that explore changing constructions of Ireland, 
focusing on ‘cultural processes and social movements that have impacted on the 
most intimate experiences and the most deeply held senses of identity’ (xvii). The 
book’s themes are developed through an analysis of canonical and lesser-known 
literature, as well as films, television dramas, and documentaries. Meaney uses 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, feminism and post-colonial theory as overlapping, 
though hardly frictionless, interpretative frameworks to examine how patriarchy 
and xenophobia helped to form, and remain embedded within, Ireland’s post-
colonial identity. She also draws attention to ‘manifestations of the official 
gendering of Irish national identity and of resistance to those official identities’ 
(xviii), and she is critical of how post-colonial studies has been applied to Ireland. 
   Meaney’s work shows how the study of nationalism in Taiwan and in Taiwan 
Studies could benefit from the three strands of her approach. While there are some 
critiques of nationalism in Taiwan from a post-colonial perspective, psychoanalytic 
and feminist critiques of nationalism in Taiwan are largely undeveloped. One of the 
few studies analysing feeling is Horng-Luen Wang’s essay ‘Ressentiment in 
Modern Communities: Some Preliminary Reflections on Taiwan’s Experience’ 
(2004), which draws on Nietzsche’s term ressentiment to interpret in a general 
psychological way Taiwan’s attitude towards China and international society.  
   One example of a post-colonial critique of Taiwan’s nationalism is Mark 
Harrison’s Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese 
Identity (2006). Harrison’s intervention in debates about national identity in Taiwan 
begin with a critique of the European liberal assumptions which have underpinned 
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national movements in Taiwan (and Ireland); namely, the assumption that a nation 
is the natural expression of an ethnos, the basic unity of identity as expressed 
through a distinct language, culture, literature and so forth. Drawing on post-
colonial and post-structuralist theory, Harrison argues that Taiwan is not a given 
(national) fact but has, rather, been brought constantly into existence by naming 
practices – Formosa, Republic of China, Chinese Taipei, Taiwan – that imply 
competing fields of values, facts and so forth through which the island has been 
made available for description and analysis. In short, for Harrison identity is always 
a fabrication in the making and what needs to be studied are the processes 
through which identity-making is authorized.  
   One passage in Meaney’s book has particular resonance for Harrison’s 
approach to Taiwan, where she observes that ‘the danger to the postcolonial 
critique now in Ireland is that it will be co-opted to a discourse of the authentic and 
native, sometimes called shared history’ (16). This is arguably what occurred when 
the KMT replaced Japan as the rulers of Taiwan, and then again when the KMT’s 
imposition of a Chinese identity gave way to an essentialized ‘Taiwanese’ identity. 
As Meaney notes, ‘the inevitability of the process whereby new nation-states 
operate in remarkably similar ways to their imperial predecessors from the point 
where they acquire armies, borders and institutions limits the liberationary potential 
of even the most utopian nationalisms’ (143). 
   Meaney’s essays are grouped into three parts: ‘Race, Women, and Nation’; 
‘Writing, Bodies, Canons’; and ‘Race, Masculinity, and Popular Culture’. The 
book’s gender perspective in particular, could be used to re-examine the 
construction of Taiwan’s nationalisms and to challenge patriarchal nationalist 
discourses. Feminist critiques in Taiwan did not emerge until the late 1980s, when 
they began to explore male domination and gender inequalities in the contexts of 
the family and workplace in terms of biological essentialism. These critiques have 
since the 2000s moved on to the notion of gender as a cultural construction, re-
examining gender subjectivities and domination as a systematic property of socio-
cultural production as a whole (Sangren 2009). However, very few feminist 
scholars on Taiwan have extended their work, like Meaney, to issues of national 
subjectivities; one exception is Fang-Mei Lin’s ‘Women’s Organizations and the 
Changing State/Society Relationship: Resistance, Co-option by the State, or 
Partnership?’ (2008), although Lin’s paper is concerned primarily with whether it is 
possible for feminist advocacy organizations to forge a new governmentality linking 
the state and feminist subjectivities. Lin also edited a special issue of Concentric: 
Literary and Cultural Studies entitled ‘Transnational Taiwan’ (2010), in which she 
argued that in order to 
 
construct a Taiwan(ese) national identity or subjectivity, one must negotiate with and 
among a range of complex factors. These include not only history, colonialism and 
geopolitics but also inter-textuality, cross- or intra-cultural translation and the 
narrative arts of cinema and the novel. (3) 
 
However, feminist critiques have left nationalisms and nationalist narrations in 
Taiwan largely un-gendered.  
   Meaney’s first chapter can be seen as laying out a feminist analytical framework 
for the whole volume, and her approach could also be applied specifically to 
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Taiwan. She begins by quoting Anne McClintock: ‘all nationalisms are gendered’ 
(quoted on page 1), and later draws on McClintock’s observation that: ‘Excluded 
from direct action as national citizens, women are subsumed symbolically into the 
national body politic as its boundary and metaphoric limit’ (quoted on page 4). 
Meaney further develops this gendering approach into the context of ‘Virgin Mother 
Ireland’, arguing that: 
 
the centrality of Mariology in Irish Catholicism and the extent to which issues of 
reproduction and sexuality dominated public debates and anxieties around 
modernization while sharing many of the general characteristics of the gendering of 
national identity… are in the Irish case also powerfully linked to residual anxieties 
around race and Ireland’s postcolonial position as a white European nation. (6) 
 
As such, the emerging field of ‘feminisms and nationalisms’ in Irish Studies could 
offer a new direction for Taiwan Studies, exploring the extent to which gender (and 
race/ethnicity) constitutes a fundamental structuring principle in the construction of 
a common (shared) national identity and subjectivity, and in making the distinction 
between the colonized self and the colonizer other; in Shelley Feldman’s words, 
with ‘women as symbol, men as agents of the nation, colonized space as feminine, 
colonial power as masculine’ (quoted on page 1). 
   Among the topics of the first part of Meaney’s book is an examination, and 
critique, of the ‘imposition of a very definite feminine identity as guarantor of the 
precarious masculinity of the new state’ (5), in which women’s sexuality was 
inscribed in religious imagery and severely socially regulated; she is critical in 
particular of how gendering and racializing strategies are naturalized through the 
figure of the Virgin Mary in Ireland. Meaney regards the decoding of such 
strategies as vital, and she discusses how women’s writing ‘in the margins of the 
national project’ (77) engages with alternative possibilities of nation and state. She 
urges readers to ‘deconstruct the binary of colonizer and colonized, agency and 
victimization, pure and hybrid, and acknowledge the extent to which complex 
processes of accommodation, resistance and opportunism have shaped the 
concept of “Irishness”’ (7). She further argues that by moving beyond 
representations of Ireland as a feminine land and landscape, ‘the national body 
could no longer be a body to be possessed, but to be lived in’ (77). Feminists in 
Irish Studies are now working to effect a different kind of nation-state, and Meaney 
indicates that: 
 
Yet it remains important to understand the basis of the affiliations between women 
and nationalism, which historically has publicly operated in situations of national 
crisis…It is equally important to be aware of and challenge the sacrificial logic that 
structured that affiliation. (77) 
 
   By contrast, very few scholars of Taiwan’s literature have brought gender 
perspectives into their analyses of national narratives; one exception is Chia-Ling 
Mei’s ‘Gender Discourse and the Development of Post-war Fiction in Taiwan’ 
(2003), which focuses on the symbolic imaginaries among the nation, the family 
and gender. However, although literature scholars in Taiwan have begun to touch 
on gender and nationalisms, their analyses, unlike Meaney’s, approach the 
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development of national imaginaries and nationalist narrations largely uncritically. 
Despite this significant gap, though, there are new approaches which, although 
they tend not to engage explicitly with critiques of Taiwan’s nationalisms, go 
around the subject of nationalism by exploring Taiwanese women’s subjectivities in 
relation to transnationalism; one example is Kuei-Fen Chiu’s ‘Documentary Power: 
Women Documentary Filmmakers and New Subjectivities in Contemporary 
Taiwan’ (2012).  
   Meaney’s first essay of the second part further develops the theme of gendering 
writing, through seeking ‘the traces of cultural, political and social agitation 
excluded from existing histories of Ireland between 1922 and 1960’ in ‘the “minor” 
fiction of the time’ (120). Of course, the censorship and cultural pressure 
experienced by Irish writers was less extreme than the contemporaneous military 
rule in Taiwan, but that does not necessarily mean that dissent or cultural critique 
was impossible (and Meaney’s book also reminds us not to ignore the output of 
exiles and those looking in). Although the second part in particular presents an 
alternative assessment of Ireland’s literary landscape that reaches beyond the 
‘canonical’, James Joyce nevertheless looms large, and a long essay at the heart 
of this part discusses Joyce in relation to modern critical (re)assessments, literary 
responses, and Joyce’s place in Dublin’s heritage industry.  
   A discussion of John Huston’s adaptation of The Dead is fruitfully compared with 
Ousmane Sembène’s Xala, and this juxtaposition between Ireland and post-
colonial Senegal raises the possibility of further comparison with Taiwan: in both 
cases discussed by Meaney (quoting Laura Mulvey on Xala) ‘the question of 
language is at the political centre of the drama’ (148), with characters in both 
stories reproached for a fondness for French (the colonial language in the case of 
Senegal, and of international high culture in turn of the last century Ireland) over 
their own language. Also, in both cases, the main character is not in control of the 
narrative. Meaney points out that national histories and national identities are both 
‘subject to haunting by the excluded, the subjects of expedient amnesia, the 
spectres of change’ (152). She then argues that if Irish nationalists would move 
beyond ‘the fetishized authenticity of the traumatic past’, they need to take on the 
challenge of ‘rearticulation of the boundaries of the sayable’ (152) demanded by 
the haunting ghosts. 
   The final part of the book reminds us that a country’s particular discourses about 
itself are not the only way in which culture is constructed, by looking at ‘Irishness’ 
and Irish masculinity as it appears in American films and in American and British 
television series. The Irish experience and character have become a rich resource 
for exploring American history and culture (Meaney discusses Martin Scorcese’s 
Gangs of New York); in contrast, it is difficult to think of anything comparable in 
relation to Taiwan, which is largely absent as a distinct location in western popular 
entertainment, but perhaps Taiwanese characteristics in the Chinese imaginary –
beyond official pronouncements about the island’s status – is a subject worth 
comparable exploration. 
   Also, Meaney notes that the way that Irish ethnicity is used as a theme in 
American dramas such as Rescue Me and The Wire. In these shows,Irish heroic 
figures tend to be represented as having self-destructive characteristics, ‘with their 
Irishness functioning as a protective distance (they are not quite American heroes)’. 
Flawed Irish Americans in these television series ‘expressed the desire for unity 
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and the terror of disintegration in a divided nation’ (190). While Meaney questions 
this stereotype from her feminist perspective, Taiwan has yet to reflect on 
‘ethnicity’ in any way in its television dramas. Ethnicity, as Meaney observes, ‘is a 
matter of family history’ and that ‘makes the history of immigration personal’(190) 
and intimate. 
   Overall, Ireland and Irish Studies as described in Meaney’s book bear many 
striking similarities with Taiwan and Taiwan Studies. Ireland and Taiwan are both 
made complex ‘by [their] ability to celebrate [their] multiculturalism and 
simultaneously restrict national citizenship on the basis of ethnicity’ (153). Also, 
Irish Studies and Taiwan Studies have both invested heavily in their own 
particularities; ironically, ‘a particularity that seeks exception from the global 
system that produces it’ (20). The search for genuine and authentic native voices 
in Ireland and Taiwan needs to bear in mind Vincent Cheng’s warning, as quoted 
by Meaney, that such a search may ‘serve only to provide us with a feel-good 
liberal and multicultural glow – while in actuality merely recycling tokenism and 
nostalgia’ (15). The issues discussed in Meaney’s book require careful and critical 
re-examination in relation to Taiwan, especially in the contexts of economic turmoil 
and global migrationary flows. Meaney commends Vincent Cheng’s use of James 
Joyce as a resource for the construction of ‘all sorts of cosmopolitan, migrant, 
hyphenated and intercultural identities’(15), in contrast to elements of Irish cultural 
criticism that privilege Joyce’s Irishness. It is an approach that parallels thoughts 
elaborated in this special issue of Taiwan in Comparative Perspective on ‘Taiwan 
and Ireland in Comparative Perspective’. 
 
Dr Fang-Long Shih is Research Fellow at the Asia Research Centre of the London 
School of Economics, and Dr R.E. Bartholomew is the managing editor of Taiwan 
in Comparative Perspective. Address for correspondence: Taiwan Research 
Programme, Asia Research Centre, London School of Economics, Houghton 
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Submission Details 
 
Academic articles 
Articles should contain a comparative perspective in the widest sense. This could mean comparisons 
between Taiwan and other parts of the world, Taiwan in the past and in the present, different regions 
and cultures of Taiwan, or different methodological and disciplinary approaches to the study of a theme 
or issue concerning Taiwan. Articles for inclusion in the Journal should be around 8000 words, and 
should follow the Harvard style of referencing. Manuscripts should begin with an abstract of around 100 
words. 
 
Commentaries 
As well as formal academic work, the Journal is also interested in receiving relevant critical and 
theoretical writing aimed at an educated general readership. Such pieces should engage with a current 
political, socio-cultural, or economic issue, dealt with in a comparative or interdisciplinary perspective: 
for example, comparing Taiwan with another part of the world, Taiwan in the past and the present, 
different regions or cultures of Taiwan, or different theoretical approaches. Commentary articles should 
be around 4000 words, and footnoting should be kept to a minimum. 
 
Review articles 
Review articles should be around 1500–2000 words, and should contain no footnotes. Reviews should 
be of a comparative nature: either comparing a work (e.g. a book, film, or exhibition) on Taiwan with a 
work on another area, or bringing in background knowledge from a different area. Reviews may also be 
written on Taiwan-related material contained within volumes that have a wider scope, such as edited 
volumes with a chapter on Taiwan. The journal also welcomes reviews of older ‘landmark’ texts about 
Taiwan reviewed from a contemporary perspective; for example, a re-appraisal of George Kerr’s 
Formosa Betrayed (1965) four decades on would be suitable. 
 
Making the Submission 
Submission should be made by MS-Word compatible email attachment with a file name based on the 
title of the article to F.Shih@lse.ac.uk. On the cover sheet, please give your full name, institutional 
affiliation (if any), and a brief biographical note of your research interests. Please do not include your 
name on other pages. All manuscripts should be double-spaced. 
 
All submissions that meet the above requirements will be reviewed by two referees. Articles may then 
be accepted subject to revisions being made by the author. 
 
Articles that are finally accepted will be returned to the authors for proof-reading before publication. The 
editors reserve the right to make changes to articles regarding content and length, although any 
substantial alterations will only be made in consultation with the author. 
 
References 
References should follow the Harvard Style. Citations should appear within the text in parentheses, and 
consist of the author’s surname followed by year of publication and, if appropriate, specific page 
numbers – e.g. (Yang 2005) or (Smith and Lin 1999: 74). If there are more than two authors, please 
indicate this as (Lee et al 1978). Where an author has more than one work cited which originated in the 
same year, the dates should be distinguished in the text and bibliography by a letter – e.g. (Hirose 
1987a). Where several references appear consecutively, these should be chronological, or if from the 
same year, alphabetical – e.g. (Perkins 1997; Wu 2003) and (Adams 2003; Pan 2003). 
 
Illustrations and tables should be referred to as Figures and given numbers – e.g. ‘Fig. 1’. They should 
be submitted on a separate sheet with their captions, and the manuscript should indicate where they 
should appear in the text. 
 
Transliteration 
Articles are permitted to contain Chinese characters, although the complete form is preferred. Pinyin is 
also preferred, except for proper names. 
 
Environmental Statement 
LSE is committed to addressing environmental issues, and Taiwan in Comparative Perspective is 
presented in electronic form rather than paper in order to minimize the environmental impact and 
‘carbon footprint’ of our publishing activities. 
 
 
Please address any enquiries to the editor, Dr Fang-Long Shih, at F.Shih@lse.ac.uk. Enquiries by post 
should be sent to the Taiwan Research Programme, Asia Research Centre, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE. 
  
 
 
